




LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE  
OF  
SIR BARTLE FRERE.









Mr. Padamjee of Poona, Photo.

Walker & Poutall Photo

*Sir Bartle Frere.*  
(1867)

THE  
LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE  
OF THE RIGHT HON.  
SIR BARTLE FRERE,  
BART., G.C.B., F.R.S., ETC.

By JOHN MARTINEAU.

Τὸ εὐθές, οὐ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει.  
THUCYDIDES, iii. 83.

*IN TWO VOLUMES.*  
VOL. II.

SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:  
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.  
1895.

**LONDON :**

**PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,  
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.**

# CONTENTS OF VOL. II.



## CHAPTER XIV.

### THE BOMBAY COMMERCIAL CRISIS. ' PAGE

Plethora of money—Back-Bay scheme—Rise of prices—Speculation — Time-bargains — Commercial crisis — Bank of Bombay—Its failure—Grumblers—Frere appointed Member of Indian Council—Leaves India ... ..	I
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---

## CHAPTER XV.

### THE INDIAN COUNCIL.

Settles in London—Abyssinian Expedition—Sanitary Department for India—Army Control Committee—Lord Mayo—The Geographical Society—The Bengal Famine—Discouragement of Sind Frontier soldiers ... ..	35
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

## CHAPTER XVI.

### THE ZANZIBAR MISSION.

East African Slave-trade—Frere goes to Paris—Rome—Naples—Cairo—Interview with the Khedive—Zanzibar—Burghash obdurate— <i>Enchantress</i> sails to the South—Majunga—The Hovas—Johanna—Incident at Kilwa—Return to Zanzibar—Departure — Frere's parting shot — Muscat — Return to England — Burghash signs the Treaty — He comes to England—Death of Livingstone—Essay on Indian Missions	65
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

## CHAPTER XVII.

## THE PRINCE OF WALES IN INDIA.

	PAGE
Preparations for the tour—Presents—Special correspondents— Athens—Egypt — Bombay—Baroda — Ceylon—Calcutta— Peshawur—Policy towards the Ameer—Return to England —Proclamation of Empress of India—Correspondence with Lord Lytton       ...       ...       ...       ...       ...       ...       ...	125

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## THE CAPE.

Appointed to the Cape—Arrival at Capetown—President Burgers—Defencelessness of Capetown—Retrospect—Dis- integration and Confederation—Condition of the Transvaal Republic—Its annexation—Damaraland and Namaqualand —Eastern and Western Colonists—Frere goes to King William's Town—The Galekas attack the Fingoes—Out- break of War—Confidence restored—The Gaikas rebel— Conduct of the Ministry—Frere dismisses them—Mr. Gordon Sprigg forms a Ministry—The war ended—School Kaffirs—Meeting of the Legislature       ...       ...       ...       ...	161
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XIX.

## THE ZULU WAR.

Native combination—The Zulus—Cetywayo's installation— Slaughter of girls—Daily victims—Frere goes to Natal— The disputed territory—Cetywayo's threatening attitude— The Ultimatum—Reinforcements asked for—Confidence of British Staff Officers—Isandhlwana—Panic—Piet Uys— Frere's journey to the Transvaal—The Boer Camp—The Memorial—Shepstone as an administrator—The Camp breaks up—Censure of Frere—His unpopularity in England and popularity at the Cape       ...       ...       ...       ...       ...	223
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XX.

## SUPERSESSION AND RECALL.

	PAGE
The High Commissionership divided—Sir Garnet Wolseley— Ulundi—Cetywayo a prisoner—Basutoland and Pondoland —The Zulu Kinglets—Missionaries—Sir Garnet Wolseley in the Transvaal—Secocoeni taken—Special correspondents —Colonial defence—Sir George Colley succeeds Sir Garnet Wolseley—Dutch feeling—The Midlothian speeches—Mr. Gladstone in office—South African policy unchanged—The Aborigines Protection Society—The Basuto disarmament— Confederation postponed—Attacks on Frere—The “Unity of the Party”—Frere’s salary—His recall—General indig- nation—Loyalty of Colonists ... ..	337

## CHAPTER XXI.

## THE BREACH OF FAITH.

The Boer Emissaries at Capetown—Outbreak of the Rebellion— Aylward — The Surrender — Sufferings of Loyalists — Bechuanaland—Zululand—Cetywayo restored—Frere policy in South Africa ... ..	406
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XXII.

## THE RECALLED GOVERNOR.

Frere lands at Southampton—Visits the Queen and the Prince of Wales in Scotland—Correspondence with Mr. Gladstone —The occupation of Candahar—The Ilbert Bill—Irish Police —Gordon—Press attacks—Last illness and death ... ..	433
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----



## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.



			PAGE
SIR BARTLE FRERE, 1867.	<i>From a photograph</i>		
<i>by Mr. Padamjee</i>	...	...	<i>Frontispiece</i>
ITALIAN SKETCHES.	<i>By Sir B. Frere</i>	...	<i>To face 34, 36</i>
ROUTE MAP OF SIR BARTLE FRERE'S ZANZI-			
BAR MISSION, JANUARY TO APRIL, 1873	...	„	88
SKETCH MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA IN 1878	...	...	<i>At End</i>

# THE LIFE OF SIR BARTLE FRERE.



## CHAPTER XIV.

### THE BOMBAY COMMERCIAL CRISIS.

Plethora of money—Back-Bay scheme—Rise of prices—Speculation—  
Time-bargains—Commercial crisis—Bank of Bombay—Its failure  
—Grumblers—Frere appointed Member of Indian Council—  
Leaves India.

As the American Civil War continued, the demand for cotton and the rise in its price were fully maintained. In 1862, cultivators near Ahmedabad had been seen by a correspondent of Frere's ploughing down grain crops a foot high in their haste to sow cotton.\* The value of the cotton exported from the Bombay Presidency had risen from less than seven millions in 1860-61 to more than thirty-one millions in 1864-65. Large and unprecedented profits were being made by the cultivators, by the Bombay merchants, and by all classes of traders and labourers. In the country districts part of the sudden accretion of wealth was being hoarded or converted into silver ornaments by the ryots. In Bombay large sums were given by rich native merchants

\* Frere to Sir Charles Wood, October 11, 1862.

for various public objects. At a meeting to raise subscriptions for the relief of the Lancashire operatives three native firms put down £2,500 each.\* A native merchant gave £10,000 to found a fellowship for the encouragement of superior education amongst the natives; another, £17,500 to found the "Canning" fellowship with a like object; another (a Jew), £15,000 for building and endowing a hospital at Poona; another, £15,000 for promoting the education of natives in the fine arts; and another, Premchund Roychund, of whom more hereafter, gave £40,000 for a University Library and a clock-tower.

But these and many other such public gifts were only drops out of the stream. The influx of wealth was so large and sudden that the native capitalists of Bombay, more excitable and more sanguine than Europeans—though perhaps more forbearing to one another in times of pressure—seemed to lose their heads, and engaged in the most reckless speculation. Great as was the supply of capital, the demand for it was even greater. Money was lent for a year certain at eighteen per cent. by a rich Parsee banker, not to needy men, but to men of large property, who sent every rupee they could collect into remote cotton districts, to purchase cotton at rates which would probably give them thirty or forty per cent. profit in six months. Land rose to an extravagant price. The site of the gun-carriage manufactory at Colaba, a suburb of Bombay, being offered for sale, a tender of fourteen lakhs (£140,000) was made for it, early in 1864, which the Collector strongly recommended Government to accept. They did not, however, do so, and the following year a *bonâ fide* offer of seventy-five lakhs (£750,000) was made, with an offer of immediate payment, though the land was not to be delivered to the purchaser for two years.

\* Frere to Sir Charles Wood, September 26, 1862.

The demand for land was such that, not to mention smaller schemes, no less than fourteen were started with nominal capitals ranging from a hundred thousand pounds to a couple of millions, for the purpose of obtaining concessions of foreshore, etc., for reclaiming land for building and for harbour works in the island of Bombay and its immediate neighbourhood.

Sir Charles Wood wrote—

“February 17, 1865.

“With regard to all the schemes for investing your plethora of capital, there is nothing for it but to let them have their swing, directing them as far as you can into an advantageous course for public considerations.”

Frere had not waited to be told this. At his instance a Commission had been appointed, presided over by Mr. (afterwards Sir Barrow) Ellis, probably the highest authority in finance then in the Presidency, before which the promoters of each scheme were required to produce their plans and estimates, and evidence of their means of carrying them out to the satisfaction of the Government. The Commission tested them very much as a Parliamentary Committee would have done. The result was that not one of the fourteen schemes obtained the desired concession.

The Back Bay Reclamation Scheme, which afterwards obtained such notoriety, had its origin in the need of the Bombay and Baroda Railway of a site for a terminus on the harbour.

The requirements of an Indian terminal railway station are much greater, in respect of space, than a European one. Unlike the latter, which can get its stores at intermediate stations, an Indian railway generally procures its coal, iron, and even timber, by sea, and large depôts of these have to be provided for at the sea terminus. At Bombay one hundred and eight acres was the space considered necessary

for the terminus of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway. At Kotree, on the Indus, where the line from Kurrachee then ended, no less than twelve miles of siding were found to be required for loading and unloading from the boats on the Indus at the different heights which the river attained at different times of the year.

In a letter to Sir Charles Wood, Frere says—

“ November 8, 1864.

“ To work an equal bulk of traffic, Indian railways require at least three, or perhaps four, times the space that is needed for English traffic. Two English porters, a carter, his cart and two horses, such as you see at Euston Square Station, would beat half a dozen Bombay coolies, four bullock carts with eight bullocks and four drivers, and would require less than one-third the space we require to work a given traffic bulk for bulk. Again . . . here in the tropics much more space and air must be allowed, so that man for man you must give more room. . . . An Indian terminal station has to accommodate the greater part of the whole traffic of the line, and a very large proportion of it is thrown on a few months of the dry season.”

The original proposal, made by Sir George Clerk when Governor of Bombay, had been to give the Bombay and Baroda Railway a concession of the shallow waters of Back-Bay, which had been converted by the inhabitants of the adjacent undrained native town into a noisome and pestilential foreshore,\* on the sole condition of their constructing their railway across it at an estimated cost of about £90,000. This outlay would have been more than covered by the sale of the land reclaimed between the railway embankment and the high-water mark. The Home Govern-

\* These shallow foreshores were the sources of much disease—malaria, typhoid, cholera, and dysentery. Frere says, in an India Office Minute of August 10, 1867, “ I speak deliberately when I say that hundreds of lives are at present annually lost owing to causes which will be entirely removed by the reclamation of Moody-Bay, of which the portion now in question is the worse part.”

ment, however, objected to this being done by the railway with their guaranteed capital, and the concession was given to a Company of Bombay merchants.\* The agreement was that the Back Bay Reclamation Company, after reclaiming from the sea and making over to the Government the land required for the railway and other public purposes, should make its profit out of the rest of the reclaimed land.

The shares immediately rose to a high premium.

Frere writes to Sir Charles Wood :—

“ May 13, 1864.

“ I am told that applications for shares in the Back Bay Reclamation Scheme have already been made to the amount of eight millions sterling—nearly double the capital likely to be required—and expectants of shares have sold their expectations at cent. per cent. premium, and this in a scheme where there is as yet no Company and no shares, where there can be no dividend for three or four years, and in which calls must be paid without return in the interim. Much of this is, of course, mere gambling, like the cotton time-bargains, the settlement of which for the season has kept Bombay in an uproar for the last week ; but there is a real plethora of capital.”

And again—

“ July 8, 1864.

“ I have no doubt the reclamation will be a very profitable work, but that it can ever realize profits at all proportionate to the enormous premium paid by applicants for shares, I much doubt ; some of the shareholders will be much disappointed in the not improbable event of their having to pay heavy calls, and wait two or three years for a dividend.”

Under the scheme as proposed, the Bombay Government

\* “ I cannot sanction any expenditure ” (runs the Secretary of State's Despatch) “ out of the guaranteed capital of the country on such an object. If it be indispensable that land should be reclaimed for purposes of the railway, the reclamation must be effected by Government, who will then have at their disposal the whole of the land reclaimed except what it may be necessary to make over to the railway.”—Despatch No. 20, May 14, 1864.

was to be allotted four hundred shares of £500 each, and to have a proportionate control over the management of the Company. To this the consent of the Government of India was requisite. Sir John Lawrence approved, but he was outvoted by his Council, with whom Sir Charles Wood concurred, and leave was refused. The Company, therefore, was left without any Government participation or control. The four hundred shares which had been reserved for and declined by Government, were put up for sale by auction amid great excitement and fetched the enormous sum of a million and sixty thousand pounds, £2,650 being paid for each £500 share.

Subsequent experience showed that the sum realized by this sale was more than three times what was needed to execute the whole of the proposed work of reclamation required for the railway, and that the Company might have secured much valuable reclaimed land without making any further calls on the shareholders. The work was proceeded with, and the most difficult part of it had been accomplished, when the mercantile panic, consequent on the peace in America and the fall in the price of cotton, occurred. Even then, though much of the money had been lost through the failure of the Asiatic Bank, ample capital remained to complete it. But the pressure for money at that time had become so great that a majority of the shareholders prevailed, in spite of the protest of the minority, to wind up the Company and divide the balance in hand; and the land and works were abandoned to the Government, who subsequently completed the reclamation to an extent sufficient for the purposes of the railway, at a cost much less than would have been incurred in providing land for that purpose in any other way.

Frere greatly regretted the exclusion of the Government from participation in the Company, not only because it

might have enabled some salutary check to have been exercised over the share-jobbing which took place, and have prevented the winding-up of the Company, but much more because the excitement caused by the public sale of the reserved shares at such an enormous price gave a fatal stimulus to the mania for speculation just at the time when it most needed to be checked.

In a letter to Sir G. Clerk, he says—

“ July 23, 1864.

“ All Bombay have gone mad about Back Bay. I was anxious that Government should have had a share in the work, such as it has in the Bombay Bank, not so much to secure a share in the profits as to have the only possible effectual hold over the management in such matters as allotment of shares. I do not think any one realized, as clearly as you did, the danger to the *morale* of the public service from these undertakings. One might as well try to stop a cyclone as to check such speculations; even if it were, *per se*, desirable to do so, I doubt if it is possible to prevent men in the higher posts under Government having an interest in them, which you, I think, would have tried to do; when the money-making mania seizes them, men will act through their relations and connections in a manner more liable to evil results than when they deal direct on their own account.

“ But if Government are large shareholders in every such work and have a potential interest in its management, the evil may be kept within some kind of bounds.

“ I mean, of course, only when Government aid of some kind, whether as a guarantee or otherwise, is asked for.

“ However, the Government of India would have nothing to say to the four hundred shares offered them. I do not know whether Trevelyan now regrets the £1,060,000 he then lost, but I know he has greatly increased my troubles. I have turned out and furbished your old armour in the shape of resolutions and minutes about share-jobbing and speculation, but that does not prevent my finding men figuring directly or indirectly as shareholders whom I should have wished to find perfectly free from pecuniary interest in the matter.”



From this time, during the rest of 1864 and the early part of 1865, Companies were started for all purposes—banks and financial associations, land reclamation, cotton cleaning, pressing, and spinning companies, coffee companies, shipping and steamer companies, hotel companies, livery stables and veterinary companies, and companies for making bricks and tiles. The shares of most of these companies were sold at a high premium as soon as they were brought into the market, and every effort was used to obtain allotments of original shares.\*

The great abundance of money at Bombay had caused a corresponding rise in the price of food, of labour, and of almost everything else. Capitalists and tradesmen, mechanics and cultivators were prospering as they had never prospered before; but the increase of prices which brought prosperity to all others, brought sore adversity to the minority who had a fixed income, and notably to Government servants. The cost of living was more than doubled, while their pay remained the same. The sepoy, indeed, had some relief, for, by an old rule, whenever the price of grain rose above a certain rate, they got an increase of pay, which at Dharwar and Belgaun, twice within six months, reached an amount which nearly doubled what they ordinarily received; but the married soldiers, both native and European, suffered much, for the increased expense of keeping their families made the compensation inadequate.

Frere writes to Sir Charles Wood :—

“October 13, 1864.

“In Bombay they have begun to strike for higher wages. The Post-office letter-carriers began. Last year we supported an application from the Bombay Postmaster-General for an increase of pay to the runners to meet the

\* Bombay Bank Commission Report, 1869.

general rise in wages. The Government of India rebuked both Government and the Postmaster-General, and this year we heard nothing from him, till the strike occurred, when he telegraphed direct to the Government of India, and got sanction, I am told, for an increase of fifty per cent. This, of course, will encourage others, and I hear that the Customs Preventive Establishments, and other classes who feel sure that they cannot be replaced without an advance in wages, are likely to follow the example of the Post-office people."

How great had been the profits of the cultivators may be gathered from Frere's description of the prosperity in the Dharwar cotton district, in spite of three years of bad harvests. It was one of the few districts which supplied, in large quantities, cotton nearly equal in quality to ordinary American short-stapled cotton.

He writes to Sir George Clerk :—

"December 19, 1865.

"We could hardly have seen the country to less advantage. This is the third season of almost total failure of crops, and grasshoppers and locusts have eaten what little grew. I have not seen a single good grain field from Dharwar to this—forty miles,—and the cotton is only half a crop at best. They would have grown more cotton, but grain was so dear that all who could, sowed it in preference. If there were any chance of getting grain from a distance more cotton would be sown. We saw grain at Dharwar brought by cart from Ahmednugger, the first effects of the nearly completed Poona road. Within the last three months grain was sold in Dharwar at two seers \* for the rupee, and when we were there was half as dear again as in the famine-stricken districts of Bengal. Yet the Government of India will pay no heed to our reports of the state of things, and will neither give relief to the salaried servants nor make roads which would bring in grain.

"I have made a good deal of inquiry as to the state of the cultivators. All have grain, the hoardings up of former years, though sometimes three or four years old, stored in good years, when the enormous prices of cotton paid rent

\* A seer is 2½ lbs.

and debts and married all their children. All have kirbee [coarse straw], though often very old and as dry as faggots of firewood. They have also very high prices for any little crop they get; and among them, though times are hard, and there is not even water to drink, there is no distress. All are well clothed and well fed, and have plenty of copper pots and jewels, and no one will give up an acre of land even on mortgage. Much of this is owing to Wingate's survey.

"But the case of stipendiary people, especially Government servants, is very different. They are really starving, and I never in my thirty-one years of service, saw and heard of so much real distress among that class. All are more or less affected. At Belgaun I found Grey's buggy the only English carriage drawn by a horse in the place. The Brigade-Major had a pair of old carriage-horses, which he wished to sell and could not, in a bullock-cart. All the rest of the community either walk or drive bullock-carts. This is the natural result of grain at two and a half to five seers per rupee. But when you are told that six years ago there would sometimes be ten or twelve carriages at the band every evening, and that I saw a European regiment, half a native regiment, and two batteries of European Artillery there, the fact speaks volumes as to the altered style of living. I asked Grey, an old Belgaunite, what made him look so miserable; he answered very gravely he had been ill, and added, 'You can have no idea how depressing it is to be always living among people who are constantly complaining of what you cannot remedy. I never see a person who does not complain of the impossibility of living in ordinary comfort and keeping out of debt, and the hardness of the times is the constant theme of conversation.' The old pensioners came to see me in a body. Belgaun had been a Pensioners' Paradise, but all were now on the verge of starvation, they said. The beggars, too, were worse than at Naples or Killarney, which, as you know, is a bad sign in India.

"The trading-classes are even better off than the cultivators, and we have just knocked off the Income-tax, the only thing that attempted to touch their pockets, and which afforded some chance of enabling Government to make roads, to irrigate, and to pay their servants properly."

In Bombay house-rent was now so dear that many Civil servants were absolutely unable to pay for decent or ~~whole~~<sup>reasonable</sup> some lodging. One of them, a Professor at the Medical College, was driven to occupy with his family "two small rooms into which light is admitted through one window, which can scarcely be kept clean, and are destitute of any approach to privacy." \* "An officer at Colaba had a house consisting of a sitting-room, bedroom, and dressing-room, in which he, his wife and three children slept; the sleeping-room afforded to each but 627 cubic feet, while a soldier in barracks is allowed 1890 cubic feet." †

In a letter to Sir George Clerk, Frere writes—

"July 23, 1864.

"Everything is at famine prices in Bombay just now. Mr. Myers‡ has just told me that with mutton at two pounds and beef four pounds the rupee, his family cannot always get meat; and while all in trade and professions are making fortunes, our Government servants, even of his class, are pinched for food.

"We write all this to Simla, and might, as far as I can judge, as well write it to Peking."

It was in vain that he pressed upon the Government of India the urgent need of raising Civil servants' salaries. Nor was any attention paid to his entreaty that if his description of their deplorable position was not accepted as accurate, some official should be deputed to come to Bombay and verify it on the spot.

He writes to Sir Charles Wood :—

"November 20, 1864.

"The distress among all except the higher paid classes of Government servants in Bombay and Poona, is really

\* Despatches, January, 1865.

† Report of Dr. Leith.

‡ Mr. Myers was head-clerk of the Governor's office. For the legibility of the handwriting with which he copied Sir Bartle's letters, the transcriber takes this opportunity of recording his acknowledgments.

beyond belief, and I am assured that officers on the pay of captains, and the lowest paid grade of the Civil service can barely live as single men, and that married men have to submit to privations of food, house-room and conveyance for themselves and their families, which are quite incompatible with health in such a hot and exhausting climate.

"To our last appeal on this subject, the Government of India has finally answered in a few lines that it makes no change in their previous opinions.

"The proved and admitted impossibility of whole classes of the public servants living on their pay is producing very extensive demoralization. Many of the best of the younger hands are resigning the service, taking their furloughs, and accepting private employment without leaving Bombay. Many more take private work of one kind or another, which is supposed to be done out of office hours, and all who can, with very few exceptions, seem to dabble in shares."

The Government pay being so much below what was now given by mercantile firms, no longer sufficed to retain the services of competent clerks or subordinate officials, or even to obtain reliable legal advice. Government servants left the service by hundreds for better paid work, and the disorganization of the public service was such that Frere could only compare it to the state of things at Melbourne and at San Francisco when gold was first discovered near those places, and ships could not sail for want of their crews, who had gone off to the diggings.

Fearing the evil example of the reckless speculation that was going on, Frere privately assembled his personal staff, and spoke clearly and gravely to them on the propriety of their keeping altogether aloof from it.

In the hope of restraining Civil servants from share-jobbing, he published, as has been already mentioned, a Minute of Sir George Clerk's on the subject, and the orders issued by Lord Dalhousie and Lord Elgin regarding the interference by Civil servants with the management of Joint Stock Companies. He also brought the matter before his

Council and issued a Minute, in the course of which he says—

“The Governor in Council now desires to point out to all public servants of Government at this particular period, when there is so strong a tendency to speculation in Bombay, the extreme importance of obedience to the spirit of all the previous orders, rather than to the mere letter of the law. He believes it to be sufficient to remind all public servants of the great importance of avoiding any connection, however remote, with any undertaking which might tend under any contingency to fetter their action, or divert them from the numerous and important responsibilities imposed by the public service upon them.”

The other members of his Council, except Mr. J. D. Inverarity, thought part of his minute too stringent. There was a general rule that Government servants might hold shares in companies having for their object the development of the resources of the country, provided they took no part in the management, and were not employed in the districts where the operations of the Companies were carried on. But beyond this limitation there was no power to prohibit. It was impossible to draw a hard and fast line between legitimate investment and speculation. All that Frere could do by way of compulsion—and he did it in one notable instance—was to pass over in promotion any one who had offended against the spirit of the prohibition.

He writes to Sir George Clerk :—

“February 14, 1865.

“A few words from Sir Charles Wood as to the absolute necessity of keeping clear of share-jobbing would have a great effect. But it is cruel, while enforcing this, to withhold any improvement in the pay of our servants. It is rather hard to a High Court Judge, an Advocate-General, or Secretary to Government to have more work than his fellow in Calcutta and less pay, but still they can live and save a little. I can without compunction tell them to resist dipping into the golden stream which flows on every side.

But it is hard work for the smaller fry to keep straight with a wife and children skimped at home. You would be shocked at the stories I sometimes hear of men, and women too, dancing attendance on 'promoters,' native and European, and justifying it to themselves as 'a duty to their families.'"

A similar warning is given in a speech of Frere's at the laying of the corner-stone of the Elphinstone Circle.

"October 22, 1864.

"No prudent man can expect such a tide of prosperity to continue without check, and when the check comes it will doubtless overwhelm many who have nothing to trust to but the favouring breath of fortune, who have not the training to steer their bark aright, and, like all who meddle with what is not their proper business, must sooner or later incur failure and disgrace."

Another effort was made by him to check, if it were possible, to some extent the propensity to speculation. The great fluctuation in the price of cotton, which within a twelvemonth varied from ninepence to two shillings, offered tempting inducements to "time-bargains," which were practically simply bets on the price of cotton or shares at a particular future date. These time-bargains were, unfortunately, especially popular amongst the eager gambling mercantile community of Bombay. In England such contracts have no legal validity, and cannot be enforced in a Court of Law; but in India it was otherwise, and much of the time of the courts was taken up in trying questions arising out of them, the number of causes set down for trial being nearly trebled in consequence. The Chief Justice, Sir M. Sausse, brought in a "Time-Bargains Bill" in the Legislative Council, the general effect of which was to assimilate the state of the law to what it was in England. Frere warmly supported it, and it was a matter of regret to him that Sir W. Mansfield, the Commander-in-Chief, who was troubled with crotchets on the subject, opposed it, and

thereby to some extent marred the moral effect that its passing unanimously would have had. The Bill was, however, passed and went up to Calcutta for sanction in November, 1864.

Frere attached great importance to its becoming law without delay, and it was a great annoyance to him that he could get no answer to his repeated requests that it might be considered by the Government of India.

He writes to Sir J. Lawrence :—

“ June 22, 1865.

“ The Bill did not propose to interfere with time-bargains in any way beyond applying the existing English law to them, and leaving them out of court to be dealt with as mere gambling debts, or debts of honour. . . . I therefore approved the Act, which was passed by a majority of the Council, and sent it to you in November, and have since heard nothing more about it.

“ We made a reference on the subject some months ago, in consequence of our Chief Justice pointing out that the High Court was being inundated with suits which had nothing to do with the legitimate commerce of the place, but were in truth the mere fencing of a couple of gamblers.

“ Mr. Michael Scott, as a leading merchant of a very advanced and liberal school, was much criticized for bringing forward a Bill which threw a certain class of bargains out of court. His reply was that they had no more to do with trade than the Derby had, but that they very seriously interfered with trade by tempting traders to gamble.

“ The event has quite justified his view. Cotton has risen in price fifty per cent. in two months, but the cotton-market is stagnant, not for want of cotton, or of buyers, or sellers, or of money, but because every man is holding every rupee he can command to be ready for a great settlement of time-bargains in July, when, I am assured on good authority, some thirty or forty millions sterling will change hands, according to the then price of cotton, opium, Government-paper, but, above all, of shares of joint-stock companies, many of which exist only on paper.

“ Of course there must be a tremendous crash, and the best and most cautious will find great difficulty in getting paid



what is owing to them in legitimate trade. The Court will be overwhelmed with business, and be sorely puzzled to apply the law, for it is in a very doubtful state, and all that is certain is that the later English Acts do not apply here."

He writes again :—

" July 7, 1865.

" I hope you will now assent to our Act for throwing these time-bargains out of court. There can be no doubt they have been one great cause of all the misery and ruin we see around us here now. There would, of course, have been over-trading and mad speculation of all kinds under any circumstances when so much money was thrown into a community peculiarly prone to speculation and gambling. But the evil has been intensified by these time-bargains. They have this peculiarity as compared with all other kinds of betting, that they are carried on under the guise of trade, and the settling-day is so far off that any unusual change in the price of the article bet on may cause such prolonged uncertainty as to the solvency of the betters, as seriously to embarrass all non-betting people who are connected with them.

" It is easy to say ' do not bank with a banker who thinks more of the Derby or *rouge-et-noir* table than his counting-house.' But if the betting be carried on in the counting-house and under the forms of ordinary trade, the most cautious man in Lombard Street may be taken in. . . .

" You must not suppose that because the first of July is past there is an end of the evil consequences of time-bargains which then fell due. The only step gained was each man's knowledge of his own losses ; a few slipped out of their liabilities by informalities in the tender, or similar modes of getting off their bets ; some of the smaller fry compromised on the spot, promising to pay twenty-five or thirty per cent. of their losses, but to the great majority in number as well as in character and wealth, the effect was merely to fix the liability and amount, and to allow the lawyers to commence a settlement by pettifogging duello [?] instead of the summary settlements of Tattersall's and the Jockey Club Committee.

" Meantime the ordinary business of lawyers and merchants is nearly at a standstill, under circumstances which,

but for these time-bargains, would have ensured a rapid revival of trade."

At last, in July, 1865, eight months after the Time-bargains Bill had been sent to Calcutta, it transpired that it had been lost by some official of the Government of India in the transit between Simla and Calcutta, and that Sir J. Lawrence had never seen it!\* The eight months' delay could not have happened more inopportunately and unfortunately. It was the time when fluctuations in prices were the greatest and share-jobbing at its worst.

During the latter part of 1865, Mr. Anstey, an eminent Bombay barrister, was appointed to the office of Judge during the temporary absence of Sir J. Arnould. He took a strong view, which he was wont to express in season and out of season, of the immorality which marked much of the speculation which was going on. One native, convicted of criminal breach of trust and cheating, he sentenced to the extreme penalty of ten years' penal servitude. This gave great offence, especially to the rich native community. A petition was got up and signed by Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy and other influential natives, praying for the mitigation of the sentence and the removal of Mr. Anstey from the Bench. But Frere, not sorry that a bad instance of the prevailing sins of the time should have received due castigation, in a strong Minute refused the prayer of the petition and supported Anstey.

The matter that caused Frere the greatest anxiety, and gave him most concern during the last two years of his government of Bombay, was the management and condition of the Bombay Bank.

The old Bank of Bombay had been established in 1840, with a capital of about half a million, and power to issue

\* Frere to Sir M. Sausse, July 16, 1865.

notes to the amount of two millions. In 1860 the Government of India determined to deprive it of this power, and to issue notes of its own. As a compensation, the treasuries and pay offices were transferred to the bank, the Government retaining the currency department in their own hands. The new charter placed less restriction on the nature of the securities on which money might be lent than the old Act and than the Bengal and Madras Bank Acts, and, amongst other relaxations, permitted advances on the security of shares in "public companies in India" without even a restriction as to their being fully paid up. When losses afterwards befell the bank from transactions permitted by this clause, the question arose how it had come to be in the charter. Frere regarded its insertion as having been intentional, while the Government of India and Sir Charles Wood maintained it was an oversight. In any case these three authorities—the Bombay Government, the Calcutta Government, and the Secretary of State, to each of whom the draft of the Bill had been submitted—were equally responsible for its being there.

When in January, 1869, the Commission of Inquiry into the bank took place in London, Frere, in his chivalrous way, took upon himself to defend the part which the Bombay Government had had in assenting to the clause. But, personally, he had had nothing to do with it. The draft of the charter had been submitted to the Bombay Government on November 8, 1861, and, on being approved, it was sent on to Calcutta on March 19, 1862, more than a month before Frere arrived at Bombay. The Supreme Government approved it, and returned it for submission to the Secretary of State on April 5. Frere assumed office at Bombay on April 24, and all he had to do with the Bill was to forward it, as approved by the Supreme Government, to the Secretary of State. Though it subsequently was returned

to Bombay for certain specified modifications, no point as to this clause was raised.

The bank was managed, or supposed to be managed, by nine directors, six of whom were chosen by the shareholders, and three appointed by the Bombay Government. Practically, however, only two of the three were so appointed, the third being the Accountant-General or some other officer of the Government of India, who, though resident at Bombay, was selected by, and in direct correspondence with, the Government at Calcutta.

Until March, 1865, nothing transpired to make it appear that the affairs of the bank were going on otherwise than as usual. The capital had been doubled; but this was the natural thing to do to make up for the cessation of the issue of notes, and to meet the general increase of trade. Frere had from time to time asked for and received the assurance of the Government directors that all was well, and notably of one of them, as late as February. Towards the end of March he received a letter from Sir Charles Wood.

" March 3, 1865.

"I cannot help being in some alarm at the possibility of a crash in your Bombay speculations. We hear of disagreeable rumours, and after the way in which they have been going on I am afraid that it is too probable.

"Pray look after your bank and currency matters. We must stand clear. But I would send for your Government directors in the bank and desire them to look very carefully into what the bank is doing, and keep you informed."

On receipt of this letter Frere at once communicated its contents to Mr. F. S. Chapman, the Chief Secretary, who had just been appointed a Government director, and he and his colleague, Mr. Lushington, immediately began to look closely into the management of the bank. They soon ascertained that it had been extremely reckless.

The whole truth did not come out till long afterwards, but enough was discovered to show that there had been gross mismanagement and very heavy losses. The president of the bank, who was Accountant-General and the appointee of the Calcutta Government, had lately resigned and gone home, after holding the office for some years. Experienced though he was in banking matters, he had neglected his duties and left all the control in the hands of the bank secretary, who was entirely under the influence of an eminently able and wealthy native stockbroker, Premchund Roychund, who was one of the directors of the bank chosen by the shareholders.

Premchund Roychund was a man who had amassed a large fortune by speculating in cotton. His large public charities and benefactions, combined with a quiet and unostentatious mode of life, had gained him a high reputation. He had attained a position which may be compared to that of Hudson at the time of the railway mania in England, but which Frere says was like nothing that he had ever seen or heard of in any other community. His name and influence were considered indispensable to the launching of any new scheme. If he was not the promoter of a company, he generally received a large allotment of shares in it.

It afterwards became known that he had lent the secretary of the bank money, entered into joint speculations with him, and got him so completely under his influence that through him he could obtain money for himself and his friends from the bank almost as he liked, upon utterly inadequate security or no security at all. In this and other ways immense sums of money had been advanced on insufficient or worthless securities, or on shares valued at a high premium but not fully paid up, and, therefore, liable for calls, and thus in some cases worse than useless.

More than half the capital of the bank, as was afterwards proved, was already irretrievably lost.

From the time of his receiving Sir Charles Wood's warning, Frere's attention to the bank affairs was anxious and unremitting. He had no power to intervene directly and personally in the direction, but he was in continual communication with the Government directors, who did their best to reform the management, to ascertain the true state of affairs, and to keep him informed of it. But in his selection of directors he was practically limited to chief secretaries or civilians of high standing, none of whom had had any previous experience of banking, which, like other businesses, requires to be learnt. Their other duties often took them away for some weeks or months from Bombay, and, owing to promotions, furlough, or sick-leave, they were being continually changed. His choice was further restricted by a regulation, subsequently repealed, which excluded from being a Government director any one who had shares in the bank. And an important part of the Government transactions with the bank—that connected with the currency department—was controlled by the Government of India without any reference to the Bombay Government; and thus there was a divided responsibility and control, which increased the difficulty of management, and, on several occasions, caused serious embarrassment.

On this subject he writes to Lawrence :—

“ June 10, 1865.

“ As an instance of the incidental effect of keeping the local government in the dark as to the proceedings of the Financial Department, I may point out that eighteen lacs of the sudden diminution of the bank's balance of cash this week is due to a transfer of that amount to the Currency Department, which was ordered by the Financial Department at Calcutta, without, as far as I can learn, a

word of warning or intimation to this Government. I do not even know the reason, and only heard of the fact in consequence of parties unconnected with the bank remonstrating at the ill-timed withdrawal of so large a sum, at a moment when the bank required the utmost forbearance. . . .

"Nothing is further from my wish than to avoid responsibility. . . . But if after we have acted to the best of our ability, our proceedings are upset by a telegram from Simla or Calcutta to some one in the Currency or Financial Department here, who looks to you and not to us for orders, we should obviously have done more harm than if we had folded our hands and let events take their course. It is very difficult at this distance to give you a correct idea of the state of affairs here, so as to enable you to judge what should be done ; all I ask is that you will give us credit for exercising reasonable care and circumspection, and not conclude we are wrong till you have given us time for explanation."

Subsequently the Calcutta Government more than once complained of not having detailed information of the affairs of the bank. Frere repeatedly asked the Calcutta Government to send a competent officer to inspect the books, and to report the result of his investigation. But it was never done.

But what multiplied all difficulties a hundredfold was the fact that this time of the bank's troubles coincided with a commercial crisis quite unprecedented in intensity and duration. In the spring of 1865, the Confederate States of America finally collapsed and the war ceased. The price of cotton at once fell ; but within three months it had gone up again fifty per cent. Cotton could ordinarily be produced at a profit for a price of from sixpence to eightpence a pound. Within fourteen months it ranged from ninepence to two shillings, and the fluctuations kept Bombay in a prolonged fever of expectation and apprehension.

Early in May, 1865, a native merchant, Byramjee Hor-

musjee Cama, failed for a large amount, owing the bank £170,000. This failure was the commencement of a panic which prevailed with increasing intensity through the remainder of May and part of June. There was a run on the bank, and the directors, fearing for its safety, applied to Frere, who, on June 15, telegraphed to Sir John Lawrence stating the facts and asking leave to advance, if necessary, 150 lacs (a million and a half) from the Currency Reserve. To this the Viceroy assented, and on its becoming known the run ceased. The crisis was so severe that the maintenance of credit depended on certain men and certain firms being supported at all hazards ; and a policy of forbearance, as it was called, which would in ordinary times have been indefensible, was deemed necessary in order to avoid bringing down commercial ruin on the community.

Frere writes to Colonel Herbert Bruce :—

“ June 23, 1865.

“ We have just now fallen on a commercial crisis of which no one not on the spot can form an idea. I have seen such things in London, but all is here multiplied in the ratio of the greater credulity, timidity, and want of frankness which characterize the natives as compared with the Europeans, and the extent of failure is incredible. I see in the papers that there were three failures in a fortnight for over a million, and I hear of one impending for six millions sterling.

“ It is of course a very anxious time for me, and the work, with only one colleague to help me, is very hard ; but I have great confidence in him, and we have no minuting ; and whatsoever may happen, I have no fears for the honour of Government. In this respect I feel very grateful to Sir Charles Wood for his support in ridding me of share-jobbers, and do not regret the black looks I have received from some of the cliques in Bombay.”

In July, 1865, the bank directors passed a resolution to declare no dividend for the past half year. But they were far



from having discovered their true position or the worthless character of many of the securities which they held. In the autumn prices improved a little, and it was hoped that the worst of the crisis was over. Just before Christmas, Frere, then at Sholapoor, a couple of hundred miles from Bombay, heard by telegraph that there were but six and a half lacs of silver coin in the bank, and that it was—for the third time—in danger. A second message being even more alarming, he started at once for Bombay, travelling through the greater part of Christmas Day and all night, and summoning the Government directors as soon as he arrived. On investigation the smallness of the balance was found to be due, firstly, to the Calcutta Financial Department having sent, instead of the coin that was wanted, forty lacs of bills drawn mostly on customers of the bank, so as to produce the effect of simply transferring money from one account to another without providing any coin; and secondly, to the Government Reserve being in small silver and copper coins, which were practically unavailable for issue, only seven out of fifty-seven lacs being in whole or half rupees. This, however, was but a temporary and accidental difficulty, and in January, 1866, the directors declared a dividend at the rate of eight per cent. per annum. On March 31, 1866, Mr. F. S. Chapman and Mr. Norman, the Government directors, presented their Report in reply to a letter from the Government of India asking for information and for an examination into the affairs of the bank. The Report, though made honestly and in good faith, took far too sanguine a view. A second committee subsequently appointed also failed to discover the true state of things.

Shortly after the Report of the first Committee had appeared the pressure for money again grew severe, intensified by sympathy with the commercial crisis in

London and the failure of Overend and Gurney. On April 26, the directors were informed that Premchund Roychund was in immediate want of a quarter of a million to prevent his stopping payment. He already owed the bank rather more than that amount, but such was the fear of the consequences of his failing that the directors, following the policy of forbearance, consented to subscribe £105,000 to a loan to him for six months, on six other banks providing between them the remaining £145,000. The Bombay Bank was to advance the whole £250,000 in the first instance, and to be recouped as to their respective amounts by the other banks. No sufficient inquiry was made as to whether this advance would really make Premchund safe, and by the almost incredible carelessness of the secretary and the solicitor of the bank, and, indeed, in a less degree, of all who were present at the Board, no agreement with the other banks was signed, and the money was paid away before the full amount of the security stipulated for had been given. Four months later in the month of August, Premchund failed. The securities taken proved wholly insufficient, and the balance due from him to the bank amounted to £247,000, which was wholly irrecoverable.

By a serious dereliction of duty on the part of the secretary, money was advanced to the Asiatic Bank also without adequate security, and when in the following month (September) that bank failed, £196,000 was due from it to the Bank of Bombay. In February, 1867, there was another severe run upon it, which was stopped by the assurance from Government that it would be supported. From that time it was practically in liquidation. In January, 1868, after Frere had gone to England, it was resolved to wind it up voluntarily. But the ruin which had overwhelmed the mercantile community of Bombay

rendered it difficult to recover any part of the capital. The shareholders, many of them Civil servants who had invested their savings in it, were anxious to fix the responsibility for the failure on some one who could be made to pay, and tried to lay all the blame on the Government, in the teeth of the fact that they had themselves chosen two-thirds of the directors—six out of the nine. The question was brought before parliament, and in 1868 a Commission of Inquiry was appointed, with Sir C. Jackson as chairman, which took evidence in England and in India. Frere himself, then in England, was examined as a witness, and a detailed report was made, in which the misdeeds of Premchund and of the secretaries of the bank were for the first time fully disclosed.

To Frere, deeply distressed at the occurrence of a disaster which he had been powerless to avert, and acutely sensitive to the character of his officers, some of the revelations were as painful as they were unexpected. Judging after the event, and apparently failing to realize how impossible it was for the Government with the means at their disposal to have discovered or prevented transactions such as those between the secretary and Premchund, which were the origin of the trouble, one of the Commissioners, Major McLeod Innes, R.E., in a separate memorandum speaks of the "supineness and inaction" of the Bombay Government. In the margin of the Blue-book opposite these words is the remark, written in pencil, in Frere's handwriting: "I only know that when the bank was first in trouble the Governor had scarce a white hair in his head, and that when he left Bombay he had few brown ones."

Thus it happened that, during the latter part of his stay at Bombay, Frere's life was saddened by the spectacle of many of his old friends and fellow-civilians, who had

suffered heavy losses, living with straitened means, and with the hopes of earning an independence for their declining years indefinitely postponed. No one is less disposed to blame himself, or to attribute his misfortunes to his own folly than an unlucky speculator; and there were not wanting those who found fault with Frere because he had encouraged the commercial activity by the collapse of which they had lost their money; as though, because he had promoted the growth of cotton, the reclamation of swamps from the sea, and the building of healthy houses, he were responsible for the exaggerated expectations of profit, and the mad folly which had forced up the price of land and the shares in companies to such an extravagant height. Perversely fastening on the one man who had striven hardest to check the gambling spirit, they paid an unconscious tribute to his ascendancy and merit in blaming him because even *his* strenuous efforts had not availed to stem the torrent which had overwhelmed them.

The disappointed candidates for promotion who, under all governments, constitute a discontented band, chose to say that Frere was wont to promise more than he performed, and nicknamed Government House the "Land of Promise." The charge was wholly false. In India there is, among Europeans, little or no social distinction except such as is conferred by official rank. Hence there is no natural counterbalancing check, such as is afforded in England by hereditary social rank, on officials sometimes assuming an arrogance of manner which may make itself disagreeably felt by a subordinate or a petitioner. Of such official arrogance and pomposity Frere had a loathing. It was ingrained in his nature to shrink from giving unnecessary pain by word or tone even to the least deserving; and when he had to refuse a

request, he instinctively threw into the manner of his refusal an even larger measure of courtesy than usual, so that though the words of rejection—as third persons who were present could testify—were plain enough, the petitioner, unused to such a way of being refused, sometimes came away from the interview with a sense of having been consoled rather than rebuffed.\*

\* The following eminently true and forcible description of this and other sides of Frere's character is taken from the *Pall Mall Gazette* of December 21, 1866 :—

“ Sir B. Frere is a man who, in all his various positions, whether as youthful civilian, as Commissioner in Sind, or as Governor of the Bombay Presidency, has always suggested something greater than his position, without manifesting the slightest impatience in that position, or anything but the most perfect adaptation to it. It is not only that he has revealed a mind of singularly wide sympathies and of high culture—of sympathies far deeper and broader than those usually considered compatible with the practical work of government, and of culture almost incredible after thirty years of life in India,—but the instructive subordination of his intellect and culture to the purposes of government, and the relationship of an amiability which cannot be ruffled to a will which cannot be tired or beaten down, is perhaps the most remarkable characteristic of the man. . . . He relied in great part, and, as it proved, justifiably, in preserving Sind, on his own personal influence with Beloochees and Mahrattas, and on that perfect sweetness and serenity of demeanour which exercises so peculiar a charm over the minds of Asiatics when they know that it does not proceed from ignorance of the danger which may be gathering round. In the Legislative Council of Calcutta, and afterwards in the Governorship which he now vacates, Sir B. Frere's skill and good fortune have not failed him. When in his latter office, there have been complaints, though neither loud nor frequent, that from a desire to make all things smooth, he has sometimes promised more than he has performed; but the character of a man such as we have now roughly sketched, is liable to careless or unintelligent misinterpretation of this kind. One thing well known is that Sir Bartle has no fondness for what are called safe colleagues and subordinates. Himself safe almost to a fault, he has shown a remarkable faculty for turning to good account the better qualities of those who have a tendency for falling into trouble. In Sind it was notorious that this steady, blameless man took more to energetic, and often injudicious officers of all services than he did to more steady-going ones, and would sooner

Interviews cannot be accurately described or recorded ; but the two following letters are fair specimens, as to manner and substance, of his way of dealing with a petitioner, when he had to say "No."

" November 8, 1862.

"I hear that you and Mrs. C—— have, with your usual kindness, taken charge of poor Mrs. N——, and therefore write to ask you whether you cannot induce Dr. N—— to ask for such leave of absence as may enable him to defer joining his regiment for a few weeks ?

"I would gladly do anything I could to prevent the necessity of such a long journey while she is so ill. But it may take some time to dispose of points on which depends my power to assist him, and I may not, after all, be able to do so, and I should therefore be glad if he would wait at Poona for a week or two till these points are decided.

"I would have told Leith to write to him to suggest this ; but I have just seen a note from him, in which he speaks of my having made a 'half promise' to do something for him. Now, I am always very careful to make neither 'half promises' (whatever they may be) nor whole promises, unless I am very sure of being able to fulfil them, and therefore I am anxious that I may not again be misunderstood by him, and therefore write to you."

" March 2, 1866.

"I have been carefully over the papers in your case with every wish to find you right, and found you hopelessly wrong. Nor do I think your best friend—and you

stretch a point to cover a sin of the former than to pass over the mistake of the latter. When he became Governor of Bombay, his coadjutor, the Commander-in-Chief of the Presidency, was Sir William Mansfield, one of the ablest but most difficult men to get on with in all India, yet the two worked most harmoniously together. Again, who but Sir Bartle Frere would have had the audacity to give Mr. Chisholm Anstey a seat on the Bench, and to keep him there in defiance of a petition of many of the influential natives of Bombay ? But this mistake was eminently characteristic of the man, of his respect for any well-developed function, and his genial appreciation of those entirely different from himself."

have none who wishes you better than I do—could come to any other conclusion.

“I cannot expect you to agree with me, nor would it be right for me to attempt to argue the matter extra officially. I can only state the conclusion at which I have arrived. But I put it to you whether it would not be the best and wisest thing for you to take your pension in April, when it is due, and try a new career in the old country ?

“Here I feel convinced you will only meet with constant disappointment. This present case, and every other which may occur, must be reported to the Secretary of State, and, in the constant changes of official life, a time must come when you will be judged by men who do not know what good service you have done, and could, I am sure, still do, if climate and other circumstances were not against you.

“Do think of what I have said, and if you are not convinced, ask G—— to decide, without telling him what my advice has been.”

One of Sir Charles Wood's last official acts, six months before, had been to recommend Frere for the Star of India. The same letter from Sir Charles Wood which told him of this, contained also the announcement of his own retirement, owing to suffering brought on by a fall from his horse. He had held the offices of President of the Board of Control or Minister for India during nearly nine of the past thirteen years. “I could not have gone from my office,” he writes to Frere, “without thus showing you how much I appreciated your services.” \*

In September, 1866, it was announced that Frere had been offered and had accepted a seat on the India Council in London, and would soon leave Bombay.

For nearly ten years his work, beginning with the Mutiny, had been not only incessant, but from various causes exceptionally arduous and anxious. Twice only

\* Sir Charles Wood to Sir B. Frere, February 19, 1866. He wrote afterwards to congratulate Frere on his nomination to the India Council, saying it was what he would have done himself.

since he first left England, in 1834, had he revisited it, both times on sick leave. He had never had any furlough. Lady Frere, after a year at Bombay, had, in 1863, been compelled by illness and the calls of her children to go to England. She returned to Bombay in April, 1864, bringing with her their eldest daughter ; but fresh cause for anxiety about the care of her children having arisen, she went to England again, leaving their daughter with Frere to do the honours of Government House, and again returned to Bombay with her second daughter in January, 1866. His other children he had not seen for several years, and his only son, then in his thirteenth year, not for ten years.

Towards the end of the year he met with an accident. His horse shied at a passing camel and elephant, and backing into a small ditch slipped and fell over, bending and crushing the stirrup on to his foot so that he could not get it out. Fortunately, at the sound of his voice, the horse, on getting up, stood still till help came, otherwise he must have been dragged. The muscles of his leg were badly crushed ; he was on crutches for nearly all the rest of his time in India, and he felt the effects of the accident all his life.

In December, 1866, he went to Kurrachee, where he had the pleasure of presenting his old friend Shet Naomul with the Star of India, and thence to Hyderabad, being received everywhere in his old province with the heartiest welcome. On his way back to Bombay, he landed at Porebunder in Kattywar and held a Durbar, at which Colonel Keatinge received the Star of India. A farewell address was presented on February 4 by the inhabitants of Bombay. From Europeans and natives of all parts of the Presidency, and from one public body after another, addresses of regretful farewell, and expressions of satisfaction that he would still have a voice in the Government of India, came pouring in. The members of the Civil Service presented



him with a service of plate ; and amongst other public leave-takings he was entertained by the Byculla Club at a farewell banquet.

A statue of him by Woolner was placed in the Town Hall and another by the same sculptor in the Hall of the University.

The following extract is from his farewell speech, as Chancellor of the Bombay University (January 8, 1867) :—

“ You have spoken of the ‘ forbearance which, as head of this political Government,’ I have exhibited towards the University, and you do me no more than justice in inferring that what you term ‘ forbearance ’ has not been the result of lukewarmness or indifference, but of a clear conviction that the political Government of this country could hardly commit a greater mistake than by attempting to convert the University into a ‘ mere office or department of the State.’ . . . It is a noteworthy circumstance that this University stands almost alone among the great institutions of this country as managed by the unbought exertions of those who direct its actions. . . . You have alluded to the jealousy which centralizing and absolute Governments naturally feel as regards any independent institutions, the main object of which is the cultivation of free thought. I would say a very few words on the reasons why we believe that the Government of British India need entertain no such fears. In almost every other parallel case that we know of, it has been more or less the object of the governing nations to treat a dependency like British India as a conquered possession to be administered for the benefit, direct or indirect, of the governing power ; and in proportion as this spirit animates the action of the Government, so will it have good reason to dread the independent growth of institutions like this. But England has, I need not remind you, no such purpose, and need have no such fear. From the day when the sudden brilliancy of the achievements of her sons in this distant country first startled the Parliament and people of England ; from the days of Clive and Warren Hastings to this hour, there has ever been a continued protest on the part of those who mould the thought and direct the action of the British nation, against the doctrine that India is to be administered in any other

spirit than as a trust from God for the good government of many millions of His creatures ; and however fitfully and imperfectly that purpose may have been carried out, it has in every generation grown in strength and was never more powerful than at the present moment. However firmly England may resolve that no force shall wrest from her the Empire of India, the root of that resolve has always been a deep conviction that to surrender that Empire would be to betray a high trust."

On March 6, 1867, he embarked with Lady Frere and his two eldest daughters on board the *Malta* for England, the yards of the ships in harbour being manned, the guns saluting, and cheer following cheer from the crowds on shore—the shore where he had landed alone and unknown from the Arab buggalow, thirty-three years before—as the barge slowly left the wharf and swung alongside the vessel.

His departure left behind many sad hearts of brave men who looked to him as their chief and their guide. "What shall we do when you go? What shall I do for my soldier's wants which Sir Bartle understands so well?" writes Sir Robert Napier to Lady Frere, on hearing of the prospect of his leaving. And again, after he was gone, "The blank caused by your departure seems to grow broader every day."

Colonel Henry Green, the old frontier soldier, writes:—

"February 10, 1867.

"I hope that you will allow me to offer in the name of my brother and myself our most sincere thanks for all your kindness to us. I assure you that I now feel quite alone in India, and as if I had no one to look to for support. Up to the present I have always felt that if I was wrong or made a mistake that you would tell me, and that if I was right that you would support me, and this gave me great self-reliance in all I undertook. I also had great pleasure in working, I cared not how hard, because I knew that you would appreciate it. All is now changed. I hope that


my brother and self will not be long following you home. . . .”

And to Lady Frere he writes—

“We have always looked for his praise and cared little for that of Government, and now he is leaving India it feels like losing some one you were always in the habit of looking to.”


Colonel W. F. Marriott, one of the Secretaries of the Bombay Government, writes to him :—

“The scene of your departure stirred me much. That bright evening, the crowd on the pier and shore as the boat put off, the music from the *Octavia*, as the band played ‘Auld lang Syne’ as we passed, were all typical and impressive by association of ideas. But it was not a shallow sympathy with which I took in all the circumstances. I could divine some of your thoughts. If I felt, like Sir Bedivere, left behind ‘among new men, strange faces, other minds,’ you must have felt in some degree like King Arthur in the barge, ‘I have lived my life, and that which I have done may He himself make pure.’ I do not doubt that you felt that all this ‘mouth honour’ is only worth so far as it is the seal of one’s own approving conscience, and though you could accept it freely as deserved from their lips, yet at that hour you judged your own work hardly. You measured the palpable results with your conceptions and hopes, and were inclined to say, ‘I am no better than my fathers.’ But I, judging now calmly and critically, feel—I may say see—that though the things which seem to have failed be amongst those for which you have taken most pains, yet they are small things compared with the work which has not failed. You have made an impression of earnest human sympathy with the people of this country, which will deepen and expand, so that it will be felt as a perpetual witness against any narrower and less noble conception of our relation to them, permanently raising the moral standard of highest policy toward them ; and your name will become a traditional embodiment of a good Governor.”



CASTELLAZIO.

*March 28, 1845.*



BORGETTO.

*March 28, 1845.*

## CHAPTER XV.

### THE INDIAN COUNCIL.

Settles in London—Abyssinian Expedition—Sanitary Department for India—Army Control Committee—Lord Mayo—The Geographical Society—The Bengal Famine—Discouragement of Sind Frontier soldiers.


WEARIED and worn as he was with ten years of unceasing toil and anxiety, and still lame and suffering from his accident, Frere was nevertheless able to enter with all his usual keen interest and enjoyment into the scenes and incidents of his journey home. He made a short stay in Egypt, going with M. Lesseps to see the works of the Suez Canal, then in progress. At Malta he and his family spent some days with Lady Hamilton Chichester at the old familiar house which had belonged to his uncle Hookham Frere, which he always visited on his way to and from India. They made a tour along the coast of Sicily, staying at Palermo some days, in company with his valued friend Colonel Henry Yule, R.E., who was then living there. Thence they travelled slowly by way of Naples, Rome, Florence, and the Mont Cenis to Paris, seeing the Exhibition there, and reached England in May.

He took a house in London in Princes Gardens, where his two youngest daughters, who had been living under the care of their aunts in the old house at Bitton, joined him, and the family was once more united. This was his home

for the next seven years, his house at Wimbledon being let, except for short periods, during the greater part of that time. He began at once his work on the India Council, which he continued for nearly ten years, with two intervals of six months when he was absent on special service.

Compared with the labours and anxieties of the previous ten years, this period brought him less anxious public work and much happiness in his unbroken family life. His health during the first year was not yet re-established, and by doctor's advice, he spent July and August of the summer of 1868 at Marienbad, which did him much good. He was interested in meeting there General Todleben, of Sebastopol fame. He visited and was much impressed with the excellence of the elementary schools, and with their superiority in many ways to our own, to which he ascribed in great measure the general success of young Germans in commercial life all over the world. Subsequently (1874) he gave a lecture at Glasgow on "Commercial Education," founded on this experience, which attracted much attention in Germany.

He generally spent most of the year in London, and six or eight weeks of the summer in a round of visits among his many friends. The number and variety of his interests, and his large acquaintance with old Indians and with men of all classes and professions, and particularly with travellers and men of science, brought many to his house, and gave him the opportunity, which he freely exercised, of becoming a connecting link between them; and he would often introduce to the notice of the Secretary of State for India, or other prominent official, any one whose knowledge or experience he thought likely to be of service. Later on the demands made on his time and strength by people calling to see him on all sorts of matters, and at all hours, had by



LEAVING CIVITA CASTELLANA.

March 28, 1845.



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degrees increased so much as to induce him to return for a time to his house at Wimbledon, where, though he had to go to London on most days of the week, he had his mornings and evenings comparatively undisturbed, and slept in fresh air. Like many old Indians, he retained his habit of beginning his day's work early, by seven at latest. After breakfast he would go through the *Times* carefully, noticing current events everywhere, marking paragraphs to be cut out, and writing or dictating letters till it was time to walk to the station on his way to the India Office. On his way back he would look in at the Athenæum.

The Council used to meet once a week; and there were meetings of departmental committees on two or three other days. The questions discussed there gave the members an opportunity—either at the request of the Secretary of State, or of their own motion—of recording minutes on important matters as they arose, and thus of bringing the weight of their knowledge and experience to bear on the deliberations of the Council.

He writes to Mr. Barrow Ellis :—

“August 25, 1867.

“What shall I say of my present office? You used to look on me as rather venerable from age, but my colleagues are more complimentary, and regard me as a youth not yet entitled to have opinions of his own, but likely, when he has been some years in office in this country, to get some experience from his seniors. The Secretary of State, being younger himself, has a little more sympathy with a man whose hair is only grey, not yet snow-white, and in time I hope I may be of use. . . . Personally they are all a very agreeable set of colleagues, and I do not at all regret having accepted office, but I see it will be a hard and thankless task to do any real good; and the whole machine is more cumbrous and ill-contrived than I should have supposed possible. . . .”

Amongst the first subjects that engaged his attention,

and in which he took a keen interest, was the expedition then being fitted out from Bombay, to rescue the captives at Magdala in Abyssinia. As Governor of Bombay, he had long before recommended the despatch of a comparatively small force—a flying column, composed mainly or entirely of cavalry—and that Merewether should be entrusted, not only with the military command, but with full political powers as well to deal with King Theodore.

Merewether wrote to him from Aden :—

“ August 11, 1867.

“ I have ample proof that there is no more difficulty in taking a force to any part of Abyssinia than there was half a century ago in India. If an old, distinguished officer must be sent, I hope it will be Sir R. Napier ; he will do the thing admirably. . . . ”

Ultimately the Government decided on sending a larger force—ten thousand strong, of all arms—under an officer of higher rank than Merewether, which involved larger preparations and a delay of a year. Sir Robert Napier, then Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, to Frere's great satisfaction, was selected for the command, with Merewether in command of the Cavalry and acting also as political officer. Frere was in frequent correspondence with both of them, and it was probably greatly due to his influence that Napier obtained a free hand in all his preparations and requirements for the expedition. Rarely has an English military expedition been so well equipped or been more successful in its conduct and issue.

Frere's known interest and experience in sanitary questions, evinced especially by the important improvements he had been the means of introducing into Bombay, brought him into correspondence with Miss Nightingale. There are amongst his papers for 1867 and the five following years considerably more than a hundred letters,

short or long, from Miss Nightingale to him, mostly upon sanitary questions affecting India, and especially the soldiers there, full of enthusiasm and hope for all that was being done and planned to remove causes of disease and improve the health of the great towns and cantonments, and continually appealing to Frere for assistance and advice in her communications with Sir Stafford Northcote, Lord Salisbury, Sir John Lawrence, and others in office.

“August 2, 1867.

“It does seem,” she writes, “that there is no element in the scheme of government (of India) by which the public health can be taken care of. And the thing is now to create such an element.”

And again, regarding the formation of a Sanitary Department at the India Office:—

“August 21, 1867.

“Sir Stafford Northcote\* came here to see me on Tuesday of his own accord, which I think I owe to your kindness. We had a long conversation, much more satisfactory to my hopes than I expected. I think you have imbued him with your views on Indian administration, more than you know. We went as fully into the whole subject as was possible in an hour, seeing that India is rather a big place. But what I write now more particularly about is this: He proposes to have a Committee in the India Office expressly for this (sanitary) work. I told him that we want the executive machinery to do it (in India) and the controlling machinery (at the India Office) to know that it is being done. If he will do this our fortunes will be made. He proposes yourself as President.”

And again she writes—

“October 25, 1867.

“I think, if you will allow me to say so, that it is very important for us now to begin well—to fix the points of what the organization proposed has to do—and then to

\* Then Secretary of State for India.

call upon Sir J. Lawrence to fix the best methods of doing it.

"We might never have such a favourable conjunction of the larger planets again :

"You, who are willing and most able to organize the machinery here ;

"Sir John Lawrence, who is able and willing, provided only he knew what to do ;

"And a Secretary of State, who is willing and in earnest.

"And I believe nothing would bring them to their senses in India more than an Annual Report of what they have done, with your comments upon it, laid before Parliament."

In order to set in motion the machinery of a Sanitary Department for all India, a despatch had to be written, pointing out clearly and concisely what was to be done. Frere writes to Miss Nightingale :—

"March 20, 1868.

"I hope to be in town in a day or two and to get a move made for the despatch, if, as I hope, something in the way of a lead has come from Madras or from the Government of India. Almost anything, however trifling, will be sufficient, but without some sort of peg to hang the despatch on, it will be very difficult to get anything comprehensive off, and we shall have to invoke the *deus ex machinâ* again.

"Not that the Secretary of State is at all lukewarm, nor, I think, that he has any doubt as to what should be said or how—that, I think, your memoranda have fixed ; the only difficulty is as to the when. . . .

"No Governor-General, I believe, since the time of Clive has had such powers and such opportunities, but he fancies the want of progress is owing to some opposing power which does not exist anywhere but in his own imagination.

"He cannot see that perpetual inspection by the Admiral of the drill and kit of every sailor is not the way to make the fleet efficient, and he gets disheartened and depressed because he finds that months and years of this squirrel-like activity leads to no real progress."

The despatch with its accompanying documents went

to Miss Nightingale for her remarks before it was sent out. Her commentary was as follows :—

“I find nothing to add or to take away in the memorandum (sanitary). It appears to me quite perfect in itself, that is, it is quite as much as the enemy will bear, meaning by the enemy—not at all the Government of India in India, still less the Government of India at home, but—that careless and ignorant person called the Devil, who is always walking about taking knowledge out of people’s heads, who said that he was coming to give us the knowledge of good and evil, and who has done just the contrary.

“It is a noble paper, an admirable paper—and what a present to make to a Government! You have included in it all the great principles—sanitary and administrative—which the country requires. And now you must work, work these points until they are embodied in local works in India. This will not be in our time, for it takes more than a few years to fill a continent with civilization. But I never despair that in God’s good time every man of us will reap the common benefit of obeying all the laws which He has given us for our well being.

“I shall give myself the pleasure of writing to you again about these papers. But I write this note merely to say that I don’t think this memorandum requires any addition.

“God bless you for it! I think it is a great work.”

In order to smoothe the way for the reception of the new sanitary organization by the Indian Government, Frere wrote privately to his old friend Sir Richard Temple, then Finance Minister at Calcutta, to bespeak his assistance.

“October 14, 1868.

“By this mail you will receive the copy of a Blue-book on Indian sanitary matters up to the end of 1867. . . . I know that your financial labours will not diminish your interest in these matters, and your aid is now especially needed because all men do not feel as strongly as I am sure you do—that the best way to save the public revenue is to spend a good deal of it in saving the lives and the health of industrious, money-making mortals, and you will

not, I am sure, be deterred from helping to save life and health merely because it costs money. But what I want you immediately to do is to get Sir J. Lawrence to take the decisive steps necessary to put the work on a proper footing before he leaves. The Blue-book will show you how much has been done, and how much proposed since he went out; but you will see that everything is in a transition state, and that unless something be done to give fixed and definite form to the Sanitary Department and make it a regular recognized part of the administrative machinery, things may revert pretty much to the state they were in before the Crimean War. There is now a Sanitary Department in this office; but I cannot learn that the Government of India has noticed this fact, which was conveyed to them in a despatch dated in November last, for nothing comes direct to the department here, and they still glean their papers haphazard from the Military, Public Works, and other Departments; nor has any reply come to a subsequent despatch sent in April last. You can understand why I do not write to Sir John direct; but this is a subject which much concerns the credit of his administration, as well as health and life, and on which, I am sure, he feels very deeply; and if you could discover where the hitch is, and remove it, you would prevent the labour and thought he has bestowed on the subject being wasted, as well as promote objects which, I am sure, are not indifferent to you, and for which you have laboured efficiently in all parts of your career. A parting resolution by the Viceroy in Council, reviewing what has been done, and laying down a course of proceeding for the future, might be drawn up. The expense of the executive, which is required to give effect to what all wish to do, is the only difficulty I can think of; and if you could wind up the resolution by a promise that a special assignment should be made for this purpose in the forthcoming Budget, there ought to be no more excuse for inaction. The local governments ought to be able to tell you by telegraph what they will want.

“I need not tell you how much will depend on leaving much latitude in details to local judgment. . . .”

About this time further attention was being called to sanitary reform in England, and a Royal Commission, with

Sir Charles Adderley as Chairman, was appointed. One of its most active and zealous members was Dr., now Sir Henry, Acland, of Oxford. He had been a warm friend of Frere's from boyhood, and now consulted him confidentially as to the form and scope of the work of the Commission.

He writes—

“ May 29.

“ I cannot help sending you the enclosed, though I dare say you are overdone with such things.

“ Dr. Hewlett sent me a copy of ‘ the Draft Municipal Act of Bombay. ’ It is most valuable as a precedent for the way in which I think we ought to draw up at the Sanitary Commission a Draft Consolidated Code.”

“ The enclosed ” was a letter from Dr. Hewlett to Dr. Acland, in which he says—

“ May 26, 1869.

“ Your letter in itself is more gratifying to me than I can express, but I own with pleasure and with pride that any good that may have been effected in Bombay, is due not to us of the present, but to that great and good and wise ruler who, alas for us in Bombay ! is no longer present to direct the carrying out of measures which he would be the very first to recognize the wisdom of.

“ I do recognize that God in His wisdom orders all things well, and I thoroughly believe that it will yet be shown that Sir Bartle Frere will, by his influence and position, direct measures that will benefit mankind more largely than if he had remained the Governor of Bombay. Many hopes are expressed, many prayers are uttered that he may be the Governor-General yet. Truly that would be a happy day for India.”

In November, 1867, Frere was requested by Sir John Pakington, then Secretary of State for War, to give him his assistance and advice in preparing a plan founded on the Report of Lord Strathnairn's Committee on the reorganization of the administrative departments of the British army. “ I have reason to believe,” Sir John writes,

“that few, if any, men are higher authorities on the subject than yourself.” At Frere’s suggestion, Major-General Balfour, whose services on the Military Finance Commission at Calcutta have been already described, was called into council, and these two, with General Sir Henry Storks, formed a triumvirate, whose functions Sir John thus lays down :—

“The main objects which they and I shall have alike in view are to effect such changes as may promote greater efficiency and economy in the transport and supply of the army, and such reforms in the corresponding departments of this office as may, by amalgamation or otherwise, tend to greater simplicity, economy, and responsibility, and, above all, to increased unity of action. . . .”

It was a new departure for an English Minister to extend to a committee of three men, one of whom was an Indian civilian and another an Indian soldier, such confidence and such wide discretion in so delicate and difficult a matter as recommending reforms in the administration of the English army. The three had frequent meetings and discussions with Sir John Pakington during the two following months ; and their work was done quietly and quickly, by conversation more than by correspondence. The result was the establishment of a Department of Control, with Sir Henry Storks as Controller-in-Chief—General Balfour being associated with him—and the publication of a Code of Regulations for the formation and guidance of the department, the whole being modelled more or less on the lines of the Military Finance Department at Calcutta, over which Balfour had presided with such good results.

Its establishment resulted in a large and immediate saving, in spite of secret, and, in some cases, even avowed official resistance. A reduction of nearly half the amount expended for stores in the year prior to the appointment of Sir H. Storks was effected in two years, the amount



being, for 1867-8, £1,898,954, and for 1869-70, £1,086,116—a sum nearly equal to the produce of a three-farthing income-tax. Subsequently, however, the department was abolished.

Once more Frere's services as an authority on military charges and finance were put in requisition. In June, 1871, the Duke of Argyll, then Minister for India, being dissatisfied with the attention paid to the India Office Despatch of 1869 on military expenditure in India, requested Sir Bartle Frere, Sir George Jamieson, and Mr. Seccombe to form a committee, to report on the whole subject—again with the assistance of Sir George Balfour—and to make any suggestions which might occur to them with reference to the possibility of specifying more definitely from home the branches of expenditure on which economy could probably be effected, and with reference to the farther question, whether it would be expedient, or necessary, to constitute in India an Audit and Control Department as a means of checking the constant tendency to growth in the expenses of the army.\*

Towards the end of the year 1868, Sir John Lawrence's tenure of office in India was drawing to a close. In the course of October it became known that his successor was to be Lord Mayo. Though early trained to official life, and then for the third time Chief Secretary for Ireland, and with a seat in the Cabinet, Lord Mayo had not as yet made much impression on the popular mind as a statesman, nor was he possessed of any special knowledge or experience to qualify him for the government of India. The appointment was received by the Opposition Press and by the Liberal Party—irritated at their exclusion from office for more than two years by a Government which could not command a majority in the House of Commons—with a chorus of

\* Minute by the Duke of Argyll, June 24, 1871.

disapproval and derision.\* Seldom has an estimate been more mistaken.

Lord Mayo wrote to Frere (October 17), to whom he was then a stranger, to ask for an interview; and from that time till he left England, about a month later, he had long and frequent conversations with him as well as much correspondence, and was introduced by him to various persons, from whom he was able to obtain information.

Amongst other points which Frere pressed upon his notice, was the need for vigorously pushing railway extension. He writes to him:—

“October 30, 1868.

“I enclose you the memorandum on Western India which I mentioned to you as indicating the lines which ought, I think, to be commenced at once. . . . You will see it was written more than two years ago, but I have little to add or alter now, for during the interval no really important progress has been made in railway matters in the half of India to which the memorandum refers. What we have lost in the interval through Sir J. Lawrence's and Mr. Massey's ‘masterly inactivity’ I need not tell you. This extract, which I have taken from a *Times* city article of this week, will give you an idea of what use Russia has made of the last year's opportunities in our own money-market for provinces the richest of which is not as rich or as civilized as the poorest of your satrapies. It may be generations before we have such a time of peace in India, and cheap money and cheap iron in England. But it is of no use grieving over the past. . . .

\* The *Spectator* wrote, in reference to the appointment:—

“The selection of Lord Mayo for the Viceroyalty of India indicates a culpable carelessness of the highest interests of the Empire. . . . It is hard to believe that Mr. Disraeli has chosen Lord Mayo as the fittest man at his disposal, harder to believe that he feels compelled to award him the one grand prize within his gift; hardest of all to avoid suspecting that India has been sacrificed in order that Mr. Disraeli should be relieved of a political burden. We do not wish to see the great satrapies of the Empire vacated with every change of ministry, but if Lord Mayo sails in November for Calcutta, the Liberal Ministry will in December be justified in ordering his recall.”

"As to the terms, I doubt whether you could do better for all these ten lines than to extend to them the ordinary terms of the guaranteed companies with a very few alterations in the present form of contract, which have been already much discussed, and which will prevent delay in execution or apathy in working the lines. . . . There are many ways in which capital, now hoarded or otherwise idle, could be drawn out in India and applied to such works as railways—but not, I believe, on cheaper terms than it can be got in England,—and no doubt as railways extend, the hoarded capital will come out and seek investment of its own accord. This end might be promoted by requiring any local government or administration which asks for a railway to raise a certain proportion, or even the whole of the capital required, in India, as a simple loan, on terms which shall not cost Government more than five per cent. This, I believe, might easily be done, by offering such facilities for the payment of interest on small sums subscribed as the French offer, but different plans might be tried in different places. . . . But I would not rigidly insist on any provision of Indian capital for a main arterial line, such as are all those in the memorandum, lest construction should be delayed.

"Nor would I attempt any construction by direct Government agency, unless it were an unimportant line, as a field for experiments and to amuse the engineers. For any other purpose it is, I am convinced, a great mistake for Government to turn either railway makers or railway managers. The work is either in quantities ridiculously small when compared with our wants—we get five miles of open railway when we want five hundred—or it is done in a costly, old-fashioned manner which makes it the laughing-stock of professional people. I believe in Indian railways both results would be produced at once; for in India the official pedantry and dragooning, which is mischievous everywhere, becomes active cruelty often with the best intentions, and people die by thousands from causes which in Europe only make 'constant readers' and 'continental travellers' swear and write to the *Times*."

On the question of the relations between the Supreme and the Local Government of India, Frere sent Lord Mayo a detailed paper of suggestions.

"November 4, 1868.

"I fear you will find the relations between the Supreme and the Local Governments in India very uncomfortable and unsatisfactory, to use the mildest term, and I feel sure you will not think me intrusive for offering a few suggestions as to what appears to me the best mode for putting those relations on a more satisfactory footing. Many people, some of them of great ability and experience, think this may be done by reducing the powers and status of the local governments to something like the position of the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab in Lord Dalhousie's time. I will only state one objection to this—it would kill the Viceroy in six months if he attempted it. . . . Of all bad plans of government for India I can imagine none worse than an overworked Viceroy and irresponsible secretaries governing in his name. I believe the only remedy lies in a course the exact reverse of this, namely, to make the local Governments and administrations individually as strong and complete as possible, so that the Governor-General may govern through them, and may have time to attend to really imperial questions, and on them be able to ensure obedience to his orders. My object would be to make the Viceroy really supreme, and to have a real, concentrative authority. This, I believe, is to be attained by governing an Empire as an Admiral governs a fleet, by having absolute authority over every ship through captains, each of whom is equally absolute in his own ship. The present system makes every head of a department in the ship look, not to the captain but to the Admiral for orders in his own special department. The master, the purser, the gunnery lieutenant, the chaplain, all go direct to the Admiral instead of to the captain, who thus loses all real power of command. . . .

"The Admiral is overworked; he may think he commands the fleet, but the fact is the fleet is not governed at all. . . .

"It will task all your powers to ensure the obedience of your own people in the government of India to any orders you may issue with a view to diminish the present incessant meddling and interference. The tendency to meddle is almost universal in men trained in a departmental secretariat, and irresistible by those who are invested with authority nearly absolute; and if you would avoid being

swamped and smothered with details during your whole time in India, I think you cannot too soon begin to take measures which shall ensure your work being that of a Governor-in-Chief, and avoid the present system of wasting the Viceroy's time in doing over again what some subordinate ruler has already done, or could do, passably and sufficiently well."

In November, 1868, Lord Mayo sailed for India. His correspondence with Frere continued, and for some months long letters passed between them by almost every mail.

Frere writes to Sir James Fergusson :—

" May 25, 1869.

" Lord Mayo seems giving great satisfaction in India. His reception of Shere Ali has been a great success. The Whigs of Exeter Hall have tried to take credit for Lord Lawrence. . . .

" But people generally, I think, see that the thing might not have been done at all, had not a new man gone out, and could not have been done so well but for Lord Mayo's personal tact and judgment. I think a good proof of the success of what he has done may be found in the tone of the Russian press. They evidently feel that their own advance has been decidedly checked without giving them any ground for remonstrance or expression of objection. I only hope that our Foreign Office here will not make a mess of the whole thing. Lord Clarendon dreads the subject, and is too old to take it up and master it thoroughly."

And Lord Mayo writes to Frere almost at the same date :—

" May 27, 1869.

" I will not discuss the question as to whether the policy towards Affghanistan is altered. As I told Shere Ali, *we* are here to deal with the present and the future. There is one person, however, who is quite convinced of the change, and that is the Amecr himself, and that is all I care about. Let us now try and fringe India with strong, independent, friendly, though not altogether neutral, States, and we shall be in a position of strengthened safety we never were in

before. With this view I have so dealt with Shere Ali that he has gone home convinced of our power and goodwill, but also understands that he gets nothing more from us except he behaves well. . . .

"I am sick of the nonsense talked about Russia. They are on the Oxus, and they will stay there, and very likely they will try and come further. . . . The press at home is doing much harm in showing such an abject fear of Russian progress. Give me strong and friendly States where I think I could put them, and the more Russia pours civilization and commerce into Central Asia the better for us. With God's help you and I will never live to see a shot fired beyond the Indus; but if Russia were so demented as to attack us, with the assistance of Affghanistan and the wild tribes of the trans-Himalayan districts we could drive her across the Jaxartes in one summer campaign, and she knows this perfectly well, and she is not going to try it."

And on the same question of frontier policy he writes to Frere :—

"November 7, 1869.

"I am very sorry that portions of the Indian Bills fell through, particularly that which proposed to give the Governor-General power to make special regulations for certain districts. This was very much wanted, particularly on the north-west frontier, and would have enabled me to have carried out my policy of endeavouring to stop those expeditions of reprisals, which, I think you will agree with me, have never been successful, and reflect little credit either upon our administration or our arms. I took a very decided step in this direction in refusing to sanction, at the very earnest request of the Punjab Government, a second Huzara Expedition this year. The result has already gone far to prove that I was right and the Punjab Government was wrong. There has been no recurrence of those raids in the Agoor valley which they prophesied. The burning of the village of Shaloot, which was within our territory, will be quite sufficient punishment for the raids of last August, and I believe that a policy of observation and defence, with a sufficient force summarily to chastise on the spot, if circumstances permit, will be quite

sufficient to protect our subjects in the Huzara from insult and aggression. All the officials were very much discontented at first, but they are now beginning to see that we are determined to continue the policy which has been begun, and that they have no chance of winning distinction by burning unnecessarily crops and villages. . . . I am endeavouring to carry out the same policy on the south-east frontier with regard to the Looshais. . . .”

As for railways, the discovery of a deficit of two millions, owing to a blunder for which he was in no way responsible, added to Lord Mayo's difficulties. He writes to Frere :—

“September 8, 1869.

“I quite agree with all you say as to the extension of railways, but the deplorable position at which our finance in India has now arrived renders the difficulties in the way of speedy and large extension almost insuperable. I have no doubt that by courage and determination our finance can be restored to something like a healthy state. You will by the mail after next receive a despatch that will awaken those who are in a dream of Indian financial security, but you had better say nothing about this further at present as it will be all out in a fortnight. Probably you may hear it by telegraph before you receive this letter. It is rather hard upon me, within six months of my arrival in India and in the middle of the financial year to be obliged to take the initiatory steps for retrieving the blindness and blunders of the last four years. . . .”

“The indiscriminate way in which charges have been thrown upon imperial funds has paralyzed to a great extent local exertion and interest. . . .”

The number and bulk of Frere's official minutes and memoranda during this time on leading Indian questions testify to his untiring energy and his ready pen. And his official duties formed but a part of the work he got through. He published a memoir of his uncle, John Hookham Frere. He wrote two important articles and

part of a third in the *Quarterly Review*, and several articles in *Good Words* and *Macmillan* on Zanzibar, Livingstone, the East Coast of Africa, and the Persian Gulf. He gave a lecture at King's College on "India as a Career for Men of all Classes and Professions;" at the Society of Arts on "The Means of ascertaining Public Opinion in India;" at the Society of Architects on "Modern Architecture in Western India;" and for the Christian Evidence Society on "Christianity suited to all Forms of Civilization;" and he read many papers in different years at the Church Congress and British Association.

He was twice president of the Asiatic Society. In 1867 he was elected a Fellow of the Geographical Society, and his lecture on the "Runn of Cutch" was the first of many papers which he read there. The president, Sir Roderick Murchison, was getting into years, and allowed it to become known that he hoped Frere would be his successor. And though he twice declined to be put forward, Frere was elected president in his absence at Zanzibar in 1873, and in that capacity took a leading part in promoting a Search Expedition for Livingstone in 1874, and also in furthering an Arctic Expedition, which sailed in the following year.

Mr. Clements Markham, the present president of the Geographical Society, writes as follows of Frere's work in connection with the Society:—

"Sir Bartle Frere was on the Council of the Royal Geographical Society from 1868 until 1876—as vice-president from 1870 to 1872, and president in 1873–74. His uncle, Mr. Bartholomew Frere, was one of the seven founders of the Society. During the period of Sir Bartle's service he took a very active interest in geographical work. . . . He strongly urged that greater efficiency and activity should be infused into the naval surveying service, and he was always anxious to promote every enterprise



which had for its object the advancement of geographical science.

"Sir Bartle had been an accomplished geographer long before he was officially connected with the Society. In his many-sided way he had been accustomed to look at administrative questions in India from a geographical point of view, and he used to say that geography and statistics were the two bases of departmental work. His mind was well stored with the thoughts arising from this way of considering the innumerable points he had had to decide in his long official career. Hence he always had some original and often very valuable suggestion to make when geographical questions were discussed in his presence. He saw at once, with wonderful quickness and precision, in what way the broad principles, established in his mind through long consideration of the general subject, bore on any new point that came before him. His power of exposition was admirable, so that his own thoughts, never vague nor confused, were quickly conveyed in the clearest way to those with whom he acted. As a friend in council he had few equals, both from his thorough grasp of subjects under discussion, and from the extent and accuracy of his previous knowledge. Proposals and schemes which had long been in abeyance were quickly disposed of, and those which contained the germs of usefulness were put into practicable and working shape under his guidance. The indescribable charm of his manner had much to do with the smoothness and facility with which the official machinery worked under his presidency; but when it was necessary, he displayed unbending firmness.

"His great pleasure was to show kindness and consideration for young men whose work came before him, and to inspire them with confidence. He was quick in distinguishing real merit from charlatanry, however cleverly veiled; and the former always secured the gentlest and most patient attention at his hands. There was nothing which struck those with whom he acted so much as the total absence of any personal motive, however slight, in all he did or said.

"As to his own individual share in any measure or undertaking he was absolutely indifferent. In this he always seemed to be the purest type of a public servant. To him the general good was everything, his own share in

producing it absolutely nothing. Thus it was that there was many a suggestion made by him, many even matured plans which bore valuable fruit owing to his initiative, with which his name will never be connected in the remotest way. As a geographer, his knowledge was not only sound but, in many branches of the subject, and these far from being all connected with India, it was minute and detailed. He often displayed such detailed knowledge quite unexpectedly and on most unexpected points, so that where we only anticipated in him a general adviser we often found an expert.

"The present writer is merely stating his own thoughts and impressions, and his remarks only have reference to intercourse with Sir Bartle Frere as President of the Geographical Society and of the Club. That intercourse increased though it did not originate the deep feeling of regard, indeed of affection, which Sir Bartle caused among his geographical colleagues. They have the pleasure of knowing from the following letter how warmly that feeling was returned.

"May 13, 1884.

"I have given up all hope of ever again joining one of the most charming meetings of the kind I know—the Geographical Club. Will you take an early opportunity of expressing to the members the deep regret with which I sever my connection with the Club, and the sincere interest I shall always take in the institution, which, as far as I know, is unequalled in its object, as it is in the pleasure it always affords its members.' "\*

Frere had never attached himself definitely to any political party. He called himself a Pittite and a follower of Canning; and he belonged to a Conservative family and always recorded his vote on that side. He was once asked to stand for Bath as a Conservative; and on another occasion was invited to be a candidate "in the old Whig Liberal interest" for Edinburgh. Had he wished it, his being on the India Council was a bar to his being in

\* This letter was one of the last he ever dictated. He was not able even to sign it with his own hand.

Parliament. The Liberal party's attitude of "masterly inactivity" applied to Indian and Colonial affairs, so changed since Lord Palmerston's death, was repugnant to Frere's highly pitched estimate of the duties and obligations of British rule, and he was gradually repelled from any sympathy he may have had with the Liberal, and drawn into an increasingly close connection with the Conservative leaders. When the Conservative Government came into power in 1874, he gladly welcomed Lord Salisbury as head of the India Office, and for the three years that followed there was a frequent interchange of letters between them, the correspondence becoming increasingly voluminous and confidential as it went on.

If anything more had been wanting to confirm his allegiance to the Conservative Government, and to repel him from the opposite side, it would probably have been supplied by the publication, in September, 1876, of Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet on "Bulgarian Horrors." Frere was the last man in the Empire to wish to prolong or to palliate Turkish misrule. He had earnestly contended for the liberation of Egypt from Turkish control. He had in the course of his Zanzibar mission (as will appear later on) denounced to Mr. Gladstone's Government, though with little effect, Turkish aggression in the South of Arabia. He had complained of the encouragement given to Slavery and the Slave-trade on the Arabian coast by the Turks, and had urged, to little purpose, pressure being put on the Porte by the British Ambassador to stop it. He had at that very time (September, 1876) in the Press an article for the *Quarterly Review*, on "The Turkish Empire," in which he describes it as a "corpse" supported in an upright position by the "pressure of opposing forces." But, as he pointed out in another article in the same number of the *Quarterly Review*, written partly by him and partly by

the editor—the problem of the hour was to let the corpse fall, without an outbreak of European war between the great Powers whose interests were involved. The danger of war was so imminent, and fanatical passions on both sides were so heated, that it became the plain duty of every public man to calm, not to excite the public mind, in order that reason, not passion, might prevail; and nothing could have been more harmful, than for an influential statesman to lessen the chances of peace by an appeal, like Mr. Gladstone's, to ill-informed and unreasoning passion.

In the list of Minutes and Papers on Indian subjects, which he wrote during the time of his being on the India Council, his lecture at the Society of Arts in the autumn of 1873, on the threatened Bengal famine, and his letter to Sir John Kaye, in 1874, on Frontier Policy,\* are amongst the most important and characteristic. The dreadful Orissa famine in 1868 had attracted public attention in England to the subject of famines. In the summer of 1873 there had been a partial failure of rain and of crops in Bengal. The magnitude of the apprehended peril and of the measures necessary to avert it may be judged by the fact that, according to one estimate, three-eighths only of an ordinary crop could be relied on; about 125 millions of tons of food for Bengal must come from somewhere; the surplus of a good year was never more than half a million tons, so that there could be no considerable local stocks to rely on, and probably so much food might be required that its tonnage would exceed the whole of the usual annual tonnage of Bengal trade.†

Could this impending famine, and other famines, be prevented? Was it anybody's fault when they happened? Why do they take place in India and not in Western Europe?

\* Cited in chap. xiii., vol. i. p. 491.

† Sir B. Frere to the Duke of Argyll, December 20, 1873.

Frere's answer was, in brief, that famines occurred, and always had occurred, in countries which were undeveloped, uncivilized, and ill-administered. India was no doubt naturally more liable to a failure of crops than a European country, because agriculture was more dependent upon a rainfall which was uncertain. But this by itself was a very insufficient explanation.

There were many causes. Amongst them were the backwardness and restricted knowledge of agriculture ; the dependence of the populations of large districts on a single crop ; the absence of railways, and also of roads—for the country roads on the Indian plains generally became impassable after a few showers of rain,—so that there might be scarcity and abundance within a comparatively short distance ; the want of irrigation ; the separation and isolation of classes and castes, and their prejudices against any kind of food but that to which they were accustomed. Another cause was the imperfect administration and, in Bengal especially, the want of grasp and acquaintance of the district officers with the condition of the population, and consequent difficulty of obtaining reliable information, which arose mainly from the fact that that province was under special disadvantage from not having had, till within the preceding twenty years, a Lieutenant-Governor to manage it, and had been nominally managed by the Governor-General, who had too much else to do to be able to attend to the details of its administration.

As to prevention. When a famine was actually impending, it was essential, he pointed out, to do nothing to check the ordinary course of trade. The measure formerly resorted to of forbidding the export of corn, instead of increasing the stock of food, had a bad effect in many ways. It was an inducement to neighbouring native States to do the same in self-defence, and so make matters

worse ; and it paralyzed trade and thus interfered with the imports which would have come in in the ordinary course. In an emergency Government must purchase and import grain in large quantities ; but this, if it is done openly, does not interfere with trade, but rather stimulates it by encouraging the importation of grain from distant places to the ports where the Government purchases are made. Nor does the establishment of temporary relief-works, such as the making of roads or canals ; for money is thereby brought into the country with which food may be purchased, and by which at the same time communications are improved.

There was no natural or inherent incapacity in India, Frere maintained, to be protected from famine as completely as England. But there was a great deal to be done. He protested against the doctrine, lately come into fashion in the British Parliament, that India, being a poor country, could not afford to pay for more than the bare necessities of administration, or bear the burden of a charge for public works which did not yield a remunerative rate of interest. He maintained, on the contrary, that the Government should act in the spirit of a good landlord, not of a moneylender, looking for a return, not so much in interest on capital, as in the increased prosperity of the people, who would be benefited by works of irrigation, railways, roads, etc., out of all proportion to the slight increase of taxation.

“I have heard it said, ‘India is not as England ; even with the best means of communication the people will starve when their own crops fail.’ I could give many instances to prove the fallacy of this statement. I will only give one, which I select merely because I know the country well and can speak from personal knowledge of the facts. The instance I refer to relates to the district between the Godavery and the Toombudra rivers, in the Deccan, east of Poona. The tract may be roughly taken

at three hundred miles in length from north to south, and two hundred miles wide from east to west. . . .

"Tradition tells us of more than one great famine which caused the depopulation of the whole country, and its return to a state of uninhabited jungle. History bears out tradition, and sites of deserted villages are still shown which have never been inhabited 'since the great famine.'

"The people still reckon traditional events by years of scarcity. 'It was in the year of Holkar's, or Scindia's, or the Mogul's famine,' that is, when famine followed the marauding hordes of those great freebooting chieftains, or 'The year of the horse's nosebag,' or 'of the five handful,' meaning years when only a nosebagful, or five handful of grain could be bought for the rupee, which in ordinary years would have purchased a hundredweight.

"These are expressions I have often heard used by old people in talking of bygone days.

"There had been a severe visitation in 1832 and 1833; traces of its cost to Government in uncollected revenues and in advances to buy food were in every public account-book. One of my first experiences in Indian district life \* was an inquiry into cases where an attempt had been made to wring arrears from the half-starved survivors by actual torture; and famine waifs, in the shape of unclaimed scraps of property which had belonged to unknown fugitives from famine, who had died in their aimless flight from starvation, and children who had been sold by their parents to buy food, or who had been left by dead or starving parents, were to be found at most stations, in the public offices, or in mission-houses, or in places of temporary relief which had been provided for the famine-stricken. . . .

"But the most curious testimony of all is borne by the Duke of Wellington, who, as Major-General Wellesley, saw the district during the worst of the famine in 1803, when, in the campaign preceding the battle of Assaye, he marched his army through it from Mysore in an expedition which, for boldness and true precision in conception and energy in execution, may rank among his greatest exploits. He prepared exactly as he would have done for an expedition into the centre of Arabia, and describes how, in the last hundred and fifty miles, including the famous forced march of sixty miles by which he saved Poona, excepting

\* As assistant to Mr. Goldsmid, in 1834. See chap. ii. p. 22.

in one village, he did not see a human creature—so completely was the country desolated by war and famine. . . .

“Such was the state of the country close to the Peishwa’s capital seventy years ago. I have said that such things were possible forty years ago, but I believe they are now as impossible there as here, and why?”

The chief reasons are, he says, first, the method of administration of the land revenue, combined with the maintenance of the ancient Hindoo village system, which was a distinctive feature of that part of Western India. By its means was secured a continuous chain of administrative agency, from the poorest cultivator to the ruler, through which detailed information as to the cultivation, crops, trades, ownership, and the names of the village authorities great and small could be immediately obtained. Secondly, the great irrigation works executed by Colonel Fife and other engineers. Thirdly, the two branches of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway, which ran through the Deccan ; the improved roads, the telegraph, etc.

“Scarcity there may be, and often the able-bodied are obliged to go elsewhere in search of work, and to live on imported food ; but the population may be pronounced fairly safe against any but occasional isolated deaths from starvation. As a proof that this is not mere theory, I may mention that the seasons preceding 1867 were as nearly rainless, and caused as entire a loss of all crops and even of the usual supply of grass, as any season which the oldest person in the country could remember, and at one time prices began to rise to a pitch which threatened extreme scarcity and possible famine. But the local rise of prices had its natural effect in attracting grain from without. Considerable supplies were immediately sent to Poona from other neighbouring provinces, and advices sent by telegraph to Kurrachee, Busheir, and Bagdad caused immediate shipment of Punjab, Persian, and Mesopotamian millet and wheat from those ports, the news of which had an instantaneous effect in reducing prices at Poona and the neighbourhood, and the result was that, though the



people were straitened, they were fed with imported grain, bought at prices which were above the famine prices of forty years previously, but paid for by wages earned in Bombay, by the savings of former years, and by money lent on credit to men who were no longer hopelessly in their bankers' debt. None of these things would have been possible without a good revenue settlement fixing and moderating the demands of Government, still less would they have been possible without the railway and the telegraph and water-carriage from far distant ports to Bombay." \*

After Frere left India, the band of Wardens of the Sind Frontier, with their splendid record of service, had met with little support or encouragement. They grew disheartened, and one by one came home.

Sir Henry Green writes to Frere :—

"July 27, 1875.

"Harrison has just arrived from the Sind Frontier. He is the only one of the old school left, and will tell you the whole truth and nothing but the truth. He is a good man, as the following anecdote will prove. Soon after he was sent to Kelat the usual rebellion broke out, but the chiefs and their followers having lost all respect and fear for the British Government actually advanced to Kelat with the intention of attacking it. The Khan sent out his lot to meet them, and both parties faced each other at the village of Shalkoo, close to Kelat. Harrison having only moral power at his command, seated himself on a chair between the two armies and lit a pipe. More than one matchlock was levelled at him, but was knocked up by some chief; a parley ensued and the matter was settled. Another time the Khan was to have been shot on his road from Mustoong to Kelat. Harrison rode next him the whole distance and beyond a doubt saved his life. From his knowledge of the country and people, the respect that they have for him, and his long experience as well as his upright and plucky character, point to him as a man whose services will be invaluable at no very distant date; but unfortunately he is *disgusted* with the state of affairs and wants to leave the frontier. He has

\* The Bengal Famine, p. 51.

had to serve two masters at the same time—Merewether and Phayre—and to satisfy both. You know what that means. A few kind words from you might change his resolution. I write for the good of the service, as I know how much the very existence of India depends upon the individual character of the agents employed by Government.”

And Sir W. Merewether writes to the same effect :—

“ June 7, 1876.

“ The break up of Jacob’s system naturally caused great disappointment to and discontent among those officers who had been educated by him, had striven zealously to qualify themselves in the line of policy he had initiated and made successful, and who looked to rise in their turn to the higher positions. Macauley and others resigned, having lost all interest in the work, and, to complete the disheartening to the remainder, strange officers, quite inexperienced in the country and people, were put into the vacant high places above them.”

As regarded the Khan of Kelat, Merewether went on to complain, Frere’s and Jacob’s policy of strengthening him, keeping him straight by sound advice, and enabling him to control his wild and unruly vassals, had fallen into abeyance. His authority had been weakened, and divided counsels, an uncertain policy, and a want of confidence in British consistency and sincerity had been the consequence.

The Shah of Persia, in the spring of 1875, expressed a wish to renew the friendly relations which had formerly existed with Great Britain, and asked for the assistance of British officers to train and discipline his army. The question arose whether this request should be complied with.

Lord Napier of Magdala, at that time Commander-in-Chief in India, wrote a memorandum in favour of compliance. It was true, he said, that the Persians were fickle

and unreliable; it was possible they might have some agreement with Russia, and that diplomatic complications with Russia might arise; but he thought there was much greater danger, ultimately, in inaction, in the "shrinking policy" of nothing but fruitless protest, until the Russian bases of action should have been formed on salient points on the frontier of India, and perhaps the northern part of Persia occupied by them. He would send to the Persian Embassy military officers, carefully selected, acquainted with the Persian language, of genial manners and disposition calculated to disarm enemies and make friends. To counteract any jealousy which such action might excite in Shere Ali's mind, he proposed to send a native envoy to Cabul, whose business it would be to gain his confidence, and to intimate to him that it was necessary for our mutual interests that we should have agents to ascertain what was going on in Central Asia, and give us warning of anything likely to affect us injuriously.

A copy of this memorandum Napier sent to Frere, who replied—

"May 28, 1875.

"Your admirable memorandum on Persia will be every way valuable, and may lead to our Government taking some decided step to put a limit to the advance of Russia on Persia, of which I had begun to despair.

"Many influential people, notably the Duke of Cambridge, and, I think, Lord Salisbury, entirely agree with you, but there is a strong party the other way—Lawrence, and the Duke of Argyll, and the large body of Liberal doctrinaires who are for 'peace at any price for the present, and let war or anything else come, if it will, on our successors.'

"Mr. Disraeli sees no popular call for more active measures, and things which would have caught his eye and fired his fancy twenty years ago fail to move him now.

"I think Lord Derby very much agrees with you. But

his great caution is an obstacle to striking while the iron is hot.

“I think Lord Salisbury will probably make an effort to press on the Viceroy the need for more active measures to enable us to know what goes on in the west and north-west of India; but I need not tell you that if the Viceroy is determined to recognize no need for action, and persists in waiting till the need for action is clear to all mankind, he will act, if he acts at all, too late; and if he is determined not to act, it is not easy to force him to act to any good purpose.”

## CHAPTER XVI.

### THE ZANZIBAR MISSION.

East African Slave-trade—Frere goes to Paris—Rome—Naples—Cairo—Interview with the Khedive—Zanzibar—Burghash obdurate—*Enchantress* sails to the South—Majunga—The Hovas—Johanna—Incident at Kilwa—Return to Zanzibar—Departure—Frere's parting shot—Muscat—Return to England—Burghash signs the Treaty—He comes to England—Death of Livingstone—Essay on Indian Missions.

THE last chapter of the history of the negro slave-trade was, at the time, generally thought to be completed by the result of the American Civil War and the collapse of slavery in the United States. The European Powers had long been united, with greater or less sincerity and zeal, in seeking to effect its abolition; and the adhesion of the United States, whose attitude had hitherto been doubtful, gave a unanimity of support to its prohibition, which the Powers were now strong enough, if they had the will, to impose upon the whole world.

The occasion was not long wanting. It became known that slaves, who had been kidnapped under circumstances of horrible atrocity in the interior, were being exported in large and yearly increasing numbers from Zanzibar, Kilwa, and other places on the east coast, to the ports of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. The dhows in which they were shipped, running with their latcen sails spread before

the south-west monsoon, could distance any steamer then on the coast. The English squadron, inadequate in numbers and equipment for the special service, and without the means of obtaining timely information, zealously as its men and officers performed their arduous duties, could do little to check the traffic. The captures which they made scarcely compensated for the increase of suffering caused to the slaves by the increased crowding and the precautions taken by their masters against capture.

England, when Lord Palmerston was in power, had been wont to take the lead in the contest with the slave-trade ; and it belonged especially to England to do so in the present case, because the Zanzibar territory, whence nearly all the slaves were shipped, was, or might be at will, almost as much under British influence as a Native State of India ; and the East African merchants who profited by the traffic were most of them Banians—British subjects from India. But Palmerston was gone, and in place of his spirit of vigorous initiative, which did not wait for orders from the public or the press, “ masterly inactivity ” was in the ascendant.

In his evidence before the Slave-trade Committee (July 17, 1871) Frere said (answer 448)—

“ It appears to me that the cardinal evil which you have to deal with is the oscillation of our own opinions in the matter. Up to about the time when Lord Palmerston died for many years the general opinion of all parties in England had been in favour of a determination to put a stop to the slave-trade . . . and the whole weight of the Government influence had been put on the side of suppressing it. . . . Our Government, representing public opinion, appears to me of late years to have been very half-hearted in the matter. The first thing seems to me to be to make up our own minds with regard to what is to be done, and whether we really are in earnest, as we were twenty-five or thirty years ago.”

And he writes to Mr. Gifford Palgrave :—

“August 31, 1868.

“I am sure you would find little difficulty in making a settlement of the slave-trade questions connected with Zanzibar. The only real difficulty is to get the Government and influential classes in England to make up their minds as to what they want. At present they want all sorts of incompatible things. Some want to respect our Zanzibar treaties, some to override them; some to stop the slave-trade, some to develop sugar and coffee and all sorts of produce which are difficult to manage with free labour; some to economize our naval expenditure, others to keep up our East African squadron. And both the Indian and English Governments think that, by shutting their eyes and doing nothing, they can avoid the diplomatic entanglements and the outlay of money which they so much dread. . . .”

But at last the truth in all its dreadful details was forced on the attention of the public by Dr. Livingstone's published letters, and sympathy was aroused by his devoted efforts to bring light to bear on the condition of the countries he was exploring. He described the country for several hundred miles inland from the coast as absolutely depopulated by the Arab slave merchants. They now had to penetrate into the interior to make their captures, and, during their march to the coast, the most horrible sufferings were undergone by the slaves. The supply in the interior being practically inexhaustible, their captors were careless how many perished by the way. Gangs of several hundreds were yoked together in groups with forked sticks and driven to the coast. Those who were too weak, or too starved, to proceed, or who tried to escape—men, women, and children—were stabbed or clubbed to death, or unyoked and left to die. The track of a slave-gang was marked all the way by decaying bodies. During the five years ending September, 1867, it was estimated

that about a hundred and fifteen thousand slaves reached the coast, and were exported to Zanzibar, Arabia, and other places.\*

Dr. Livingstone, in "Zambesi and its Tributaries," says—

"Would that we could give a comprehensive account of the horrors of the slave-trade, with an approximation to the number of lives it yearly destroys; for we feel sure that, were even half the truth told and recognized, the feelings of men would be so thoroughly roused, that this devilish traffic in human flesh would be put down at all risks; but neither we nor any one else have the statistics necessary for a work of this kind. Let us state what we know of one portion of Africa, and then every reader who believes our tale can apply the ratio of the known misery to find out the unknown. Let it not be supposed for an instant that those taken out of the country represent all the victims; they are but a very small section of the sufferers. Besides those actually captured, thousands are killed or die of their wounds and famine, driven from their villages by the slave raid; thousands in internecine war, waged for slaves with their own clansmen and neighbours, slain by the lust of gain which is stimulated by the slave purchasers. The many skeletons we have seen amongst rocks and woods, by the little ports, and along the paths of the wilderness, attest the awful sacrifice of human life, which must be attributed, directly or indirectly, to this trade of hell. We would ask our countrymen to believe us when we say, as we conscientiously can, that it is our deliberate opinion, from what we know and have seen, that not one-fifth of the victims of the slave-trade ever become slaves. Taking the Shire valley as an average, we should say not even one-tenth arrive at their destination."

A Committee on the East African Slave-trade, appointed by Lord Clarendon, had reported in January, 1870, and a Committee of the House of Commons in 1871; and early in the following year, Lord Granville, who had

\* Mr. Churchill, British Consul at Zanzibar, quoted in Hutchinson's "Slave-Trade of East Africa," p. 31.



succeeded Lord Clarendon at the Foreign Office, had addressed communications on the subject to the French Government. In the summer of 1872 a public meeting, convened by the Anti-Slavery Society, was held at the Mansion House; in August, the Queen's speech, proroguing Parliament, announced an intention to take action, and, on September 27, Lord Granville wrote to Frere, asking him to undertake a temporary mission to Zanzibar for the purpose of negotiating a new treaty with the Sultan, and of organizing a more efficient mode of dealing with the slave-trade.

Frere had taken a leading part in the matter, speaking at public meetings and acting in conjunction with the Anti-Slavery Society in pressing the question on the Government; but so little had he any idea of being himself sent as envoy, that he had already suggested and recommended Colonel Pelly as an officer in every way competent to undertake such a duty, if entrusted with the means necessary to carry it out.

In the expectation that Pelly, who was then British Resident in the Persian Gulf, would be appointed, Frere, to save the mail, had written at once to prepare him.

"September 27, 1872.

"I have some reason for hoping that the execution of a fresh treaty with Muscat and Zanzibar may be entrusted to you. I have stated very strongly that I believe you to be better fitted than any man I know to carry out such a mission, and in the hope that my advice, as to the selection of an envoy at least, may be taken, I will try shortly to describe the present position of affairs here. Should Her Majesty's Government make any other selection, I am quite sure that what I now tell you is perfectly safe with you, and that you will treat it as strictly confidential.

"We have all, and no one more than yourself, preached in vain for years past that slavery and the slave-trade were on the increase on the East African coast, and in

your seas. No one in power here heeded. But the tales told by Livingstone have startled and shocked the public conscience (for the public here has a conscience, though not a very observant or sensitive one), and Her Majesty's Government begin to think that the subject must be taken up.

"You know the whole subject so well that I need not give you the reasons why I and many others have urged that no measures of repression will be of any use unless—

"1. We secure the hearty acquiescence and co-operation of Muscat and Zanzibar, making all transport of slaves by sea penal, without limitation of coast line.

"2. Unless we enable them to observe their engagements with us, which requires that Muscat should receive, and Zanzibar cease to have to pay, the subsidy settled by Lord Canning and Coghlan—£8000.

"3. That therefore our best plan to secure the two first objects is to relieve Zanzibar from the payment and pay it ourselves. . . .

"You ought to have full powers both from Her Majesty's Foreign Office and the Viceroy, and have large discretion in every way. . . ."

The appointment was, however, pressed upon Frere; and he accepted it, following his rule of asking for nothing, but taking the work that came. Leave was granted him from the India Office. He stipulated for full powers and support from all the departments of the State, and at Lord Granville's request he drew up a memorandum of instructions to himself which was approved and adopted.

It was an important element in the success of the mission that it should not only represent the Queen's Government, but should also be the medium of conveying a strong and unanimous expression of opinion on the Slave-trade Question from all the European Powers known on the East Coast of Africa. Accordingly, assurances were asked for and given by the French, German, Italian, and Portuguese Governments that they approved of the objects

of the mission, and would instruct their consuls to support it. The French Government, perhaps too sore under recent troubles at home to attend to matters at a distance, were understood to be somewhat lukewarm,\* and it was arranged that Frere should take Paris and Rome on his way, and obtain, if possible, additional assurances of support.

He left England on November 21, taking with him Mr. (now Sir) Clement Hill of the Foreign Office, Mr. Charles Grey of the India Office, Captain Fairfax, R.N., representing the Admiralty, Major (now Sir Charles) Euan Smith as his private secretary, Dr. Badger, the great Arabic scholar, as interpreter. His son Bartle, who had just left Eton, also accompanied him. Subsequently he was joined by Colonel Pelly, who at Frere's request had been attached to the mission, and by Kazi Shahabudin, a Minister of the Rao of Cutch, a native state on the north-west coast of India, adjoining Sind, whom he took as a representative of the Banians—the name given to the trading-class of Hindoos, most of whom come from Cutch, and by whom almost all the trade on the East Coast of Africa is carried on.

At Paris he called on M. Thiers and on M. de Rémusat, the Foreign Minister, who informed him that the French Consul at Zanzibar was now on leave, and that no instructions had been sent to him. He however promised that he should be instructed to support the objects of the mission.

At Rome he had an interview with the king, Victor Emmanuel.

\* M. Schoelcher, a member of the French Government, had in a speech in the House of Representatives distorted the annual payment by the Sultan of Zanzibar to the Sultan of Muscat into a payment to the English Government for a licence to carry on the slave-trade! The statement was, on the remonstrance of Lord Lyons, afterwards withdrawn.

He writes to Miss Frere :—

“December 4, 1872.

“We picked up Sir A. Paget at the Legation and drove to the Quirinal—the palace with the horses grouped round the obelisk in front—and entered it by the gate in front of which poor Cardinal Rossi was shot in 1848. An aide-de-camp, in a cavalry uniform very like the Bombay Lancers, received us, and the private secretary soon came in, a sharp little man, who told us the king had ordered a gold medal to be prepared, which he would ask me to take for Livingstone. Soon after His Majesty called from the inner room, and the aide-de-camp ushered in Sir A. Paget and me. (The suite to be presented had been limited to three, and Hill, Badger, and Smith were with me as the three chief.) He received us standing, shook hands, and began to talk in very bad French, very sensibly, and, as if he was well informed on the subject of the mission, said he had ordered a medal to be prepared, and asked me to convey it to Dr. Livingstone. I told him of a copy of Badger’s translation of Ludovico di Varthema, the Bolognese traveller in the sixteenth century, which I had had bound for him, and which he graciously promised to accept, asking many pertinent questions about it and East Africa. After about a quarter of an hour he told me I might introduce my suite, and he said a few words to each very graciously, and shook hands on our taking our leave.”

Frere had conversations with Venosta, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with Sella, the Finance Minister, and with other leading men, who all took an interest in his mission, and to whom he pointed out the commercial advantages which might result to Italy from the opening up of the African coast. He also obtained, through Mr. Clarke Jervoise, a copy of a circular letter which had been addressed by the Secretary of the Propaganda to the heads of all the Roman Catholic Missions on the East Coast of Africa, who had under their care many African children, and whose concurrence and co-operation would be likely to be of value in considering the question of the disposal of liberated slaves. Monsignore Howard, formerly an English

guardsman, and then just made an Archbishop, who he found had a grateful recollection of his reception a few years before at Government House, Bombay, begged to be allowed to arrange for his seeing the Pope. Frere and his suite accordingly went one morning to the Vatican—in evening dress, not in uniform, as it was an informal visit—and met with a kind and sympathetic reception from the Pope, who stood all alone in a large room in his white dress to receive them, and conversed with Frere about his plans, ending by giving his blessing, with an expression of regret that he had now nothing more substantial to give.

From Rome he went on to Naples, where, after some trouble, he succeeded in discovering an institution he had heard much of at Rome—the Collegio dei Mori, on the Capo di Monte,—an establishment for the industrial education of Africans, managed by a Franciscan Friar, Lodovico da Casaria. The Monastery had escaped suppression as being an educational establishment, and moreover without endowment. Fra Lodovico “must be a man” (Frere writes) “of immense zeal, energy, resource, and powers of organization, for he maintains the Collegio, etc., as well as the Girls’ School here, and two similar institutions in Egypt, entirely by the alms he collects.” There were thirty brethren, and thirty or forty boys. The most obvious defect of the place, to Frere’s English notions, was the want of cleanliness. He says—

“December 7, 1872.

“As to the spirit in which the work is done no outsider can be a very competent judge, but my impressions were those of apathetic resignation in the dozen or so of brethren we saw, rather than of any active spirit of devotion, and of a life which, though one of privation to an educated gentleman brought up in the luxuries of modern social life, is by no means so hard as the ordinary life of

the class whence the Franciscan brethren are chiefly recruited. With the boys it is different; to poor orphans from the city the change to the pure air and sufficient wholesome food of the Collegio may be a physical benefit, despite the dreary cold and dirty passages and cells in which they live, and which are probably better than in their former homes. But after seeing their cells, I was not surprised to hear that the mortality of the 'Mori' pupils had been so great from chest complaints and other diseases attributed to the climate, that Fra Lodovico had reduced the numbers as low as possible, and retained only those who were intended for the Priesthood—keeping all others in two establishments which he had in Egypt. For all, old and young, I feel sure that a good matron and nurse would save much sickness and mortality at the Collegio; but such an addition to a Monastery would be worse than all that Garibaldi could invent to uproot them, and so a Protestant may be allowed to prefer institutions where matrons and nurses are possibilities."

From Naples they went to Brindisi, where the Admiralty yacht *Enchantress*, a paddle-steamer of eight hundred tons, was waiting for them. They sailed to Alexandria, stopping a day at Corfu, and went by railway to Cairo, where they stayed a week. Cairo was not in the programme, and Frere had no special instructions with regard to it. But Egypt was the ultimate destination of many of the slaves which came from East Africa, and the Slave Question had to be taken in hand there as well as at the other end of the chain. Colonel Stanton, the British Consul, was most efficient and helpful. They went together to see the Khedive, and Frere seems at once to have gained his confidence.

He writes to Lady Frere:—

"December, 1872.

"His Highness met us at the door of the first room, and, after I had introduced all my staff, Bartle included, led us to an inner room overlooking the courtyard, where he

seated himself in an armchair in the corner by the window, put me on a sofa on his right, Stanton on his left, and the rest round the room. After some ordinary talk, he said he wished to speak to me very fully and confidentially on the subject of my mission, and I having given a signal to the staff to retire into the ante-room, he gave me and Stanton nearly an hour's discourse, speaking very fluently in French, and expressing himself with great force and clearness. I told him briefly what were the reasons of our mission and its objects, and he showed far more knowledge of the whole subject and its difficulties, and far more intelligent interest in the matter than any statesman, not being an Englishman, I have met, and there are not many Englishmen who are at all equal to him in grasp of the subject. He said he had no doubt the Sultan of Zanzibar or 'Imaum,' as he pointedly called him, if well advised, would do all we asked him in the way of promising to stop slave-trade and to shut up the slave markets; but there were things the Imaum could, and things he could not do, and our difficulty would be to get him to do all he would promise, and to protect him against the northern Arabs and others who would try to force him to let the present state of things continue. As for the question in Egypt, he did not wish to be put on a level with Zanzibar. He claimed for Egypt the position of being a leader in the civilization of Africa, and he was very sensible of the serious obstacle which slavery and slave-trade opposed to her maintaining such a position, and to the progress of civilization; but we must not forget the distinction between the two. Slave-trade, he hoped, and undertook, if supported by England, effectually to put down. He and his predecessors had done much to check it. (I told him I could testify to this from personal observation, and recounted my personal experience since 1834, which seemed to please him much.) It was no longer permitted by law, though no doubt carried on secretly. He did not think more than four hundred were now imported annually. (Colonel Stanton suggested a thousand. 'Well,' his Highness said, 'say a thousand, *par exagération*.' ) This was much less than formerly, and he hoped to extinguish it, and would promise to do so if he had the moral support of England. He had gone to great expense with Baker's expedition, and though much disappointed at the result, he felt

sure it had greatly checked slave-trade on the White Nile. . . .

"With regard to slavery the case was different. He held it equally in abhorrence, and hoped to do much to abolish it. But you could not get rid of it by a *coup de sabre*. It had existed in Egypt long before Mahommedanism, and could only be extinguished gradually, as people got more enlightened and as a class of free servants to do the same work grew up. There was at present a great want of such free labour. He had done what he could by establishing an industrial school for training servants, and little by little he hoped to civilize his people in this as in other things; but he wanted the moral support of England and other civilized nations, and that they should supply him with a motive which should account to his people for his fresh action in the matter. In reply to my question how His Highness thought this could be done, he said, 'Well, as an example, you have a society which charges itself with this particular duty of repressing slavery—the Anti-Slavery Society. If your Government send me a memorial from them, asking that I should take more active measures for the suppression of slave-trade, it will account to my people for my taking fresh action in the matter, and will involve no diplomatic difficulty with Turkey. But, without the moral support of European nations, and especially of Great Britain, my progress must be very slow.' \*

"After taking leave of him we called on the Prime Minister and *ad interim* Foreign Minister, Sherrieff Pacha, and, not finding him at his house or office, were driving home, when we met him going to call on me at the hotel, and went there together. He is a most intelligent, agreeable Turkish gentleman, speaks excellent French, and is more in manner and appearance like an Anglicised Frenchman or German than an Arab. . . . He sat for an hour, talking and smoking, very much as any English gentleman

\* About two months afterwards, in accordance with this suggestion, a meeting of the Anti-Slavery Society was held at the Mansion House to arrange for a petition to the Khedive. Unfortunately it was foolishly *published* at the meeting that the Khedive wished for pressure to be put on him. Naturally, when this became known in Egypt, it defeated the object of the meeting.—Mr. Wylde to Sir B. Frere, March 14, 1873.



might have done, and as intelligently and agreeably. Colonel Stanton seems a great favourite with them all, as you can easily believe."

At the Khedive's request Frere went a second time to see him.

"His Highness gave me nearly an hour of what Stanton said was one of the most remarkable conversations he had ever heard from him. It was a very clear and well-stated account, not only of his views regarding Abyssinia, but of his whole position as the head of the most liberal and progressive Government in Africa, sorely tried by French meddling and anxiety to make Egypt a French province and His Highness himself a French Prefect, and not effectually backed by England when his views and interests were identical with ours. He was very sore about our playing into the hands of the French by opposing his judicial reforms. At present every European nation protects its own subjects, and interferes with the local legal tribunals in all matters in which European subjects are concerned. Of course this is galling even when, as in the case of the English, there is no wish on the consul's part to screen the wrongdoer; but it is intolerable when Greeks and French shamelessly uphold the scum of their own people in their crimes and frauds committed in Egypt, and do not allow justice to be done. The Khedive says, 'I will have good tribunals; let all men appear before them.' And this, which we should support in India, we refuse to him, mistrusting his tribunals, for which I should say, speaking as an old Indian, we have no just ground.

"He was very earnest over the Abyssinian Question, which he discussed at great length, earnestly denied all schemes of conquest in that direction, which he argued would be simply madness, not only from the difficulty of the country, but from the religious dissensions which would be sure to involve him with every European Power, and which he pictured with great humour.

"Colonel Stanton had told him of a case of slave-dealing, reported by the French, in which His Highness's own mother, a lady of great influence with him, was said to have been concerned, trying to get fifty slaves for her grandchildren's *trousseaux*. His Highness said he had made a great stir directly Colonel Stanton told him,

was assured the whole was an invention of the French Vice-Consul, a noted rogue. However, he would send off a man-of-war at once to inquire at Massowa and let him know the result. (This we heard at Suez His Highness had done. He evidently believed that we should look in and inquire, and told his captain to take a corvette and steamer despatch-boat and to get down before us and make inquiry. The captain came on board the *Enchantress* at Suez and made most particular inquiry as to when we should start, where we should touch, and how many days we could steam, and how fast.)

"I told him I should, as in duty bound, report all he had told me to Lord Granville, and he earnestly begged me to do so. When we left, he came downstairs further, Stanton said, than he usually did, except to royalty, and he evidently meant to be very gracious—and certainly he is the ablest and most agreeable man that, in my very limited acquaintance with sovereigns, I have ever met. . . ."

A day or two later the Khedive invited all the party to breakfast with him, in the course of which he told Frere that, "if I saw no objection, he would write to the Imaum, as a friend, as one Moslem would write to another, to advise him earnestly to carry out all we asked him to do."

In Egypt, as at Naples, Frere sought out schools where slave children would be taken. Amongst other people he saw Miss Whately, who had devoted herself to schoolwork there.

"Her testimony was, like that of all unofficial persons that slavery, and, in consequence, slave-trade, is increasing as luxury increases; and that, unless the Government abolish slavery, as it has been abolished in India and elsewhere, it will increase as riches increase."

He went with Lady Eyre to see some schools of negro girls kept by Franciscan nuns.

"There are about sixty or seventy in all, of European or Syrian and Egyptian parentage, and about thirty or forty negro girls, bought as slaves, mostly very ill or

dying, 'as a healthy child costs more than the poor sisters can afford.' There are about forty sisters, mostly French, Italians, and Germans, and one Maltese who spoke a little English. They have no property but the alms they collect; when a man has a slave-child likely to die, or to be long ill, he brings it to them as his last hope of turning a penny by it, and they give him five, fifteen, sometimes as much as twenty Napoleons, if they can afford it, and, if the seller is a Turk who will abate nothing *pour amour du bon Dieu*, baptize it, and, if it is likely to live, get a consular certificate of sale and freedom. Most of the poor little creatures die, but many live and grow up, and they have generally more than thirty—an untoward generation, as the poor sisters described, mentally, morally, and physically, most of them hopeless little savages, often sickly from long ill-treatment and want, with no notion of truth or honesty, and a curious insensibility to gratitude. It made my heart ache to hear them in their poor, barely furnished room tell of all their trials and privations and disappointments, so humbly and cheerfully borne; few, very few, of the negro girls were ever fit to be admitted to vows, but some were. . . .

"Smith and Hill, in an expedition to old Cairo, managed with much difficulty to find Monsignor Daniel Cambone, Pro-Vicar-Apostolic of Central Africa. He was not at home, but having heard from Rome of our mission, and of the wish of the authorities there that he should do all he could for us, he came while we were at dinner, and we had a long and very interesting talk. He is a stout, good-humoured, resolute-looking man of about forty, speaks English intelligibly, and French and German fluently, and Arabic, and any number of negro dialects. He has been many years in Central Africa, and is now acting as Vicar-Apostolic from the Arabian Sea to Senegambia, over a population of eighty millions, of whom one million yearly, he calculates, are sacrificed as slaves. Their head-quarters were originally at Khartoum, on the White Nile, where they lost, in fourteen years, thirty-five out of thirty-nine brethren; but he proposes moving away from the river to Kordofan, a fine province, very populous and healthy. He is to start in a few weeks with forty persons—brethren, Sisters of Charity, etc., to establish their Kordofan Mission. He does not advocate educating the negroes as missionaries, either in Central Africa, where they cannot be properly

trained, nor in Europe, where they die, or get spoiled by becoming too Europeanized. He would have his university half way, at Cairo, and this, I think, is wise. . . .

"I cannot tell you how I was struck by the great progress of every kind—good and evil—even since we were here last. The Frank is greatly on the increase, and in the ascendant—not the Frank of any one country, for French influence has notably declined, and we seem to be in favour, mainly because we are supposed to be least inclined to territorial aggression. But His Highness seems to feel that his only chance is by adhering to Western civilization and getting free from the dead body of Turkish domination. He seems to have little sympathy with his father Ibrahim's or Abbas Pacha's plans for making Egypt a Syrian or Arabian power. A far easier and more safe and extended empire is before him, carrying out Mehmet Ali's idea as leader of African civilization. . . . His dangers are going too fast for the Turks or too slow for the Franks, besides the financial risks which beset all but very steady-going and old-fashioned Governments. . . .

"Slavery and the slave-trade are to him real and not sentimental dangers. He sees enough of race and class hatreds and prejudices not to wish to see a serf or slave caste grow up in Egypt. The fellah has been the backbone of the State from Joseph's time to this, and Pharaoh would not gain by converting the fellah into a landed proprietor or tenant farmer with negro slaves for labourers. Unless he goes with us in this matter, he will lose all title in the eyes of all the labouring men in the world to pretend to be a leader of African or any other civilization. . . ."

Frere and his party rejoined the *Enchantress* at Suez, and arrived at Aden on the last day of the year, finding there Colonel Pelly, who had come from India to join the party, and who went on in the *Punjab* to meet them at Zanzibar. At Aden Frere found matters in so unsatisfactory a condition that he wrote immediately to Sir Henry Elliot, the Ambassador at Constantinople, and a few days later to Lord Granville to the same effect.

\* Sir B. Frere to Lord Granville, January 10, 1873.

"January 2, 1873.

"I had heard something of Turkish aggression on these coasts, but I was to-day astounded to learn from the Resident here, Brigadier-General Schneider, that a Turkish Mushir, now fully established with a considerable force at Sanaa, some miles from this, has ventured in writing to summon the chief of Lahej, a stipendiary of ours, to attend his camp and submit himself formally to the Turkish Government; and I was, if possible, more astonished to find that this had been fully and ably reported by the Resident here on October 26, and that he has not yet received instructions how to act. . . ."

The Chief of Lahej, it will be remembered, was Merewether's ally, in conjunction with whom he had pacified the disturbed country round Aden, and enabled the inhabitants to bring in supplies without molestation. He was now threatened with a descent upon his country by the Turkish Mushir, if he did not obey his summons.

"As regards Aden, the garrison and port drew their nearest and best supplies of grain, vegetables, fruit, forage, firewood, meat, and, above all, fresh water from the belt of low country which intervenes between the sea and the mountains on the road to Senaa, which was plainly visible in the distance. There the cattle imported from the African coast are pastured till required for sale to the garrison or shipping, and thousands of the Arab inhabitants of the plain country furnish day labour in Aden, which a few years ago was imported at great expense from India or Africa. Any interruption of these supplies, or any disturbance of the peace in the country from whence they are drawn, would affect Aden like a hostile investment. . . . To produce all this inconvenience it is not necessary that the Turks should act in any way hostilely towards us. A military demonstration, such as the Resident reports, is now threatened, or the employment of a few thousand Arab levies to occupy Lahej would 'eat up' the country as effectually as a hostile army; and the blundering or oppression, which are not unknown in distant Turkish Pashaliks, might paralyze agriculture for months or years before the cry for redress was heard at

Constantinople. . . . The Chief is naturally in a state of the utmost alarm, and came into Aden while I was staying at the Residency to ask General Schneider's advice, which, in the absence of instructions from England or India, it was not easy to give."

In this matter was involved also the larger question of the claim which the Turks were putting forth to the sovereignty of Nejd Yemen and Oman, a great part of Arabia, a claim which had been expressly repudiated by the British, as void of foundation, when Aden was first occupied, and which, if now acquiesced in, was likely not only to give an impulse to the slave-trade and enable it to be carried on under cover of the Turkish flag, but in the future would be likely to have the most disquieting effect on the Mahommedan population of India.

Eight days' steaming from Aden brought the *Enchantress* to Zanzibar after sundown on January 12. In the harbour were the British men-of-war *Glasgow*, *Briton*, and *Daphne*, and the American *Yantic*. Next morning Mr. Hill went on shore and called upon the German and American Consuls and on the acting Consul for France, to ascertain if they were fully informed as to the objects of the mission. It was at once evident that no assistance or sympathy was to be expected from them, though subsequently the German Consul, in conformity with instructions from Berlin, did loyally give his support.

In the afternoon, the whole party, forty-eight in number, including the officers off duty from the three men-of-war, and, by invitation, Captain Wilson and the officers of the *Yantic*, went ashore in full uniform for a formal reception by the Sultan. They passed in procession up a narrow street, lined by the Sultan's Persian and Arab Guards, beyond whom was a throng of respectful and orderly Arabs and negroes. The Sultan, Seyid Burghash, who

was previously known to Frere when at Bombay, met them about thirty yards from his door—it was an unusual compliment for him to advance so far—and shook hands with Frere and all his staff. All then entered the house and sate down. After the usual compliments Frere presented the Royal letter. On receiving it, His Highness rose, all present following his example, and, according to Eastern custom, raised it to his head as a mark of respect. The other letters were then handed to him, and after more introductions and conversation the Durbar ended.

Next day the Sultan returned the visit, being towed to the *Enchantress* in his barge.

The three main provisions of the treaty proffered for the Sultan's acceptance were : that all transport of slaves by sea should cease absolutely ; that the public slave-markets should be closed ; and that the subsidy due to Muscat, and which was in arrear, should be paid.

By the former treaty of 1845, to avoid interfering with the cultivation of the country, the transport of slaves by sea had been permitted to continue under certain limitations between the mainland and the island of Zanzibar. But this concession had been grossly abused. It was notorious that of the slaves brought to Zanzibar the immense majority were sold to dealers, who exported them to the ports of the Red Sea, Arabia, and the Persian Gulf, which was expressly forbidden by the treaty. As to the payment of the Muscat subsidy, it was known that, owing to a dreadful hurricane in the previous year, which had destroyed most of his ships and made havoc of the crops and trees, the Sultan was much impoverished, and therefore discretion was left to Frere, if compliance was shown on the other points, to undertake on the part of the British Government to discharge this liability for him.

The Sultan was sore perplexed. He was very anxious to

please Frere and the British Government, but he feared that the consequences of yielding to their demands would be to endanger his authority over his subjects. His Council of Arab relatives and headmen were against any concessions, and they told him plainly that if he gave way they would look elsewhere for a Sultan.

The post of English Consul had been for some time vacant, and the duties were being discharged by the Surgeon and Political Agent, Dr. (afterwards Sir John) Kirk. Frere lost no time in writing to Sir Philip Wodehouse, then Governor of Bombay, to say that "he is one of the best men we have ever had here," and expressing a strong opinion that he should at once be appointed Consul—which was done, with good results, as will be seen.

The attitudes of the other consuls Frere describes as follows, in a letter to Lord Granville :—

"February 1, 1873.

"The German Consul, Mr. Schultz, had not, I believe received any instructions till we arrived, and personally was not inclined to any change in the present state of affairs, under which his own house has prospered greatly. But directly he got his instructions from Berlin he supported us manfully, asked Colonel Pelly, who is an old friend and colleague, to go with him to the Sultan, and urged on His Highness, both officially and personally, the necessity of putting an end to the Slave-trade by consenting to what all civilized Europe required of him. I shall be glad if you will mention to Count Bernstorff that I have every reason to be satisfied with what the German Consul has done since I arrived.

"I wish I could say as much for the American, Mr. Webb ; but he has declined all co-operation, and thwarted the well-meant efforts of Captain Wilson, of the United States man-of-war *Yantic*, to anticipate the objects of our mission. Captain Wilson was not a very efficient ally, for, though a shrewd man, his habits and manners did not give weight to his advice. He had, as a sort of secretary, a special correspondent of the *New York Herald*, besides other



correspondents of other papers, in the ship's company, and with this gentleman's aid, some days before we arrived, drew up and presented to His Highness a long and strong despatch, urging him to bring himself into accord with all civilized nations by abolishing the Slave-trade. I am told that the captain was so confident of the effect of his rhetoric, that he hoped to have greeted us with the news that he had already accomplished the objects of our mission, and thus, as his secretary explained it, have acted Stanley and Livingstone over again. But unfortunately the letter was in English, which the Sultan did not understand. His Highness asked for a version in Arabic, which the American Consul's interpreter gave in a brief travesty, which simply assured him of the goodwill of the United States, and asked him to do what his father had already done twenty-seven years ago. The captain then proposed to make an anti-slave-trade treaty similar to any the British might have, but he was dissuaded from broaching the subject to His Highness, and went off with the conviction that he could do no good by staying.

"The French are represented by M. Bertrand, a young Levantine—more Syrian, I am told, than French. His position is merely that of a secretary in charge. He declared he had received no instructions to support us, and declined to co-operate in any way. Indeed, whatever French influence there may be is actively exerted against us, and the Arabs, who are supposed to belong to the French party, are loud in declaiming against the selfish policy of England, and urging the Sultan to no surrender. Thus, except from the German Consul, His Highness has had little confirmation of my assurance that the other civilized nations who have interests on this coast are with us, and he pointedly told an English merchant whom he consulted on the subject that he knew that the French did not concur in our views and would not approve of his giving in.

"His other means of learning what England will say and do if he refuses all co-operation are very imperfect and likely to mislead him. He picks up something for himself with much natural sagacity from people—European and Americans—here; but they are none of them sound, and some are very dishonest advisers. Of his own people none know more than he learnt himself during his residence at

Bombay. He has newspapers, especially Indian ones, of which the substance is translated for him by an old Arab ship captain, who was for some time in England and understands nautical English, but his intemperate habits led to his exclusion from the English Consulate, and at best he can never have been a better guide than Commodore Truncheon would have been to European politics in his day."

For a whole month, during which Frere, as well as Kirk and Badger, had long and repeated interviews with him, the Sultan hesitated, and deferred his answer. During this time Frere took the opportunity of making himself acquainted with the town and neighbouring country, and of visiting the consuls, plantations, mission stations, etc. Amongst other places he went over the Kokotoni estate, a large sugar-growing and palm-growing farm belonging to Captain Frazer, in the north of the island, which was especially interesting as a successful instance of cultivation being carried on by free labour, in the heart of a slave country, and the labourers having been nearly all of them formerly slaves. What had been a jungle and a swamp had been thoroughly drained, and roads made over it; and it had been planted with sugar and cocoa-nuts, and had all the appearance of a valuable property.

He also went to see the slave-market,\* which he describes in a letter to Lady Frere.

"January 20, 1873.

"The slave-market is a hideous sight—a dirty, uneven space surrounded with filthy huts. The commoner slaves—generally children, seated in lines or batches—were miserably thin and ill; hardly any had more than a few rags to cover them; two or three runaways in chains—and all but a few having that look of stolid indifference which a sheep or cow would have. Some of the younger and better-fed women were well clad and had silver ornaments on. As

\* The cathedral of Zanzibar now stands on the site of the old slave-market.

we came away we met batches being taken to market, and in some cases I observed that the guards, when they saw Europeans coming, pushed their charges into the nearest door and stood there till we were past. The market-place seemed the favourite lounge of all the idlers in the place. I wished to see it to feel sure the descriptions were not overdrawn, but it was a far more brutal and degrading sight than I ever saw in Egypt or Arabia, and no description could well do justice to its degradation. . . .”

M. de Vienne, the French Consul, returned to Zanzibar on February 9. A few days previously, Dr. Kirk had thought that the Sultan was on the point of giving way; but when he heard that the French Consul was coming back, he again deferred giving his answer. De Vienne, on his arrival, studiously and in a marked manner avoided Frere, as far as he could do so without any breach of official etiquette, and refused either to co-operate with him or to state what his instructions from the French Government were.\* From

\* M. de Rémusat, the French Foreign Minister, subsequently made an apology for M. de Vienne's attitude and conduct, at the same time suggesting, as a compromise, that ten instead of twenty thousand slaves should be permitted to be brought to Zanzibar annually! How great was the hostility of the French representatives at Zanzibar to the English at this time appears from the following incident:—

“Dr. Kirk informs me that, so lately as the end of 1871, the then senior naval officer on this coast, M. Lagongine, lost no opportunity of impressing on all around him, both here and elsewhere, the hatred which was felt by France and by himself personally against England and the English. He publicly told Dr. Kirk that he should devote the whole of his energies, while on this station, to the lessening of England's influence and commerce and the endeavour to pick a quarrel with our ships. He asserted that our missionaries in Madagascar were political merchants, who used their tracts and bibles only as a cover to the smuggled goods which filled the boxes beneath them. He even carried his animus so far as to say to Dr. Kirk, with reference to the recent birth of one of Dr. Kirk's children, ‘Ah, there is another enemy of France come into the world.’

“Though M. Lagongine has now left this station, yet I need not further point out to your Lordship what is likely to have been the effect on the mind of the Sultan of such language as the above, openly and very recently used on every occasion by the representative of the

this time the Sultan's attitude completely altered, and from being amenable and inclined to compliance with the demands made, he became bold and defiant. At length, on February 11, his answer came, civilly but flatly refusing to sign the treaty.


Frere was quite prepared for this event. Feeling confident of ultimate success, he was so far from being disheartened that he looked for a better permanent effect on the slave-trade by an exhibition of firmness and energy on the part of England, such as was now imperative, than would have been produced by a too easy and ready compliance with the first demands. So four days later, leaving the Sultan to reflect, he sailed away to the southward, with the *Briton* man-of-war in company, to return in a month in case the Sultan should by that time have changed his mind.

It was part of his plan to visit all the places of importance or special interest on the coast, where the slave-trade was being more or less actively carried on, to obtain accurate information, and to make it evident to the Arabs and others concerned in it, by his presence in company with an English ship-of-war, that his mission, of which most of them had heard a rumour, was something more than a rumour, and had the power of England behind it. "I do not think I could have thoroughly understood the whole question without seeing what I have thus seen," he writes to Lady Frere at the end of the trip, "and I hope naval power of France in these seas."—Sir B. Frere to Lord Granville, February 11, 1873.

As to the use of the French flag to cover slave-trading, Frere writes to Lord Granville :—

"February 12, 1873.

"At present at this port, where there is merely a trace of French trade, and few, if any, French ship-owners, the French flag flies from a large proportion of the Zanzibar shipping, simply because under it the vessel is free from visitation, and may carry slaves unchallenged."



it will enable Government to do what is needed effectually to put down the Slave-trade. It has been *very* hard work in every way, from heat as well as sheer physical labour, and a very anxious time in many ways, but, thank God, we are none of us a bit the worse." It was a very interesting, and, especially to his companions, who had more leisure and less responsibility, in spite of some discomforts, a very enjoyable time. Dr. Badger had been compelled by illness to return to England, and the Kazi had gone back to Cutch from Zanzibar. The *Enchantress* was a fine yacht, but she had only one little cabin on deck in which Frere used to write, and she was as lively as a cork and deep in the water, so that the ports could rarely be opened; the heat below was intolerable, the thermometer often standing at 107° in the ward-room officers' cabins; and in a heavy sea she rolled so much that few on board, even of the ship's officers, escaped being ill at times. Frere's daily task of despatches and letters could often be written only by holding on to the table with one hand and both feet. The party were all on the most cordial terms. Frere, in his letters home, frequently speaks in praise of each and all of them,\* and he was glad to let them have frequent opportunities for seeing the country, and for shooting hippopotamuses† and other game at the mouths of rivers and wherever they from time to time landed.

Several creatures joined the ship's company at various

\* "Fairfax, a great comfort, as throughout; but all do admirably, Hill especially. Tell Vivian and Wylde I have found Vivian right in everything," he writes to Lady Frere.

And again: "Pelly has been of great use to me throughout, and a great comfort in many ways."

† Several hippopotamuses were shot at different times, but their carcasses were rarely recovered. In one of his letters Frere says, "M—— will, I know, share my regret that such huge creatures should be exterminated; but they eat up *whole fields of cultivation in a night*, and must disappear as the population increases."

places—a crane, a water-snake, a parrot, a lemur, a deer, a ratel, a monkey, etc. But their conduct was not exemplary. The ratel bit a sailor on the tendon Achillis, and was promptly executed. The monkey made himself so troublesome that he would have been condemned had not Frere interfered on his behalf. One breezy morning he was seen skipping about the deck with a sheaf of despatches in his hands, out of which he took a bite at intervals, deftly keeping just out of reach of a tall, pursuing figure which issued from the chief cabin, clad in a dressing-gown with skirts flying in the wind. Only the deer and the lemur lived to reach England; the official report being that the others had all got loose during a storm, and met their deaths by various melancholy accidents.

The *Enchantress* touched at Monfia, Kiswara, Lindy, Ibo, and Mozambique. Mozambique was her farthest point south on the coast, and thence she crossed the channel to Majunga, in Madagascar. The government of Madagascar was carried on by the Hovas, as the dominant tribe, the Sakalavas comprising the rest of the aboriginal population. The Hovas showed the greatest desire to imitate the English in everything. Frere, in a letter to Lady Frere, thus describes his reception:—

“The town is a long line of neatly built huts—even at this distance evidently neater than the African huts—and a few stone buildings. . . . We landed in undress, as it was only a private visit; nevertheless we found a guard of honour drawn up to receive us. No description can give you any idea of their comical appearance. The men were dressed in French Kepis, dark blue caps with red piping, white shirts, sometimes tucked into the trousers, oftener outside; no shoes or stockings, and armed with old flint muskets and spears; officers in every description of uniform of every nation and age and colour, but many had only a Panama hat and sword. The commander of our party had a *very* old black hat, a black frock coat, also very old

blue trousers, with yellow worsted lacc on the seams, and in a large lozenge in front of each leg. The Hovas have much better heads than the negroes, but comically ugly faces. . . The hair is rarely woolly, still more rarely quite straight. The men wear it short, but the women dress it in every kind of fantastic shape ; the common people often frizzed straight out ; but most of the better class have some kind of curls, very possibly derived from the good ladies who accompanied the first missionaries forty or fifty years ago, but combined with queer traces of African hair-dressing — sometimes little bobs of sausage, or tight circular knobs or long corkscrews, and mixed with a deal of good shaving in patterns ; generally the effect is hideous."

After passing through a stockade and undergoing a salute from a gun on the top of an old stone gateway, which it threatened to shake down, they—

"found the Governor and staff assembled in front of a small house, with a single line of soldiers on either hand of the same kind as our escort. His Excellency was dressed in an ancient French Political uniform, blue and gold, with a cocked hat to match, and black trousers ; the staff, in every variety of ancient and modern field-officer's uniform—scarlet, blue, green, and crimson. He was a very tall, benevolent, and sensible-looking man, and his officers, many of them very old, grave-looking, *very* plain men. Having shaken hands, his Excellency took a sword from an attendant and gave the word, 'Rear rank, take open order!' As there was but one rank, the rear-rank was non-existent ; but it seemed to mean that they should stick their spears in the ground and retire a step. Then they had 'Right face!' which was done, and the old interpreter explained they were going to salute the Queen of Madagascar. Then 'Present arms!' and a long sentence in Malagash ending with Madagascar, and all presented arms, and we all took off our hats and bowed in the direction of the capital. Then all were faced in the opposite direction, and all presented arms to Queen Victoria in what was believed to be the direction of *her* capital. . . . After a little talk, explaining the objects of the mission, and why we had come to Madagascar when our business was at



Zanzibar, the Governor said that Slave-trade had been abolished by King Radama, and the present Queen would not permit it because the English disliked it, and she had severely punished all slave-traders ; and he had two Arabs then in irons in his fort for 'making fuss,' as the interpreter said, when his Excellency seized their dhows, Arabs here as elsewhere being the great slave-traders. His Excellency then made a speech, which the interpreter said meant that her Majesty Queen Ramaralomanjaka and her Majesty Queen Victoria 'were all one piece,' and so his Excellency wished us to drink their united healths, which we did with much enthusiasm. Then his Excellency proposed my health, and I his Excellency's. I asked if there were any rules as to where strangers might not go, or what they might not do ; to which his Excellency made a long answer, interpreted as 'Governor say, Queen of Madagascar and Queen Victoria all one piece, and your people like our people ; so if you like walk about in this way or that way, go shoot, go in boat, do all you please, Governor quite happy.'"

A dinner and other festivities followed, and the next day there was a ball, at which all the rank and fashion attended.

"Bartie's sketches will give you some idea of the costume, but nothing but the wildest dream could give you the reality. Next to a smart officer in uniform would come an old dame with sausage curls and a white jacket and coloured petticoat ; then a girl with a gentleman's white wideawake, a pork-pie hat, or a hat of green velvet and gold lace, with the tickets of Manchester calico pasted at the top, and her jacket cut so that the words 'superfine shirt cloth, eighty yards' in blue letters adorned her back—and all done in the most serious air. All was extremely modest and decorous. It seemed to be regarded as a matter of business, not pleasure. . . ."

The Hovas, notwithstanding their comical exterior, made a favourable impression on Frere. One scene, in which he took part, impressed him greatly. He writes to the Duke of Argyll :—

"March 10, 1873.

"Nothing has struck me so much as a Hova church, which we stumbled on quite accidentally at Majunga. There were two in the town, and the smaller one, to which I went, was quite as orderly and well-conducted, and quite as free from anything like excitement or extravagance, as any congregation I ever saw. Every one who could read had his Testament and Hymn-book, and hymns were sung to the same tunes, with some native additions, in better tunes and time and nearly as harmoniously as in most European churches. The Governor's son preached from notes an extempore sermon, which, to judge from the faces of his hearers, was quite as effective as most sermons of the same length—about half an hour. And the Holy Sacrament was administered with a decorum and earnestness which were really impressive. It was the most real thing of its kind I have ever seen, and seems greatly to impress all around them: Mahomedans, and English and French sceptics, and Roman Catholics, all seem equally struck. . . ."

To Lady Frere he writes in detail of the same scene:—

"When the service was about half over, the interpreter came to me and said this was the first Sunday in the month, and the day on which they always had the Holy Communion, and the Governor wished to say that if we liked to remain and join them in partaking, he and his people would be very glad. But if we preferred going away he and his people had no objection. They wished us to do exactly as we pleased. Mr. Holloway and I were both very thankful to have an opportunity of joining them. . . . Some persons left and some came in. The communicants, forty-three in number, came forward and sat round the dais, so as to face the rest of the congregation, who remained seated. A man who seemed to act as deacon then came in, bringing the Elements wrapped in white napkins, which he placed on the table. Portions of scripture were then read and commented on or explained. A hymn was sung between the readings. A prayer. Some verses from Corinthians were then read, the napkin opened, and the bread, cut in small squares, handed round on a plate. Each communicant took one, and having received it remained in an attitude of devotion till all had

received. A prayer was then offered. Some more verses from Corinthians were then read. The wine, a sweet red sherbet, apparently not fermented, was poured from a bottle into a glass, and the deacon handed it round. All was done with the greatest reverence, and you might have heard a pin drop. After all had received, another prayer and hymn concluded the service. During the singing of the hymn there was an offertory, a plate being carried round by the deacon to the communicants only. The Governor then walked with us to the door of the stockade and we took our leave. I do not know when I have been so much pleased or surprised as by the simple, earnest devotion of these poor people, and the evidently deep root which the truths taught them seem to have taken. Everything was perfectly natural and in ordinary course—nothing got up for the strangers.”

As to the prevalence of slave-trade within the Portuguese possessions on the African coast and the export of slaves to Madagascar, Frere writes to Lord Granville :—

“March 12, 1873.

“There is undoubtedly a considerable slave-trade still carried on within the Portuguese possessions. General Amaral, the Governor of Mozambique, himself admitted this. . . . He informed me that he believed the chief part of this contraband trade was carried on in Arab dhows with Madagascar. . . .

“The power of the Hova Government of the Queen of Madagascar is not, I fear, equal to their will to carry out their slave-trade engagements with England. Though I saw no signs of slave-trade myself at Majunga, I was informed on very good authority that between five thousand and eight thousand slaves were annually landed on the northern and western shores of the island, whence they are re-exported as labourers to the French Colonies or to Johanna, or else find masters in Madagascar itself. The boats of Her Majesty’s ships cruising more often than is now the case in this direction, would probably soon put a stop to this traffic, and the more easily, since the Sultan of Johanna has engaged, in the document of which I enclose a copy, to grant freedom to all future immigrants to his island,

and to protect all slaves whom our cruisers may liberate there."

From Majunga they went to Nos Beh and Mayotte, two beautiful islands occupied by the French, where they were civilly received by the authorities. Mayotte is "a beautifully mountainous island surrounded with a circular belt of coral reefs, with numerous openings through them and a wide channel of perfectly smooth water all round the island inside the reef."

They next landed at Johanna, the principal of the Comoro islands, which Frere describes as of "extraordinary richness of verdure, much finer than Ceylon, with infinite variety of valley and peak;" and of which his son Bartle writes: "This is much the most beautiful place we have seen yet—the most beautiful that I have *ever* seen." It used to be the port of call for Indiamen taking the Mozambique Channel route, every one of the elders having a sheaf of testimonials from passengers and captains dignified and undignified! There was a flourishing estate, chiefly for sugar cultivation, belonging to Mr. Sunley, an Englishman, carried on by free labour. The Sultan was anxious for the suppression of the slave-trade.

The last place they called at on the coast before getting back to Zanzibar was Kilwa (Kivinja or Quiloa), which they had failed to find on their way south, owing to the imperfection of the chart, and to the desire of the inhabitants to conceal the channel to it and to prevent Europeans visiting it; for it was by far the largest and most important slave port of the whole coast, and the great entrepot for all the southern slave-trade. At many places they had been viewed with suspicion, and they afterwards heard that orders had been sent from Zanzibar that slaves should be sent up the country out of sight, and that nothing should be told them. But at Kilwa they were for

the first and only time received with marked rudeness and insult. The Banian who kept the custom-house refused to answer any questions. Frere demanded to see the headman or Wali, who made various excuses, and when he at last appeared he was insolent, and made no attempt to restrain an armed crowd which had collected and had assumed a threatening attitude. The party was quite unarmed, and the ship at some distance from shore. As they walked back to the boat, where they had to wait till two of the party, who had gone to a little distance, returned, the crowd followed them, abusing them and brandishing their weapons, and becoming so excited that the slightest accident or indiscretion might have led to an attack. Frere was, as usual, perfectly unmoved, insisted on being the last man to enter the boat, and they got away unharmed. On his return to Zanzibar he made a formal complaint to the Sultan of the Wali's misconduct, and nothing of the kind occurred again.

He had written to Lord Granville during the trip :—

“February 27, 1873.

“We have been coasting southward, seeing as much as we could of the places where trade is or might be carried on. Nothing could be finer than the coast—full of good ports and anchorages, and with a fine country inland and plenty of tractable, industrious people to trade and cultivate, if the slave-traders would only let them alone.

“For the moment the want most present to my mind is a good survey. I hope we shall bring back to Mr. Goschen his beautiful yacht uninjured, but we have had an anxious time of it, feeling our way into half-surveyed anchorages, and missing much we should have wished to see, but could not, without a good chart, venture to attempt in the *Enchantress*. The only survey we have was a wonderful work fifty years ago, but it only professes to be a mere running sketch of the coast, which ought to be surveyed more minutely than the Red Sea. It would pay for surveying better than almost any coast I know.\* . . . Two surveying

\* “The *Enchantress*,” he says in another letter, “is the only ship

vessels whilst on the coast will be a most valuable addition to the squadron employed to check slave-trade. . . .

"Next to the urgent need of a good survey, what has struck me most on this coast, is the enormous increase of Indian commercial interests during the past thirty years. . . . It is hardly an exaggeration to say that all trade passes through Indian hands. African, Arab, and European all use an Indian agent or Banian to manage the details of buying and selling ; and without the intervention of an Indian, either as capitalist or petty trader, very little business is done. They occupy every place where there is any trade. At Zanzibar they have the command of the custom-houses along nearly a thousand miles of coast ; and I saw the details of one Indian house's liabilities and assets, which came judicially before the consul, and showed a capital of £430,000 invested in the country. There are other houses equally substantial ; and wherever we went we found them monopolizing whatever trade there might be, speaking and keeping their accounts in Guzeratti, whether in small shops or in large mercantile houses. Their silent occupation of this coast from Socotra to the Cape Colony is one of the most curious things of the kind I know.

"Two inferences may be drawn from these facts—first, that everything connected with African trade is at least as much an Indian as an English question. The German, American, and French trade is altogether larger than the English. But Germans, Americans, and Frenchmen, as well as Englishmen, trade through Banians—natives of India—with Indian capital and Indian houses, whither they carry the greater part of their African profits. India, therefore, must share with England the responsibility for what they do, and the obligation to protect them in their lawful callings.

Secondly, England, through India, has an immense practical hold on East Africa. The Sultan and his Arabs can do nothing for good or evil without the Indian capitalist. The present difficulty is how to use this hold for the purpose of putting down the slave-trade, which has

that was ever employed on this coast which has not been ashore, and it has often been a near thing during our stay." The survey recommended was afterwards carried out by Captain Wharton, R.N.

grown with the growth of the Indian interests on this coast.

"The question would be simple if we had to deal with the Sultan alone; but he knows we have joined France in guaranteeing his independence by the treaty of 1866; and the influence of France is actively exerted to prevent his concurring in our views regarding the slave-trade.

"I fear there can be no question as to the complicity of the Indian traders. They advance the capital for that as for all other trade on these coasts, and reap the capitalist's lion's share of the profits. They know every turn of the trade, all who are engaged in it, and they do their best to shield it and those implicated in it, for the sake of the large profits which it brings to them and their customers.\*. . .

"I have been much struck with the extremely superficial character of the Sultan's hold over the coast. I knew his authority did not extend far inland, but I was not prepared to find it so entirely confined to a few ports on the coast; and that even at some of the more important of these ports, his garrisons are hemmed in by the petty chiefs of neighbouring tribes. At one place, Lindy—which is his principal garrison to the south—we found the town in nightly expectation of a plundering attack from some negro tribes who have never acknowledged the Sultan's authority. . . . The hurricane has destroyed his ships, and with an empty treasury he cannot replace them. His financial difficulties seem to me very serious, and I do not see how he can get on, unless we aid him very effectually to stop the slave-trade, which is eating out the vitals of his country.

"The Portuguese dominion north of Mozambique is nearly as superficial as that of the Sultan in his dominions. It hardly extends, in fact, beyond the islands and a very

\* In a lecture, which Frere afterwards gave at the London Institution, on "Vicissitudes of Commerce between Asia and East Africa," he mentions the remarkable fact that Battias and Banians, extremely strict Hindoos though they are in every respect, may leave India and live in Africa without incurring the penalty of loss of caste, which is enforced on Hindoos leaving India to live anywhere else. This indicates that the habit of trading to Africa from India is older in origin than the laws of caste, at any rate in their present severity, and has held its ground against them.

few ports on the coast ; but as far as I could judge from the few days we were with them, the Portuguese have turned the corner. They have begun to relax their absurdly high duties and exclusive policy—seem really anxious to attract foreigners, especially Englishmen, and they are well satisfied with the results, as far as they can be seen, of lowered duties.”

Frere was the more anxious for a survey of the coast, as he attached great importance to the establishment of a line of steamers calling regularly at the principal ports. Many of them were rarely visited by European vessels ; some of the consuls had been as much as seven months without news from Europe. The more the coast was put into communication with the rest of the world, the less could the slave-trade continue to be carried on, and the sooner would legitimate trade supplant it. The British India Company undertook to run steamers for a subsidy once a month as far as Zanzibar, and during the mission they were, at Sir William Mackinnon’s instigation, sending an extra one once a fortnight to take the mails, which was a great assistance to Frere, and highly appreciated by him.

On his return to Zanzibar, Frere found everything in suspense, and the merchants anxious. As long as the question of the continuance of the slave-trade remained unsettled, trade of all kind was, and would be, at a stand-still. The Sultan affected an air of indifference to the whole matter. He had pleased the Arabs, was secretly, if not openly, supported by the French Consul, and was confident that at the worst nothing harsh or unjust would be done to him by the English. He had cast the die, and was awaiting the next move.

Frere had been very conciliatory and very patient. He had done all in his power to make it easy for Burghash to yield, and he had refused. But while others were



lamenting his obstinacy as a rebuff and a misfortune, Frere did not altogether regret it. He knew that a formal and readily obtained assent from a Sultan possessed of little real authority could have had comparatively little permanent effect. He now looked to the issue being fairly raised of retention or abolition of the slave-trade on those coasts as it had never been raised before, and in such manner that it would be seen by all the world which side had the preponderating will and power behind it to cause it to prevail.

Whether the English Government desired or contemplated coercive action being taken under the circumstances may be doubted. Frere, at any rate, knew his own mind ; he was the last man to shrink from responsibility, and he acted at once. Writing a last letter of warning to Burghash, he left Zanzibar to continue his voyage to Muscat. Ten days later (March 28) he sent from Mombasa, a place to the north of Zanzibar, where the ship touched, a despatch to Dr. Kirk, and instructions to Captain Malcolm, the senior naval officer, to the same purport, and at the same time a letter to the Sultan.

No transport of slaves by sea, the despatches said, however restricted, would be any longer permitted. The allegation that it was necessary to keep up the supply of slaves from the mainland in order that the island of Zanzibar might be cultivated was a mere pretence. There were already more slaves there than could be fed or employed, and they were manifestly brought there only with a view to exportation. As many as thirty thousand had of late years passed through the various custom-houses and paid duty to the Sultan, and many besides these had been smuggled in of whom no account was taken. The provisions of the Treaty of 1845 were being grossly and notoriously evaded and set at naught.

Henceforth, therefore, after May 1, the existing system of custom-house passes would be stopped ; and instead of it there would be an examination of each slave before the consul at Zanzibar, who would permit to pass only such slaves as should be proved to be *bonâ fide* domestic or other slaves accompanying their owner, and not destined for re-sale or exportation. The prohibition to convey slaves by sea, hitherto enforced only during the months from January to April, would be continued and enforced by the squadron without any limitation of time or place. These orders were to be in force provisionally till the further pleasure of the Queen's Government should be known. Directions followed a few days later (April 1 and 2), addressed to Dr. Kirk and to General Schneider at Aden, as to the disposal of liberated slaves, and their reception at the different mission stations.

Frere, in writing to Lord Granville to announce what he had done, suggested that the English Government should lay an embargo on, or, in other words, take charge of the Sultan's custom-houses, employing the custom-house officials, who were almost all natives of India and British subjects, to stop the slave-trade, to collect the customs, and account to the British Government, who would account to the Sultan of Zanzibar.

Frere's letter seems to have fallen like a bomb-shell on the English Cabinet. It met to consider the matter, and appears to have scarcely liked either what he had done or what he proposed the Government should do. But there was a precedent for it in a slave-trade incident in Brazil, in which a similar course had been taken, and Frere had by his prompt action practically settled the question, so that it was easier to go forward than to go back, and ultimately instructions were given to the consul and to the squadron to act in accordance with his recommendations.

In the mean time, Frere was proceeding on his voyage. The first place he had touched at, after finally leaving Zanzibar, was Bagamoyo, where he stayed two days, finding there Cameron's expedition to join Livingstone just on the point of starting, and visiting the French Mission which had been established there four and a half years before, on land granted by the Sultan.

Of this mission he writes to Lord Granville :—

“April 5, 1873.

“In that time they had, with no other aid but that of their pupils—chiefly slaves liberated by our cruisers—cleared some eighty acres of land, built comfortable houses for themselves and the sisterhood which is attached to the Mission, and set up a chapel and dormitories and school-rooms for their three hundred people. . . . The Zanzibar establishment receives liberated slaves, and educates them in the same manner as at Bagamoyo ; it possesses, besides, a foundry, which is worked by negroes, and till lately maintained a hospital and resident French physician, whose services were always at the disposal of any European sailors or indigent persons who might require them. Whilst I was at Zanzibar, they took in and cared for, till his death, a young Englishman who had come out to collect natural history specimens. I was so much struck with the admirably practical system on which this Mission is conducted, that on finding their funds were at a low ebb, and that they had received nothing on account of the liberated slave-children made over to them, I contributed to their funds, on Government behalf, the sum of £200, and feel sure that my having done so will meet with your Lordship's approval.”

He afterwards visited the Methodist Mission at Ribi—“kind, good people, but sadly wanting in the worldly wisdom of the French ; however, they have made a good footing, and seem much loved and respected, far and near ;” and the Church Missionary establishment at Kisoludini—“prettily situated in a spot where the numbers of cocoanut trees, the wild cotton, which grows abundantly, and other

valuable products of the soil show of what it is capable, were only its cultivation attended to."

"Looking at the results of all these missions" [he writes to Lord Granville, March 25, 1873], "as well as Bishop Tozer's at Zanzibar, I find the least as well as the most successful prove the entire absence of all difficulty in establishing free African communities under European organization and direction on the Continent, as well as the islands of Africa, and Mr. Sunley's and Captain Frazer's experience assures me that this may be done so as to make the undertaking a commercial success. . . . It is clear that no real difficulty can exist in establishing safely in East Africa any number of released slaves."

Thence touching at Mombasa, at Lamoo—a great station for slave-traders—and at Merka, where the Zanzibar dominion ended, they proceeded, along the Somali coast, no longer green and fertile, but sandy and sterile, to Ras Hafoon, and thence across the Strait to Maculla on the south coast of Arabia—"a picturesque, stone-built Arab town at the foot of some fine barren hills," where they called, to coal and to renew the Slave-trade Treaty with the old Nukeeb, as the chief is called—a fine old Arab, who "was soon persuaded by Pelly to do all we required about slave-trade; but he is much afraid of the Turks, who attacked him some time ago, but were beaten off."

They reached Muscat on Easter Eve, April 12, and were now, as Frere wrote, "in Pelly's realm," and the Sultan and every one else very friendly. Toorkee, the Sultan, was the man whom Pelly had saved seven years before from being walled up in a fort by Salim the parricide. After that, he had made several attempts to upset Salim; but Pelly, bound by instructions from Calcutta, was, much against his inclination, obliged to acknowledge Salim, and more than once intercepted and restrained Toorkee. Afterwards Salim had been dethroned by a

distant cousin Azan, who, in his turn, had been killed in battle and succeeded by Toorkee.

Pelly landed at once and visited Toorkee, who not only assented readily to all that was asked, but also agreed to declare all future immigrants into his territory free, so that no one would be able to claim a slave as such after he had set foot in Oman.

Frere writes to Lady Frere :—

“April 15, 1873.

“Nothing can be better than the way everything has gone here, greatly owing to the excellent order in which Pelly has all his people in hand. The Sultan has agreed to all we ask of him, and has declared that any slaves hereafter imported into his dominions shall be free, which is a very important step beyond what I expected to obtain, and may, in time, lead to the extinction of slavery as well as of the slave-trade. But the country has suffered so much from civil wars that it will take a long time to set things in order, and to bring it back to the state it was in when, contrary to my advice, the parricide Salim was so hastily recognized by the Government of India.”

With respect to the two and a half years' subsidy due from Burghash, the Sultan of Zanzibar, to Toorkee, under Lord Canning's arbitration settlement, Toorkee asked for nothing more than to be allowed to recover it for himself by force of arms. Frere told him this could not be allowed on any account, but that as he was in urgent need of money, he might draw on the Resident for one year of the arrears due to him, while the matter was being considered.

In a letter to Lady Frere he describes his visit to Toorkee at Muscat :—

“April 13, 1873.

“At eight o'clock we all started with a large attendance of officers from the *Vulture*, *Kwantung*, and *Enchantress*, and landed at the foot of the steps leading to His Highness's palace. The reception-room was in a kind of balcony

over the water. He seemed very glad to see me ;—a fine face with a careworn expression lighting up now and then with a very bright expression, perfect self-possessed manners, no Arab attendant, sitting down, but guards, servants, etc., around. After I had presented the letter from Her Majesty, Duke of Argyll, etc., I told him that Pelly had told me of his having at once signed the treaty, which I countersigned in his presence, and we exchanged copies. . . . After coffee and sherbet, we went through the palace—a huge, bare, Arab mansion—into the street behind, which was lined with the most picturesque medley of Arabs and Beloochees, and a few Persians in every variety of rough costume and rude arms, many with wild elf-locks, all in great good humour. Through rambling streets, more like passages in a rambling house than thoroughfares, we reached the Consulate, where the British-Indian subjects—Bhattias, Khojahs, and Kurrachee Banians—were assembled to meet me and have a talk very much in the old Sind fashion ; but they were fine healthy fellows and in very good humour. . . . I started early for Matrah, a sort of Birkenhead to Muscat, which has outgrown its parent. . . . We landed near the custom-house and were met by the principal Khojah merchants, who all live here and go daily to Muscat by boats, some in smart boats of their own, others in omnibus boats and canoes. The Khojahs all dress like rich Arab merchants, and are in all things the exact counterparts of the ‘Moors’ described by Vasco di Gama and the early navigators,—their rich dresses, courteous manners, gaily dressed and jewelled ladies, and handsome children,—though we as strangers did not see so many of the latter as in Bombay. They asked us if we would like to see their Bazar, and took us through a very thriving labyrinth of fish, meat, cloth, grain, and vegetable sellers, shoe-makers, cutlers and hardware sellers, and the shops of beads and ornaments such as M. and K. used to delight in in Sind. . . . Clear of the Bazars we walked through lines of neat dwellings, negro and Arab, to the gate kept by a picturesque rabble of Arabs and Beloochees. The wells were outside, and troops of women and water-carriers thronged the road, with camels and donkeys bringing in produce from without. Thence back to the Bazars and by the beach to the Khojah’s Mahallet, or Quarter, within which they all live and allow no one else to live.

Suliman Khojah, their head-man, explained to me how they had in old times managed to get all their houses together—windows and doors inside, dead walls outside—and little by little connected the houses by substantial walls, a tower or two, and a gateway. Over the door leading into the interior was a date two hundred and forty years ago ; now they shut the gates at dusk and keep all inside subject to their Sumat or assembly of elders. They have cast off the supremacy of Aga Khan and are fairly independent, but Ryots of the British Government and your humble servants. The gateway to the sea was a large guard-house ; here they spread carpets and pillows, gave us sherbet and hulwa and punkahs of date-mats, and all came round, a well dressed and thriving crowd. There were their Belooch guards and an old Belooch Governor of Gwadir, and sons and brothers and little boys to be introduced and patted on the back. Thence through the Quarter, all thriving and clean but crowded. The Khojahs are the only Indians who bring their families abroad, and troops of women and children, with well-fed and well-clothed negro attendants, peeped out of every door and window at us as we passed. They pointed out their mosques and places of meeting with dark-blue flags, with a star and scimitar in white (the Arab flag is plain red, or red with a white border, and sometimes a crescent and star or scimitar in white or yellow), and brought us out at the other side towards the country. Here lived their artificers, masons, carpenters, and boat-builders, and they showed us with much pride the two towers which they had been allowed, not just lately but long ago, to build for landward defences. Altogether they were very comfortable and had nothing to complain of, praise be to God ! In troublesome times they kept quiet in their own place, and no one molested them. If very bad times came, as had happened once or twice lately, they were English subjects, and the English Consul always took care of them, as Pelly Sahib had done when he brought a steamer down and took off numbers of them with their valuables. . . . They are heretics to all orthodox Muslims, and came, I fancy, originally from Syria or Chaldea."

At Muscat the wanderings of the mission ended. The *Enchantress* took the party on to Bombay, calling at Kurrachee. At both places Frere was gladdened by the

sight of many old friends, English and Native, and met with a warm welcome, crowds collecting on the landing-place and greeting him with prolonged cheers.

Zanzibar and Muscat had hitherto been within the jurisdiction of the Bombay Presidency, but he found that Lord Northbrook had just assented to the proposal of the Government of Bombay to transfer all Zanzibar and Muscat affairs to the Viceroy. This made him anxious to see Lord Northbrook, if possible, before returning home, and he accepted his invitation to stay with him at Simla.

Writing to Lord Granville from Mahableshwur (May 3, 1873), he states succinctly the three measures he considers to be most immediately necessary with respect to Zanzibar and the slave-trade :—

1. More ships, and better adapted for the service, required.
2. Better consular establishments to watch the coast and deal with the liberated slaves.
3. An embargo on the Sultan of Zanzibar's custom-houses till he agrees to an honest plan of working under the Treaty of 1845, or some more effectual plan of carrying out the objects of that treaty.

He goes on to say—

“I have pressed on Lord Northbrook the necessity for looking more closely to what goes on at Muscat and on the Arabian and Persian coasts. The state of affairs there seems to me very critical, owing mainly to our neglect of the warnings given to us by local officers. Both Turks and Persians are evidently eager to extend their influence eastward, to a degree unknown a few years ago, when the old Imam of Muscat could defy both Turk and Persian in their own waters. . . . It is partly, I think, a symptom of the curious Mahomedan revival which seems to pervade the whole Muslem world, and partly the inspiration of European diplomacy. . . . Whatever the cause, I found



not only Arabs, but the Beloochees and Mekranees, who are a much less excitable race, seriously disturbed by the Turkish and Persian advances. The former, I have no doubt, will be somewhat checked by your remonstrances about Aden ; but they are not stopped, and I hear even here of emissaries of an Ottoman propaganda coming from Arabia to Bombay and disquieting our loyal friends at the Nizam's Hyderabad.

"The Persians are equally active and more mischievous. The Turk, whether an old bigot or a young sceptic, is a gentleman, and however much the peasant may groan, the trader contrives to live. . . . All seems to wither under the falsehood and cruelty which invariably characterize the Persian official. Chobar, on the Mekran coast, had no sooner been made over to the Persians by our adjustment of the boundary line, than all the Indian Banians, the only traders in the place, and all the Beloochees, left it ; no one would go back while the Persian flag flew there, because there could be no security for life or property under Persians. . . .

"Our influence on those coasts is a perfectly legitimate one—partly the influence of trade, which is mainly in the hands of our subjects, partly of power everywhere known and felt, but not threatening. We check piracy and maritime inter-tribal wars, and in many ways protect quiet-going people. But the main element of our influence seems to me to be a conviction of our non-aggressiveness. We flatter ourselves it is a sense of our justice or benevolence, but I believe it is more a conviction that, except when we want a coaling-station or telegraph station, or something which spends money and does no harm in itself, we are not aggressive or encroaching. We do not want territory, as the Turks and Persians and Egyptians do, or islands like the French, and are altogether the least troublesome of all Kaffirs.

"This sort of influence is easily maintained, but it may also be easily lost if we shut up ourselves in our own shell and proclaim that we will take interest in nothing till we are ourselves attacked. . . .

"You may ask what this has to do with the slave-trade. But it really has a great deal. An Arab quite understands a craze or a crotchet, and all the better if there be a slight tinge of fanaticism about it. Our crusade against the

slave-trade is, in his eyes, something like the Union of Wahabi and Ibadlinjah fanatics, who agree in nothing else but to stop his tobacco—a very disagreeable and unaccountable prejudice, but one which does not threaten his independence in other things. He rather respects us for having a hobby which is clearly not a commercial speculation, and he does not believe a word of the ravings of the French Admiral, who assures him that we import Manchester goods under a covering of tracts and bibles, and capture the slaves that we may sell them ourselves. . . . I feel sure that your legitimate influence will be strengthened rather than impaired by anything you may do in the way of pressure or armed intervention to stop the slave-trade. The Arab is quite acute enough to make out our real motives, and will respect us all the more for standing to our guns in pursuit of a crotchet which he considers quite allowable in us, though he does not sympathize with it.”

Frere was detained some days at Bombay about some documents relating to the mission, and in the mean time was informed by telegraph that the Government at home was anxious for his return before the end of the Session of Parliament. He was therefore compelled, for want of time, to abandon his intention to visit Lord Northbrook at Simla, and had to depute Colonel Pelly to go in his stead, with the despatches. It was well, perhaps, tried as he was with four months' incessant and anxious work—four months spent tossing about on an unhealthy coast, with rarely a night on shore—that he was saved the long journey across the burning plains of India. But he was sorry not to have the opportunity of communicating personally with Lord Northbrook, who was anxious to see him, and who had cordially supported him in all matters relating to the mission, as well as in his representations as to the danger menacing Aden.

The *Enchantress* had gone home to avoid having to face the breaking of the monsoon in the middle of May. Frere left Bombay by the mail on May 12, and, going by

way of Brindisi, and thence leisurely by way of Venice, the Brenner, Munich, and Paris, reached London on June 12.

Two days later, a telegraphic message from Kirk, dated June 5, reached London, announcing that on that day the Sultan had signed the treaty,\* and that the Zanzibar slave-market was closed for ever.

Frere's Parthian arrow, discharged from Mombasa after leaving Zanzibar, had brought down its quarry. Dr. Kirk wrote on May 11 of "the grand success we are having under the orders you gave me regarding the slave-trade after the first of May." And a month later, when the treaty was at last signed, he writes to Frere:—

"June 7, 1873.

"I have been too busy giving effect to your policy that has ended in the treaty to do much else, and by this mail hardly have been able to write to a private friend.

"Well, we have got the treaty, thanks to the orders you gave at Mombasa, and that I carried out with rather an iron hand, more in the spirit of total prohibition than anything else. The fact was when I came to treat I could point at the work done and say that the slave-trade had ceased, and it should never be again opened. From the beginning I dealt with the Sultan in Council, never meeting him in any other capacity, and forced the Arabs to give an opinion on which he might act. This succeeded admirably, but it was hard work. . . .

"Let me congratulate you now on the result of our mutual labours. I am glad to be able to justify in some way the confidence you placed in me, and make my local experience of the Arabs and the place of some practical use at so favourable a time."

And Dr. Kirk writes again, a month later:—

\* The treaty was a short and simple document. The Sultan engaged that the transport and export of slaves from the coast for any purpose should cease entirely; that all public slave-markets in his dominions should be closed; and that protection should be given to liberated slaves. The Queen undertook that natives of Indian States under British protection should be prohibited from possessing slaves or acquiring fresh ones.

"July 4, 1873.

"The Sultan has as honestly worked for us since signing the new treaty as he did against us when he was in the hands of the French, and it is against them I feel enraged, for the Arabs honestly thought they were being ruined, and that we were acting only in compliance to a faction. . . .

"You must be delighted to see the grand results of your mission a complete success at all points. There never was one more so, and as it has turned out, it is very well the treaty was not signed before we used compulsion. In my first memo. I pointed out that, without this were obvious to the people, the Sultan would not be safe. Burghash, in the first place, could not give in then, and the French made him very plausible offers of help. With the circle of treaties now concluded, it will be our own fault if we do not crush the slave-trade, which in its great strength is, I think, even now at an end; such is the feeling, at least, among the Arabs."

The Sultan, when he had signed the treaty, was anxious to visit England at once. The English Government did not want him, and Dr. Kirk had, with some trouble, to prevent his coming. Early in the following year, however, there was a change of Ministry in England, and the Conservatives came into office. Dr. Badger writes to Frere:—

"August 12, 1874.

"I sincerely hope that there is now some chance of the Sultan of Zanzibar being invited to England. . . . His Highness was much pained by the refusal of the late Ministry to sanction his proposed visit, especially as he never contemplated being entertained at the Government expense. On this subject he writes to me as follows: 'My desire to come to London was not with the design of contention, but to turn to good account their (the Government's) attention towards me.' The effect of a special invitation by our Government would undoubtedly increase his importance with his own people; on the other hand, it would heighten his obligation to us, and induce him to make almost any concessions, in reason, for enabling us to carry out our philanthropic designs on the East Coast of Africa. In this latter respect I consider

that the invitation would do the work of a couple of gun-boats."

The invitation was sent, and Seyid Burghash came to England in June, 1875, and was very well received. He was invited to visit the Queen at Windsor, and was proud of being asked to write in her album; and he went to see the Prince and Princess of Wales and their children at Marlborough House, which delighted him beyond measure. On the way to Windsor, in the train, some one remarked, "that His Highness would doubtless one day have railways in his own country." He, using an Arab proverb, answered, "Ah! we shall always be like the younger brother who said, 'In a few years I shall be as old as my elder brother.'" He more than once asked, when he saw any great proof of English power, "Why didn't you knock me on the head when I first refused to sign the treaty?" \*

Letters of warm congratulations from Frere's friends greeted him on his return home.

Sir George Clerk writes—

"Now, if you are at all the worse in health, take care to restore it. . . . And I lay stress on this because, though I have no idea that Northbrook will curtail his fixed time, I am sure he will not delay a day beyond it. . . . When that time comes, I am sure it will be best for the people of India, and for British interest in that country, that the reins should be handed over to you; and it could do you no harm—at least three years of it—provided you keep in store physical strength *quant. suff.*;—without that, as you and I know, though all Makedummehs may be A B C, one is apt to break down under the accumulation of them."

And again Sir G. Clerk writes—

"June 26, 1873.

"This morning I was looking through the Blue-book of your mission. I don't see that you attach importance to

\* Sir B. Frere to General Ponsonby, June 24, 1873.

Delagoa and Aden hereafter as watch-towers. I do. I consider that your labours and researches on the East and South Coast of Africa have done incomparably more towards real and entire annihilation of the slave-trade in the course of two or three years than would have resulted from any slap-dash seeming success displayed in a hasty assent by a Burghash—or even his ‘breesh-i-ma’—caused by the flourish of trumpets with which Lord Granville, for Cabinet tactics, sent you forth. Now, if you have not yet dropped all correspondence with the Foreign Office, contrive to leave on their records your conviction that neither Downing Street, through Kirk, nor Simla, through a Bombay Government, can efficiently work, as England ought to work, on the solid, extended foundation you have so well laid ; that it is not to be accomplished by working in those long traces ; and that there must be created some substantial appointment, having head-quarters at Aden, and held by an active man of useful experience suitable for completing the good work : to have large discretion to that end, to communicate on the subject direct with the Foreign Office and the Governor-General, to have a sloop of war at all times under his orders, and to exercise full authority over all our agents, consuls, and establishments, from Bushire to Mussowah, and from Cape Guardafui to Delagoa.

“Bear in mind that you must not expect that this Government cares, or that the next will care ‘tuppence’ for slavery out there—except for party purposes. The more need therefore that local functions should be in operation that no ministry here could restrain or treat with supineness, without affording Opposition a chance of tripping them up.”

Sir George Clerk’s last remark was only too true. The public interest in the suppression of the slave-trade roused by Livingstone’s revelations had subsided, and with it the interest of the Government. So little did Mr. Gladstone concern himself about it, that meeting Frere and entering into conversation with him shortly after his return, he never so much as alluded to the subject.

The Zanzibar Mission and the treaty with the Sultan  
VOL. II. I

gave the death-blow to the slave-traffic by sea. At the end of the first year the number exported, which had been from 16,000 to 23,000, had fallen to 1400, of whom 217 were taken, though subsequently it increased again to a certain extent. And this result followed, although Frere's recommendations to increase the naval squadron, the consular establishments, the number of interpreters, and the sum allowed for purchasing information, also to give more authority to the Resident at Aden, to obtain more extended rights of search from the French, Turks, and Persians, and to revive the Slave-trade Department at the Foreign Office, were neglected, all these, except the last, having failed of being carried out by the Government; nor do the recommendations appear in the published Blue-books.

But the Arab slave-dealers, made aware that the sea was now closed to them, were not long in adapting themselves to circumstances and setting to work to transport the slaves by land. These were taken down the Nile, driven through the towns on the Somali and Red Sea coasts, and by other routes. This could not be put an end to by a stroke of the sword or of the pen. It could only cease entirely after many years, by the gradual extinction of slavery in Egypt, Turkey, and Arabia. But much could be done to check the traffic in its worst forms by the action of the English Government and people; and during the years that Frere remained in England he took a leading part in endeavouring to arouse and keep alive public interest in the question, in pressing on the Government to support the Sultan of Zanzibar and the Khedive in following the right path, in urging the establishment of free settlements in East and Central Africa, and in other ways seeking to promote the opening-up and civilization of dark places in Africa.

The Slavery Question and the Missions in Africa were

closely connected ; for the principal work of most of these mission-stations was to receive and train the liberated slaves, whom it was difficult to dispose of satisfactorily elsewhere ; and Frere always insisted on the need of making industrial work a part of their training, so as to enable them to earn a living. He spoke frequently, and read many papers on these and kindred subjects at the Geographical Society, at the Society of Arts, the London Institution, the Church Congresses, and the Church Missionary Society's Meetings, and always with a wealth of information and knowledge, and a freedom from declamatory or conventional verbiage which could not fail to command attention.

For his services in connection with the Zanzibar Mission Frere was made a Privy Councillor.

On the occasion of his being sworn in at Osborne he had the honour of a long interview with the Queen, and was much struck with Her Majesty's minute knowledge of, and interest in, the subject of his late expedition. The Queen sent for a map and made him show her the whole course of the Mission, and questioned him minutely on the subject. "The Queen knew more about it than all her Ministers," he used to say.

The Corporation of London gave him the Freedom of the City. The University of Cambridge, in the following spring, conferred on him the honorary degree of LL.D., which he had already received, a few years previously, from the University of Oxford.

Dr. Livingstone, the African traveller, had when at Bombay been Frere's guest, and afterwards, when he returned to Africa, letters passed between them from time to time. Towards the end of 1868, after a long interval of silence, a letter, written closely on a sheet of foolscap, dated from Central Africa, July, 1867, had reached



Frere in London, having been seventeen months on the way.

The first part of it was occupied with geographical details. It went on as follows :—

“Thanks to your good services with the Sultan, I have been treated by all the Arabs with the greatest kindness. Only four of my attendants would come; the fact is they are all so tired of this everlasting tramping, and so am I; nothing could be brought but the veriest necessaries. No paper, only a couple of note-books and the Bible. I have borrowed this and another sheet from an Arab trader; the other is for Lord Clarendon; and they will go by a party proceeding to the coast through Usang. I would go myself if it were not for an inveterate dislike to give up what I have undertaken without finishing it. I am often distressed on thinking of a son whom I left at the university of Glasgow. He was to be two years there, then spend a year or more in Germany for French and German, before trying the Civil Service examination for India. He will now be in especial need of my counsel and assistance, and here I am at Bangweolo. . . . Possibly Sir Charles Wood, in consideration of my services, might do something to fix this one. I never asked anything for myself. Lord Palmerston sent Mr. Hayward, a Queen's Counsel, to me before I left home, to ask, ‘What he could do for me, as he was most anxious to serve me.’ I don't know how it was, but it never once occurred to me, till I was in here, that he meant anything for myself. I replied that if he could open the Portuguese ports in East Africa to free-trade, this was the greatest boon he could confer. I thought only of my work, not of myself or of my children. I feel more at liberty in telling you of my domestic anxiety and my fears lest Tom should go to the examination unprepared, because you have a family yourself and will sympathize with me.”

Frere thereupon wrote to Sir Thomas Acland, asking him to send a copy of Livingstone's letter, which he had had printed for private circulation, to Mr. Gladstone, then Prime Minister, for his consideration.

"December 25, 1869.

"I have been rather at a loss to know how I could be of any use to these poor orphan-like children of a man whom I reverence as a real hero, a true apostle. . . . But it seems to me that the nation owes something to the father. If, as I gather from his last letter to Dr. Kirk, he has turned again to enter the Nile basin, worn with incessant travel, anxiety, and fever, and with little left of his old self but his old spirit, it may be long ere the nation can repay him, if it ever can repay him at all, save through his children."

After much correspondence, Frere obtained, in 1871, a grant for Livingstone's children from the Queen's Bounty, the news of which cheered their father in his exile.

In January, 1874, came the rumour, often spread in error but now true, that Livingstone was dead. Even when the body was brought to England there was a doubt till it had been examined, and the elbow identified, which had been years before crushed in a lion's jaw and badly set. Livingstone was, perhaps of all men of his generation, the one whom Frere venerated most ; and he exerted himself successfully to obtain for him the last honour of being buried at the public expense in Westminster Abbey, and for his children a pension.

He had about this time (February 6, 1874) to deliver the inaugural address for the African section of the Society of Arts. The address is full of noble thoughts, some very characteristic of him, and of eloquent language, such as when he was much moved flowed readily from his pen. He had been called an advocate for the extension of "equivocal and entangling engagements." To this he answered that Englishmen all over the world, whether we like it or not, enter into infinite engagements with barbarous or semi-civilized chiefs, but they are "equivocal and entangling" only if ill understood and neglected.

"The semi-civilized chief rarely understands our power ;

my doctrine would be to teach it him by friendly communication before the necessity of unfriendly remonstrance arises. . . .

"Now, I believe that this might be effected, and much more, if we only make a reasonable use of our diplomatic service and consular agencies in connection with these people, and if, instead of turning our backs on a potentate, and refusing to know anything or care anything about him because he is black or weak, we took pains to let him know all about us and our power, and endeavoured not only to teach him that we were strong but that we meant justly and kindly towards him and all men. I can answer for it from long experience that you will seldom be disappointed by the agency of your countrymen in such matters. I have tried them scores of times; sometimes when they were little better than half-bearded lads, without better training than a good English home, a good English school, and a good English regiment afford, and I do not recollect ever being disappointed when they once understood that, as diplomatic agents in dealing with savages, they were expected to be as carefully observant of the duties of an English gentleman as if they were *attachés* at Paris or St. Petersburg."

At the end of the lecture he describes the man, the thought of whom was doubtless in his mind throughout it.

"Livingstone was intellectually and morally as perfect a man as it has ever been my fortune to meet, one who formed vast designs for the good of mankind, and placed his hopes of achieving them in no earthly power, but in Him who created the universe and controls the raging of nations. . . .

"In all he did he worked in the same spirit as the great apostles of old, and he has done for civilization and religion a work which has had few parallels since the days of the early martyrs of our faith. Martyr he was and hero, and we may no more lament him than other heroes who have died in their country's service, or holy men who have entered into their rest." \*

\* *Journal of Society of Arts.*

Amongst the most striking and characteristic of his writings about this time was an essay, published in the *Church and the Age*, and subsequently as a pamphlet, on Indian Missions. It is founded on facts which had come under his own personal observation, and on changes and scenes which he had himself witnessed, and over which he had pondered and reflected for thirty-five years.

He describes the extraordinary vitality of the Indian village communities with their laws of caste, of religious observance, and of municipal government, which have existed unchanged for ages, and survived war, pestilence, and famine. After British rule is introduced, the village has at first to do with but one master, usually all-powerful, active, intelligent, and benevolent, and the villagers have a good time under this old system. But gradually the work of administration gets divided amongst several centralized departments. The villagers note a diminution of power in their rulers, and remark, "Ah! the Sahibs of this generation are not such rulers of men as in our young days." Power and responsibility become more and more distributed. The judicial powers are separated from the executive and administrative. Malcontents discover that they can worry or defy the headman of their village with the assistance of some departmental patron. And thus old bonds are giving way, "which have for centuries kept rural society together under circumstances of adversity such as in any other country would have gone far to destroy all traces of civilization."

"Still more potent, if less universally diffused, is the disintegrating agency of our religion, which I mention last, because, though most effective of all, it is the agency with which the British Government has least active concern. The period soon passes by when the villagers of a newly annexed district believed, as they too often used to do at first, that the 'Sahibs' are atheists, without religion, and

when the village matrons hushed their children with threats of making them over to the 'Sahib,' to be buried alive in the foundations of the court-house or the bridge he was constructing.

"Probably, with very few exceptions, the evening conclave of village elders in most hamlets has long since settled, after frequent discussions, not only that the English gentlemen have a religion, but that they think a good deal about it.

"All who have visited the head-quarter garrison station of the province, know that some kind of a place of worship is considered as necessary as a mess-house, a canteen, or a theatre, to a complete set of barracks. They see the European soldiers marched off, with bands playing, every Sunday to one, and sometimes two, of these churches, whither the gentlemen and ladies drive in their carriages to listen to 'Padres' of various kinds. All public work is stopped, and a general holiday is kept. Then there is often a 'Devil's House,' as the Freemason's Lodge is generally termed, where meetings are held at night, with mysterious ceremonies, which, more than any religious services held among Europeans, seem to awaken the curiosity of the native country-cousin who comes to town to see the world. . . .

"Religion of some kind is evidently an important business with these white-skinned people. But its exact nature is usually for a long time a puzzle to the villagers.

"They do not often learn much in explanation of this mystery from the first Englishmen who visit their village. These busy officials have seldom time for talk except on official subjects. Nevertheless the villagers observe that many of them cease from official work on Sundays. A few may make it a day of amusement, but there is generally something clearly religious about the observance. If a villager makes bold to ask a question or two on the subject from the great man, he sometimes hears a good deal more. But usually the great man is reserved, and advises the querist to inquire from the first Padre he meets.

"Perhaps a Padre may visit the village while the great man is there, and then the observant villagers remark that the freest livers among the 'Sahibs' pay him marked respect, even though he may be 'Dhurm Padre'—a priest, that is, for the love of God, *i.e.* a missionary and not a

Government officer. Such a Padre is pretty sure to extend his walk towards the village, to converse with the elders at their evening conclave, and say a few words to the women who come to draw at the village well. He gives tracts and books to all who will accept them and promise to read them, and often goes his way with a heavy heart, and a note in his journal expressive of his still deferred hopes that some good may follow his efforts in his Lord's service, though so little is apparent.

"But though not apparent to him, his visit is often a most important era in the history of the village, when he least thinks he has made any impression. Like every other visitor of note, he is talked over at the evening meeting of the village elders, and the talk is generally some index to the popular opinion.

"A fanatic or two, the bigoted old Brahmin Shastri and a rather disaffected Mohammedan Moolla, are of opinion that under a well-ordered Government such preaching would be stopped. It is all part and parcel of the same insidious design for taking all rent-free lands from temples and mosques, and turning the people into Christians.

"They would probably say a good deal more in the same strain if the prudent elders did not interfere to stop anything which malicious eavesdroppers might construe into treason against Government.

". . . Probably, as regards both the views of Government and the futility of the Padre's preaching, the feelings of the speakers are less positive than their expressions, and the more sagacious have a sort of instinctive misgiving that though the Padre is not a 'Department,' his talk is likely to work more change in the village than all the departments in India put together. But they have no very obvious grounds for their fears, and therefore say little about them.

"There are, however, two or three who do not cease to think of the subject when the assembly breaks up.

"In every village community will be found some men of naturally devout minds, ill content with what their ancestral system offers them.

"Their hearts have been stirred by misfortune or suffering, their consciences awakened they hardly know how. They have vainly sought rest for their souls by self-inflicted penances and long pilgrimages, and sacrifices of what they

love and value. In this state they hear something from this new religion, some words of St. Paul or St. John, or some saying of our Lord's, which seems to promise them what they have long sought, and they resolve, if possible, to learn more about it.

"Then there are members of the 'outside' population, the helots and serfs, who, important as they are to the village community, are not admitted to the Council of Elders, but talk among themselves in a little council of their own, under the tree by their huts outside the village. There has been much to stir their minds ever since these white faces first appeared in the land. The yeomen of pure Hindoo descent, the shopkeepers, and the Brahmins, still hold these outsiders, as they have done for ages past, unclean, and feel polluted by their touch; but the 'Sahibs' do not appear to think so, at least not till they learn it from the Brahmins.

"The younger Sahibs may be hot and hasty sometimes, and get impatient when people don't understand their bad pronunciation, but it is clear they don't agree with the Brahmins in matters of caste, and every one of the speakers has some instance of his own experience, something which occurred when he was hunting or shooting with the Sahib, or when he was giving evidence in his Court, or taking a message from him, which proves that the Sahib looks on all these distinctions of caste as nonsense, and that he would not even object to drink water of the helot's drawing, provided it was brought in a clean vessel. . . .

"Now this equalizing and levelling policy, which at first was a great puzzle to the villagers, seems explained by what this Dhurm Padre says.

"He tells of one God over all, of one Saviour for all, and insists that this God made of one blood all mankind; that there is no distinction before Him of Brahmin or 'outsider;' that all will be equal in death, and all be judged by one rule after death.

"If the Sahibs really believe this, no wonder all their doings and inventions have such a levelling tendency. The oldest of the community of outsiders have never heard anything of the kind before, and some of them resolve to inquire more about what the Padre says, and, if possible, make their children attend some school where they may

learn to read these books which the Padre gives so freely, and which tells such wonderful things not only of London and railways, but of a new heaven and a new earth in which dwelleth righteousness.

"Perhaps the profoundest impression, though he says least about it, is made on the young Brahmin, the village schoolmaster it may be, or vaccinator, or postmaster. He has listened almost in silence to the discussion among the village elders. He was born in the village and had been taught a little Sanscrit by his father in boyhood; he has received a good education in his own language, and learnt enough of English to wish to learn more, at a Government school in the provincial capital. . . . He has in his heart the most profound contempt for all that his father, the bigoted old Shastri, and his friends go on talking about their gods, and the silly, licentious tales of what their gods did, which seem to him only fit to amuse vicious children; he is pained at their open worship of their hideous stone and metal idols, whose legendary acts and attributes appear to his awakened moral sense even more debased than their outward forms.

"But this he is forced to keep to himself. He would not willingly vex his father or his kind old mother, and evil be to him if they or their friends suspected half the thoughts that rise up in his heart. So he works at his official duties, has a talk now and then with a former class-fellow who visits the village as a surveyor, tax assessor, or in some other public department, and who he finds is as unsettled as himself, and muses often on the inexplicable tangle of human affairs. . . . He is a patriot in his way. . . . He has dreams of his own about his own people and country, which he hardly dares breathe to himself, as he mourns over the hopeless internal divisions of India, and feels that heavy as may be the yoke of the most benevolent foreign ruler, it must be borne as long as the children of India are so obviously unable to combine for the common good and rule themselves.

"In the common truths which the 'Dhurm Padre' urges so earnestly with no object but the personal salvation of his hearers, the young Brahmin thinks he sees the secret of that wonderful power which has enabled the people of a remote islet in the Northern Seas to subjugate the hundred millions of Hindoostan, with all its ancient arts, civilization, and elements of wealth and power. . . .



“And as he watches the good Padre mount his pony and leave the village in doubt whether his day’s preaching has produced the slightest permanent effect, the young Brahmin feels that he at least has caught a glimpse of truths which may not only change his future but the future of India. It is but one step on the thorny and toilsome path, but he has resolved to take it and to inquire further, to get a Bible and read the books which the Padre says contain all the whole secret of his own faith, and to learn more from some friend who has attended a Mission School. And if the truth has not lost its virtue among the many centuries since it was first proclaimed among the mountains of Judea, who shall set limits to its energy when preached in their own tongues and by their own countrymen among the myriads of India?”

## CHAPTER XVII.

### THE PRINCE OF WALES IN INDIA.

Preparations for the tour—Presents—Special correspondents—Athens—Egypt—Bombay—Baroda—Ceylon—Calcutta—Peshawur—Policy towards the Ameer—Return to England—Proclamation of Empress of India—Correspondence with Lord Lytton.

ONCE more Frere was to revisit India.

The Prince of Wales had long had a wish to travel there. The suggestion that he should do so had been originally made by Lord Canning to the Prince Consort, who had taken it up warmly, intending that it should be carried out whenever a convenient opportunity should occur. Other Indian statesmen had approved the idea, knowing what a good political effect it might have if well and judiciously executed.

Frere seems to have been at once fixed upon, by common consent, as the man who was best fitted, for social and political reasons, to undertake the direction and management of the tour, the effect of which upon the people of India would depend so much upon knowledge of native institutions, character, and susceptibilities, and upon sympathy and tact in dealing with them.

Some indeed wondered if a man of his distinction, and who had completed his sixtieth year, would consent to forego his hard-earned repose for so arduous and harassing an office. But he did not hesitate. It had long been his

desire that Royalty should be seen in the flesh by the people of India. The Eastern mind, he had often pointed out, seeks for a visible chief on whom to bestow its allegiance, and cannot rest on the idea of power latent in a code or a constitution. "Who is my lord and master?" not "By what rules and laws am I to be governed?" is the question that is asked. In modern European life the significance of pageants has become faint and feeble, or has vanished altogether except as a historical commemoration. It requires an effort of the imagination to realize that—like the act of homage done in public to the liege lord in the feudal ages of Europe—the regulated splendours and ceremonies of an Indian Durbar still constitute a recognition, a symbol, and a picture of existing fact, and an indication of the source and degrees of authority, which have a practical effect and influence on the minds of those who witness them. "The event of the Prince's coming," writes Lord Napier of Magdala, "is a great one for our prestige in India. It is a want that has been unfulfilled since the time of the best Moguls. The shadow of it rests in the mind of the old Zemindar, who holds with pride the family sunnud given by Akbar."

Frere drew up the plan of the tour, communicated with the authorities at the places to be visited, and was consulted or referred to as to all the arrangements, great and small, which had to be made. The six or seven months before the start for India were a time of continual interviewing and letter-writing. The Admiralty fitted out the large troop-ship *Serapis* for the voyage. The Indian Government were to pay the travelling expenses in India. The House of Commons passed a vote of sixty thousand pounds for the personal expenses of the Prince and his suite, notwithstanding the opposition of some members who were unable to perceive that the tour was to have

any more significance or effect than a magnified Lord Mayor's show, and some of whom took especial exception to any part of the expense being borne by India.

This sum of sixty thousand pounds, Frere, who would have to make it suffice, and was to be responsible for the way in which it was spent, pronounced to be inadequate. Unless the amount was increased to something like a hundred thousand pounds, the Prince would be unable to give presents, according to indispensable custom, suitable to his rank and to the occasion. Old Indian officials, when consulted, expressed their agreement with him. On the question of India contributing, Sir George Clerk said—

“Cost is a matter which ought to be regulated on an estimate of expenditure on no lavish scale, but requisite for effecting the important object handsomely. . . . I am in the habit of never disbursing the public money of India unless convinced that its people, high and low, would go with me. On this occasion I would provide one hundred thousand pounds from the Treasury of India.” \*

The question of presents produced much discussion, and opinions were asked for and given by many high officials both at home and in India. In the East, since the days of which the Book of Genesis tells, it has been held disrespectful for an inferior to approach a superior without bringing with him a present suitable to his means and rank. This custom gave rise to many difficulties in the early days of our Indian rule, for since the days of Lord Bacon no Englishman in an official position has been able to receive a present without incurring the imputation of corruption. Lord Cornwallis, finding it impossible to

\* As an instance of the great expenses incurred on the tour, Dr. Russell writes to Frere, May 17, 1876: “The Indian visit cost the *Times* more than ten thousand pounds—a sixth of all that Parliament gave the Prince of Wales.”

offend the native feeling by abolishing the custom, established a rule that all presents received by Government servants should be made over to a department of the Government treasury—the Toshakhana,—out of which were to be defrayed the cost of giving presents in return. This salutary practice has been maintained ever since.

In the Prince's case, though the presents he received would, according to the established rule, be made over to the Government, it had been stipulated that he should pay out of his own purse for those which he gave, and this alone would absorb more than half of the sixty thousand pounds.

But no more money could be asked for from Parliament that Session. It was suggested that as it would not do for the presents given by the Prince to be less valuable than those he received, an order should be issued limiting the value of what the chiefs were to offer; and thus the question stood over till the *Serapis* reached Bombay. In the mean time, during the voyage, Frere again wrote a strong note for the consideration of the Government both at home and in India, in the course of which, after making a calculation of the number of native princes who would have to receive presents, and the sum to be allotted for the purpose, he says:—

“The average value of each ruler's present is less than a hundred and seventy-seven pounds—certainly not a large sum for the descendants of an ancient line of princes to hope may be acceptable to the Heir Apparent of the Empire as a souvenir of such a meeting, and where this average is exceeded there is usually some obvious reason: *e.g.* the Raja of Kolapoor asks leave to call after H.R.H.'s name a hospital which he proposes to build at a cost of thirty thousand pounds.

“Of course to such a proposal no reasonable objection can be offered, and when the young ruler asks H.R.H. to accept, as a personal memorial of a meeting which to the

Raja will be the great event of his reign, an ancient jewelled sword and dagger worth six hundred pounds, some relic probably of the days of Sivaji, or of some other of the Raja's Mahratta ancestors, is he to be told to substitute something more trumpery because the English nation cannot afford to let the Prince give such a watch as he would at home give from his own purse to an Eton school-boy, or a snuff-box such as he would leave with the locomotive superintendent of a Russian railway for driving H.R.H. safely from St. Petersburg to Moscow? Take again the case of the Rao of Cutch, whose well-governed State has been the secure home of the wealthiest of Indian traders, and the daintiest and boldest of Indian artists in gold and silver and steel, for centuries before the Dutch and English merchants obtained from his ancestors ground for their factories at the Cutch capital, and whose dynasty has since then, for more than a century and a half, never refused the reasonable request of an English political agent. . . . After hearing how the Rao and his predecessor have suppressed female infanticide when it had the religious sanction of ages, how he has founded female schools, and within the last three years gone further than the British Government required in coercing its subjects to give up slave-holding in African States, is this Rao to be told that four or five hundred pounds' worth of his beautiful gold and silver work is too much for him to be allowed to offer to H.R.H. as a keepsake and a memorial of a visit from the ruler of one of the oldest, most orderly, and most loyal of the Indian States which have been in alliance with the English since they first appeared in Western India?"

To Frere's great relief, Lord Northbrook so far assented to his opinion as to procure ten thousand pounds to be added to the Presents Fund from the Indian Treasury, and some other smaller items of expense were provided for from the same source.

Amongst the innumerable details Frere had to attend to, were the arrangements with the special correspondents of the newspapers. It was desired to give them every facility for obtaining information. The difficulty was to

do this without interfering with the Prince's privacy. He writes to Lord Salisbury :—

“ August 27, 1875.

“ I have not been quite idle, for there has been a swarm of editors and special correspondents, who generally leave me under the impression that Hanwell, where nobody can get at one, must be a very quiet and enviable place.

“ They have got it into their heads that a selection of six or eight or more favoured correspondents is to go out in the *Serapis* at the public expense, and that I am the only obstacle to each of them being one of the fortunate eight.

“ They seem never content with a refusal in writing, till they have interviewed the obstruction. One very intelligent young gentleman, after a very long argument, seemed nearly nonplussed, when a very bright idea struck him.

“ I had suggested he should always go on ahead and wait the Prince's arrival at Calcutta, Bombay, etc. ‘ No, sir, on reflection I see that would never do. It would give me the best view of the Prince's arrivals, but not of his departures, and that is the really important part. You see, it is *certain* that attempts will be made to assassinate him, and, probably, as he is leaving some place. Now, if I had gone on ahead when the attempt was made, I am sure it would kill me.’

“ ‘ Kill you ? ’ I said, rather interested in his very loyal feeling.

“ ‘ Yes, sir, it would kill me. I am sure it would. I have never been beaten yet—never failed to be present at the most interesting moment, and if anything of the kind were to happen when I had gone on ahead, it would kill me at once.’

“ However, at last they seem to acquiesce unwillingly in my view—that they will do best if left to themselves.”

A good deal of not altogether unreasonable anxiety was expressed as to the Prince's safety. Lord Mayo's

assassination was then fresh in people's memory, and it was not a solitary instance of late years of a high official being murdered. Religious fanatics are common in India, and with every precaution, there still remained an appreciable amount of risk.

Frere received many suggestions of precautionary measures, one only of which, as it came from Lord Napier of Magdala, he forwarded to Lord Salisbury. It was that the Prince should have a bodyguard of twenty picked Life-Guardsmen, who, on public occasions, would be always about his person, and would prevent access to him by any unauthorized person. It was not adopted, though Frere was inclined to favour it, for it was thought that men fresh from England and ignorant of India would be of little use.

On this subject Frere writes to Mr. Knollys :—

“ October 4, 1875.

“ I return Mr. William Tayler's letter and printed paper. The latter well deserves H.R.H.'s attentive perusal, for, with some superfluous rhetoric, it contains some valuable facts and truths regarding the Indian Moslem secret sects, which are popularly, but often erroneously, called 'Wahabeeism.' These sects occupy, among the Sunis or Turkish Moslems, much the same position as the Kojahs and other disciples of the 'Old Man of the Mountain' occupy among the Shias or Persian Moslems. They are held by the learned and orthodox to be dangerous and fanatical heretics, but are dreaded and courted by all classes. They are the natural vent for the undying fanaticism of Islam, requiring at all times to be watched, and in troubled times becoming a political force of much importance. . . .

“ Their head-quarters in India are at Patna, whence they feed a colony at Sittarena on the 'Black Mountain' beyond the Indus. Mr. Tayler was Commissioner at Patna in 1857, and, having learnt much of their secret intrigues, arrested their leader, and so saved Patna from an outbreak. But



the evidence was then not very conclusive, and it was the policy of the then Bengal Government to ignore the existence of disaffection, so he was removed in disgrace and the Wahabee leaders released, fortunately not till the opportunity for a successful rising had passed. Twelve years afterwards an accident led to the whole organization being laid bare, and a most curious history it is. It will probably be fully told in the forthcoming volumes of 'Kaye's Sepoy War,' which I hope we may have to read on our way out, and I am sure it will interest the Prince.

"There can be no doubt, very special precautions are still needed against the agents of these fanatics, and no one is, I believe, better able to do this without fuss or worry than Major Bradford, who will be in constant attendance on H.R.H., and ought never to leave him while he stays in India. I know how fearless H.R.H. is in all matters regarding his personal safety, and would not for a moment wish his feelings in this respect altered; but I trust H.R.H. will remember that in all these matters the state of social, political, and religious feelings, outside our barracks in India, is often, especially in large cities, little altered from what it was in the days when his great ancestor Cœur de Lion stood face to face against Saladin, and both were the objects of plots by their common enemies."

Some persons and associations in Scotland and elsewhere thought it to be their special duty to address the Prince as to the manner in which he ought to spend his Sundays during his tour. It happened that the plans for travelling had already been arranged so that the Sundays might be kept, as in England, as days of rest. Frere, therefore, when he was applied to on the subject, was able to convince them that their intervention and the addresses they proposed to present would be unnecessary and superfluous, and thus what might have been an unpleasant occurrence was avoided.

Harassed by these and innumerable other details, it was

a relief to Frere when the time for starting arrived. Going overland, he joined the *Serapis* at Brindisi, on October 16. They stayed three days at Athens, and here he began to exercise his function of eyes and ears to the Government on political questions at each place he visited, which was no unimportant part of his duties. "You may think it hard we should find India so far west," he begins his letter to Lord Salisbury, "but it always used to begin in Egypt, and now that the Suez Canal lets Red Sea sharks into the Mediterranean, India has become a Mediterranean Power." He finds evident signs of improvement in Greece, but the rate of progress is not what it ought to be. The country has every advantage in natural position, climate, and soil, the people are frugal and laborious, the protection of the Great Powers renders the maintenance of a large army and navy unnecessary; yet there are no roads or railways ten miles away from Athens, and Greek wheat is undersold at the Piræus by wheat from Odessa and from Central India. He continues:—

"October 21, 1875.

"When the present King succeeded, either sufficient pains were not taken to rectify the mistakes in the old Constitution, or the mistakes were not recognized. I have heard that the whole thing was very hurriedly done at a meeting of the whole Assembly—Deputies scribbling on their knees any clause they fancied, and handing it to the President, who put it to the vote, and it became part of the new Constitution.

"There is also a ten years' 'Medes and Persians' clause, which is a bar to all amendments, however obviously needed. There is no Upper Chamber, and the net result, joined to universal suffrage, is a dead-lock to all useful government and a perpetual change of the whole personnel of the Ministry. Ministries last only a few weeks or only days; no one can tell you how many Administrations have been in power during the past few years, and every one is tired out except the

few scores of advocates and place-hunters, who make a profession of turning one another out and getting a few weeks or months of salary for themselves or their friends.

"I was introduced to the five principal leaders of parties in the present Assembly, and sat at dinner next Commondouros, a very sensible old man, who is expected to be elected President of the new Assembly. I gathered from his talk a confirmation of what I had heard from others, and told you above. He hopes to rule a little longer than his predecessors, as he has effected a sort of temporary fusion of two or three of the great parties in the Assembly, but no one expects it to last or to lead to any permanent party formation; and after a lease of power a few weeks, or perhaps months, longer than usual, he too will find himself out-voted, and have to resign.

"The King seems utterly worn out by these incessant contests for purely personal objects. I can imagine nothing more galling to a young and accomplished Sovereign, full of noble ideas and good sentiments, as he seems to be, clearly seeing what is needed and unable to do it, owing to the constant fretting opposition which turns the best projects of administration into ropes of sand. What struck me most was the extreme good sense and moderation of all his ideas, as far as I could judge them. I had expected to hear the old story—grand ideas of Byzantine Empire, and the like. But I heard of nothing but useful, practical schemes of good faith and good neighbourhood in foreign affairs, fidelity to engagements, and plans of internal improvement by better police and better courts of justice, better roads, agricultural improvements, irrigation, tree planting, and the like.

"His character is thoroughly respected, and M. Commondouros, in recounting to me the advantages which Greece possesses, gave a prominent place, as he looked across the table to where Her Majesty was sitting, to his country having the most beautiful and most popular of Queens.

"The work most immediately wanted is a railway to link Greece on to the railway system of Europe, probably to a Turkish line to Salonica and so south—the more

direct the better for every one; but any such line would be a great boon, and would soon extend to the Piræus.

"But for all these things a revision of the Constitution seems necessary; no one seems to doubt this, but opinions differ as to how it should be attempted. Some are for a *coup d'état*, some for the interference of the Great Powers, while some sanguine politicians think they would do it by force of Russia. I confess it only seems to me necessary to place a well-considered scheme before the nation and the Great Powers in order to ensure its adoption. No one wishes for a revolution—nothing so disastrous could be imagined for Greece.

"There can be no doubt there are dangerous elements here, which, once let loose, might set all the Turkish Empire and all Europe in a blaze.

"'What is all this to India?' you may ask. Much, I submit, every way. What England and India need in these parts is not a Levantine Ireland, but a really strong, industrious, and thoroughly independent Holland, or, if possible, an Italy, not inclined to be swallowed up easily by any boa constrictor, be he Christian or Moslem, able to appreciate the friendship of England and to help us to secure the neutrality of the Suez Canal."

At Cairo, Tewfik, the eldest son of the Khedive, was invested with the Star of India by the Prince of Wales, who made a short speech, expressing his pleasure in executing the Queen's commands in presence of the Khedive, who had done so much for facilitating communication between England and India.

Frere had much important conversation with the Khedive, and with Nubar, his Minister. There was a severe financial crisis at the time at Constantinople, which had dangerously affected Egyptian credit, and in a few days there had been a fall of nearly twenty per cent. in Egyptian stock. Nubar described the pressure put upon them by the Porte for pecuniary aid in any form, direct or indirect, but said that His Highness's Government had

steadily refused, from a conviction that if they once gave way there would be no limit to the Porte's demands. The extra contributions of the Khedive to the Sultan's treasury during the past few years were, Nubar said, at least ten millions sterling ; but this probably included backsheesh to harem and Ministers as well as gifts to the Porte.\* The Khedive and Nubar were very earnest in their wish to get, through Lord Derby, an English statesman, not a mere routine financier, to report and advise on Egyptian finance. Nubar spoke confidently of Egyptian resources and solvency, and expressed sound views as to the harm that was being done to the country and to the finances by *corvées*, monopolies, *octrois*, tolls, etc. Both the Khedive and Nubar spoke very highly of Gordon, as a good and economical administrator, and of the excellent results of his operations. By a judicious mixture of firmness and conciliation, he had not only checked the slave-trade both by river and land, but had given a new direction to the energies of those classes who used to engage in it.† Frere received full confirmation of this account of Gordon from American and English missionaries and others who had formerly been sceptical as to the Khedive having either the will or the power to give any effectual check to the importation of slaves.

All this went to strengthen Frere's previous conviction that the true policy for England was to help to consolidate and to support Egypt as an independent Power. "At present," he says, "Egypt, Greece, and Italy seem to me the only Powers whose interests in Turkish affairs are absolutely and entirely identical with our own."

Bombay was the place where the Prince was first to touch Indian ground. Besides the Governor of the Presidency,

\* Note on Egypt, October 29, 1875.

† Frere to Lord Granville, October 31, 1875.

the Viceroy was there, and a great concourse of expectant Europeans.

"The natives, in their thousand different ways [Frere writes to Sir S. Northcote, November 7], and according to their myriad superstitions, looked to his advent, some with hope and affection, most with intense satisfaction, but all with an indescribable amount of awe which fascinates and attracts them in a way we can hardly realize."

A greater number of important chiefs had come than even Frere had anticipated, some of them men

"whose ancestors would not have stirred a hundred miles from their capitals to save the lives of all the Governors-General who ever came to India. . . .

"Sir P. Wodehouse, I was told, returned, in six weeks, nearly sixty visits; the Viceroy, with shorter time for it, and more power of selection, devoted much of his few days to returning sixteen visits, each involving a regular procession of several carriages, with escorts of mounted body-guard, guard of honour, etc., and consuming hours to get through three or four in a day.

"The impossibility of H.R.H. doing this with only a week to devote to everything, had struck every one before the Prince arrived. . . .

"I think the Prince's tact and kindly gracious manner have corrected the evil in all cases where he had an opportunity of talking to the Chief, and those who, like the Gaikwar and a few others, saw and spoke to him repeatedly were quite captivated. He told Major Henderson, after the first day or two, that he wished to talk to the visitors and not to be kept to the official silent pantomime; and the result was at once apparent. . . . Even Henderson confessed that H.R.H. had found his way to the hearts of the chiefs, even if he had infringed the dusty rules of Durbar etiquette.

"The presents given by the chiefs considerably exceeded the Viceroy's estimate, though we stoutly insisted on all reductions which the Viceroy thought necessary. No attempt could be made at equivalent returns. But the presents the Prince gave were remarkably well chosen, and

he gave them all with a few words of explanation, which greatly enhanced the estimation of the souvenir, and which were often evidently more valued than the presents themselves. It was curious to see how chiefs, who would be studiously indifferent to the trays of 'Toshakhana' presents, listened to what the Prince said, and came or sent for repetition or explanation of the remark about hunting-knife, rifle, or portrait medal, which evidently gave the keepsake its value in their eyes."

And to General Ponsonby he writes from Poona :—

"November 14, 1875.

"Nothing could exceed the enthusiasm of the Prince's reception. I expected much more, perhaps, than most people did, but I could not have believed how the natives would be moved by H.R.H.'s presence among them. This was yet more observable with the chiefs. I wish you could have seen the expression of their faces after an interview with H.R.H.—so pleased and happy. . . .

"Altogether I am sure the results already apparent are so particularly useful, that I should consider them cheaply purchased by the cost of the whole tour."

Durbars, banquets, balls, picnics, and other festivities, followed in quick succession, "eager, active men in fresh relays urging H.R.H. to do all they think possible. . . . No one stands work, heat, damp, or exposure, better than H.R.H., and few stand them so well." The Staff were almost worn out. Mr. Albert Grey, Frere's private secretary, became ill when at Ceylon, and eventually had to return home, so that Frere's own work became more constant and fatiguing than ever.

When the ten days allotted to Bombay, Poona, and the adjacent country were at an end, the plan of the tour was suddenly disarranged by an outbreak of cholera in the district to which they were going. The Prince's party could not

stay where they were, nor could they anticipate the time when they were expected elsewhere. A decision had to be made at once without communicating with the Viceroy, who was already gone back to Calcutta. Frere recommended that they should go to Baroda. It was a responsible step for him to have to take. Baroda had for some time had a bad name. The Gaikwar had lately been deposed for his crimes and misgovernment, and replaced by a child of nine years old under the regency of his mother. There was some anxiety as to the manner in which the Prince might be received, especially as he was coming unexpectedly at a few hours' notice.

The result, however, was a complete success. The elephants, with their gold and silver trappings, the gorgeous jewels and bright-coloured dresses were made to produce scenic effects as splendid as if the ceremonial had been prepared for months beforehand. And behind the show and the glamour, a practical political effect of real importance at that particular time was produced by the Prince's visit. It gave the Government of the widowed Ranee of a disturbed and unsettled State, just the recognition and support required to strengthen its authority.

The applications for presentation to the Prince were, of course, innumerable, and had to be dealt with with great discrimination. And some disappointment was naturally expressed by the inhabitants of the places which were not to be visited. The following is taken from a letter to Frere from a native official in Sind, disappointed that the Prince was not going there, and that he could not go and see him.

"It is a greatest pleasure and joy for the Princes, Chiefs, and people of India that the King, son of Victoria, by the



grace of God of the United Kingdom, etc., Queen, Defender of the Faith has been arrived in India, and also your honor, who has made several kindnesses favours and justice towards your subject while you were in India. My heart and sole is in a such degree anxious that if I had possessed a charm, I would have made myself a Bird, or made myself an Electric Telegraph and would have presented myself before the Gentlemen. However, if I could not obtain the Visit of the King I would have seen his glorious face from a distance." (Here follow some Persian Verses.) . . . "It is well know fact that the Prince of Wales will only come as far as Lahore and not to Scindh Country! Most respected Sir, I think the Scindh Country is not a part of India, it is a weak and poor country, but the people of India are most desirous to see the King, and also most desirous to see you as they considering you for your justice favours and kindnesses father and mother. But I think it is an unfortunate country of the Scindh that they are failure of their Wills." (More Persian Verses.) "Most respected Sir, it is my heart and sole's desire that I may obtain your visit, but it depends on occasion. At present I beg to submit my petition with thousand compliments to you and wellcome."

From Bombay the Prince went to Ceylon, and thence to Madras and to Calcutta, where Christmas and the last days of the year were passed, the native population there being at first apathetic, and even sullen, but warming up after a few days into something like enthusiasm. Leaving Calcutta, the Prince's party went by Benares, Lucknow, and Cawnpore to Delhi, where a camp of exercise had been formed, containing a large body of troops, European and native, and manœuvres or reviews took place daily. "The marks of approbation and regard," Lord Napier of Magdala writes, "which the Prince of Wales has shown towards the native army are politically of the greatest value, and have surprised and delighted it."

On the Prince's leaving Delhi, there was a rumour that an attempt would be made to wreck his train as it passed

at night. As a precaution, therefore, men with torches were stationed at intervals of fifty yards on each side of the line the whole distance—three hundred miles—to Lahore.

After visiting Agra, Gwalior, and Jeypore, the Prince was to have a respite from receptions and ceremonial, and to enjoy three weeks of sport at Naini Tal. Frere's presence during that time being less indispensable, he obtained leave of absence to fulfil a wish that he had cherished for thirty-three years—to visit the last resting-place of his beloved brother Richard, the young soldier of the garrison of Jellalabad, who had died at Rawul Pindee on his way from the great siege.

Lord Salisbury had asked Frere to report specially on frontier affairs, and on British relations with the Ameer, and he therefore went on from Rawul Pindee to Peshawur.

Peshawur is a walled city with an Affghan population, situated just within British territory facing the mouth of the Khyber Pass. Being a first-class military station on the frontier, it was essential that it should be adequately fortified, and also that the quarters of the troops should be made as healthy as possible, especially as the climate, with its extremes of heat and cold, is a very trying one. The question of fortifications and of the accommodation of troops had been dealt with in a despatch of the Duke of Argyll's in August, 1871, but after three or four years of consideration it was still undecided; "and the soldiers in garrison and their families still die by scores in consequence."

In a letter to Lord Salisbury, Frere describes Peshawur and the surrounding country :—

"February 22, 1876.

"After clearing the hills about Attock, you drive along the excellent trunk-road, up a broad valley, with hills

towards Kohat on your left, the Cabul river and Momund Hills and the snowy peaks of the Hindoo Kosh on your right, and the Kyber Hills in front; pass Nowshera, a large cantonment which is being constantly shaken by earthquakes, on a bare plain on the left, and twenty-eight miles further on you reach the walled city, commanded by a detached fort quite strong enough to resist any native attack; then come nearly two miles of very straggling native cantonment, with barracks and bungalows much intermixed, then two huge upper-storied barracks, with four smaller ones for officers' quarters in the rear. These were to form two of the seven or nine sides of the famous fortified enclosure. Beyond these the bungalow and cantonment buildings and trees come to an end, a parade ground, cemetery, etc., are passed, and the main road ends. It is cleared for some miles further, through fields which cease about half-way to Jumrood, at the frontier, then wide river-beds and bare gravelly hills in a sort of neutral ground up to the great deserted fort of Jumrood. A few friendly Afreedis hold a sort of police-post in the citadel. The path beyond winds among gravel hills and river-beds, with towers and fortified houses on some of the eminences, up to the jaws of the Pass, where the rocks rise abruptly on either side about sixty feet apart, and it so continues, we were told, many miles beyond where we turned round at the point beyond which the friendly Afreedis could not guarantee us from stray matchlock shots and attempts at kidnapping by their Troglodite brethren who live in caves in the Pass.

"From near Rawul Pindi the character of the population and their costume, style of cultivation, etc., become less and less Indian. West of Attock all is Affghan; the frequent streams from the hills, the mulberry and other fruit orchards near the villages, the veiled women and the tall, sturdy, well-clad men, are not of Hindustan, whilst the increasing insecurity as you near the frontier is shown by the fortified aspect of even the smaller houses: watch-towers rise above every cattle stading, and are scattered about the fields. They are built of mud—two, and sometimes three, stories high—with a door twelve or fourteen feet from the ground, which is reached by a ladder easily drawn up when the owner is inside; and in the larger

towers the door is commanded by a sort of projecting machicolation, whence stones, of which plenty are always kept on the roof, can always be thrown on any one attempting to get in at the door. Near the hills we saw few men unarmed. Even the little boys at the Pass had huge Kyberee knives, and many of them firearms. Part of this was perhaps holiday swagger ; but all the men had arms, and shot well at a mark. In the cantonment, life and property are safer than they were some years ago. Still, armed robbers are always prowling about at night and after dark ; our own people do not generally go about without arms or armed attendants. Only a year or two ago a drunken bandmaster, returning home at night from mess, was seized and carried off for ransom. Sentries and pickets are always posted as if in face of an enemy, and any one who goes at night beyond their lines, or who at any time passes the frontier, may expect to be shot at by our neighbours.

“This did not seem to me a very creditable nor, in any sense, an inevitable state of things, but I will say nothing now of border policy.

“The cantonment and city are both still very unhealthy, especially from fever, in September to November. The drainage everywhere seemed to me very unscientific and imperfect. Much of the land lies low, and it is difficult to drain, but there has been no attempt at any comprehensive plan, nor can there ever be anything of the kind whilst the present division of authority continues. There is a Commissioner who ought to be, and in some respects is, trusted with great powers, but he can spend nothing on the most necessary military public works without a reference to Calcutta. There is a Brigadier in the same predicament, but they report to, and ask sanction through different channels and from different heads of departments, and combined action is difficult. There is a great swamp east of the town and fort. It was once a fertile source of malaria, but was drained some years ago. The drains got choked, and when I was there the swamp was again denounced by the doctor as a fertile source of fever. The Commissioner and Brigadier consulted together how to meet the common enemy, but nothing could be done till orders came from Calcutta, further than Transylvania is from London ; and Calcutta was not easy to move, for

the sufferers were partly civil, partly military—the drains military work, but the land drained civil—with different engineers, executive, superintending, and chief, and different heads of Public Works Department of the Government of India. No one has authority over both short of the Viceroy, and he, to be obeyed, must send his orders through several secretaries—one Financial, and two Public Works; but the Viceroy has also Bengal famines and Burmese difficulties and other things to attend to, so soldiers and citizens go on dying in their several “departments,” because no one on or near the spot has authority over all departments, and no one can spend money even to save life, unless it has been budgeted for many months before.

“The poor Brigadier is not in an enviable position. He has no authority beyond his own camp limits. The troops at the outposts toward the hills are Punjab troops under the orders of the Viceroy and Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and quite independent of the Brigadier and even of the Commissioner-in-Chief. Even in his own limits he has little power to carry out the most obviously sanitary works. He and the Civil Commissioner are quite independent of each other, and have no common master nearer than the Viceroy. Even if, like sensible men, they agree what to do, it is not easy for them to get authority to do it. . . .”

“Whenever Lord Lytton has decided what to do, let him put one man, whether Lieutenant-Governor, General, or Commissioner, on the spot, with full powers to do all that the Viceroy decides shall be done. A simple order, ‘As you were in Sir John Lawrence’s and Sir Robert Montgomery’s time,’\* would go far to rectify the present wasteful and inefficient system, and to remove the dead-lock; for most of what I have described is the result of changes since they left, transferring final authority from Lahore to Calcutta or Simla. Its transfer back again might be effected by a stroke of the Viceroy’s pen. The change was intended to promote efficiency and economy, but it has produced paralysis and waste. It has made the Viceroy virtually local governor of the Punjab as of every other division of the Indian Empire, and the con-

\* *I.e.* when Sir J. Lawrence was Commissioner of the Punjab, not when he was Viceroy.

sequence is that if he does his duty in one, all the others must wait. . . .”

Frere found on inquiry that the disposition of Shere Ali, Ameer of Affghanistan, to the British was now “one of more bitter hostility” than he had supposed. As to the negotiations to be entered into, and the attitude and measures to be adopted with reference to him, he writes again to Lord Salisbury from Lahore :—

“February 24, 1876.

“I had much talk with Pollock on Affghan affairs. What passed at Calcutta when he went to discuss with the Viceroy the present position of affairs was so entirely confidential that he was not at liberty to mention either the subjects discussed or the results ; but it was clear he had only been treated with half confidence, knew nothing of some of the most important elements, and must therefore have been rather a blind adviser. For instance, he had never seen any of the Persian despatches—copies of which are regularly sent every mail by the Minister direct to India—nor any of the English Foreign Office letters to you. He only saw yours to the Viceroy—the official ones—by accident, and was, in fact, advising very much in the dark.

“I gather that the Lieutenant-Governor here is not better informed, and neither of them seem to be more than half in the confidence of the Calcutta Foreign Office. What other sources of information exist I cannot guess, but I found Pollock, who, as the channel in all ordinary diplomatic correspondence, ought to know, if any one does, quite as uncertain as I was in England on such questions as ‘What is the Ameer’s real feeling towards us? What towards the Russians? What is the real state of his present diplomatic relations with the Russians or Persians? What will he say to any proposal to open more intimate relations with us? Why did he delay to receive the £100,000? Why the arms? Did he think the offer too much or too little? Was he sulky, or did he expect to get more by delay? Or was he alarmed at the magnitude of our bid for his friendship, about which

before we seemed to care so little?' On all these, and many more questions of equal importance, Pollock had made shrewd guesses; but accurate and reliable information from the best possible sources, such as he ought to have had for the Viceroy's information, he had little or none, and can have none under the present blind-man's-buff system.

And again—

“ March 3.

“ I was grievously disappointed at the amount of knowledge possessed by men in excellent positions for learning what goes on amongst the Affghans. Of course no intelligent, zealous man can be long in such a position without learning a vast deal about his neighbour over the border; but the constant inculcation of a non-interference and know-nothing policy, the standing orders to frontier officers, the spirit of the orders being to turn their backs and shut their eyes and ears to all beyond the frontier, and the prohibition of using the most obvious means of getting information, all these have borne fruit, and very little of real diplomatic utility seems known of events, persons, motives, or parties beyond our border. To the questions, ‘ Could you not learn? Could you not ascertain the truth or details? ’ the answer generally was, ‘ Of course, nothing easier, but the Government of India does not want to know,’ or ‘ the Government would be down on me if I inquired.’ . . .

“ I will now briefly indicate the course which I would suggest for the consideration of Lord Lytton, on the supposition that the objects Her Majesty's Government have in view are not to quarrel with the Ameer of Cabul, but to be on the best possible terms with him, using the Affghans as a ‘ buffer ’ to avoid immediate contact between our frontier and the Russian frontier as long as possible, and to prevent throwing on to the Russian side in Central Asiatic politics such near neighbours of our own as the Affghans are.

“ I would begin by revising the diplomatic machinery and mode of dealing with all questions between the Government of India and the Ameer. Instead of the present diplomatic incognito of agents with the half-

knowledge of all that is going on, and all that is wished and intended by both parties, and its half, or less than half, confidence between all parties and agents, I would have a carefully selected officer who should be chosen mainly for his fitness to be the permanent and recognized representative of the British Government in its intercourse with the Ameer. I would clothe him with all the attributes usually assigned to all the representatives of the Crown in foreign Courts in Europe, and I would trust him with a confidence as entire as that between an English Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British Envoys at foreign Courts.

"This need occasion no dislocation of existing agency and no great addition to existing charges. In the Commissioner of Peshawur, Sir Richard Pollock, the Viceroy would find the frontier officer who would probably have to begin any negotiation under the present system. He is on the spot, experienced, conciliatory, popular with the Affghans, and personally acceptable to the Ameer, whom he brought down to the Umballa conference with Lord Mayo. If his power were extended by making him the Viceroy's agent for the frontier of Affghanistan on the same footing as the agents for Central India, Rajpootana, etc., you would have the first step towards a better understanding with the Ameer in having a recognized Minister with a defined position and duties and adequate rank.

"I would communicate the change in his position to the Ameer, and intimate 'that the General was charged with formal credentials accrediting him in his new or higher office to the Ameer,' after delivering which he would communicate to the Ameer the Viceroy's views on several important matters, and I would invite the Ameer to name any time and place for giving an audience to the envoy which would be agreeable to him.

"If he responded cordially, I would not mind some delay in arranging the meeting. I would not hurry or show much anxiety about it, but would consult the Ameer's convenience and make allowance for his many difficulties with his own people and fanatical advisers, as well as with foreign influence, which will certainly be exerted to prevent any greater intimacy in his relations with us.



"If, on the other hand, the Ameer showed obvious signs of disinclination to improve his relations with us, I would take it as clear proof that hostile influence had worked more effectually than we now suppose, that it was useless to attempt to coax or cajole him into a better frame of mind, and that we must look for alliances and influences elsewhere than at Cabul, must seek them in Kelat, at Candahar, Herat, and in Persia, and I would lose no time in looking out for them.

"If, however, the Ameer agreed to meet the envoy, the suite and the escort of the latter should be very carefully arranged so as to make a distinct military impression, without any appearance of threatening or bullying. The officers attached should be carefully chosen without stint as to numbers; bullies and swaggerers should be as carefully avoided as professors of blarney and soft sawder. There are plenty of straightforward English officers who do not dislike Affghans or natives generally, and who can be trusted to treat them, as gentlemen should, without flattery or nonsense. . . .

"Before seeking from the Ameer any direct explanation of his changed attitude towards us, I would instruct the envoy to give him a perfectly frank and full explanation of the English view of the present situation. It is worse than useless to tell him, as we have so often told him before, 'that the Russians are our good friends, and have no design beyond the protection of their own frontier and the extension of civilization and commerce; that we are not the least disturbed by their advance, and are prepared to co-operate with them in promoting an era of peace and good will; that Lord Dalhousie, Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook, all meant the same thing and had the same views of our popular policy.'

"The Ameer knows that all this is humbug, and that we know it to be so . . . and therefore I would waive all discussion about the past. . . . I would simply insist on the fact that we do not desire to advance our frontier, we covet none of his valleys; this he knows to be true, and understands to be in accordance with our plain interest. . . . In all the envoy said he should be careful to avoid appearing either to undervalue or to overvalue the Affghan Alliance. The envoy should neither wound the Ameer's

self-esteem by depreciating, nor flatter it by over-estimating the utility to us of an independent Affghanistan. I would let him clearly see that we quite recognized the service he could render us as a barrier to Russian advance, and that we were convinced an independent Affghanistan, friendly to us, would be infinitely more valuable in every way than a dependent or conquered Affghanistan.

"All this he can well understand and appreciate if it is frankly put before him, but then it is necessary he should clearly realize our view of his position as a weak power between two enormously strong ones, an earthen vessel between two iron ones ; that for our own sakes we should infinitely prefer an independent and voluntary alliance to any share of his kingdom ; that, rightly or wrongly, we do not believe in the possibility of improving our frontier by advancing it ; that nothing would make us desire advance but a conviction of his unfriendship ; but that, if we desired it, he would find no foreign support of any avail in a contest to which we should not be driven but by our instinct of self-preservation, but which once entered on, we should conduct with all the energy of a struggle for existence and empire, for supremacy in India and rank among the great nations of Europe.

"For all these reasons we cannot afford to occupy any secondary or doubtful position among his neighbours and allies ; that the present state of things could not continue, and that it was for him to indicate what he would like substituted for it.

"This would probably bring about a clearer understanding as to what are his real wishes and expectations from us, and at least pave the way for some proposal as to the improved agency through which our communications might be carried on in future.

"If the Ameer came into your views and consented to receive English officers in positions where they can watch the course of events, ascertain opinions, learn about persons and parties, and act as your trusty videttes, I would not insist on the permanent residence of the envoy at the capital, Cabul. He would do well enough within our own frontier, as Sir George Clerk used to manage our relations with Runjeet from Umballa as well, or better, than we could have done from Lahore. But he

must have good assistants in Affghanistan, with power to send them when necessary to Candahar or Herat, and to such places as Meshed and the Persian frontier, who would keep him well informed of all that went on. The envoy could always visit the Ameer on special occasions, and meet him, if not at Cabul, at Jellalabad, Guzni, or Candahar, or invite him to India to meet the Viceroy. . . .

"Having secured these two cardinal points: (1) a recognized and qualified envoy in permanent, well-understood, and direct communication between the Viceroy and Ameer, and (2) a clear understanding between the Viceroy and Ameer as to what each party desires, it would be premature to consider what should be done next till you know what the Ameer is prepared to do, or what he wishes you to do for or with him. Quite as much harm may be done by doing or offering too much as by doing or offering too little, and it seems very doubtful whether this mistake was not made when the last payment was made to him a few months ago.

"You will, I know, excuse the length of a letter written partly in a sick man's room, and partly in a railway-carriage."

The sick man was Canon Duckworth, the Prince's chaplain, who had accompanied him, and who from over-fatigue or other cause was attacked by fever, and was for some time seriously ill. Frere deferred rejoining the Prince to watch over him. When the crisis of the fever was passed, leaving the patient in good hands, and leaving behind also his own servant to attend him, he set out to rejoin the rest of the party at Bombay, whence the *Serapis* started on her homeward voyage.

At Suez he met Lord Lytton on his way out to succeed Lord Northbrook. A few days were spent at Cairo, and it was here that he got the news of the purchase by the English Government of the Suez Canal shares, which he rejoiced at, as tending to draw closer the connection between England and Egypt.

"So we have got a good lump of the Suez Canal shares," Dr. Badger writes to him (March 4, 1876). "Hurrah! you will remember how three years ago you and I endeavoured to press the purchase on the Government at a time when it might have got all the shares of the sharehold dirt-cheap, as the saying is. But Mr. Gladstone would have nothing to do with it. Let delators talk as they will, our influence over Egypt will be vastly strengthened by our possessing so large a share in the Suez Canal."

At Cairo Frere passed his sixty-first birthday, an occasion of which the members of the Prince's suite took advantage to make him a present of a handsome carpet. From Egypt the Prince went to Spain, and at Alexandria Frere took leave of him and returned by way of Vienna and Munich to England, arriving on April 21.

The accomplishment of the Prince's tour was followed, on January 1, 1877, by the proclamation of the Queen, at the Imperial City of Delhi, as Empress of India. It was a fitting sequel to it. There were those who scoffed at the assumption of the title as a meaningless expression. It was not meaningless. It was a name, now for the first time pronounced and adopted, which correctly expressed and explained the position and authority which the Queen actually held and exercised throughout India.

Dr. Badger writes with reference to it :—

"March 4, 1876.

"It does not much matter what the style is in English ; but it matters much what it is to be in the language of India. I have put in a strong veto, against the title of 'Sultānah' which, etymologically, is only a feminine noun expressive of abstract power, hence, doubtless, there are so many Sultāns and Sultānahs. But 'Sultānah,' even in its modern application, designates merely a wife, or

perchance one of the wives of a Sultân. Shâhin-Shâh, the Shâh of Shâhs, might do ; but I maintain that ' Pâd Shâh '—*i.e.* the guardian or protecting sovereign—is the most suitable designation, and one with which the Indians are familiar. It was the title of the great Akbar, and its application at the present day is confined, I think, to the Emperor of Russia—I mean its application to sovereigns beyond Islam."

The tour had, from first to last, been beyond all expectation successful. A public Thanksgiving Service for the Prince's safe return was held at Westminster Abbey—Dean Stanley preaching the sermon. To Frere, from the Queen downwards, came warm acknowledgments and congratulations on the important service he had rendered in piloting the expedition. He was asked by Lord Beaconsfield to choose between being made a baronet and a G.C.B. He chose the former ; but the Queen bestowed both honours on him.

Through the summer he had, in addition to his other work, that of making up the accounts of the expenditure on the tour, which was especially troublesome, as the disbursements had necessarily been through so many persons and in so many places, and it was complicated by the payments to meet them having to come from the Indian as well as the English Exchequers.

Early in September he attended the International African Conference under the Presidency of the King of the Belgians at Brussels. The autumn he spent with his wife and children very happily at Birk Hall, near Ballater, which had been lent him by the Prince of Wales. Here he found time to write the article for the *Quarterly Review*, already mentioned, on the "Turkish Empire," and his part of that on the "Eastern Question and the Government."

His popularity in England was now at its highest point. His counsel and assistance were sought, not only on Indian, Egyptian, and East African affairs, but, amongst other matters, on the Eastern Question, then in one of its crises on the eve of the breaking out of the war between Russia and Turkey. His name was so much before the public, and he seemed so naturally destined for important office, that rumour assigned him various posts. He was to go to India to be present at the proclamation of the Queen as Empress. He was to succeed Sir Philip Wodehouse and serve another term as Governor of Bombay.\*

There was an idea that Bulgaria, or one of the Turkish provinces in Europe, might be assigned to England to govern, and Frere's name was suggested as Governor.†

\* Miss Carpenter writes to Lady Frere: "I was afraid it was too good to be true that Sir Bartle Frere was going to Bombay again. I have never felt the place the same since you left. A spirit has departed! No one will fill that place."

† The following letter from Sir Henry Green is a characteristic expression of the feeling with which the news of his subsequent appointment to the Cape was received by Frere's old comrades and lieutenants:—

"November 30, 1876.

"Do not think me an impracticable dreamer, but why should not Turkey say to England, 'Come, if you will undertake to regenerate us, and show us how to govern properly, we will place everything in your hands, and give you every assistance'? And why should not England say to Russia, 'This offer has been made to us; you profess to want only good government for the Christian population of Turkey; we will guarantee within a certain time to give good government to all creeds; if we fail, then we will withdraw, and you can try your hand'? If Russia be sincere in her professions, could she refuse? Would not England be proud to accept such a position? Would it not unite all parties to assist in so good a cause, with all Europe as a witness? Would not the Turks, as their last hope of maintaining their position in Europe, assist heart and soul? And would not the English gentlemen, who might be called upon to assist in so noble a

The Khedive, who now had Mr. Goschen to advise him in financial matters, had discovered that much revenue might be saved by better management of the State railways. He wrote to Frere to ask if he would go out as "Inspecteur Controlleur," with full power to control them, and, in fact, to be one of his Ministers. This was impossible, for it was incompatible with his remaining on the India Council. So the Khedive applied to him to nominate some one else. He named his old friend, General Marriott, who, having obtained the sanction of the Foreign Office, at once went out and did good service.

It has been mentioned that Frere, on his way home with the Prince, met, at Suez, Lord Lytton on his way out to assume the Viceroyalty of India. They had opportunity only for a single interview, but Frere, anticipating the meeting, seems to have had copies of the last three of his letters to Lord Salisbury ready, and to have left them with Lord Lytton. The following day Lord Lytton, after reading them, wrote a long letter to Frere,

work, earnestly, honestly, and truly put their whole souls in it, as only English gentlemen can do? For myself, I can see no difficulties; the same principles which governed Sind would merely have to be applied on a somewhat larger scale in Turkey; in fact, I believe, from my experience of that country, that we should find fewer difficulties in dealing with the Turkish population than we have with that of India. Not a foreign soldier would be required, only a few well-selected English gentlemen, principally furnished from our Indian Service, with you as their head. I say you, but I do not wish to flatter. You are now known to Europe. Could any one doubt your honesty of purpose? You know, or ought to know, the power you gain over every native you approach. Could the Sultan have a better or a more honest and able guide who, while being his friend, would never come the master over him?

"I should never have thought of writing this unless I had seen this morning that they were about to send you to Africa—sending a doctor to look after the great toe when the most vital part of the whole system is in danger. I have had my say; you have listened often before."

expressing the most cordial agreement with his views as to Affghanistan, and with the principles of action which he laid down.

Four years later it was sought to make Frere responsible for the events which took place in Affghanistan in 1878-80, as being the result of a policy and measures which he had recommended. And it is a common opinion that Lord Lytton was sent out with instructions to force a permanent agent upon the Ameer at Cabul, and that the probability, almost amounting to certainty, of a war with him was contemplated. How far these allegations are from being true is shown by the following extracts from Lord Lytton's letter, from which it will be seen how completely, *at that time*, he accepted and endorsed Frere's views, though his subsequent action was so much at variance with them.

"March 26, 1876.

"There is something positively startling in the almost exact coincidence of the opinions recorded in your letter of the 3rd of March to Lord Salisbury with those which, before leaving England, I put on paper, confidentially, for examination by Lord Salisbury and Mr. Disraeli, who entirely concurred in them. . . .

"We seem, therefore, to have worked the problem by different formulas, and yet with the same result.

"I need not go over the ground we hold in common as the basis of our conviction, that no time is to be lost in trying to retrieve the errors of the last four years. You have so admirably laid it out in your letter of the 3rd that I can only say 'Ditto to Mr. Burke.'

"So long as there is a chance of firmly establishing our political position in Affghanistan, I would strain every effort to keep the Ameer's dominions united and his rule strong. If that chance fails, if it has already slipped away, then, as you say, we must consider our whole policy.

"Thinking over the matter since I left England, I had come to precisely the same conclusion as yourself about



the unadvisableness of insisting on a permanent agent at Cabul if Shere Ali makes great difficulties about it. But there should be a close understanding with the Amir that he is to do all that can be reasonably expected of him to protect British trade and travel in his dominions; and we must not be so squeamish as we have hitherto been about the risks of travelling in Affghanistan. Russia finds some of her most valuable agents in independent adventurers travelling unofficially with an ardour for information unchilled by any fear of personal danger. We have excellent material of the same kind, and I would not discourage its spontaneous activity.

“But all this will be of no avail if the policy of the Indian and English Governments be not cordially homogeneous. Russia should be distinctly told by our Foreign Office at home that we cannot allow her even to compete with us for influence in either Affghanistan, Kelat, or Beloochistan. At present this has been only vaguely hinted at. Gortschakoff complained some time ago of our rumoured intention to garrison Quetta; and the English Government was actually afraid to tell him, what he did not seem to be aware of, that we have already a right to do so if we please. I have myself held very strong language to Shouvaleff about these frontier states; and I have implored Lord Salisbury to urge upon the Foreign Office the necessity of backing it up. If you agree with me, I hope I shall have the support of your influence, when you return to England, on this point, to which I attach great importance.”

To this Frere replied :—

“May 5, 1876.

“I reached home on April 22, and found your letter, for which allow me to offer my heartiest thanks, not only for what you so kindly say of what I had written, but for the first gleam of sunshine on what has to my eye been for some years past a most gloomy political prospect; gloomy, not from the actual circumstances before us, but from the absolute refusal of men in power to look those circumstances in the face.”

Lord Lytton was an able and persuasive writer, and the

views he expressed gave Frere high hopes as to his future career in India. With his sanguine temperament, always perceiving first the best side of every man he had to do with, Frere was ready to anticipate that Lord Lytton might succeed in carrying out in practice what he had indicated in his letters. The anticipation was not realized.

This is not the place to examine the policy and methods pursued under Lord Lytton's administration, or to inquire how far the course of action which he followed was due to his instructions from home, how far to his own initiative, and how far to the pressure or conduct of his advisers and subordinates. It is enough to point out that on essential points his action was distinctly at variance with Frere's views, with which he had expressed cordial concurrence, and a course taken which they had both deprecated.

The Affghan War, the massacre of Cavagnari and his staff, and the renewal of the war, cost much blood and treasure, and led to a reactionary policy under the succeeding Viceroy. Quetta, which had been occupied as a military post, was abandoned, and the railway to it, which had been almost completed under Lord Lytton, was actually pulled up and destroyed under his successor.

But since that time, and within the last ten years, gradually and imperceptibly the leading features of the policy of Jacob and Frere on the north-west frontier have been adopted, and the views which as a hopelessly small minority they steadily advocated, are now silently and without question—albeit without acknowledgment—more or less completely accepted by all schools and parties. No one any longer talks of the Indus being our natural military frontier. Quetta, the very discussion as to the occupation of which was, when Lawrence was Viceroy,

peremptorily stifled, has been occupied in force, fortified, connected by railway with the port of Kurrachee, and is now one of the most important military stations in all India. The Affghans are no longer tabooed as too irreconcilably hostile to be associated with, or their ruler as too faithless to be treated with. As these pages are being transcribed comes the intelligence of the result of Sir Mortimer Durand's mission to Cabul, of the Ameer's friendly disposition, of Kafristan with Chitral being received and acknowledged as under British protection, of permission accorded by the Ameer to extend the Quetta railway, tunnelled through the mountain barriers of Affghanistan, to Chaman, on the road to Candahar, and in the heart of the country; while to the north-east of Affghanistan acknowledgment of the British protectorate has assured peace among the wild tribes of Northern Cashmere and up to the foot of the precipices of the Pamirs.

In reading Lord Lytton's correspondence with Frere—and in reading Lord Mayo's—it is impossible to avoid asking the question, Why, on these two occasions, when a Governor-General was to be appointed, was not the veteran sent instead of the novice, the teacher rather than the learner?

In Frere's own letters and papers not the smallest hint of any such ambition or expectation is to be found. But in letters written to him and to others, the anticipation does frequently occur. It would indeed be difficult to name any qualification for the office which he did not possess. In knowledge of India, of the country—its resources and capacity for development,—of the native rulers, of the people, of the Imperial service, civil and military, no Englishman of his generation could equal him. The natives, chiefs and people, would have welcomed him as

one who during forty years had done more than any living Englishman to obtain for them fair treatment and protection for their rights and their cherished institutions, and to promote the great public works, which, turning wildernesses into gardens, had enriched the trader and brought plenty to the ryot. The natives of Sind had said to him—and their opinion was not confined to Sind—"If Her Majesty's Government want to select from among the Indian statesmen one who possesses the key of the secret of touching and winning the hearts of men of different creeds and castes of which the native society of this country is composed, by the power of love and not of fear, they should look to you and to you alone." Among those of his own countrymen who disagreed with his policy and his methods he had not a single personal enemy; and his success when on the Supreme Council at Calcutta was a standing proof of how readily he could make his way and conciliate his colleagues, even when there were strong antagonisms and prejudices to overcome. As to the number of those who knew him personally and had served under him, the repeated and enthusiastic expressions of confidence and attachment with which their letters abound, testify to the zeal and devotion with which they would have served under him.

Had Frere gone to India as Viceroy in 1876, his tact and faculty for gaining the confidence and respect of semi-barbarous chieftains, his intimate knowledge of the qualities and capabilities of the foremost British officers, civil and military, of all schools, and the enthusiastic service which the best of them would have placed at his disposal, would in all human probability have enabled him, without recourse to arms, to have convinced Shere Ali that his best course lay in a return to the policy of Dost Mahomed and a cordial alliance with the British Power,

and would thus have availed to extricate the Government from the difficulties and danger in which a long period of supineness had involved it, and placed our frontier relations on a safe and peaceful basis, such as has only now at length been attained after a war, costly in blood and treasure, followed by so many years of uncertainty, vacillation, and unrest.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### THE CAPE.

Appointed to the Cape—Arrival at Capetown—President Burgers—Defencelessness of Capetown—Retrospect—Disintegration and Confederation—Condition of the Transvaal Republic—Its annexation—Damaraland and Namaqualand—Eastern and Western Colonists—Frere goes to King William's Town—The Galekas attack the Fingoes—Outbreak of War—Confidence restored—The Gaikas rebel—Conduct of the Ministry—Frere dismisses them—Mr. Gordon Sprigg forms a Ministry—The war ended—School Kaffirs—Meeting of the Legislature.

THE call to work came to him from an unexpected quarter. Lord Carnarvon, then Colonial Secretary, wrote to him as follows :—

“October 13, 1876.

“I venture, in what I consider a very important and critical matter, to ask whether you can give the Government the benefit of those valuable services which have so often and so signally been proved on other occasions?

“You are probably aware of the general position of affairs at the Cape. We have been on the edge of a great native war; and, though I trust that the danger is passing, if not past, the position is one of extreme delicacy from its political as well as its native complications, and a strong hand is required.

“But the war between the Transvaal Republic and the natives has had this further effect: it rapidly ripened all South African policy. . . . It brings us near to the object and end for which I have now for two years been steadily labouring—the union of the South African Colonies and States. I am indeed now considering the

details of a Bill for their confederation, which I desire to introduce next Session, and I propose to press, by all means in my power, my confederation policy in South Africa.

"With this brief explanation I have now only to say that my hope is to induce you to accept the difficult and responsible, but, as I believe, the most important task of undertaking the government of the Cape, which becomes vacant on December 31, nominally as Governor, but really as the statesman who seems to me most capable of carrying my scheme of confederation into effect, and whose long administrative experience and personal character give me the best chances of success.

"To do this a very early departure for the Cape is necessary, but I do not estimate the time required for the work of confederating and of consolidating the confederated states at more than two years.

"Anything in excess of this I do not feel justified in asking of you. I will only add that if, after having done this great work, you feel yourself able to stay on for two or three years to bring the new machine into working order, as the first Governor-General of the South African Dominion, I shall hail the decision both on personal and on public grounds. I desire, however, to leave you free on this point to act as you may yourself think fit.

"I ought perhaps to add, as a matter of business, that the present salary of the Governor of the Cape is £5000, but that I contemplate, in the event of the general scheme being carried into effect, a much higher salary—probably £10,000. I cannot help hoping that though you would not care to accept an ordinary government, the extreme interest which attaches to the whole question at the present juncture, and the distinction of being connected with so great a scheme as that which I trust may now become practicable, may induce you—especially bearing in mind the excellence of the climate—to give a favourable consideration to my proposal. If in doubt on any detail, pray give me an opportunity of affording you further explanations."

To this Frere replied, after alluding to some private details:—

"October 18, 1876.

"I should not have cared for the ordinary current duties of Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, but a special duty I should look upon in a different light, and there are few things which I should personally like better than to be associated in any way with such a great policy as yours in South Africa, entering as I do into the imperial importance of your masterly scheme, and being deeply interested personally from old Indian and African associations in such work.

"I have always understood that the expenses of the Government of the Cape are very heavy in proportion to the salary. How far this may be the case I cannot, of course, tell; but I should not be willing to undertake any post of the kind unless I were certain it could be efficiently and worthily filled. And having little private fortune of my own, I should have to make sure, before deciding, that the means at command were sufficient to provide everything necessary to maintain the dignity of such a position.

"Also it strikes me that at a transition period such as you anticipate, the unavoidable calls upon the salary of the Governor would be greatly increased beyond their ordinary amount.

"Family reasons would make it difficult for me to undertake any duty which would keep me for an indefinite time away from home, but definite special work such as you appear to contemplate would be different; and you will, I know, pardon my thus frankly entering into so many personal details, and will need no assurance from me of my own great interest in any such work which Her Majesty's Government might see fit to entrust to me."

Eventually Frere accepted, a special allowance of £2000 a year being assigned to him, for two years, in his capacity of High Commissioner of South Africa;\* and it was arranged that he was to sail in March.

It was not without a pang that he surrendered the repose to which he had been so long looking forward, and undertook arduous service in a new country, where he

\* Mr. R. W. Herbert to Frere, Feb. 17, 1877 (C. 2601, p. 4).



would have none of his old colleagues, or of the lieutenants whom he had trained, to support him. But Lord Carnarvon's appeal sounded in his ears like a call to duty, and in the spirit of a soldier he responded to it.

The announcement of his appointment was made at the end of November. The congratulations of his friends were not unmixed with regret that he was going so far both from home and from the scenes of his former labours. He sailed on March 9, in the *Balmoral Castle*, taking with him all his family except his son, who was with his regiment at Gibraltar, and arrived at Capetown on March 31.

A fortnight after his arrival, Frere wrote to Lord Carnarvon, giving his first impressions of the place :—

“ April 17, 1877.

“ In some things the place reminds me of a less tropical Ceylon. The climate, the flowers, and the magnificent Table Mountain are all that has been described, but it would be difficult to imagine anything more sleepy and slipshod than everything about the place, or more dirty and unwholesome than the town. . . .”

In a later letter, referring to the crowd on the Queen's birthday, when the single infantry regiment and a few artillerymen which constituted the garrison were paraded, he writes :—

“ May 30.

“ They are a very picturesque crowd, nearly as idle as the Italians, but far more good-humoured. You seldom see a scowling or disagreeable expression on their faces.

“ The Malays form, in Capetown, a large proportion of the lower orders. Some are very good-looking, and the women especially have not lost their Oriental fondness for bright colours. All seem to delight in anything like a

show or public occasion, and crowded to see the Birthday Levee and the opening of the Colonial Parliament, and to see the Colonial Ministers coming here to dinner, in a way which quite brightened up the weather-beaten old Government House and its very dingy surroundings.

"After all I had heard of South African grievances I was agreeably surprised to find that they did not in the least interfere with South African loyalty. . . .

"They are very fond of dancing, though the amusement is rather frowned upon by the Calvinist ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church, many of whom are young Scotchmen who have graduated at Utrecht or Leyden, and have not enlarged their views there, except in the direction of what they call Rationalism or Darwinianism, when, like Mr. Burgers, they are in danger of expulsion from the Dutch orthodox Church.

"The great social event of the year in Capetown is the ball in honour of Her Majesty's birthday. . . . The members, some of them living six or seven hundred miles off, are always anxious to attend, as an essential part of the annual visit to the South African capital. . . . Mr. Burgers was there and danced as if he were neither ex-President nor ex-Divine. He is a singular, and evidently a very clever man, and has great powers of attracting and attaching followers; but I am much disappointed in what I have seen of him since I arrived here. There is to my mind more of the charlatan and less of the poetical element in his consistency than I had expected." \*

Shortly before going there, Frere had written a paper, calling attention to the insufficiency of the defences at the Cape. When he arrived, he found that there was

\* Of Burgers, Shepstone writes to Frere (July 24): "Burgers is a very impulsive man, and while the impulse is upon him, very reckless. I think that is the proper word to use, but he is, like all men of that temperament, liable to opposite extremes, and the average of his character is therefore weak. I am much mistaken if your frankness does not quite subdue him; indeed it has already, for in a letter to me of July 3, he tells me of having been at your ball, and speaks very enthusiastically of you. 'One feels,' he says, 'as if one could trust and work with such a man.'"

not a single gun of modern construction capable of defending Capetown or Simons Bay from so much as an armed privateer. Some Russian officers had visited Capetown two or three years before and had been fêted. They had joked with their entertainers as to what they might do in case of war; how they might carry off Sir H. Barkly, his Ministers or their hospitable families, besides requisitioning a million or two in cash, and burning all the coals. In case of war with Russia, at that time not improbable, there was real danger lest in the absence of the British squadron the Russian officers' joke might become a reality; and so pressing did Frere consider the need of preparation, that he began the works of defence at once, pending the obtaining of a grant from the War Office. The grant having been obtained, he was able a year afterwards (April, 1878) to write that Simons Bay, the naval store-yard and coal depôt, were, he hoped, now safe from privateering attacks. But Table Bay was still open to the attack of any vessel with a rifled gun. To the defence of this also his efforts were directed.

To explain the political condition of South Africa at this time, it is necessary to take a brief retrospect.

✓ During the French War at the beginning of the century, when Holland for a time ceased to be an independent nation and became a province of France, the settlement of the Dutch East India Company at the Cape of Good Hope had, after a brief resistance, surrendered to a British force and come under British rule. It was intended to be a temporary arrangement, till Holland recovered her independence, but so well pleased were the Cape Dutchmen with the change, and so valuable was the station as a half-way resting-place to India, that at the peace of 1814 the Colony was, with general consent, made over permanently to England.

The settlers enjoyed much more liberty as a British, than they had had as a Dutch, colony. Holland, which in Europe posed as a champion of liberty, had treated them in a spirit of selfish and narrow despotism. They had been prohibited from trading on their own account, and compelled to sell their produce to the Company at a fixed price, and in the minutest details of administration had been subject to the caprice of the Government of the Hague. Early in the history of the Colony this treatment had driven the less submissive and more adventurous spirits to set the example of "trekking," or wandering out of reach of all authority into the interior, and living a life removed from contact with civilization. But the bulk of the settlers had submitted to the severe discipline, were modest in their requirements and ambition, and established a tradition of contentment with the simple necessities of life, so easily obtained in that climate. The Puritan faith which they brought with them from Holland had been confirmed and intensified by the arrival, in 1687, of a body of French Huguenot refugees expelled from France by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. These immigrants, prohibited from using their native French language, had been absorbed into the population and were the progenitors of many of the leading families of the Colony.

After the Colony came under the British Government, some small grievances arose on ecclesiastical questions, but no serious breach of harmony occurred between governors and governed till after the passing of the Negro Emancipation Act of 1834. The white people were then suddenly called upon by the British Government to free the native slaves whom they were employing in the cultivation of their land. The compensation given them was inadequate, its payment was so badly arranged and distributed that

only a small proportion of it reached the right persons, and many well-to-do farmers were impoverished or ruined. The recent English settlers, then comparatively few in number, who had brought English ideas with them, could look upon slave-emancipation from the same point of view as their fellow-countrymen at home ; but it was otherwise with the old Dutch colonists. Isolated from external influences, they had preserved almost unaltered the Puritanism of the seventeenth century. The native African race were, in their estimation, Canaanites, whom they, as the chosen people, might go forth, the Bible in one hand and an ox-whip or rifle in the other, to extirpate, or to employ as hewers of wood and drawers of water, with as little compunction as Cromwell or Ireton felt when they caused Irishmen and "Malignants" to be slaughtered or shipped by thousands as slaves to the Barbadoes, or as the Pilgrim Fathers when they slew the redskins of the West. And from that day to this the Act of Emancipation has been looked upon by a large section of the Dutch population as a wrong done to them for which there was no justification.

Opinions may differ as to the degree of harshness with which the natives have been habitually treated by the Boers. But the theory of the two independent Dutch Republics, as expressed in their constitutional law, or "Grondvet," has been and is that no native can under any circumstances be admitted to the privileges of either Church or State. The inhabitants, of whatever origin, of the Colonies where English law prevails have, on the contrary, sought to admit the Kaffir to both. The natives themselves have not failed to appreciate the difference between the two theories, and have become restless and uneasy whenever the establishment of Dutch rule seemed probable or possible.

Most of the mistakes in our government of South Africa have been caused by the fatal tendency to try and govern it from England. There, as elsewhere, the English Government has too often failed to place due confidence in its own representatives. It has listened to one-sided evidence and doctrinaire views, and has overruled or recalled Governors and High Commissioners, men of its own choice, who had every qualification for forming a just judgment on the scene of action, where alone a just judgment could be formed. The consequence has been a weak and vacillating policy. It has been this vacillating policy, the fear, founded on sad experience, that the English Government could not be depended upon to stand by its own word and support its own officers, which has alienated loyal men, both white and black, and has been and continues to this day to be, the abiding cause of confusion, strife, and bloodshed.

In nothing has this vacillation been so fatal as in the constantly recurring question of the extension or non-extension of the Colonial and Imperial authority, in newly settled country, over colonists who have wandered away beyond the old boundaries.

It used to be maintained that British subjects could not divest themselves of their allegiance, could not unite to form an independent state. To enforce this principle, and to put a stop to an independent war which was being waged between the trekking Boers and the Zulus, officials and soldiers were sent by Sir George Napier, the Cape Governor (1838), to Natal. And when the Boers trekked again from Natal to the Orange State, Sir Harry Smith followed them, fought the battle of Boomplatz (August, 1848), and shed British soldiers' blood to establish British sovereignty there. Three years later (1851) a despatch from Lord Grey to Sir Harry Smith declared all this to

have been a mistake ; that blood had been shed vainly ; and all that had been done was reversed. No extension, however small, of Her Majesty's dominions in South Africa was henceforth to be sanctioned.

"The ultimate abandonment of the Orange River territory" [it runs] "must be a settled point of our policy. You will distinctly understand that any wars, however sanguinary, which may afterwards occur between different tribes and communities which will be left in a state of independence beyond the Colonial boundary, are to be considered as affording no ground for your interference."

And so Sir Harry Smith was recalled, and Sir George Cathcart, who succeeded him, concluded (January 17, 1852) "the Sand River Convention" with the Boers, by which the Transvaal was made an independent State, and the British Government undertook to abstain from all interference with native tribes bordering on it. Two years later (1854), the government of the Orange Free State was handed over to a Convention of Boers by Sir George Clerk, on behalf of England.

But the native difficulty could not be thus got rid of. Sir George Grey, who became Governor in 1854, was not long in perceiving and pointing out that the policy of disintegration was a serious impediment to the peace, progress, and civilization of the country, and that the undisputed authority of a single paramount civilized power capable of enforcing fixed principles of conduct towards the natives was essential to peace and tranquillity. The Orange Free State had by their troubles with the natives been made to feel this, and in December, 1858, had by a resolution of the Raad proposed reunion, by federation or otherwise, with the Cape Colony. Sir George Grey did all he could to promote it, and at first the Home Government was disposed to support him. But eventually the Colonial

Secretary, Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, announced that on consideration he had decided against it ; the proposal fell to the ground, and a golden opportunity was lost.

Nevertheless, and in spite of the rule laid down by Lord Grey, it was found necessary to intervene between the Orange River Boers and the Basutos. The latter, twice rescued by Sir George Grey's mediation, were afterwards, and after suffering much loss, saved by Sir Philip Woodhouse's good offices from annihilation, and were located (1868) on territory assigned to them by the Cape Colony. The Griquas also had a territory given to them in what became East Griqualand. And at Kimberley, when the discovery of the diamond-fields (1870) attracted a multitude of people to the edge of the Orange Free State, where there was pending a boundary-dispute with a native Chief, British police and troops had to occupy the town to save it from disorder ; the boundary dispute was settled by the payment of £90,000 to the Orange Free State, and the territory of West Griqualand was added (October 27, 1871) to the British Empire.

Lord Carnarvon became Colonial Minister in 1874. The success of confederation in Canada was an encouragement to him to try a similar scheme in South Africa, and to abandon in favour of confederation the policy of disintegration initiated twenty years before. In the following year, therefore, he addressed a despatch to Sir H. Barkly, then Governor of the Cape, containing an elaborate scheme for bringing about a meeting of delegates from all the South African States to determine on a plan of confederation.

Unfortunately, he had committed the old Colonial-Office mistake of sending out, cut and dried, all the details of the scheme, and nominating, or at least suggesting, the members who were to take part in the Conference, instead



of offering an outline and leaving details to be filled in on the spot ; and he had now to deal with the susceptibilities of a Colony which had just received a new constitution and responsible Government, and was morbidly sensitive to any treatment which bore the least appearance of dictation from the Home Government. The result was, that the House of Assembly, resenting the despatch, without expressing an opinion on the general question of confederation, passed a resolution (June, 1875), that any movement in that direction should originate in South Africa and not in England.

The position the Cape Parliament had taken was not tenable. In a matter affecting all the South African Colonies and Provinces, it was the place of the Home Government, which had relations with, and presided over them all, to suggest the outline of a scheme for establishing new relations between them. A little tact and patience would no doubt have put matters right. Unfortunately, Lord Carnarvon had gone out of his way to select as the exponent and advocate of the proposed scheme, not the Governor of the Cape, who was the natural channel for communication with the Colonial Office, but Mr. Froude, the historian, who was also named or suggested by him as a member of the proposed Conference. Eminent as he was in literature, Mr. Froude had had no official or political experience or training, and possessed no special qualifications for such duties. He landed at Capetown just after the resolution of the House of Assembly had been passed, and the proposed Conference nipped in the bud. He had therefore practically ceased to have any *locus standi*, and it would have been well for the cause of federation if he had returned to England by the next steamer, or at any rate had abstained from making public speeches. But

contrary to the expressed desire of the Governor, Sir Henry Barkly, he attended a public dinner at Capetown on the day of his arrival, at which he made so ill-advised a speech, that before twenty-four hours had passed, he had put himself in a position of antagonism to the Governor, his Ministers, and public feeling generally at Capetown.

He went on to the Eastern Province of the Colony, to Natal, to the Orange Free State, to Kimberley, and to the Transvaal. No one could say whether he came as Lord Carnarvon's representative or on his own account. At Grahamstown he called himself "Lord Carnarvon's unworthy representative;" at other places he expressly repudiated any official character; but he continued to make speeches. At Bloemfontein he praised his entertainers, the Boers, effusively, at the expense of their neighbours at Kimberley;\* and gained their acclamations by using language which they could only understand as suggesting, not federation under the British Crown, but a Dutch Afrikaner Republic impatient to throw off all connection with the British Empire.

There were few South Africans who did not recognize that federation of some kind was an end to be desired. It was obvious that half a dozen contiguous territories, under distinct Governments, with different customs duties, different systems of law, different credit in the money market, and different policy towards the natives, could

\* In the course of his speech, he is reported to have said—

"What interest have miners and storekeepers and speculators in the independence of South Africa? Under any flag they can equally pursue their trade, and gain such ends as they are contending for. . . . You have the misfortune to possess a soil and climate of unexampled excellence, and a position on the globe the most attractive to every ambitious and aggressive Power. The independence of South Africa will come when you can reply to these Powers with shot and shell (vociferous cheers). . . . "I honour and admire the achievement of national independence, because, etc."—"Our South African Empire," by W. Greswell, vol. i. ch. ix.

not progress in the same way as if there were unity of action, which would provide even justice, unrestricted commerce, and the opening up of the country by roads, railways, and telegraphs, and which would secure peace on the frontier. But the conflicting interests and antagonisms were so many and so great as to raise almost insuperable difficulties. The utmost tact and patience to wait for fitting opportunities were needed to give even a hope of overcoming them. The effect, as far as they had any effect, of Mr. Froude's speeches was to aggravate instead of to allay them. And, what was worse, the ill-considered flattery which he bestowed on the Boers at the expense of their neighbours left an impression on the natives that the federation which was contemplated involved Dutch ascendancy, which boded ill, as they had had good reason to know, to them. It was oil on the smouldering fires of native discontent, which were soon to burst forth with fatal consequences.

When, by the Sand River Convention, the Transvaal Republic was given its independence, a condition was made that there should be no slavery. This condition, as there were no means of enforcing it, was obviously useless. Its only effect was to cause the word "apprentice" to be used instead of that of "slave," to express the same thing. Children were kidnapped, trained to work in the fields, had their price, and were as little protected by the law as any other live stock on the farm. The apprenticeship never came to an end. Waggon-loads of slaves—"black ivory," as they were called—passed through the country, and were put up to auction or were exchanged, sometimes for money, sometimes for a horse or for "a cow and a big pot." \*

\* See, for the above and worse instances, "Cetewayo and his White Neighbours," ch. ii., by Rider Haggard.

After a separate existence of twelve years, the Transvaal Republic had fallen into a hopeless condition of lawlessness and insolvency. Burgers, the President, had appointed to office several adventurers from Holland and elsewhere. For the European Dutchman—the Hollander, as he was called—the African Dutch have never shown any liking, and these new arrivals had most of them brought with them socialistic and neologian or atheistic views which were abhorrent to the rigid Puritanism of the Boers.\* Taxes were paid grudgingly, and at last were not paid at all. Obedience to the law was often refused by armed bodies sufficiently strong to render it impossible for the Executive to compel submission. Renegades of different nationalities gathered, after their wont, on the outskirts of civilization on the northern and eastern frontiers. Each man did pretty much what was right in his own eyes. There was a chronic state of war with the natives. Sometimes a white man would purchase the right to graze stock upon portions of native territory at certain seasons

\* There was also an element of charlatanism about them. One of them who had been Attorney-General of the Republic afterwards complained to Frere at Pretoria of his not having been continued in office. Frere, after pointing out to him that the judge had pronounced him incompetent, asked him where he was educated. "At a Dutch university," he answered, "where I took the degree of Doctor of Geology" (meaning Theology). "What next?" "I was Pastor of a Dutch congregation in Holland." "And then?" "Sub-editor of a paper in Holland." "And then?" "Examined and passed in law by a law-agent at Pretoria."

Another official was the Fenian Aylward, of whom more hereafter.

Frere writes to Lord Chelmsford from Pretoria (April 30, 1879):—

"I have at various times had much useful talk with some of the old Boer hands. . . . One old Voortrekker said he 'disliked Hollanders much worse than Britishers. The Briton was always hard working, and could ride and shoot, and he had even known some who could harness and inspan a team and drive a waggon, but a Hollander could only talk and write, and could not harness a mule, or drive a waggon to save his life.'"

of the year. This licence would be magnified after a few years into a title to the freehold, and the native chief compelled by threats or violence to confirm it. Thus encroachments were continually going on, and the Government was too weak to interfere.

A war broke out with Secocoeni, the Chief of a tribe akin to the Basutos and to the Zulus. He had entrenched himself in a strong natural mountain fortress, where the Boers attacked him with a force, white and black, of 2900 men. They seem not to have displayed their usual courage; they were repulsed, and, though their loss was small, were so discouraged that their force disbanded and dispersed. President Burgers, who commanded, begging them to shoot him rather than let him survive such a disgrace.

Volunteers not being forthcoming, and the treasury being empty, the Transvaal Government resorted to the expedient of carrying on the war by a force of filibusters under one Von Schlickman, an ex-Prussian officer, who were to receive no pay or supplies, and were to reimburse themselves by the cattle or land that they might be able to take from the natives. The war in consequence assumed a character of unrestrained ferocity. Prisoners were slaughtered in cold blood, and women and children often met the same fate.\* Von Schlickman was not long

\* In a Despatch to Lord Carnarvon, of December 18, 1876, Sir Henry Barkly says (C. 1776, p. 11)—

“As Von Schlickman has since fallen fighting bravely, it is not without reluctance that I join in affixing this dark stain on his memory, but truth compels me to add the following extract from a letter which I have since received from one whose name (which I communicate to your lordship privately) forbids disbelief. ‘There is no longer the *slightest doubt* as to the murder of the two women and the child at Steelpoort by the *direct order of Schlickman*, and in the attack on the kraal near which these women were captured (or some attack about that period) he ordered his men to cut the throats of all the wounded! This is no mere report; it is positively true.’ And in a subsequent letter the same writer informs me that the statements

afterwards killed, and was succeeded in his command by Aylward, an Irish Fenian.

At this point Lord Carnarvon wrote (Sept. 22, 1876) to Sir Henry Barkly that a war such as this menaced the peace of all South Africa, and he must insist on are based on the evidence, not alone of Kaffirs, but of whites who were present.

"As regards the even more serious accusations brought against Abel Erasmus" (the Kruger's Post field-cornet), "as specially alluded to in my letter to President Burgers, of the 28th ult." (viz. of treacherously killing forty or fifty friendly natives, men and women, and carrying off the children), "I beg to invite your lordship's attention to an account derived, I am assured, from a respectable Boer who accompanied the expedition, and protested against the slaughter and robbery of friendly Kaffirs committed by order of the above-named field-cornet.

"Should I not shortly receive such a reply from the President to my letters of last month, as to convince me that his Honour has taken effectual steps to check such outrages and punish the perpetrators, I will enter another protest, if only for form's sake.

"Seeing, however, that Aylward, who is said to boast, whether truly or not, that he took part with his brother Fenians in the murder of the police constable at Manchester, as well as in the attempt to blow up the Clerkenwell prison, had succeeded Schlickman in the command of the Steelpoort Volunteers, I question whether the Government of the South African Republic has the power, even supposing it to have the will, to put a stop to further atrocities on the part of this band of 'Filibusters,' as they are commonly styled in the newspapers.

"In my opinion it will be requisite to call in the aid of British troops before this can be done, and I am not without hope that one of the results of the mission on which Sir T. Shepstone is about to start, will be a petition from persons of education and property throughout the country for such an intervention on the part of Her Majesty's Government as will terminate this wanton and useless bloodshed, and prevent the recurrence of the scenes of injustice, cruelty, and rapine, which abundant evidence is every day forthcoming to prove have rarely ceased to disgrace the Republics beyond the Vaal ever since they first sprang into existence."

The above-mentioned Abel Erasmus was afterwards described by Sir G. Wolseley at a public dinner as a "fiend in human form." Thirteen women and three children are said to have been massacred on one occasion by his force of Boer Kaffirs. See Rider Haggard's "Cetywayo and His White Neighbours," p. 98.

its being stopped. In the course of his despatch, he said—

“There can be no doubt that the safety and prosperity of the Republic would be best assured by its union with the British Colonies, when no occasion for local wars would continue to exist. If, however, the policy of the Transvaal Government had been such as not to injure British interests, I should have been content to do nothing to influence or accelerate the popular opinion of the State in favour of such union. . . . But should the people of the Transvaal Republic consider it advisable under all the circumstances to invite Her Majesty’s Government to undertake the government of that territory on terms consistent with the now well-known policy of Her Majesty’s Government, I am of opinion that the request could not properly or prudently be declined.”\*

Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who was then [1876] in England for the South African Conference, was sent out to the Transvaal on a special commission, to confer with the President on the question of confederation, with discretion, should the course of events make it expedient, and subject to confirmation by the British Government, to arrange for its being brought under the British flag. Again the old mistake was made of conferring an authority distinct from and independent of the High Commissioner.

It was about five months after this that Frere arrived at Capetown. In selecting for the office of the High Commissioner, not an official with Colonial experience, but an Indian statesman whose views on Imperial policy were so pronounced and so well known, Lord Carnarvon had practically adopted them on behalf of the Colonial Office and of the Government, and had given Frere a mission to promote and endeavour to establish in South Africa union and confederation under the British flag, in place of a policy of separation and disintegration.

\* C. 1748, p. 103.

Of all the misrepresentations and mistakes that have been made concerning Frere's administration of South Africa, the commonest and the most flagrantly false is that he was responsible for the annexation of the Transvaal. Not only had Shepstone discretion to annex it independently of the High Commissioner, but even had it been otherwise, a comparison of dates proves that the proclamation was issued before Frere could have had time to communicate with him. The telegraph from Capetown was completed only as far as Kimberley; and so slow and ill-arranged was the post that it only went twice a week, and letters took more than a fortnight between Capetown and Pretoria, where Shepstone was.\*

Frere had landed at Capetown on March 31. On the morning of April 16, Mr. R. W. Murray, jun., the editor of the *Cape Times*, hurried up to Government House and showed him a telegraphic press message he had just received from Kimberley, that the Proclamation of annexation of the Transvaal had been issued on the 12th. "Good heavens!" was Frere's exclamation, "what will they say in England?"

Details were slow in coming, and it was not till the 30th, eighteen days after its issue, that Frere received an official copy of the Proclamation.

Though there are no written words of Frere's to that effect, there is no doubt that he inclined to the opinion that Shepstone's proclamation was premature.† He had

\* The journey from Kimberley to Pretoria, a distance of about 270 miles, took nearly four whole days to accomplish. The horses that drew the mail were not stabled, but grazed by contract with the farmers on the line of road, and at the end of each stage the coach had to wait, sometimes for hours, till fresh horses were caught.

† Frere always regretted that the word "annexation" should have been used. He would have preferred the words "cession and union under the British flag."



no choice, however, but to accept the act as accomplished, and, as was his wont, he was quite prepared to believe that Shepstone, the officer on the spot and in possession of the fullest and latest information, might have acted for the best. On the 4th, twelve days before the news came, he had written to Lord Carnarvon :—

“It seems to me that, as matters now stand, criticism as to what Shepstone is doing is as misplaced as suggestions how to hold his paddle would be to a man shooting a rapid. Our best course is cordially to support him in all reasonable ways as long as he appears to be doing his best to carry out our views and instructions.”

Burgers the President and others of the leading Boers had been privately encouraging \* Shepstone to take over

\* Shepstone writes, on April 11, to Mr. Robert Herbert, enclosing his letter under “Flying Seal” to Frere :—

“There will be a protest against my act of annexation issued by the Government, but they will at the same time call upon the people to submit quietly, pending the issue; you need not be disquieted by such action, because it is taken merely to save appearances and the members of the Government from the violence of a faction that seems for years to have held Pretoria in terror when any act of the Government displeased it.

“You will better understand this when I tell you privately that the President has from the first fully acquiesced in the necessity for the change, and that most of the members of the Government have expressed themselves anxious for it—but none of them have had the courage openly to express their opinions, so I have had to act apparently against them; and this I have felt bound to do, knowing the state and danger of the country, and that three-fourths of the people will be thankful for the change when once it is made.

“Yesterday morning Mr. Burgers came to me to arrange how the matter should be done. I read to him the draft of my Proclamation, and he proposed the alteration of two words only, to which I agreed. He brought to me a number of conditions which he wished me to insert, which I have accepted and have embodied in my Proclamation. He told me that he could not help issuing a protest to keep the noisy portion of the people quiet, and you will see grounds for this precaution when I tell you that there are only half a dozen native constables to represent the power of the State in Pretoria, and a

the government, and most of them had stipulated for and afterwards received office or pension, whilst in their public speeches they were protesting against his action. They were playing a double game. The British Government was to settle their native and financial difficulties for them—to be the cat's-paw to take their chestnuts out of the fire—and then they could repudiate it. When therefore Shepstone issued the Proclamation, Burger's Government published a protest, and Krüger and Jorissen started for England to agitate against the annexation.\*

considerable number of the Boers in the neighbourhood are of the lowest and most ignorant class. Mr. Burgers read me, too, the draft of his protest, and asked me if I saw any objection to it, or thought it too strong. I said that it appeared to me to pledge the people to resist by-and-bye; to which he replied that it was to tide over the difficulty of the moment, seeing that my support, the troops, were a fortnight's march distant, and that by the time the answer to the protest came, all desire of opposition would have died out. I therefore did not dissuade him from his protest.

"You will see, when the Proclamation reaches you, that I have taken high ground. Nothing but annexation will or can save the State, and nothing else can save South Africa from the direst consequences. All the thinking and intelligent people know this, and will be thankful to be delivered from the thralldom of petty factions by which they are perpetually kept in a state of excitement and unrest because the Government and everything connected with it is a thorough sham."

Eight days previously (April 3) Shepstone had written to Frere:—

"Mr. Burgers, who had been all along, as far as his conversation and professions to me went, in full accord with me, had suddenly taken alarm; he made impossible proposals, all of which involved infinite delay, and of course, dangerous agitation. As far as I am concerned, it is impossible for me to retreat now, come what may. If I were to leave the country, Civil War would at once take place, as the natives would consider it the sunshine in which they should make hay in the Transvaal; the gold-fields are in a state of rebellion against the Transvaal Government, and they are kept from overt acts only by my warnings and entreaties."

\* Shepstone writes (May 9): "Mr. Paul Krüger and his colleague Dr. Jorissen, D.D., the Commission to Europe, leave to-day. I do not think that either of them wishes the act of annexation to be cancelled; Dr. Jorissen certainly does not." Mr. J. D. Barry, Recorder of Kimberley, writes to Frere (May 15): "The delegates, Paul Krüger

It may be that Shepstone should have waited till a still greater stress of necessity forced the Transvaal Government to take a more straightforward course, or induced the Volksraad to ask spontaneously for annexation. At any rate, he should not have connived at Burgers' double-dealing by assenting to the issue of his protest—a grave error, which led to subsequent misrepresentation of the true state of the case. But Burgers had voluntarily thrown down the reins, and there was no one to pick them up—no one offered to take his place. The situation was critical, and the peril of the country imminent. There was just twelve shillings and sixpence in the treasury; taxes were now altogether refused, and salaries and contracts unpaid; the gaols were thrown open, for there was no money to pay for food for the prisoners; there was no public credit, and no interest paid on the debt. Meantime Secocoeni was again threatening. And on the south-eastern frontier an army of Cetywayo's Zulus, thirty or forty thousand strong, was gathered for invasion. There was no organized force, no preparation to resist it. To delay too long might have entailed the burning of every homestead, and the slaughter of every man, woman, and child up to the walls of Pretoria.\* It

and Dr. Jorissen, left Pretoria on the 8th, and even they do not seem to have much faith in their mission; Dr. Jorissen thinks that the reversal of Sir Theophilus' act would not only be impossible, but a great injury to the country."

\* The day before he issued the Proclamation, Shepstone sent a messenger to Cetywayo, telling him that the Transvaal would be under British sovereignty, and warning him against aggression in that direction. Cetywayo replied, "I thank my father Somtseu (Shepstone) for his message. I am glad that he has sent it, because the Dutch have tired me out, and I intended to fight with them once, only once, and to drive them over the Vaal. Kabana, you see my Impis are gathered. It was to fight the Dutch I called them together. Now I will send them back to their houses." (C. 1883, p. 19.)

Colonel A. W. Durnford, R.E., in a memorandum of July 5, 1877,

would have been a Machiavellian policy which would have bid the British Government stand aside and let the Boers and Zulus fight out their quarrel and leave it master of the situation. It may well be that, judging by the light of subsequent events—of wavering counsels in England, of Boer ingratitude, and of the surrender of 1881,—it would have been better, no matter at what risk of wholesale bloodshed, to have waited. But if Shepstone's action was premature or faulty, the annexation was at any rate a generous and unselfish act on the part of the British Government in the interests of peace, and on behalf of Boers and of natives alike.\* And Lord Carnarvon accepted and ratified it, though he seems to have been quite as much startled by its sudden conclusion as Frere was.

Frere writes to Lord Carnarvon :—

“I have already seen enough to be sure it will require great care to prevent the whole Dutch section of the writes : “About this time (April 10) Cetywayo had massed his forces in three corps on the borders, and would undoubtedly have swept the Transvaal, at least up to the Vaal River, if not to Pretoria itself, had the country not been taken over by the English. In my opinion, he would have cleared the country to Pretoria.”

“I am convinced,” writes Sir A. Cunynghame, June 12, from Pretoria, “that had this country not been annexed it would have been ravaged by the native tribes. Forty square miles of country had been overrun by natives and every house burned, just before the annexation.” And he writes again, July 6 : “Every day convinces me that unless this country had been annexed it would have been a prey to plunder and rapine from the natives on its eastern border, joined by Secocoeni, Mapock, and other tribes in the Transvaal. Feeling the influence of the British Government, they are now tranquil.”

\* “There was another reason for Shepstone's act of annexation. Burgers had sought alliances with Continental powers—Germans, Belgians, and Portuguese, and Shepstone had no reason to doubt that if England declined to interfere, Germany would be induced to undertake the protection of the Transvaal, which would have added infinitely to our troubles in South Africa.”—Frere to Mr. J. M. Maclean, April 22, 1881.

population feeling deeply on the subject. None of them seem to realize, as I had expected, that it was quite impossible for the Transvaal to go on any longer as it has been doing for the last two years, and that if they were cordially to adopt what you had offered, they might obtain more security for reasonable self-government than they or their forefathers ever hoped for."

He wrote to Shepstone to ask if he intended to summon the Volksraad. Shepstone, however, gave reasons why he did not consider this to be practicable; and Frere, assenting, writes to Lord Carnarvon:—

"I think Shepstone is quite wise not to summon the Volksraad, nor to take any step which could be mistaken for a recognition of its possessing any of its old quasi-sovereign powers; but I think it will be necessary to hear the burghers and all other men of property as to their future form of government, and no better opportunity for doing this is likely to offer than the occasion when they may be summoned to hear that the Queen has confirmed the act of annexation, and intends henceforward to govern the Transvaal.

"This would obviate all difficulty in summoning men whose views you wish to learn, but whose advice it may not be easy to ask directly. . . . I do not think you need apprehend any difficulty in giving the Dutch in the Transvaal or elsewhere a very real and efficient representation, which will be quite satisfactory to them. But you must carry back your mind to the days and ideas of Hampden and Milton, or at least of Somers and William Penn, if you would realize the Cape Dutch farmer's notions of representation or republic. I can imagine nothing less like his political elysium than a modern republic of the French type, and its forms of liberty, equality, and fraternity. American or English ideas of universal suffrage, equal electoral circles, constantly recurring elections, and theoretical symmetry in representation, are only one degree less hateful to him. Proper qualifications he would consider essential, and very arbitrary distinctions of race and colour unobjectionable. . . .

"Even native interests may, I think, be represented, though perhaps at first indirectly, but with sufficient reality

to satisfy their reasonable advocates. It would be well to discourage tribal representation by chiefs, however able, influential, or well educated, in their capacity *as chiefs*. Any representation of natives should be local, so as not to be affected by changes in the ownership of land. . . .

"Every chief and tribe, from Cetywayo and the Zulus down to the smallest Batlapin, seems to have had for years past an English or English-speaking-and-writing Agent or Minister, who speaks, writes, or interprets for him—often a missionary, or a very decent sort of farmer or trader, sometimes a bad specimen of his class, but generally as acceptable to his European neighbours as the Chief can find, and in at least one well-known case, Mrs. Jenkins, the Pondo missionary's widow, a woman."

Frere's notes and observations on a Constitution for the Transvaal, written about this time, show what anxious thought he gave to it from the first—how essential he considered it to be that in granting the Constitution there should be no hesitation or delay, such as occurred, as will be seen, with such unfortunate consequences, and in spite of his repeated and earnest representations.

In the mean time the proclamation of the annexation was received throughout the Transvaal with acquiescence and relief, and in many places with enthusiasm. Addresses of congratulation and thanks poured in by every mail, some of them signed by Boers who were afterwards conspicuous for hostility to British rule.\* Not a single English soldier was in the country, yet there was nowhere any disturbance. Credit was restored, commerce recommenced, and landed property nearly doubled in value. It was not till three weeks afterwards that the first British soldiers, a battalion of the 13th Light Infantry, marched in from Newcastle in Natal. It entered Pretoria amid

\* A memorial protesting against the object of Krüger's and Jorissen's deputation to England and approving the annexation was numerously signed. Amongst other signatures are those of six members of the Volksraad. (C. 1883, p. 23.)

general rejoicing, the whole population turning out to meet it. On the Queen's birthday there was a general festival. In addition to all the English, a large number of Boers and several native chiefs attended; and to the strains of "God save the Queen," and amid the cheers of the crowd, the Union Jack was run up a lofty flagstaff, and the Transvaal formally announced to be British soil.

Frere writes to Lord Carnarvon:—

"May 15, 1877.

"Our news from the Transvaal continues very favourable, and I think even Burgers' friends here see that opposition or protest is useless. They still argue that the annexation requires the confirmation of the Volksraad to give it legal validity, but they confess that if Shepstone were to summon a fresh Volksraad elected to decide between the annexation and a return to Mr. Burgers' republic, a great majority would prefer annexation."

And in another letter to him he says—

"May 21, 1877.

"There can be no doubt that the annexation of the Transvaal has materially altered the position of all parties, if parties they can be called, with regard to confederation. It has immensely strengthened the position of all who desire confederation, by making it more of an absolute certainty and necessity than it was before.

"But it has at the same time startled and alarmed both classes of the Dutch, the Africanders, and Neologians who sympathized with Burgers in his dreams of a great anti-English South Africa. These men see an end of their dreams. It has had a similar effect, for a time only and in a smaller degree, on the old orthodox Dutch party, who are not really more anti-English than French Canadians or Welsh farmers, that is to say, they don't love our nation, its language, or its busy, bustling, exact ways, but they are really loyal to the Government, and are as faithful subjects as the Queen possesses. They have a vague kind of sympathetic regret for the extinction of anything that calls itself Dutch, and they have a notion that the annexation of the Transvaal will disturb the

existing equilibrium in the western provinces, which seems to be the Dutch farmers' idea of the political millennium."

Frere's commission was so vaguely worded that it was hard to say precisely what powers it conferred.\* Besides having a special mission to effect confederation, he had, as High Commissioner of Her Majesty's territories in South Africa, an undefined duty of supervision; and that he might lose no time in putting himself into communication with all the Governments, he had, immediately on his arrival at Capetown, despatched letters to Sir H. Bulwer, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, to Major Lanyon, the Administrator at Kimberley, and to Sir T. Shepstone in the Transvaal, asking them to correspond freely with him on all that was going on, and promising to do the like by them.

Hearing an unsatisfactory account of some of the men whom Shepstone had appointed to office, Frere writes to Mr. Robert Herbert, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies:—

"June 5, 1877.

"I shall tell Shepstone all I hear of these people, on the principle that I should like him to tell me anything he heard against any appointment I made. But I shall be careful not to meddle with anything he does without specific instructions from Lord Carnarvon. He has difficulties and work enough, and will want all the support we can give him."

In the course of July he learnt that Shepstone, who had inherited from the Republic a heavy schedule of pecuniary liabilities, was drawing somewhat freely and irregularly on the British Government. He therefore wrote to Mr. Herbert:—

"July 24, 1877.

"If you wish me to take any more active part in such matters, I must beg you to ask Lord Carnarvon to let

\* C. 2242, p. 50.



Shepstone know how far the Secretary of State wishes him to look for my advice or approval in whatever he does in financial or any other branches of government. . . . Nothing can be more cordial than our relations hitherto, but . . . I cannot say that what I hear or read of the few men about him who could advise on financial matters, relieves my anxiety. Mr. Burgers' financial Minister is evidently not a man to trust."

This letter, and some particulars which he gave as to the expenditure which was going on in the Transvaal, roused the attention of the Colonial Office, and Mr. Sargeaunt, a financial officer of experience, was sent out, who was of the greatest assistance in getting the Transvaal finances into order. Mr. Herbert writes in answer :—

"August 28, 1877.

"We none of us supposed that Shepstone was a financier, but nevertheless we are aghast, as you may well have expected, at the wild drawing reported in your last letters and despatches. It is impossible to overestimate the value of your action in at once calling attention to what is being done, and your communications to Shepstone have been full of tact, and should have done good. Not only I, but Lord Carnarvon and the Government are really very thankful to you. You are the only person in South Africa who appears to have been sensible of what was taking place."

And in a subsequent letter Mr. Herbert says—

"October 18, 1877.

"You would be repaid for much hard and unpleasant work if you could hear the terms in which Lord Carnarvon expresses his satisfaction with all that you have done in the short time during which you have been in South Africa, and the confidence which he places in your judgment. It would be impertinent in me to say more than that I think him very right in this as in almost all his conclusions."

Nor did Shepstone fail to acknowledge the benefit of Frere's assistance. "What an enormous advantage to me

one hour's conversation with you would be!" he writes to Frere (August 6, 1877), hearing of his proposed visit to Pretoria; "there are points which it is difficult to convey the exact meaning of by writing."

The Ministry then in office at the Cape was the first formed after the establishment of constitutional government five years before. Mr. Molteno was Colonial Secretary, a man of fair ability and parliamentary skill, who had done good work in his time, but who took little interest in, and was anxious to avoid responsibility for, anything outside the Cape Colony. When the Governor's speech for the opening of the Cape Parliamentary Session was being considered Frere wished a paragraph to be inserted announcing the annexation of the Transvaal as a completed fact. Mr. Molteno replied that Ministers did not in the least wish to impede or ignore the act of annexation, but they did not wish to be supposed to have had anything to do with it, and Frere had the greatest difficulty in inducing them to make themselves acquainted with the facts of the case. They were even unwilling that it should be known that they had seen any of Shepstone's letters.

Their attitude towards confederation was the same. As far as they had any opinion on the subject at all, they accepted it as settled that it was to be, but they would do nothing to further it. The British Government was at this time passing a Bill through Parliament enabling the South African Colonies, subject to the consent of the Crown, to confederate at such times as they should think fit. Taught by the experience of what had happened two years before, Lord Carnarvon had sent a draft of the Bill to the Cape Ministers before it was introduced into the British Parliament, and certain suggestions made by them were embodied in it. It passed without opposition, except from the obstruction of the Irish members. The question of the

annexation of the Transvaal was raised incidentally during the debate, and of this act only two private English Members expressed any disapprobation.

Frere writes to Lord Carnarvon :—

“ May 12, 1877.

“ I doubt whether, up to the present time, people here have generally regarded confederation as likely to become a proximate question for some years to come. ‘ Eastern Province folk might agitate about it, but it would be years before their talk came to any practical issue.’

“ Now, however, the annexation of the Transvaal, and the enactment of your Bill will force them to bestir themselves and make up their minds, but I doubt whether, till they have talked it over in Parliament, one in two of them will know exactly what to think of it, or have any definite notion how he ought to vote about it.”

Security and peace amongst the native tribes within and near the frontier was the first condition for bringing the older and more settled provinces to agree to any plan of confederation, which would cause the expense of guarding it to be shared by all. Namaqualand and Damaraland, tracts of country hitherto unsettled and little visited by white men, extend for some seven hundred miles along the west coast northward of the Cape Colony, between Bechuanaland and the sea. Mr. Coates Palgrave, who had formerly spent some years there, had recently been sent to report on the country, and had brought back a great amount of information and earnest appeals from the chiefs of the more important tribes to be taken under the British protectorate. Failing this, it was likely that intertribal wars would break out again, and not improbably the confusion be aggravated by Boers trekking from the Transvaal, or by foreign interference, possibly by some filibustering crew who might land on the coast, and set up a republic of their own, with such consequences to the neighbouring territories as may be imagined. All

this country, and Walfisch Bay in particular, with the adjacent land, Frere urged should be proclaimed to be under the British protectorate.

Mr. Molteno would give no answer, one way or the other, as to whether his government would or would not favour the declaration of this protectorate. At last Frere explained that he might have to act without him by means of instructions given to Lanyon or Shepstone, and this brought Molteno round at once. He agreed that Palgrave should be sent back; and just as Frere was getting into his carriage to start on a prolonged absence from Capetown, he called to beg that he would instruct the Commodore to hoist the British flag at Walfisch Bay. This was done, and the annexation of Walfisch Bay and the adjacent territory from thirteen to eighteen miles inland, was sanctioned by the British Government; but to Frere's great regret the protectorate of Damaraland and Namaqualand was refused by Lord Carnarvon; the opportunity was lost, and that country has since come under German protection.

There was a marked separation, a rivalry, and, on some important questions, a divergence of political opinion between the old western and the more recently settled eastern parts of the Cape Colony. Mr. Molteno's Ministry represented mainly the views of Western colonists. Communication was slow, and the posts infrequent.

"I will do my best to mend matters here," Frere writes, "but you will be able to understand how much has to be done, from the fact that Mr. Molteno and his Postmaster-General both justified their contentment with posts only twice or thrice a week to their great eastern ports, not by the want of letters to be carried, for the mail-cart is often so crammed it can hardly hold its load, but by the fact that they tried a daily post some years ago, and it created such confusion, coming in at all hours of the day and night, that it had to be given up."

And in a paper written some years later, he says—

“Western men, far removed from the frontier, with little practical knowledge of any native difficulty except the scarcity of native labour, generally professed a firm belief in the peaceful character of the native tribes; they regarded Kaffir wars as things of the past, never likely to recur, and ridiculed the fears of the eastern colonists.

“Eastern men, on the other hand, living more on the frontier, and often mixed up with Kaffir tribes, believed that the natives were then being stirred by a general movement against the white population—a restless spirit such as preceded the Indian Mutiny of 1857—which had been growing in strength for many years, and had its centre of action in Zululand.

“They asked for more efficient organization of frontier defence, and for more stringent laws against native vagrancy and stock-stealing.

“Both parties were equally positive and apparently equally sincere in their conflicting statements of fact and opinion.”

Frere, therefore, determined to visit the eastern frontier and see for himself.

He left Capetown in August, intending to go to the Transvaal, taking the eastern province and either Natal or Kimberley by the way. Anxious as he was to visit the Transvaal, he little thought that eighteen months would pass before stress of work and danger elsewhere would admit of his going there.

He landed at Port Elizabeth—a settlement founded in 1820, at a time of poverty and want of employment in England, when the glowing accounts of the beauty and fertility of the country induced the British Parliament to vote a sum of £50,000 for the settlement of colonists there. It would have been money well spent if ten times the amount had been granted, for there were 90,000 applicants, of whom only 4000 could be sent; and the success of the Albany settlers, as they are called, proved the wisdom of the scheme.

The harbour, he noted, was quite defenceless. "At present every warehouse and bank and the shipping is absolutely at the mercy of any little steamer that can carry a rifled gun." There was valuable building-land belonging to the War Office and of no use to it. This, he suggested, might be sold for a sum sufficient to provide the necessary defences. "They are all warmly for confederation here," he says, "not much in favour of responsible government, but far more reasonable regarding eastern and western divisions in politics than I expected."

Thence he went on to Grahamstown (August 30)—

"prettily situated in a sort of amphitheatre of rocky hills; the streets are too wide and the houses too far apart for an English cathedral town; a sub-Alpine Austrian town is the nearest likeness I can think of, but it does not look as if it ever could be the capital of South Africa. It is entirely English, and loyal, and hospitable, and I have learned much while staying here. But a great part of my time has been given to the Frontier scare, which has much increased in dimensions since we left Port Elizabeth. Some Fingoes and Galekas (Kreli's tribe) had a fight at a beer-drinking; broken heads led to cattle-lifting, and the fight spread."

To try if, by a personal interview, he could induce Kreli to keep his people in order, he went on through King William's Town, over the border of British Kaffraria to Butterworth, where he met Colonel Eustace, then Resident with Kreli, and having let the latter know that he was ready to listen to his grievances, if he had any, waited for him there. Kreli, however, under various pretences, kept aloof, and Frere, therefore, returned to King William's Town. The same day a force of Galekas made an attack upon the police, and when he reached the town he found it so full of farmers and their wives and families, taking refuge in fear of their homesteads being attacked and

burnt by the Kaffirs, that there was no house empty to receive him, and he was glad to take up his quarters in the barracks with the 24th Regiment.

In those barracks he continued to live for seven months. Two of the Ministers—Mr. Merriman, Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works, and Mr. Brownlee, Secretary for Native Affairs—were there with him. It was soon apparent that a Kaffir outbreak and a native war had to be faced, with which there was no sufficient military force or adequate organization to cope.

King William's Town, which became the base of operations, is the last town in the Cape Colony before the river Kei is reached, which was then its eastern boundary, the Ciskei being Cape territory, and the Transkei at that time extra-Colonial territory, inhabited by Kreli and the Galekas under British supervision.

Frere writes thence to Lord Carnarvon :—

“ October 3, 1877.

“ I was unable by last mail to do more than send you a very rambling official despatch written amid greater interruptions than I recollect since the Mutiny days in India, and the interruptions were much of the same kind—pressing calls to meet immediate wants, telegrams, interviews with deputations indignant, loyal, panic-stricken, fire-eating ; applications for every kind of advice and assistance, and offers of advice and aid in equal variety, and all with glorious disregard of any fitness of time, season, or place. . . .

“ Littleton and I, in a long ride round a day or two ago, found all the farms we saw deserted, and met waggon-loads of women, children, and furniture coming in. But I hope the tide has turned ; the people here have given up mass meetings for the last few days, and taken to serious drilling, three hundred at a time, on the 24th parade ground, under our windows, besides sending out a good troop of volunteers to join Commandant Griffith ; and the spirit everywhere, with very few exceptions, is excellent, and I

am sure much permanent good will result from the panic.

"Meantime, it is a total suspension of profitable industry for many weeks, and it must tell heavily on the prosperity of the country."

In another letter to Lord Carnarvon he writes—

"October 8, 1877.

"Merriman and Brownlee were at first aghast at such an innovation as a daily council, at which the General would sit as Commandant of the Forces, where we could interchange intelligence and suggestions and settle the orders to be given, which could be issued at once and communicated to Cape Town without further correspondence. They had evident misgivings as to the view that their colleagues would take of such an intimate relation with the military authorities, but they concurred when I pointed out its necessity, and Merriman came into barracks with me to enable us better to carry out our system of united action, and now he is most fully sensible of its advantages.

"I am certain that without it some great disaster must have occurred.

"Merriman is extremely able, quick, intelligent, and thorough. . . ."

The following letter to Brownlee illustrates some of the difficulties Frere had to contend with in preventing inter-tribal hostilities and dealing with "gun-runners."

"October 9, 1877.

"Will you let us know what orders you have given about arming Fingoes here, and sending them hence to Ayliff.

"Last night, just as it was getting dark, on my way back by the Queenstown Road from Peulton, Hodson and I came on some thirty-five native men, armed with Enfields and fully equipped with ammunition-pouches, haversacks, water-bottles, etc., for field service.

"My attention was drawn to them by one of them firing off his gun with blank cartridge, and I found them parleying with a soldier of the 88th Connaught Rangers,



just arrived from Ireland. Whether he was telling them to 'stand in the Queen's name' or proposing to drink the health of the Ministry, we could not make out, for 'George,' the commandant of the party, talked but imperfect Railway English, and our conductor, Innes's office-messenger, despite his country, birth, and education, knew no Kaffir.

"'George,' however, assured us that it was 'all right.' He was 'a good man' and all his people 'good men—Ayliff's Fingoes.' They produced some gun-passes and permits for ammunition, some passes, etc., for between the Colony and Fingoland, mostly some months old, and many of bygone years.

"Their party, they said, consisted of sixty or more in all, and they were waiting there on the roadside to be joined by their companions.

"Hereupon Innes's messenger recognized them. 'They were some of large numbers of Fingoes who had been to the Civil Commissioner's Office during the past few days and had obtained leave to join Ayliff, provided they went by the high-road to the next Magistrate's Office. This had been done by Mr. Brownlee's orders.'

"They had no pass for a body of men, nor any one with them to interpret to any officer or railway engineer they might meet.

"Any active young officer of Her Majesty's service, or Volunteers, or Burghers, might in all good faith have fired into them, as — did into Mopassa's Galekas; but the bloodshed in that case would not have been confined to two or three herdsmen shot by mistake because they ran away on seeing armed Europeans.

"'George,' with his thirty-five good railway men with Enfields and ammunition, did not seem inclined to be shot without shooting some one in return; nor would Mr. 'George' and his men be inclined to pass any Gaikas or Islambis they might meet in the glorious state of our friends at Draai Bosch.

"All this is directly opposed to the principle I thought we had fully agreed on, and which no one, as I understood you, recognized more fully than you did—that we should not within the Colony arm tribe against tribe, but endeavour to make all live at peace with their neighbours.

"I hope, therefore, you will let us know exactly what

orders you gave, and be able to assure us that you had nothing to do with this armament.

"We (Merriman and I) have told Innes to prevent anything of the kind in future, and his orders led to a characteristic sequel to my story.

'Mr. —, the great Kaffir trader, came to him and complained that Innes's orders, consequent on our interference, 'impeded the sale of guns.' Innes explained the circumstances and reasons of our orders, whereupon — complained that he had invested largely in guns, and any such interference would spoil his sale, and I have no doubt will move heaven and earth to get the order rescinded or evaded.

"Let me hear soon on this subject."

In a letter to General Ponsonby, Frere describes the circumstances which led to the breaking out of the war.

"October 17, 1877.

"I was hurried up in consequence of the alarm of a Kaffir War, and found that hostilities had broken out between the Fingoes, who are British subjects and live in British territory, and the Galekas of Krelī—an old chief, son of Hinza, Sir Harry Smith's opponent, who was unfortunately killed when he had come in under a safe conduct. Krelī was in a state of semi-independence not easily classified according to any rules of international law. He was nominally allowed to govern his own people according to their own customs, but he had a Resident to control him, a pension of £100 per annum from Government, and had been moved about from one province to another after wars and cattle-killings, which had reduced his tribe in numbers and power without much improving their civilization. He is described as an able, crafty old man, with a rooted distrust, real or affected, of us and our promises, a great name among the Kaffirs, and a hatred of his neighbours the Fingoes, who had formerly been his father's helots, were freed by us for taking our side in our wars, and who, since they were settled on parts of the land whence the Galekas were driven, had prospered and improved in civilization, whilst their former masters remained poor and unimproved.

"There are ten or twelve other tribes in Kaffraria in

various stages of anomalous dependence. Some fully annexed to Her Majesty's dominions by Acts of Parliament and Orders in Council, others in various transition stages towards that state, and some claiming a sort of Monaco-like independence, with an old Welsh missionary's widow as a kind of unofficial British Resident, educating and adopting sons of the former chief, whilst she writes letters in a style of American independence for his successor. I have not yet seen Mrs. Jenkins nor her Pondo pupil with his eight thousand warriors, but the stories I hear of her and him are amongst the most comical of the many anomalies in Kaffraria.

"For many years past the old typical Kaffir wars of 'eating up' and entire extermination of the defeated, have ceased; the Kaffirs have greatly multiplied and some have prospered and improved. The thoughts of statesmen in England and Africa ran in other directions, and no one gave much heed to set Kaffraria in order; but the country improved steadily and rapidly. Missionaries and traders in great numbers settled down, and many of the Kaffirs, finding no room for their old pastoral habits in keeping cattle, turned to agriculture and sheep-farming, both civilizing changes. You cannot drive sheep as you drive cattle, and sheep-stealing being a less warlike occupation than cattle-lifting, sheep-farming tended to peace. But the great change was effected by the introduction of light cheap Scotch and American ploughs. A Kaffir man may not hoe—that is woman's work; but no woman may tend cattle—that is man's privilege! so that Kaffir milkmaids are all the young warriors of the Kraal. Hence ploughing with oxen becomes a part of the whole duty of Kaffir man, who formerly, when not milking the cows or slaughtering an ox for a feast, had no heavier work than shaping an assegai shaft, and passed their spare time in beer-drinking and basking in the sun, whilst the women hoed and did all hard work. When the European magistrate or missionary was a kindly intelligent or active man he fostered these habits of industry, and many Kaffirs became rich and civilized; others, neglected, remained savages, clad in red blankets, and drapery, if they used any, covering well-turned limbs, unused to any real labour, and polished with red clay and fat. We sometimes passed from a Kraal of these picturesque savages, poor, proud, idle, and red-ochred,

to a Christian village of thriving cultivators, clad in substantial (but, alas! such ugly) habits of calico and broad cloth, their well-dressed children drawn up in front of a neat school-house, with a sable schoolmaster in black coat and white neck-tie singing 'God save the Queen' with more loyal emphasis than harmony.

"The Fingoes and Galekas were at opposite poles of this kind of civilization and, unluckily, were neighbours. Under active, improving magistrates, Captains Cobbe and Blythe, the Fingoes had improved every way and become rich. The Galekas neglected everything but their oxen, and having killed all their herds at the bidding of a prophet, were poor and had no idea of bettering themselves, but by taking the land of their former 'dogs' the Fingoes. A firm hand and a kindly system a few years ago might have turned this rivalry to useful account, but nothing effectual was done and things were allowed to drift, and two parties grew up among the Galekas. The war party and young men believed they could drive out the Fingoes and the English too, if necessary; the peace party were sure the English would sooner or later protect the Fingoes and therefore counselled peace. A drunken brawl led to border fighting and things were allowed to drift as in times past. When we came up we found there had been pitched battles, in which many lives were lost, amongst the two or three thousand men engaged, on British territory, in the presence of large bodies of British well-armed and mounted European police, who, according to custom, quietly looked on, and reported to Government—not to the magistrate who was in their camp—and asked for orders from Capetown by the weekly post to this place, where sat the Commandant of Police, the Civil Commissioner, and Colonel Glyn, commanding Her Majesty's troops, all absolutely prohibited by Colonial official jealousy from exchanging opinions or even news, and all obliged to apply for orders to Capetown, four or five days distant, by a post only three times a week.

"Unless I had seen it myself I could not have believed in such a state of things. Murders and cattle raids were of almost daily occurrence, and were hardly suspended whilst I was on the spot, and all this not from any one person's fault, but simply from 'drifting.'

"I soon saw that if an outbreak against the English took

place, and the Colonial Kaffirs joined in, our forces were quite inadequate, and our organization so defective, that great disasters must occur before we could be prepared with adequate means for restoring order. I hoped to have met the old chief and to have found him, as I was assured he would be, tired of war and anxious to keep the peace. But he evaded meeting me, believing, as I was told, that he would share his father Hinza's fate. After I left he told the Resident, Colonel Eustace, that he could no longer control his people, and Colonel Eustace having retired to the other side the border, Kreli ordered the Europeans living near him to be conducted safely out of the country.\* His people assembled in great numbers and in regular order for war, and attacked the police in British territory, with all the ceremony of formal Kaffir warfare. They, the Kaffirs, had never before had any experience of the modern improvement in weapons, and suffered heavy loss. Commandant Griffiths had thrown up some slight shelter for his men, and their Snider carbines, with the fire from a couple of seven-pounder Armstrongs and some rockets, prevented the swarms of many thousand Galekas from closing with the police, about 250 in number, with 1500 Fingo auxiliaries. Some chiefs of influence were killed and wounded, and a 'witch doctress,' who had promised to lead to victory the Galeka bands, as she had done before in native wars, was shot at the head of an attacking column.

"The Galekas were greatly depressed by the failure of their attack, but the Colony and the Colonial forces were quite unprepared, and the greatest alarm and confusion prevailed. The frontier police were good material—about a thousand young Englishmen, well armed with Snider carbine and revolver, and tolerably well mounted on hardy ponies, but ill-organized, undisciplined, and with very few capable officers, and very bad field equipment. They were under law, but for other Colonial forces we had only volunteers.

"The obsolete Burgher militia law was quite unworkable, except for 'Commandos' on the old Dutch system of

\* As early as August 26, Mr. West Fynn, Colonel Eustace's interpreter, found Kreli and all his chiefs with the "war charm"—a black spot—on their foreheads. This with the Galekas was an invariable sign of an intention to fight. (C. 1961, p. 107.)

volunteer privateering expeditions, when the farmer, having hired out his waggons and oxen to the Government Commissariat at exorbitant rates, set off with his horse and his gun to join his neighbours in lifting Kaffir cattle, and, so long as he could live in free quarters, was in no hurry to finish the war.

"Volunteers, on our English system, had grown up since the panic last year, in spite of ridicule and official rebuffs, but they were unorganized, only partially well-armed, and utterly undisciplined, in the sense of fitness for field work.

"Her Majesty's forces consisted of a single seasoned Battalion (1-24th) under an excellent, steady, sensible Commander, Colonel Glyn, and with very good young officers; and we have since brought up six companies of H.M.'s 88th from Capetown; but they are young Irish soldiers just arrived in the country, admirable for fighting, but unused to the wearing petty work of a Kaffir war.

"Fortunately we have an excellent officer in Commandant Griffith of the Frontier Police. He took charge of his command only a day before he was attacked, but he had been in the force some years ago, knows the country and people thoroughly, and is a cool, determined, prudent man. But we should have been quite adrift had not Sir Arthur Cunynghame hurried down from the Diamond fields and joined us just at the critical moment. . . .

"I insisted on Sir Arthur Cunynghame having the sole command, much against the Colonial grain; but it was our only chance of good, rapid, and united work, and he has done admirably. He made Griffith commandant of all the Police and native levies Transkei, while he put Glyn in command of the Ciskei, where he distributed Her Majesty's troops to the best advantage to prevent a Galeka irruption into the Colony, and to keep down any rising of Colonial Kaffirs, sympathizing with any one who promises to restore the old days of fighting, cattle-lifting, etc. Our object is to localize the outbreak to the territory of the offending tribe; and I must defer any account of the panic among Europeans, which was for some time quite uncontrollable, and of the alarm and excitement among natives, uncertain what was to be done to them or us, and the wonderful series of fortunate coincidences which, thank God, have been in our favour,

and helped us against the effects of long neglect and un-wisdom."

By the end of October the whole tribe of Galekas had been driven eastward across the Bashee and Umtata rivers by the Colonial forces, which, at one time, numbered more than 580 armed and mounted police and 990 volunteers. Here Commandant Griffith abandoned pursuit, considering that the tribe, which had lost 700 men and 20 chiefs killed, and 13,000 head of cattle captured, had been sufficiently punished. The war seemed to be at an end, and confidence was being restored. But many days had not passed when, in consequence of a neglect of General Cunynghame's caution to guard the fords of the Bashee, several bodies of Galekas returned and unexpectedly attacked a Colonial detachment, while others slipped past and crossed the Kei into British territory, and there stirred up to rebellion the Gaikas and their chief Sandilli.

Frere writes to Lord Carnarvon :—

"November 21, 1877.

"I was, yesterday morning, making plans for leaving this, in the belief that things were quieting down, and balancing whether I was more wanted at Capetown or Kimberley, when we were startled by the news of a fresh disturbance on the Gaika border. . . .

"That there has been very bad management is clear ; but who is to be blamed is not so apparent, nor can we tell for a day or two whether the consequences are likely to be serious. But I find a very serious difference of opinion between myself and Mr. Merriman, as to the mode in which the question is to be treated. He is for carrying matters with a very high hand, in a manner which must bring about a collision with the Gaikas, a result which he avows he would not regret, as enabling us forcibly to break up the present Gaika location, and to deprive Sandilli and the other chiefs of the power hitherto accorded to them by our acts of negligence. I cannot see the legality, necessity, or justice of such violent remedies. After a visit from

some members of the Chamber of Commerce, who came to me in great alarm, Mr. Merriman, the General, and I had a long discussion, and he has since sent me his views in writing. . . .

"I enclose copies of both letters. Mine is less in answer to his letter than to the arguments he founded on his view of the real weakness of the Gaikas, who, he contended, ought to be coerced into submission to all demands, legal or illegal, even if the consequence of insisting on an illegal demand was to raise the whole tribe in insurrection."

Frere's reply to Mr. Merriman here referred to is as follows, and is given nearly entire, as it expresses his view of the right and the wrong of the case as between the Government and the Gaikas and Galekas, as well as his strong sense of the protection and guidance that were justly due to the native races from the Government.

"November 21, 1877.

"Many thanks for your letter. I will try to show my value for it by putting down, as shortly as I can, my view of the Gaika question for you to consider at leisure.

"First, I entirely agree with you as to your estimate of their strength. As a mere military question, I feel sure that by repeating the process followed against Kreli, by summoning burghers and volunteers and arming Fingoes, you could crush the Gaikas more completely, and slaughter more of them in a few weeks, than in Kreli's case.

"But consider the difference of the two cases.

"Kreli, whether a rebel, or a chief entitled to make war, assembled his people with the avowed intention of getting more land, and driving his neighbours, unquestionable British subjects, out of theirs.

"In British territory his forces attacked the Fingoes and the police; killed all they could, and were repulsed with such loss, that their fighting spirit was quite broken, and their utter defeat and conquest of their country followed.

"So far, I think, you and I can justify all we have had any share in.

"But as regards the causes which led to the outbreak before you and I came here, is our Government wholly blameless?



"How did Kreli, a miserable, poverty-stricken exile, when he was allowed to cross the Bashee in 1862, praying to be accepted as a British subject, develop in 1877 into 'King Kreli,' 'Paramount Chief,' discussing ceremonies of coronation with West Fynn and his councillors?

"Can one wonder that, after being allowed successfully to elbow the Tambookies and Bomvanas, he and his people could not see the harm of trying to elbow the Fingoes? How came he to trust trader Crouch more than Colonel Eustace, and to be so incurably suspicious of the good faith and good will of an English Governor, that he dared not trust himself in his camp?

"As I ask myself these and other similar questions, I feel that whilst it would be wicked folly to try more experiments with Kreli as 'an almost independent chief' (whatever that may mean) at the expense of his sixty or eighty thousand people, we are bound to do our best for them by ruling them at least as well as we have ruled the Fingoes.

"The case of Sandilli and the Gaikas is essentially different. They have been for many years our own fellow-subjects.

"We believe they do not like us, and we are sure that many of them are afraid of what we may be going to do to them.

"How shall we attach them to us and gain their confidence?

"I say, by ruling them justly and strictly, but mercifully; not by letting loose volunteers and burghers to carry fire and sword through the country, to inflict on them the terrible punishment which in self-defence we were forced to inflict on Kreli and his people.

"'But they steal our cattle.'

"This is absolutely and entirely our own fault. If we had anything like a tolerable system of police, stock-stealing might be made, in three months, as unprofitable an occupation in Sandilli's location as in Argyllshire. There is no kind of difficulty. Every farmer and trader will be a gainer, and there is no obstacle in the way save the inertness of the farmers themselves and their representatives.

"'But Sandilli's people still speak of him as the paramount chief, ask whether he means peace or war, and

claim a boundary within which the Queen's writ runneth not unless endorsed by Sandilli; where no survey can be made or police posted, as the Gaikas object to such interference with their independence.'

"All this is very wrong and requires correction; but who taught them this mischievous and foolish idea of their position?

"Surely, we, the Government, are as guilty as any one. The 'boundary' is pointed out and insisted upon by the Secretary for Native Affairs. Can we wonder that Sandilli and his people believe in it? Would the poor miserable sot I saw at Kabousie have dreamed of being able to decide on peace or war if we had done our duty to him in the last ten years?

"We send a sot to represent us, and then wonder that the chief is not cured of drunkenness. We replace him by a man who is said to have been sent here because he allowed a petty chief in Kaffraria to call him a liar on the bench; and we wonder Sandilli's people do not respect us more; we give them no adequate establishments, and then wonder that people go to the chief for redress, instead of to the sot or poltroon who represents us.

"They ought to be taught better and made to respect our law, but is this best done by sending fire and sword into their country, or by sending fit men to rule and teach them?

"I have said I agree with you as to the ease with which the Gaikas could be crushed. But you cannot do it by the same process or machinery as in Krel's country. The Armed and Mounted Police are pretty well knocked up, and require rest as well as reorganizing. You may get fresh burghers and volunteers in troops, but you will have to proceed according to strict Colonial law, and to answer for all you do to Colonial tribunals, and our acts will have to be judged, not by a grateful public just saved from the horrors of war, but by people horror-struck by tales of starvation from burnt kraals and forest fastnesses, to which in their terror and folly the fugitives betook themselves.

"I would not care for this if my conscience told me that it was done in the execution of duty. But I cannot see any call of duty to the use of force, unless these misgoverned people in their terror should attack us. This I

hope we may prevent, if the troops can be kept in hand; I am sure it could not be prevented if we resort to burghers and volunteers. . . .

"The real evil is the total absence of police—either protective or detective—and of any useful Intelligence Department; and it is quite true that a few dozen Kaffirs, who can steal with impunity and go about the country unchallenged, may do as much harm in Peddie or Albany as an unbroken tribe does in Sandilli's location.

"People in panic do not reason or calculate. If you want to quiet them you must manage to make them feel secure. Here the people seem to have been in a state of chronic panic for years past."

Frere at first believed he had convinced Mr. Merriman; this, however, as will appear, was not the case.

On another point of a similar nature Frere differed from the Attorney-General.

The Gaikas, with whom the war had by that time broken out, were British subjects, and were, therefore, technically rebels. Frere was apprehensive lest, as happened too often during the Indian Mutiny, advantage should be taken of this to kill prisoners without even a trial. On his communicating with Stockenstrom, the Attorney-General, as to the best tribunal for trying such cases, the answer came by telegraph.

"Rebels in arms may be shot without mercy or trial. Investigation at drumhead, suggested by me merely to distinguish between rebels and other enemies, and allow instant execution of former on the field. If there is to be formal trial as proposed and delay [of] execution until Governor's approval obtained, there will not be the summary punishment recognized by law and justified by emergency, but informal trial, subsequently to be ratified by Act of Indemnity."

Frere the same day wrote a Minute repudiating the suggestion, and concluded by saying—

“January 16, 1878.

“The inevitable bloodshed in action is surely more than sufficient for every purpose of example.

“For such rebels as the Gaikas or Islambies, whether captured in action or surrendering, no indiscriminate punishment could in my opinion be justified.

“There may be chiefs and others whose guilt may prove to be of the deepest dye, and I should be the last to interpose any difficulties in punishing the men according to their deserts. But the great mass of the common herd appear to me to be no more deserving indiscriminate slaughter or indiscriminate punishment of any kind than the soldiers of a foreign enemy. It is our duty to disarm and render them harmless, and to teach them that they are not justified by the call of any chief in resisting the authority of Government or in breaking the laws of the Colony; but this is a lesson which we ought to have taught them long ago, and which, I may remark, has yet to be learnt by many of our own people.”

The situation by the third week in December had again become serious. Many of the volunteers had returned home, leaving only a few Mounted Police in the Transkei. On the 26th, the communications between King William's Town and the Transkei were cut off, Sandilli, Chief of the Gaikas, having seized and burnt the Draibosch Hotel, on the main road between them. The Gaikas and Galekas being now combined in hostility, a new disposition of troops had become necessary. Hitherto the British force, having no cavalry, and consisting only of a battalion and a half of infantry, had been chiefly occupied in guarding the line of railway, garrisoning the forts and keeping up the communications. But now it was essential to strengthen the force of police in the Transkei, and Colonel Glyn was sent there with some companies of the 24th to take the command.

At the daily councils which Frere had held since arriving at King William's Town, it had needed all his

tact to keep within bounds the feeling of jealousy which the participation of the General in their deliberations excited in the minds of the Ministers. The harmony which prevailed at first had not continued. The prolongation of the war was bringing unpopularity on the Ministers, and they now sought to escape from it by asserting that it was due to the mismanagement of Her Majesty's troops by the General; and, ignoring the fact that they had expressly concurred in Frere's request for reinforcements, and had officially acquiesced in the command of all the troops being placed in the General's hands, they now gave out that they could finish the war with the Colonial forces alone, and unsupported by the Regulars.

Mr. Merriman began to make military appointments, and to give orders without even consulting the Governor or the General. Frere heard by a mere accident from a chance traveller of a movement of Colonial troops having been made, which he knew to be without orders from the General in command.

In a despatch to Lord Carnarvon, he writes—

“February 5, 1878.

“A separate campaign has been commenced on a considerable scale by the Honorable Mr. Merriman, without the previous knowledge and contrary to the advice and warnings of the General commanding the Forces and of the Governor. . . .

“I have gathered, in a vague kind of way, that besides the Queenstown contingent, numbering more than eight hundred men, several bodies each of several hundred men have been set in motion, with what objects and with what orders or results I gather very imperfectly from the fragmentary telegrams reporting details of serious engagements near the junction of the White and Black Kei.

“It is clear that great numbers of the Tambookies have been slaughtered and thousands of cattle captured; that the progress of our troops has been by no means an unchecked success, as they have repeatedly to halt for

reinforcements and supplies ; that one result has been to extend considerably the area of disturbance northward among the Tambookies, and another result seriously to cripple the movements of the troops in the Transkei under Colonel Glyn. His native auxiliaries have been withdrawn without his leave or knowledge, and he finds himself without the means of effectually attacking and dispersing large bands of Gaikas who have joined Krelî's warriors in what is understood to be another attempt to carry war into the Colony.

"The persistence of Messrs. Merriman and Molteno in starting this Tambookie campaign, their disregard of all warnings to postpone it, or to carry it on in a carefully concerted manner, so as to ensure success with the least possible bloodshed, their evasion of satisfactory replies to all requests for information, and their avowed determination to let the Governor and military authorities have nothing to say to the conduct of operations which seriously compromise the position of Her Majesty's troops on both sides of the Kei, were among the proximate causes of the present ministerial crisis."

The Ministerial crisis referred to occurred as follows :—

Early in January, Mr. Molteno, having vainly endeavoured to induce Frere to return to Capetown and leave the seat of war, had come himself, at Frere's instance, to King William's Town. Between January 10 and February 1, Frere had no less than ten interviews with him, some of them lasting as much as four hours. Molteno insisted that the Colonial forces should be wholly independent of the Governor or the Commander of the Forces, and repeated this with wearisome iteration. Frere expressed his dissent, and required that at any rate the opinion of the Attorney-General should be taken before such a principle was acted upon. This Mr. Molteno refused to do ; and it was evident that it was intended to constitute Mr. Merriman a military dictator independent of the Commander-in-Chief or the Governor. Mr. Merriman began to carry out this plan with a high hand. Every opportunity was taken to put slights on

Her Majesty's troops and their Commander, and to refuse, in the least courteous terms, the most reasonable suggestions for co-operation or assistance or even discussion. Orders not to supply information to the Governor or military authorities had been conveyed, not, perhaps, in direct terms, but in unmistakable hints to all Government officials. On receiving a memorandum from the Governor, in which he stated his objections to this course of action, as being both contrary to reason and illegal, Mr. Molteno observed that "it admitted of but one answer—a tender of his own resignation." Upon this, Frere intimated to him and to those of his colleagues who agreed with him, that their resignations would be accepted. Mr. Molteno thereupon withdrew his proposal to resign. Frere replied that in that case he had no alternative—if Ministers persisted in their illegal course—but to dismiss them; and he dismissed them accordingly.\*

It was a bold step for him to take; for a Governor to dismiss on his sole responsibility a ministry which had hitherto possessed, and was supposed to possess still, the confidence of the Legislative Assembly, was an act without precedent in Colonial Constitutional government, and was likely to meet with severe criticism in a newly enfranchised Colony morbidly sensitive to dictation from the representative of the Queen. But to take any other course would have been to surrender the fundamental rights of the Crown, and to assent to what appeared to him gross acts of injustice and aggression on the natives; and he did not hesitate.†

He communicated by telegraph with some of the leading politicians at Capetown. But the difficulty of the situation,

\* C. 2097, p. 90.

† See, as to this incident, Todd's "Constitutional Government," in which Frere's action is referred to as entirely constitutional and as establishing a valuable precedent.

the burden and responsibility of the war, and Mr. Molteno's hitherto unbroken majority in the House of Assembly made them shrink from accepting office. Fortunately, there was living on his farm in the midst of the disturbed district, and within a few miles of King William's Town, Mr. Gordon Sprigg, a member of the Legislative Assembly of some distinction, but who had never held office and had not as yet made any great mark. Born of a Puritan family in Essex, he had been familiarized with Parliamentary practice by reporting in the House of Commons, and had emigrated to South Africa while still a young man. He came, at Frere's summons, like Cincinnatus, literally from his farm, leaving his wife, who bravely remained in charge, and was brought away afterwards by a detachment of the Diamond Field Horse, just before the farm was attacked and the cattle carried off by the Kaffirs. After taking a few hours to consider, he undertook to form a Ministry, a task, under the circumstances, requiring no little courage and patriotism.

Frere writes to Mr. Herbert :—

“ February 20, 1878.

“ We are, as I need not tell you, in an extremely critical state, both here and in the Transvaal. It appears that the very strong measure I was obliged to take in removing Messrs. Molteno and Merriman was not a day too soon. Merriman's insane attempt to ape Gambetta had caused a serious aggravation of the war fever. Years of good management will not repair the evil the war has already done in the Gaika and Tambookie locations by his amateur campaign under civilian soldiers, and we have yet to see whether we shall be able to allay the excitement he has caused in the Waterkloof and its neighbourhood, which in former wars were the strongholds of the enemy, and where his orders to arrest Tini Macomo have already sent Macomo's people into the bush. . . .

“ Mr. Sprigg has had to organize everything *de novo*, with such aid as the General and his department can give



him, which he very thankfully accepts. Merriman made a great parade of his Commandant-General of Colonial Forces, who was to supersede the General and his large staff and military department, and Griffith had been sent out, without being allowed to communicate with the General or Governor, to the Tambookie location near Queenstown. Of course we supposed he had some kind of instructions and something in the shape of Staff. But he appears to have neither. He was simply a screen, and Merriman managed all the various bodies of volunteers who were marching independently of each other about the country, cattle-lifting, shooting Kaffirs, and burning kraals, by his telegrams. . . .

"You must not suppose that I think for a moment it is the Governor's function to have anything to say to the selection of his Ministers under a responsible Government. I should have left the Parliament to deal with the old ones had it not become a struggle for existence. There was really no alternative, but to give over the country to two or three months of unchecked Kaffir Civil War, or to make a stand in defence of the constitution.

"But I have no desire to act as the Constitutional Colonial Patriot. Mr. Sprigg may do that, and it is really very patriotic in him to take office in the face of such difficulties. I shall confine myself to the very prosaic office of having asserted an important prerogative of the Crown."

Meantime, in the Transkei, and where the regular troops were acting, matters were improving. On December 29 and 30, Major Moore, with forty young recruits of the Connaught Rangers and thirty police, repulsed the attacks of large numbers of the enemy, and reopened the communications. More Burghers, Irregular Horse and native levies took the field. And in February and March H.M.'s 90th Regiment, 2nd battalion 24th, and a battery of artillery arrived from England. On February 7, a combined attack of the Gaikas and Galekas was made near the Quintana mountain, on a force commanded by Captain Upcher, which, though small, was fortunately complete in all arms, well posted, and

thoroughly well handled. Kreli was in the field with his witch-doctor and his sons, and Sandilli, a weak man, with little personal love of fighting. Frere writes to Lord Carnarvon :—

“ February 17, 1878.

“ They seemed to have had great hopes of crushing Upcher by enveloping his position, and then of raising the Colony. They came on in four divisions very steadily, and in the days of Brown Bess would certainly have closed, and being eight or ten to one would possibly have overwhelmed our people.

“ They held on after several shells had burst among their advanced masses, but they could not live under the fire of the Martini-Henry. The 24th are old, steady shots, and every bullet told, and when they broke, Carrington's Horse followed them up and made the success more decided than in any former action.

“ It has been in many respects a very instructive action ; not only as regards the vastly increased power in our improved weapons and organization, but as showing the Kaffir persistence in the new tactics of attacking us in the open in masses. At present this is their fatal error, but it might not be so if they had a few renegade foreigners as drill-masters ; and we find many indications that they may ere long possess themselves of all such desiderata, cannon and artillerymen included.”

And to the Duke of Cambridge he writes—

“ February 20, 1878.

“ From the very first the Royal troops, though consisting but of a single battalion, without cavalry or artillery, were the backbone of everything, the one force on which we could rely, and whilst H.M.'s 1-24th held the line of railway and the towns, the volunteer forces were able to go forward. As the rebellion spread and the 88th and 90th came up with artillery, the best part of the severe fighting has been by Her Majesty's troops. . . . The General will have told your Royal Highness what good reason we have had to be thoroughly satisfied in every way with Colonel Glyn and his regiment the 1-24th. . . . As to the feeling of the Colony being, adverse to

Her Majesty's army, it is, I believe, here as elsewhere, one of the most popular of our institutions ; but for party and selfish personal objects, it suited the late Ministry of the Colony to get up a cry against 'imperial domination and military despotism, etc.' The attempt, however, signally failed. . . ."

The hilly region comprised in the disturbed district was extensive, the mountain summits being "sometimes higher than the Grampians," steep, and clothed with almost impenetrable bush of hard, thorny wood, "worse than any but the densest bamboo jungle." General Thesiger, who had just succeeded Sir Arthur Cunynghame as Commander-in-Chief, had but two thousand British Regulars.\* And most of the volunteers, whose time had expired, had returned to their homes, so that operations had to be suspended during three weeks of April. But the mountain and forest paths were now known, and at important points there were loyal natives, or German settlers. The insurgents were becoming discouraged ; matters were looking brighter, and Frere was so well satisfied with Thesiger's management that after seven months' sojourn in barracks at King William's Town he was able to return to Capetown. Towards the end of April offensive operations were vigorously and successfully resumed. Sandilli was not long after killed by a stray shot, Tini Macomo was taken prisoner, and Kreli became a fugitive. On June 29 an amnesty was proclaimed to all who would lay down their arms, though the spirit of unrest which pervaded the natives throughout South Africa at this time prevented the Transkei from being brought to a settled condition till some time afterwards.

Frere had formed a favourable opinion of the capacity of the Kaffirs, and considered them to be, as compared

\* In the war of 1851-3, which lasted nearly three years, Sir George Cathcart had had thirteen thousand troops.

with the martial races of India, easily governed and susceptible of rapid and permanent civilization. The "School Kaffirs," as they were called, that is, those who, under the teaching of the missionaries, had adopted, subject to occasional relapses, European dress and habits, had as a rule remained loyal throughout the war, those of them especially, generally a small minority, who had become Christians. There was one remarkable exception in the case of Umhala, a cousin of Sandilli, an able, well-educated man, who held the office of interpreter in the Court of the Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate of King William's Town.

This man's conduct had been suspicious, and after the war he was tried for sedition. For the prosecution his diary was produced, a strange jumble of fierce ejaculations and devout wishes for the success of the rebels; but no overt act of rebellion was proved against him, and he was acquitted. The Bishop of Grahamstown applied to Frere on his behalf that he might be reinstated in his office. To this letter Frere replied, going minutely into all the details of the case, and pointing out how, notwithstanding his acquittal, he was disqualified for holding an office under Government. He concludes as follows:—

"September 23, 1879.

"You can explain to him that it is his utter apparent oblivion of any sense of duty to our symbol of sovereignty, to the Crown, or its Colonial representative, to the Colonial Government, or to the Constitution as by law established, that cuts him off from my sympathy and disables me from suggesting to my Ministers his re-employment in any of the many positions for which he is otherwise, by nature and education, so well fitted. I can sympathize with Tell or Hofer, with a Chouan chief or with Hector McIvor; they had belief in violated rights and other causes of discontent and excuses for rising against the Government as it existed, and they believed they could set up a better; but I have no more sympathy with a Fenian than with a

French Communist, and least of all with an educated and intellectual man, who, under pretence of improving the world, attempts to upset the Government as it is, and to bring back chaos. . . .

"In Umhala's case I did my best before he left the Government service to induce Mr. Brownlee to deport him out of harm's way. Mr. Brownlee, I believe, gave him every facility to go, short of deportation like a child. I can see great room for pitying Umhala's weakness which prevented his going, but while he is unrepentant and evinces no contrition for his false step, and for his infidelity to Government, even though it went no further than feeling, I cannot see any good ground for his re-employment.

"Umhala's case seems to me to illustrate one serious but little-noticed defect in much of our teaching in this country where natives are concerned. I allude to any direct teaching of the duty of obedience to the law. Among ourselves such teaching would be usually quite superfluous. The duty is indirectly taught in our families and among our schoolfellows, better than it could be possibly learnt in any formal lesson, and is thus more perfectly learnt and realized among the most law-abiding nation in Christendom.

"But the Kaffir has no such advantages, and the consequence is that controversies and arguments, which with us can never shake the foundation of civil allegiance, have for them a significance quite different from what they have for us. The Queen and the Constitution have no more ardent and loyal supporters than are to be found among our controversialists, reformers, and anti-reformers of all classes and creeds, but the Kaffir who has learnt the whole duty of Christian man, with the exception of that law of civil obedience to constituted authority which his teacher had never occasion to learn, may naturally translate much of the argument into assegais and red ochre, and be dangerously perverted from obedience to laws which really hold society together.

"It seems to me that in most of the native schools I have seen, there was some room for direct teaching of Christian duties, of civil obedience to law, which in our home schools have been little needed for many generations."

To Sir M. Hicks-Beach he writes—

“June 1, 1878.

“Here, as in India in the early days of native education through the English language, the higher the English education received by a native the greater are his trials. The educated men of his own nation are too few to form a society for him. He can rarely find as his wife a woman sufficiently educated to understand him. He has new wants, wishes, and aspirations, and little prospect of gratifying them. . . .

“Very little has been done hitherto to make use of this new element of educated natives otherwise than as teachers, and very partially in commerce. The attempts to turn it to account in the public service have been very few, and have not, as a rule, been judicious.

“There is nothing like a native branch of the Civil Service, such as is so useful in India. There is a great want of clerks and interpreters in the English offices, but I know of no native employed as a Government servant in any office of trust or responsibility except as interpreter. Chiefs have been allowed greater power, both within and without the Colony, but it is by right of birth as chiefs, not as Government servants. I cannot find a single instance of an educated native being employed to do any Government work which required a good education, such as magisterial or revenue duty, simply because he was fit for it, and because Government ordered and empowered him to do it on European and not on Kaffir principles.

“When anything of the kind is proposed, it strikes even the best friends of the natives, as unpractical, if not an impossibility, though probably nothing would do so much to abolish the evil influences of tribal chiefship; and few things seem to me easier.

“None of the objections I have heard stated appear to me of any force. It can hardly be said that educated natives, carefully selected and trained, are unfit for the duties or responsibilities of deciding the ordinary police or magisterial duties of a Kaffir kraal, when we allow uneducated natives, not selected and not trained, but simply because they are chiefs, to exercise, almost unchecked, absolute power over the lives and fortunes of hundreds and thousands of their fellow-tribesmen.

"It seems to me that a time has arrived for altering a state of things so anomalous. I think a beginning might be made by organizing a service, which, without being exclusively native, should give opportunities for the employment of natives in the public service and for advancing them when found worthy.

"I would limit its sphere for the present to the Kaffrarian province Transkei."

Just as he was emerging successfully from the crisis in February, the news had reached Frere that Lord Carnarvon had resigned office. It was a great blow to him; and the event proved that it was a great misfortune for South Africa. Lord Carnarvon was not a great statesman. He was deficient in knowledge and perception of men and events, and made not a few mistakes. In speech and writing he was apt to be prolix and tedious. But he was an honourable, single-minded man, with a high standard of duty and a clear, consistent purpose in public life. He worked hard and did his best for the Colonies, over whose affairs he presided with no ulterior purpose of selfish or party advantage. Frere and he were in entire harmony as to South African policy. In striving to bring about federation, they had an object before them, very difficult of attainment, and impossible for any Governor to effect, unless he were loyally supported by the Colonial Office and the Government at home.

The Eastern Question was then in a critical stage, and unfortunately it happened that on the question of sending the British fleet to the Bosphorus at a particular time, Lord Carnarvon differed from the majority of his colleagues in the Cabinet. It was apparently a difference not so much of principle as of mode of action and expediency, on a matter outside his own department, and as to which his share of responsibility would have been comparatively small. But with his deficient sense of proportion, he failed to see that, having

initiated a great and bold course of policy in South Africa, he was under a specially strong obligation to remain at the helm himself in order to uphold those whom he had selected to carry it out, and that in abandoning office at a critical time he deprived Frere of a support which was essential to his success. His resignation was the first blow to the prospect of federation and of a consistent policy in South Africa. From that time forward to the end of Frere's life, whichever party was in power, the policy of the Colonial Office and of the British Government came to be inspired less and less by a consistent purpose in the interests of South Africa and the Empire, and was more and more swayed by the desire of conciliating at any price parliamentary adherents or opponents, however ignorant or careless these might be of the facts or rights of the case.

Frere writes to Lord Carnarvon :—

“ February 17, 1878.

“ Reuter's telegram, saying that you had left the Ministry, has, without any figure of speech, utterly taken the heart out of me. I try to frame all kinds of theories by which you are again at the helm in the Colonial Office till South African confederation is carried, or at soonest till my share in the work is finished, for I feel my interest in the work, and my hopes of carrying it through, sadly diminished by the possibility of your leaving the post which has so identified your name with the fortunes of South Africa. It is peculiarly trying to us just now, when there seems at last a prospect of a break in the clouds. . . .

“ If you have really left the Colonial Office, it adds another, and the strongest of all reasons for my wishing to follow you, and to rest after forty-four years of continuous service with very little holiday.”

Lord Carnarvon was succeeded at the Colonial Office by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach.



The successful termination of the war had smoothed the way of the new Ministry in meeting the Legislature.

Frere writes to the Hon. Cecil Ashley :—

“ July 14, 1878.

“ When Parliament met, the ex-Ministers in the House and their friends in the newspapers were loud in demanding all the papers and correspondence regarding their dismissal. I left Mr. Sprigg at full liberty to produce what he liked, and the first batch staggered the friends of the ex-Ministers; and after another batch or two ‘Argus’ gave them up, and they have literally not had a single advocate in any leading or respectable paper in the Colony, or elsewhere in South Africa.

“ Merriman brought forward a motion condemning me for their dismissal. He subsequently changed it to a condemnation of poor Sir A. Cunynghame, but after a long debate he was defeated by a larger majority than Molteno could ever boast of.

“ Sprigg then brought forward his defence measures—a disarming Act, reforms of Police, Burghers, and Volunteers, and a paid Yeomanry Bill—and they were carried with little alteration beyond what improved them.

“ Then came their financial statement, the first full and plain and honest account the House had had for some years. This made a very favourable impression; and then taxing-bills, to increase some of the custom duties and to impose a house-tax and an excise duty, were all well received. There has been a great fight over the excise, but I think it will be carried.

“ Finally, Sprigg proposed a vote of thanks to Theisiger and all his forces, including, in his speech proposing it, some very handsome words to Cunynghame. Mr. Molteno, as leader of the Opposition, seconded it. It was carried unanimously; and the presentation of the address to the General and Commodore in person, with all their officers, and all the rank and fashion of Capetown in the galleries, was, I am told, a sight worth seeing—though the Governor, for ‘Constitutional reasons,’ could not be present.”

This was the last session of the first Cape Legislative Assembly. The new elections, which by custom extended

over several months, were about to take place, and the Sprigg Ministry, to Frere's great satisfaction, in their programme promised a hearty support to the policy of Confederation.

Mr. Sprigg continued to be Colonial Secretary during the remainder of Frere's stay at the Cape. From first to last they worked together in complete harmony.

The atmosphere of a Constitutional Government by Ministers responsible to a Parliament, was to Frere, notwithstanding his Indian official training and experience, much more congenial than that of a despotic or Crown Government; and his decision, absence of reserve, and tenderness for local susceptibilities, gave him great influence and authority. Mr. Sprigg reciprocated his confidence and regarded him with the warmest feelings of esteem and respect; and in his administration combined, to an extent seldom attained by the chief of a Colonial Ministry, devotion to the interests of the Colony with an equally jealous care for the honour and integrity of the Empire.

Frere was anxious that the services of the Colonists who had distinguished themselves in the late war should not pass without recognition by the British Government. His reiterated requests on their behalf having been but partially and tardily responded to, he writes some months later to Mr. Herbert:—

“January 12, 1879.

“I wish you could impress on Sir Michael the evils of delay in conferring any honours on the Colonial Forces. It is now many months since I adopted the very unusual course of sending officially a request from my Ministers that I would move Her Majesty's Government to recognize the services of Frost and Brabant. They fully deserved the compliment for services in the field, but I should have left that to the General had I not seen the great political

importance of honouring the men who had come forward earliest and most effectually to support the gallant little English farmer, who left his 'laager' on the rebel frontier to help me when the Molteno-Merriman conspiracy to humble Sir Arthur Cunynghame, and through him the English Government, was so nearly successful. Had it not been for Mr. Sprigg, the Gaika rebellion would have been still smouldering on, with its crop of reprisals and massacres, and the inevitable Royal Commissions of Inquiry and party debates in Parliament, with no result to compensate for increased colonial irritation and misgovernment. . . ."

## CHAPTER XIX.

### THE ZULU WAR.

Native combination — The Zulus — Cetywayo's installation — Slaughter of girls—Daily victims—Frere goes to Natal—The disputed territory—Cetywayo's threatening attitude—The Ultimatum—Reinforcements asked for—Confidence of British Staff Officers—Isandhlwana—Panic—Piet Uys—Frere's journey to the Transvaal—The Boer Camp—The Memorial—Shepstone as an administrator—The Camp breaks up—Censure of Frere—His unpopularity in England and popularity at the Cape.

THE events in the midst of which Frere had been living at King William's Town, and the intelligence and reports of magistrates that came to him from all quarters, had proved to him that the Galeka and Gaika risings, the war with Secocoeni, and all the recent outbreaks of the natives were not isolated or accidental occurrences, but the result of a general conviction that the English power could be overthrown, which, like the spirit which was abroad in India at the time of the Mutiny, pervaded the natives everywhere.

He writes to Mr. R. W. Herbert:—

“March 18, 1878.

“I do not think I ever expressed to you my conviction which has been gradually and unwillingly growing that Shepstone and others of experience in the country, were right as to the existence of a wish among the great chiefs to make this war a general and simultaneous rising of Kaffirdom against white civilization.

“I did not at first believe it, owing to the obvious selfishness and fondness for isolation which characterizes the feelings and actions of all chiefs, great and small, and

prevents effectual and continuous combination of any kind for any common purpose.

"But the conviction has been forced on me by a hundred little bits of evidence from different quarters, that though they are incapable of combination and compact in our fashion of leagues and treaties for a common object, there was a widespread feeling among them, from Secocoeni to Sandilli, that the time was come for them all to join to resist the flood of new ideas and ways which threatened to sweep away the idle, sensuous elysium of Kaffirdom, such as Gaika and Chaka and Dingaan fought for and enjoyed; that they too had got guns and could shoot as well or better than the white man, and had, besides, numbers and valour on their side; that all they wanted was union and discipline, etc.

"This sort of talk seems to have been the staple, of late, of the endless embassies which are always passing between the chiefs great and small, and employment in which is the favourite amusement of elderly Kaffir gentlemen who are getting too old for hunting or fighting.

"They are sent in twos or threes, rarely alone (for who would trust a single Councillor by himself?), with several attachés on every imaginable occasion, and it is a science to guess, from the rank of the Councillor sent to meet the envoys, from the fatness of the beast killed in their honour, from the comfort of the hut assigned for lodging, from the position of the mat on which the chief seats them in audience, and from the tones of the grunts he utters, as they very slowly and with many pauses deliver their message—what he thinks of it much more than from what he may say, which is rarely to the point, but rather some clever parry or fence with the address, if the subject be delicate or difficult—so that many envoys come and go without the Chief committing himself. Thus a mission comes from the Zulus to the Pondos about a marriage, and in the course of an audience the Zulu envoy observes that Cetywayo's English cow (Shepstone) had neglected her own calf (the Zulus) and was giving milk to a strange calf (the Transvaal Boers). And according to the tone or emphasis of the Pondo Chief's grunts on hearing this news, he will go on and develop his views or drop the subject.

"In this childish kind of way, though they may never form any treaty or league in our fashion, they may arrange

a good deal of combined action. Their weakness is, whatever they do is always out of time—too early or too late. Thus there can be little doubt that Kreli relied on sympathy and help from many chiefs besides those who have sided with him, and he is said now to tell his people that he will wait till after the mealie harvest when the Pondos and Cetywayo will send him help. But he precipitated the outbreak in August, before his allies had screwed themselves up to the fighting point. Sandilli, on the other hand, was too late, and others, who certainly received messages to sound them, and did not, like some of the smaller Gaika chiefs and Siwani and Kama, report the overtures to us at the time, are still wavering, and will, I hope, keep quiet, if Kreli and Sandilli are effectually put down.

“This kind of thing is evidently going on along the Transvaal frontier. If Shepstone is able to give Secocoeni a decided check, it will tell on the Zulus and keep them quiet for a time; but you must not expect peace on that border till the chiefs have satisfied themselves who is master. When once they have learnt that lesson it must be our own fault if they forget it; for unless they are very unlike their cousins here, they are more easily governed than most Indian nations, but they must be *governed*, not neglected and left to follow their own devices. They are very teachable, and can be made to take all the cost and much of the labour of their own government, but the impulse and the standards of right and wrong must be European.”

By far the most powerful of the native tribes in South Africa were the Zulus, and it was to them and to their King Cetywayo that the others looked as their leaders and champions in the contest.\*

The Zulu power had been built up by Chaka, a fugitive chief, who early in the century visited Capetown, and there, watching the British soldiers exercise, discerned and

\* “Yes, you have beaten us,” said an old Galeka warrior to a native magistrate—“you have beaten us well, but there,” said he, pointing eastward, “there are the Ama Zulu warriors! Can you beat them? They say not! Go and try. Don’t trouble any more about us, but beat *them*, and we shall be quiet enough.”—“A Sketch of the Kaffir and Zulu Wars,” by Captain Hallam Parr, p. 101.

appreciated the power conferred by strict discipline and drill. With great ability he set to work to utilize his knowledge. Raising an army, small at first, he increased it, as a snowball is increased, by forcing every vigorous, able-bodied man, without distinction of friend or foe, into the ranks, sparing a certain proportion of the women, but killing every one else, man, woman, or child, over the whole face of the country, who would not add, directly or indirectly, to its fighting power. An estimate put the number of victims in the wars of his reign (1813-1828) at a million.

Chaka was killed and succeeded by Dingaan his brother, a savage of the same type. It was in his reign that the Boers, trekking over the Drakensberg, first came in contact with the Zulus, and, entering Natal, found it almost depopulated by them. Dingaan received the Boer deputation and its leader Retief with apparent friendliness, entered into an agreement with them for the cession of land, gave them hospitality, and in the midst of the feast fell upon and slew the whole number, seventy, and thirty servants, in cold blood. The Zulus then made an attack on the unsuspecting Boer families in the waggon and killed all whom they found, six hundred men, women, and children. The Dutch survivors were, however, strong enough to avenge the massacre. They killed Dingaan and three thousand of his warriors in fight, and set up his brother Panda as King in his stead; and the Zulu power was for a time cowed and ceased to be aggressive. Panda's reign of twenty-eight years was, compared with that of his predecessors, peaceful. As he got old, his two sons Umbelazi and Cetywayo contended for the succession, and in 1856 a fierce battle took place between them and their respective followers, in which Cetywayo was victorious, and Umbelazi defeated and killed.

In 1861, the Natal Government, thinking it desirable that a fixed succession in Zululand should be established and recognized, sent Shepstone, at Panda's request, to perform the ceremony of Cetywayo's installation as heir-apparent. At the last moment Cetywayo's pride revolted at receiving nomination at the hands of a white man, and he came to the meeting with the intention of killing Shepstone, who found himself surrounded by a mob of excited, yelling savages, and for two hours thought every moment would be his last. An eloquent address by old Panda on the duties of hospitality, and Shepstone's perfect coolness and courage saved his life. Instead of killing him, the Zulus declared that as the nominator of their future King, he must hold the rank of a King himself, and from that time forward Cetywayo addressed him as his "father Somtseu," and he became a power in the land.

Twelve years later, in 1873, the message came that Panda was dead, and with it a request that Shepstone, as Cetywayo's "father," would come and install him on the throne. Twice was the request refused by the Government of Natal, but on its being pressed a third time, consent was given on the express condition of Cetywayo making certain promises for the better government of his country; and Shepstone proceeded to Zululand and proclaimed Cetywayo with due ceremony. On this occasion Shepstone, by his presence and influence, prevented the human slaughter taking place which was a customary part of the ceremonial; and he went on to proclaim, as the result of a consultation with the King and his Council, and with much emphasis, that henceforth indiscriminate shedding of blood should cease in the land; that no man should be killed till after fair trial, or without the King's leave; and that for minor offences loss of property should be substituted for the death penalty. Cetywayo further promised, though



unwillingly, that the European missionaries then, resident in the land should remain unmolested, as in Panda's time.

In spite of these apparent advances in the direction of friendship, it was soon evident that Cetywayo meant to imitate the example of Chaka and of Dingaan rather than that of his father Panda. He kept his promise as regards the missionaries so far as their own personal safety was concerned, but their converts were in several cases and on various pretexts killed, in one instance under the very eyes of the missionary and his wife, so that their occupation being gone, they were finally constrained to leave the country, two only remaining up to the end of 1878. The old military system of Chaka was revived with stringency. A Zulu who had not "washed his spear," that is, who had not killed an enemy, could not marry. The unmarried men and the unmarried women were formed into separate regiments and classes; and a regiment or class of either might reach middle age, failing an opportunity of fighting, without being allowed to marry. Peace under Panda had been of such unwonted duration that a grievance had thus arisen.

In September, 1876, came a story of massacre startling even in Zulu annals. A number of girls had without leave married men of corresponding age, instead of the men of an older regiment for whom they were destined. Large numbers of girls and others connected with them were in consequence ruthlessly slaughtered in cold blood and their bodies exposed on the public ways; and when the parents of some of them buried the corpses, they too were killed.\*

There was little disposition on the part of the Natal

\* Sir H. Bulwer to Lord Carnarvon, October 13, 1876. (C. 1748, p. 198-9.)

Government to criticize the internal affairs of the Zulus, but this outrage was too monstrous to be passed over ; and Sir Henry Bulwer, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, sent a message to Cetywayo to remonstrate with him for this breach of his coronation promises.

The Zulus are adepts in the arts and devices of diplomacy, and on subsequent occasions Cetywayo was careful to excuse his conduct, and to mask his designs under specious professions of friendliness ; but on this occasion he was candid enough. Instead of denying or excusing the outrages, he replied :—

“Did I ever tell Mr. Shepstone I would not kill ? Did he tell the white people I made such an arrangement ? Because if he did he has deceived them. I do kill. But do not consider that I have done anything yet in the way of killing. Why do the white people start at nothing ? I have not yet begun ; I have yet to kill ; it is the custom of our nation and I shall not depart from it.\* Why does the Governor of Natal speak to me about his laws ? Do I go to Natal and dictate to him about his laws ? I shall not agree to any laws or rules from Natal, and so throw the large kraal which I govern into the water. My people will not listen unless they are killed ; and while wishing to be friends with the English, I do not agree to give my people over to be governed by laws sent to me by them. Have I not asked the English to allow me to wash my spears since the death of my father Umpandi, and they have kept playing with me all this time, treating me like a child ? Go back and tell the English that I shall now act on my own account, and if they wish me to agree to their laws I shall leave and become a wanderer ; but before I go it will be seen, as I shall not go without having acted. Go back and tell the white men this, and let them hear it well.

\* The same savage propensity was shown in the treatment of animals. Oxen would be torn in pieces alive by men as a trial of strength. When a war with white men was impending, a black ox and a white ox would be skinned alive, and it was held to be an omen of success for the black or white race according as the black or white ox survived the operation longest.

The Governor of Natal and I are equal ; he is Governor of Natal and I am Governor here." \*

This was plain speaking. Writing to Lord Carnarvon with reference to this message, Sir H. Bulwer says—

" November 2, 1876.

"The reply of Cetywayo to the message which I sent him is an outward expression of the present temper of the King. Incited by the young men of the nation, urged on by his own desire to distinguish himself and to wash the assegais of his people, which has not been done since his father's death, and elated at the result of the conflict between the Government of the Transvaal and Secocoeni, he has for some time past evinced a great desire for war. It is evident, if the information which has reached me is correct, and there is no reason to doubt its correctness, that he has not only been preparing for war, but that he has been sounding the way with a view to a combination of the native races against the white men. Whether that combination has been effected, or whether it can be effected, we are not in a position yet to form an opinion, but that messages have been passing on the subject between Cetywayo and other native chiefs there can be little doubt.

"In the present message Cetywayo throws off any concealment of his intention to wash his spears, and repudiates the moral influence which this Government has exercised with him since his father's death, and especially since his formal recognition and installation as King of the Zulus by Sir T. Shepstone, and which he was only too ready to accept and be guided by so long as the support of this Government was found necessary for the maintenance of his power and even for the safety of his person." †

This was five months before Frere's arrival as Governor and before the annexation of the Transvaal. That event altered our relations with the Zulus greatly for the worse. Regarding the Boers as his natural and hereditary enemies, Cetywayo had courted the friendship of the

\* C. 165, p. 216.

† C. 1748, p. 215.

British and of his "father Somtseu" as a protection against them in case of need. Unfortunately there had been too much disposition on the part of the Natal Government to accept this position, and to regard the Zulus and the Boers as dangerous neighbours who could be played off against each other. The Boers were now British subjects, and such a policy was no longer possible.

"The fact is," writes Frere to General Ponsonby, "that while the Boer Republic was a rival and semi-hostile power, it was a Natal weakness rather to pet the Zulus as one might a tame wolf who only devoured one's neighbour's sheep. We always remonstrated, but rather feebly, and now that both flocks belong to us we are rather embarrassed in stopping the wolf's ravages."

At first Cetywayo was puzzled what to make of the new situation. Shepstone, instead of being his "father Somtseu," was now chief of the Boers.

"Probably," writes Sir H. Bulwer (July 19, 1877), "he has no wish to try conclusions with the English unnecessarily, but his temper of mind is such that he is quite prepared to fight, not merely to defend himself and his authority as an independent King, but to fight on the slightest provocation, regardless of all consequences."\*

In May, 1877, the missionaries—Norwegian, Swedish, Hanoverian, and English—sent a memorial to Sir H. Bulwer, saying that the number of people killed annually since Cetywayo's coronation, instead of being less, was greater than ever.

"The chief work of the King and his Izinduna *every day* is inquiring into or originating witchcraft cases, too many of which end in one or more persons being killed."†

\* C. 1961, p. 35.

† "Smelling out," *i.e.* conviction of being a witch, was a sort of established legal fiction which generally preceded the killing of any one whose life or property the chief wanted to take. The motive was generally malice or plunder, not *bonâ fide* superstition.

"No sun," it was said, "rises or sets without its victim in Zululand." The Christian converts were especially selected for murder; their protection as such was, however, a matter in which the British Government rightly declined to interfere.\*

In June Cetywayo asked Mr. Fynney, the Border Agent at Stanger, who was then at the King's kraal at Ulundi, to get leave for him from Shepstone to make a raid, only "one small swoop" to wash his assegais, intending to attack the Swazi. This being refused, Mr. Bell, a Commissioner for Native Affairs near the Swazi border, reported that Cetywayo's messengers had brought word to the Swazi

\* "I request that you will cause the missionaries to understand distinctly that Her Majesty's Government cannot undertake to compel the King to permit the maintenance of mission stations in Zululand, and that it is desirable for them (if they cannot live there in peace) to retire for the present from the country."—Lord Carnarvon to Sir H. Bulwer, August 31, 1877. C. 1961, p. 60. Subsequently there was a despatch from Sir M. Hicks-Beach to the same effect.

There is an entry in Frere's private diary (Nov. 12) of what was told him of the Zulus by Bishop Schreuder, a Norwegian missionary.

"Bishop Schreuder's account of Zulus. Chaka was a really great man, cruel and unscrupulous, but with many great qualities. Dingaan was simply a beast on two legs. Panda was a weaker and less able man, but kindly and really grateful, a very rare quality among Zulus. He used to kill sometimes, but never wantonly or continuously.

"No doubt Cetywayo has greatly increased killing of late. Bishop Schreuder knows of many cases; but in general no one knows more than that the man has disappeared. It is not safe to talk, inquire, or to tell tales. Cetywayo is an able man, but for cold, selfish pride, cruelty, and untruthfulness, worse than any of his predecessors. He has a curious want of gratitude, and will never acknowledge the slightest obligation to any one.

"Chaka never ordered torture. He always ordered the execution of men by instant death. Cetywayo of late has, Bishop Schreuder knows, ordered a man's lips to be cut off for biting another, and a man's arms and legs to be cut off, after which he lived three days."

Bishop Schreuder's mission-station was at Entumeni, in Zululand. He had lived many years in the country, was well acquainted with Cetywayo, and frequently saw him. He remained there to the last, after nearly all the other missionaries had gone.

King's kraal "that he wished the Amaswazi to enter into an alliance with him against the white man, as they would then be able to attack the white man from two sides, and that he wished to begin at once," with threats in case of non-compliance.

Shepstone wrote (December 1, 1877) to Frere :—

"It is said that Cetywayo is being advised from Natal, and it is commonly reported in Zululand that his adviser is Bishop Colenso. Indeed, Cetywayo all but said so. If this be so, I am afraid there is no chance of a peaceful solution of the question, for Cetywayo will put a very different construction on the Bishop's words to what the Bishop intends."

And again—

"December 7, 1877.

"The Zulus do not believe that Krela is in the least getting the worst in his conflict with you, and pretend to have heard from sources of their own that he has always been successful in every encounter with your forces. Such reports are doubtless circulated to keep up the excitement of the war-party, and to stimulate the feelings of all in the direction of a struggle with us. Everything seems to me to show that this difficulty is a preconcerted matter, and that Cetywayo really believes in his power to overcome us all without much difficulty. . . . One thing is quite certain, that if we are forced into hostilities we cannot stop short of breaking down the Zulu power, which, after all, is the root and real strength of all <sup>es</sup> difficulties in South Africa."

And a week later he writes—

"December 15, 1877.

"My great anxiety is, of course, to avoid collision, and I am satisfied that the only chance I have of keeping clear of it is to show that I do not fear it. The Boers are, of course, in a state of great apprehension, and I have ordered those of the two frontier districts of Utrecht and Wakkerstrom to hold themselves in readiness should I find it necessary to call upon them for active service." \*

\* That Lord Carnarvon was at this time alive to the imminent

The immediate danger of collision between the Boers and the Zulus at this time arose from a long-standing dispute as to a belt of territory on the border, occupied by Boer farmers and claimed by them as having been sold to them by the Zulus, but which the Zulus asserted had only been let to the Boers to graze cattle on, for a limited time, and which they now wanted restored. Shepstone had a conference with the Zulu Prime Minister

danger to be apprehended from Cetywayo as the chief leader and instigator of rebellion, and was prepared to face a war with him, is shown by the following despatch to Frere, dated January 24, 1878 (C. 2000, p. 94):—

“It seems certain that the Zulu King has derived from his messengers the unfortunate idea that the Kaffirs are able to cope with the Colony on more than equal terms, and this belief has, as was inevitable, produced a very threatening change in his language and conduct towards the Transvaal Government. It is only too probable that a savage chief, such as Cetywayo, supported by a powerful army, already excited by the recent successes of a neighbouring tribe over the late Government of the Transvaal, may now become fired with the idea of victory over Her Majesty's forces, and that a deliberate attempt upon Her Majesty's territories may ensue. Should this unfortunately happen, you must understand that at whatever sacrifice it is imperatively necessary that Her Majesty's forces in Natal and the Transvaal must be reinforced by the immediate despatch of the military and naval contingents now operating in the Cape, or such portion of them as may be required. This is necessary not only for the safety of the Transvaal, for the defence of which Her Majesty's Government are immediately concerned, but also in the interest of the Cape, since a defeat of the Zulu King would act more powerfully than any other means in disheartening the native races of South Africa.”

See also, on this point, his speech in the debate in the House of Lords, March 26, 1879, in which he says:—

“When I resigned the seals of office in January, 1878, the position of affairs was as precarious as possibly could be, and nothing but necessity at home compelled the authorities to hold their hands. . . . On August 12 Sir H. Bulwer says: ‘There has been for the last eight or nine months a danger of collision with the Zulus at any moment.’ And in November, 1878, he writes, ‘The system of Government in the Zulu country is so bad that any improvement seems hopeless. We should, if necessary, be justified in deposing Cetywayo.’”

and Indunas on the Blood River on October 18, 1877; and was "surprised and puzzled" at the "self-asserting, aggressive, and defiant spirit" in which he was met by them.\* Ultimately it was agreed that the disputed territory should be the subject of a formal arbitration; but the Zulus, too impatient to wait, had attacked and burnt several of the farm houses, and seized or burnt the crops, and built a military kraal on the disputed territory, the Boers and their families having to fly for their lives.

Shepstone writes—

"December 25, 1877.

"The Boers are still flying, and I think by this time there must be a belt of more than a hundred miles long and thirty broad in which, with three insignificant exceptions, there is nothing but absolute desolation. This will give your Excellency some idea of the mischief which Cetywayo's conduct has caused."

And again (April 30, 1878)—

"I find that Secocoeni acts as a kind of lieutenant to Cetywayo. He receives directions from the Zulu King, and these directions are by Secocoeni issued to the various Basuto tribes in the Transvaal."

Thus, during the anxious months spent at King William's Town in the midst of the Transkei war and troubles, there had been coming to Frere from the Zulu border frequent tidings of threatening danger, of plunder and violence, of government without the strength to make its authority respected, of the dark shadow of an impending native war more formidable than any which had preceded it.

A Commission had been appointed by Sir H. Bulwer in February, 1878, to report on the Boundary Question between the Zulus and the Boers, consisting of Mr. Gallwey,

\* C. 2079, p. 54.



Attorney-General of Natal, Mr. J. W. Shepstone, a brother of Sir Theophilus, acting Secretary for Native Affairs, and Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E. They held their sittings at Rorke's Drift, which is near the south-west end of the disputed territory ; but they do not seem to have personally visited or examined the country in question. The Boers produced written documents, as evidence in support of their case. Written agreements as between civilized men and savages, few of whom can read or write, are always open to suspicion, but it was a questionable act summarily to reject them all, as the Commissioners did.

Their Report was produced in July. It was greatly in favour of the Zulus. Frere, as High Commissioner, had to make the final award.

As long as the Gaika and Galeka outbreaks were the chief causes of anxiety, Frere, as has been related, was detained near the seat of danger, at King William's Town. When that passed he had to return to Capetown. In September he was at last free to go elsewhere. Colonel Lanyon, the Administrator of Griqualand West, was anxious that he should go to Kimberley, the capital of that province. Colonel Lanyon had written in May, from a place on the Orange River, that for a hundred and fifty miles of his march thither from Kimberley he had found the country deserted and all the farmers in laager, "the attitude of the natives being insolent, and cattle-stealing, accompanied by acts of violence, not uncommon." In Pondoland there was apprehension of trouble with the natives. In the Transvaal discontent was on the increase among the Boers ; and Secocoeni, who had successfully defied the Boer levies, and was closely allied with Cetywayo, was ready to break out again. There was the disputed territory award to make, and there were Cetywayo's unwashed spears like

a thunder cloud on the frontier. Everywhere the outlook was stormy ; yet everywhere those in charge were disposed to let matters drift rather than incur the responsibility of taking, or even of recommending decisive action. Frere was, for once, in doubt and perplexity to decide where his presence was most needed and whither to go. But just then came a letter from Sir M. Hicks-Beach which directed him to go first to Natal to settle matters there.

He left Capetown accordingly by steamer for Durban, arriving there September 23, and went on to Pietermaritzburg, the capital of Natal, where he was received and remained as the guest of Sir Henry Bulwer, the Lieutenant-Governor. With him went Mr. William Littleton, his private secretary ; Colonel Forestier Walker, acting military secretary (in the absence on sick leave of Captain Hallam Parr, who rejoined him in November) ; Lieutenant Coghill, 24th Regiment, his acting aide-de-camp ; and also the Rev. George Stegmann, a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, a man of high character intelligence, and attainments, who acted as his Dutch interpreter and secretary, and was of the greatest use to him, especially during his subsequent visit to the Transvaal, for he was justly held in high estimation by the Dutch, both for his own merits and also on account of his father's former services as peacemaker and mediator in the Transvaal.

Natal was a Crown Colony. The Legislature—as altered and settled by a law passed under the auspices of Sir Garnet Wolseley, when he was acting as Administrator of Natal for five months in 1875—consisted of five executive, eight nominee, and fifteen elected members. The Government, not being dependent on a majority of the Legislature, was subjected to little criticism, and underwent little change in its composition and traditions. The Colony

had been till lately isolated from any other, and there had been little thought of concerted action with the Cape.

With the exception of Major Mitchell,\* the Colonial Secretary, Frere found no one from whom he could get much help. Most of the local officials had strong prejudices against the Transvaal Boers, against Dutchmen in general against the Cape Colony, its ways and its ministers, against advocates of responsible government, military men, and all non-officials and outsiders.

He writes to Lord Carnarvon :—

“December 8, 1878.

“Altogether I find the difficulties in the way of harmonious working for the good of Her Majesty’s service not less than they were this time last year in the Cape Colony. It of course makes an immense difference that Sir Henry Bulwer is a thorough gentleman in every feeling and almost fanatically just and loyal.”

And to Mr. R. W. Herbert :—

“January 12, 1879.

“No country farmer, with a bunch of gold seals dangling from his watch-pocket and a well-filled purse and pocket-book equally manifest under the broad-cloth of his garments, dozing among thieves in a Whitechapel ‘boozing den,’ had ever a greater or more undeserved escape than this Colony has had from its Zulu neighbours.

“I was puzzled at first why the Zulus had let it alone so long, but I found that they had been thoroughly beaten when the Boers, taking Panda’s side, set him on the throne, *vice* his brother Dingaan, defeated and killed in 1840. The Boers were aggressive, the English were not, and were well inclined to help the Zulus against the Boers.

“I have been shocked to find how very close to the wind the predecessors of the present Government here have sailed in supporting the Zulus, against Boer aggression. Mr. John Dunn, still a salaried official of this Government, thinking himself bound to explain his own share in supplying rifles to the Zulus, in consequence of the revelations in a late trial of a Durban gun-runner, avows that he did so with the knowledge if not the consent and at the

\* Now Sir Charles Mitchell, Governor of the Straits Settlements.

suggestion of [naming a high colonial official] in Natal. — denies this and shows the untruth of much that Dunn says, but there can be no doubt that Natal sympathy was strongly with the Zulus as against the Boers, and what is worse, is so still. I cannot tell you what uphill work it is contending, one day with some crotchet or difficulty raised by Colenso, another with every form of selfish and narrow-minded difficulty. 'Natal has nothing to do with the Transvaal or Imperial interests in South Africa ; everything of this kind ought to be the care of the Home Government,' etc.

"The Boers are well aware of this. . . . I had no idea till I came here how entirely the colonists were kept from any share in or knowledge of many of the most important branches of administration, notably of all that relates to native affairs. . . ."

In continuation of this letter, he writes again a few days later :—

"There is a strongly marked separation between the official governing class and the colonists, mainly, I think, due to the form of Constitution, though increased by the separation of the main body and head-quarters of the officials from Durban, the busy mercantile centre and port of the Colony.

"This capital is an accident, and not a peculiarly happy one. When Durban was an English port, Pietermaritzburg was the largest of the Dutch laagers and became the capital, and has so continued ever since. But it has no special convenience of situation, and almost any other pretty little country town between the sea and Drakensberg would have equal claims, as far as natural advantages go.

"It is in a hollow a thousand feet below the surrounding country, not accessible without going over the rim of the basin, hotter consequently, and less healthy than the country fifteen miles away. Take away the Government offices and people and the small military detachment, and nothing will remain but a very small country town. I only mention this as a reason why the Government officials are so completely apart from either farmers or merchants, and not with any idea of changing the capital.

"The capital, however, would do well enough if they had a better Constitution. I need not describe it, for you know the hybrid affair which here, as at Kimberley, lets in just enough of independence to checkmate the best of despots, but not enough to make the independents feel responsible for any part of the mischief they may do.

"The strange thing is that not one of the officials I have yet met, sees, or if he sees, likes to acknowledge the obvious reason of the failure of the Constitution to give reasonable satisfaction to any one. All admit it was bad and unworkable when Sir Garnet Wolseley came here, and is worse now. I have seen no one who thinks it possible to go on with it, as it is, after the term of its trial is over one or two years hence. Few men even of the most determined officials hint at the possibility of a change in the direction of more absolute autocracy. All reasonable practical men scout such an idea. But many say in a kind of despair 'they fear the Colony is not fit for responsible Government.' This, I believe, is a great mistake.

"I have not seen as much of the non-officials here as I should like, but I feel quite confident that you have here all the elements of a good responsible Government, if you exclude those subjects which the South African Act reserves to the Union, or to Her Majesty's Government.

"But whatever is done, you will have to change the present system of managing native affairs.

"I have not time to-day to describe the many absurdities of the present system. It could only have endured with a man like Sir Theophilus Shepstone at its head, silent, self-asserting, determined to oppose all innovation and division of his authority, and very skilful in that sort of diplomacy which defers decisions and evades difficulties by postponing action. . . .

"Save a superannuated old clerk, there is no establishment here, but native messengers and a most absurd and mischievous [Native] High Court. Some of the native agents and magistrates are fairly good, but they are few and far between, and there is no progress or improvement [among the natives] except from the indirect effect of peace and protection, and from the labours of some of the missionaries.

"The system has only been kept going by the vicinity of Zululand. Most of the natives are Zulus, refugees from Zulu misgovernment, and as long as the peace and protection they enjoy here is contrasted with the oppressions of Cetywayo they are happy and content, and the bad subjects go over to him; but when the state of things over the border is improved, the present system of leaving everything to manage itself in native locations will no longer be safe or possible, and people here are fifty years behind the Cape in their notions how to deal with such materials. . . ."

The award as to the disputed territory was engaging Frere's earnest attention. The Report of the Commissioners in favour of the title of the Zulus he thought one-sided and unfair to the Boers. Subsequent inquiry strengthened this conviction. He ascertained—that the Commissioner had failed to discover—that on the territory in question there were no less than seventy-five farms\* occupied by Boer farmers, with the homesteads they had built on them, besides twenty farms now unoccupied. Amongst civilized nations, when territory is ceded by one to another—as when Savoy and Nice were ceded to France, and Alsace and Lorraine to Germany,—private rights of property are, as a matter of course, respected. But with savage races it is otherwise. The seventy-five homesteads, with all they contained, would be burnt or swept away as soon as they came under Zulu dominion, unless special provision were made for their protection.

Before delivering his award, he consulted, as was his wont, all those best qualified to give him information.† The observations of Shepstone, the Administrator of the Transvaal on the Report, did not reach him till November.

\* A "farm" amongst the Boers generally contains about six thousand acres.

† He had also to wait for the observations of the Secretary of State, to whom he had sent a copy of the Report.

Shepstone was greatly dissatisfied with it. "The fact that it is adverse," he writes, "is difficulty enough, but the worst part of it is its insulting tone and the cynical language towards the Transvaal people which pervades it from beginning to end, and the effect on the latter of its publication will be most unfortunate."

Though disapproving of it, Frere felt bound to accept the terms of the Report, as a judge with certain limitations accepts the verdict of a jury whether he agrees with it or not. But it was evident that to do so without some safeguards would not only seriously and, as he thought, justly incense the Boers, and greatly aggravate their discontent with the British Government, in which Dutch feeling at the Cape would support them, but it would also probably lead to hostilities between them and the Zulus. He therefore in his award introduced a stipulation that, when the territory occupied by the Boers was handed over to the Zulus, the Boer farmers should either be compensated, if they left their farms, or protected in their occupation of them, if they elected to remain and become Zulu subjects; and that a British Resident with Cetywayo should be specially charged with this duty.\*

Meantime Cetywayo's attitude was becoming more and more threatening.

About the 24th of July one of the wives of Sirayo, a Zulu chief of importance, fled from Zululand across the Tugela into Natal for protection. Being in a wounded

\* Zulus settled within the Transvaal border were to be similarly compensated or protected. Information subsequently acquired increased Frere's objections to the conclusions of the Report. He writes to Sir Garnet Wolseley (September 15, 1879): "As to the Boundary award, you are quite right. It was an unjust verdict, but it came from a jury chosen by ourselves, though not my own selection, and I did not see my way to directing a fresh trial. Had I known then as much as I do now of its history, I would not even under such circumstances have given effect to it."

condition she was taken to a kraal of the Natal native police, twelve miles from the frontier. Two days afterwards a force of Zulus, led by two sons of Sirayo, and consisting of twenty or thirty horsemen and forty or fifty on foot, all fully armed with guns or assegais, crossed the river, and proceeding to the police-kraal and threatening the few police there with violence if they resisted, carried off the woman to Zulu territory, singing their war-songs as they went, and there killed her. Another of Sirayo's wives, who had also about the same time taken refuge in Natal, was carried off by another armed Zulu party, led by two other sons of Sirayo. Her front teeth were dashed out, she was dragged along the ground by a rope, "as if she had been an old hide," for some five hundred yards, placed across the backs of two horses till the river was recrossed, and then killed like the other.\*

Sir H. Bulwer at once requested that the leaders in these outrages should be surrendered for trial in Natal, and a fortnight later repeated his demand. Cetywayo's reply was to excuse the outrages as a boyish freak, and to offer a sum of money (£50) as a solatium for the violation of British territory. This was, of course, refused. Cetywayo then said he would lay the matter before his Council, but nothing came of it.

Such was the fear of provoking hostilities that Sir H. Bulwer raised an objection to sending another British Regiment to Natal during that month, in accordance with orders from home to strengthen the garrison, lest it should increase the alarm on the border. And for the same reason he requested Lord Chelmsford to abstain from sending troops by the direct road to Utrecht, which passed near the border, though at that time the additional thirty-five

\* C. 2220, pp. 124, 194, and 265.



miles involved in using the more circuitous road was, on account of the drought, specially inconvenient.

In September, the Swazi chief Umbelini, living in Zululand, was, with the connivance, if not under the express orders of Cetywayo, making raids into the Transvaal, not only into the disputed territory, but into the country close to the Lüneberg settlement north of the Pongolo, killing men, women, and children in a kraal of friendly natives. So threatening was the prospect that Rudolph, the Landdrost of Utrecht, wrote to Mr. J. W. Shepstone (acting Secretary for Native Affairs), that unless the Lüneberg settlers were at once reassured by the presence of a force, they would trek, and that their example would be followed by all the Boers living under the mountain, and by most of the friendly natives. Frere at once wrote to Colonel Evelyn Wood, who was at Utrecht.

“October 7, 1878.

“The German settlers at Lüneberg have received notice to quit, in Cetywayo’s name, from the Commandant of the military kraal. Let Mr. Rudolph know that we have no intention of allowing any one to meddle with the Lunebergers.”

Colonel Wood, accordingly, on his own responsibility,\* and at some risk of dangerously weakening the force at Utrecht, promptly sent two companies of the 90th Regiment to Lüneberg, which had the desired effect.

In October, Rudolph wrote word that a Zulu war-doctor had been going to all the chief Zulu kraals, using charms and medicines with which he doctored the warriors to make them invulnerable, a ceremony so important “that no one would presume to perform it without the positive order of the King, nor until war had been determined on by Cetywayo.” Royal hunts on a large scale were being

\* “Life of Lieutenant-General Sir Evelyn Wood,” p. 72.

organized by the Zulus near the border,\* where there was little game, but which might afford an excuse for crossing it, according to Zulu custom, a recognized mode of beginning or declaring war.

Frere writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach from Pietermaritzburg :—

“September 30, 1878.

“Since we landed a week ago at Durban, I have been so hard at work gathering information and putting it into condensed shape for you, that I can do little more than refer you to my despatch for the grounds of my conviction that the state of things here is far more serious than I had supposed possible. The people here seem slumbering on a volcano, and I much fear you will not be able to send out the reinforcements we have asked for in time to prevent an explosion. . . .

“The Zulus are now quite out of hand, and the maintenance of peace depends on their forbearance.

“These views will, no doubt, appear extreme to most people here, but you will judge for yourself when the facts are before you. I speak with a deep sense of responsibility for what I say, when I assure you that the peace of South Africa for many years to come seems to me to depend on your taking steps to put a final end to Zulu pretensions to dictate to Her Majesty's Government what they may or may not do to protect Her Majesty's Colonies in South Africa, and that unless you settle with the Zulus, you will find it difficult, if not impossible, to govern the Transvaal without a considerable standing force of Her Majesty's troops.

“Nothing can be more hospitable than Sir Henry Bulwer, and nothing more cordial and frank than our relations, both public and private. I found his opinions differed widely from mine on many points. On some I think I have succeeded in bringing him round to my views,

\* “Report received from border agent at Lower Tugela of a force consisting of two large Zulu regiments being close to Tugela, ostensibly for purpose of hunting. We have sent instructions to resident magistrates to warn our chiefs along the border, and to take steps for defending their districts against a possible attack or raid.”—Sir H. Bulwer to Frere, September 12, 1878. C. 2220, p. 266.

on others I hope to do so, when he recognizes as practically as he does in theory, that the other Colonies are not separate or rival 'nations,' as it seems the fashion in Natal to consider them. Sir Henry is himself a thoroughly patriotic English gentleman, but he has never had to do much with military affairs, and many things which are burnt into one after a few years' dealing with natives in India have to be explained to him, and he is not facile in altering opinions once formed."

Frere, as usual, says the best he can of his colleagues. But it is evident that he was not supported, and not furnished with information, as he had a right to expect, by the Natal Government. It was the obvious duty of that Government, threatening as had been the attitude of the Zulus for some time past, to have obtained full and reliable information concerning the chiefs, the military strength, the disposition of the various regiments, and still more as to the geographical features of Zululand, the practicable roads, the water-supply, the fords, the distances, etc. No such information had been collected, though it could have been easily obtained by means of the Natal Zulus, who, being indistinguishable from their fellow-tribesmen and relations over the border, could pass to and fro without question. Frere and Lord Chelmsford, therefore, had to gather their information about the country as best they could, chiefly from missionaries, who, except the gun-runners, were almost the only white men who knew the interior of Zululand, and from the Natal magistrates living near the border.

All that he could learn, tended to confirm and intensify his previously formed conviction as to the extent and imminence of the danger to be apprehended. He therefore prepared to utilize the occasion of announcing to Cetywayo the terms of the Boundary award, in order to make such demands upon him, as regarded reparation for the past and security for the future, as would test the

sincerity of his peaceful professions and his willingness to put an end to the essentially aggressive and threatening features of the Zulu military system, and thus once for all, either peaceably or by stress of arms, to rid South Africa of the long-standing menace to its tranquillity and union.

Throughout South Africa there were few who did not recognize the existence and magnitude of the danger; it was only as to whether it was imminent or remote that there was much difference of opinion.

Bishop Colenso was almost the only man of note who, with a small following, undertook to defend Cetywayo's attitude and conduct. It was always Frere's habit to seek out those who most differed from him, and by listening patiently to all they had to say, to check and test his own opinions. He had much talk and afterwards a lengthy correspondence with Colenso, which the latter printed and circulated—not at the Cape or in Natal, where it would have been promptly criticized—but in England, where the facts were little known. Frere gradually came to see that Colenso's opinion concerning Cetywayo was of little real value, as, after having once become prepossessed in his favour, he had got into the habit of accepting, without discrimination, all that was alleged to his credit, and rejecting everything that told against him.

Although those who agreed with Colenso were very few, yet in Natal, more than elsewhere in South Africa, there was, in spite of the constant sense of insecurity, a disposition to ignore the danger, an idea that somehow or other it could still be averted by playing off the Boers against the Zulus. Many of the Natalians could not understand how the cousins and kinsmen of the Zulu "boys," who, often employed by them as male nurses, were wheeling their children about in perambulators, could

have been moulded by Cetywayo's military system into a pack of wolves. For very few of them had ever been in Zululand, or knew anything of the Zulus in their own country. They were for the most part comparatively recent settlers ; only a few older men, mostly Dutchmen, recollected, or had themselves witnessed, the slaughter of the six hundred men, women, and children, the victims of Dingaan's treachery, and recognized in the acts which were now being done, and the words which were being spoken across the Tugela, signs that what had happened in 1838 might any day happen again.

The experienced officials, such as the Shepstones and Brownlee, the former Native Minister of the Cape Colony, took much the same view of the situation as Frere. But when it came to taking a definite course, those who should have aided him were for the most part unwilling to commit themselves to anything ; they balanced arguments, discussed alternative courses, and were for temporizing and postponing. The whole burden of deciding what action to take lay upon Frere's shoulders.

At last, however, the Award as to the Disputed Territory was drawn up, and at the same time a second document, containing the demands to be made on Cetywayo in respect of the outrages which had been committed, and also the other conditions to be insisted on. The whole case was set forth at length. In substance what was demanded was as follows :

The verdict of the Boundary Commissioners upon the Disputed Territory was accepted unaltered, but the private rights of those who were settled on it were to be secured, either by way of compensation, if they elected to leave, or by protection being accorded to them if they remained. A demand was made for the surrender, within twenty days, for trial by a Natal Court, of the two sons and the

brother of Sirayo, who had carried off and killed the refugee women ; with a fine of five hundred cattle for the delay in compliance with the two former demands. Another fine of a hundred cattle was demanded for an offence committed on two Englishmen who were molested while surveying British territory. The existing military system was to be reformed, and all men allowed to marry as they came to man's estate ; and while the universal obligation to serve in war was not interfered with, the regiments were not to be called up without permission of the great Council of the Zulu Nation assembled, and the consent of the British Government. In order that all these provisions should be carried out, a British Resident in Zululand, or on its immediate border, would be appointed, who would be "the eyes, ears, and mouth" of the British Governor towards the Zulu King and the great Council of the nation. The missionaries who had settled in the country were to be left unmolested, as in Panda's time. A period of thirty days was allowed for an answer to these demands.

This document, though called the words of the High Commissioner, bore the signature of Sir Henry Bulwer, as Lieutenant-Governor of Natal ; for though Frere, as High Commissioner, had jurisdiction over all matters outside the boundary of that Colony, he had no jurisdiction within Natal itself. The minutes and despatches of the two show that though they differed in some minor details, they were in substantial agreement as to the facts and aspect of the case.\* Sir H. Bulwer, the end of whose term of office

\* In a Minute of November 29, 1878, Sir H. Bulwer writes :—

"In requiring the abolition of the Zulu military system as it is, the High Commissioner strikes at the root of all that is most vicious and most dangerous in the Zulu country.

"Nothing but the eventual complete abolition of that system will, I think, suffice, though the effectual attainment of this object will

was not far distant, might perhaps have been glad to avoid bringing matters to an issue during that time; but when he found Frere resolved to deal with the impending danger at once, he not only consented but insisted on appending his signature to the Ultimatum. This was a great satisfaction to Frere, who, provided the right thing was done, concerned himself little about his own share in the credit of it.

require some management and careful attention on our part for some time.

"The abolition as proposed by the High Commissioner of the rule of compulsory celibacy, and of the system of centralized regiments, will go far towards attaining the object. The whole regimental system in fact must be broken up, and the abolition of the great military kraals must also be an essential condition" (C. 2222, p. 187).

And again, in a Memorandum of December 16, 1878, he concludes as follows :—

"The extension of British responsibility caused by the annexation of the Transvaal and the greatly changed position which we consequently occupy in South Africa, obliges that our future relations with the Zulu King should be placed on a more definite footing than has hitherto been thought necessary. The time has come for doing this, and the time has come, it is also considered, for dealing with the disregard that has hitherto been shown by the King for the promises made by him to us at his coronation, and which were formally proclaimed by the representative of the Natal Government to the Zulu nation, and for exacting the due performance of them in future. These promises provide for the greater security of human life in the Zulu country, and they were conditions laid down by us and accepted by the King in return for the countenance given to him by the Government in taking part in his installation.

"The High Commissioner has judged it to be necessary, for reasons of the greatest moment to the welfare of this portion of South Africa, to place the condition of affairs in the Zulu country, and our relations with the Zulu King and people, on a more satisfactory basis than that on which they now are; and I entirely concur in his Excellency's decision on this point, as also in the conditions which he has laid down, and which have been communicated to the Zulu King, and which are conditions for the better government of the Zulu people and for their great advantage, and conditions also which it may be said are indispensable for securing peace in this part of South Africa" (C. 2242, p. 16).

About the Ultimatum Frere writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach :—

“December 8, 1878.

“I send you officially much more than you will care to read about the terms to be imposed. The papers might have been much shorter, but I wished to carry Sir H. Bulwer with me in every step. He is most scrupulously just, and as a trained Diplomatist, requires every step to be proved, is mistrustful of all but official sources of information, and though he estimates pretty fairly such public opinion as exists here, he is naturally somewhat influenced by local views. Altogether I have felt that great weight was due to his approval of each step, and though the process was often tedious and somewhat laborious, the final result, when he agreed, was well worth the trouble.

“But the principal difficulty has been the great divergence of views here and in the Transvaal. There seems little healthy or well-formed public opinion in either province, and from the way native questions have been treated here for twenty years past as sacred mysteries, not to be revealed to vulgar eyes, there is less sound opinion and sound public interest than there ought to be. In Natal what the Transvaal desires is sure to be wrong. . . .

“Such public opinion as exists in the Transvaal seems much simpler and less divided. With the Boers, of course, whatever the English Government does or says is wrong. Their native policy is very simple. To have no more natives than are wanted to work on their farms, and to keep those few in a very complete state of subordination, are, of course, cardinal points. Large, powerful, and growing [races of] natives like the Zulus alongside us are stubborn facts, and a great difficulty to the general run of Dutch Transvaal politicians, but they have a hazy notion that such people ought to be, and may be driven away somewhere else, into unhealthy regions north of the Portuguese, or pent up in black Alsacias, where they may grow mealies, but cannot keep horses or sheep. . . .

“These are, of course, only the views of the uninstructed. But they are the great majority. I hear a good deal from them here, thanks to Mr. Stegmann, my excellent Dutch secretary, and I believe that if I go to them, after having settled the Zulus into a position clearly subordinate to



Her Majesty's Government, and if the delegates Krüger and Joubert deal honestly with them, telling them how hopeless is any scheme of undoing the annexation, they will acquiesce, reluctantly, no doubt, at first; but they have many noble qualities and capabilities, and if fairly treated will, I believe, be subjects of whom Her Majesty may be proud. I am quite sure that no people could have done what the trek Boers have done during the past thirty years, without having the materials of a great people among them; but they have hitherto had scant justice done them by either friends or detractors.

"Shepstone's position in the Transvaal is a very difficult one. The Boers do not read Blue-books, but they have long memories, and as the embodiment of Natal native policy, and protector of Cetywayo in his opposition to Boer extension, he had much lee-way to make up. He is now the advocate, very properly, of all Transvaal interests, but this very constantly leads him into positions inconsistent with his former views, when representing the Natal Government, and you will see that I have sometimes had to remind him as well as Natal officials that we are now here on Her Majesty's service, and not on duty exclusively interesting either Natal or Transvaal.

"In a week or two I hope we may be able to give you some certain facts indicating what course the Zulus and Cetywayo are likely to take. At present nothing can be more contradictory than the opinions of the best-informed authorities. The only points on which all seem to agree are that the great majority of the people long for quiet, and for some sort of security for their lives and property; that the King's young regiments believe themselves invincible and will oppose any concession, and that Cetywayo will make none except from fear, for no man has ever yet told me of his doing a single act of justice, mercy, or good aith.

"I hope you will bear in mind that we had fairly taken the wolf by the ears long before we had any reason to suppose that the present was not the most opportune time for taking him in hand. If we had not done so he would certainly have taken us by the hand, or rather by the throat, in a very few months; but certainly for the last twelve months there has been no possibility of receding. The idea that the white races were not invincible, and that

a Kaffir empire like that of Chaka might yet be restored by reverting to Chaka's policy of slaughter and extermination of all enemies, dates further back. It is at least as old as the first acquisition of guns on a great scale by Kaffirs and Zulus after the discovery of the diamond-fields, and the unwise relaxations of restrictions on the gun and powder trade. But certainly for the last two years it has been impossible for us to decline the contest."

It was said then and afterwards that a border raid by savages, the killing of two women, the insult to an official, the violation of the Transvaal frontier, were small matters for which to exact amends under threat of war. It was for no such causes in themselves that the demands were made. These outrages were the latest indications of the temper and disposition of Cetywayo towards the white man, and of the hostile attitude which, since his coronation, and especially during the last two years, had made his growing power a standing menace to the safety of the neighbouring provinces, and a rallying-point for the rebellious and disaffected natives throughout South Africa. The seizure of the Duc d'Enghien on neutral territory and his execution in the ditch of a French fortress is pointed to as one of the most flagrant breaches of international law committed by Napoleon. But it was not revenge for such an act as this; it was fear of the consequences to Europe of the power and will which dictated it, which made Europe content to be bathed in blood rather than leave Napoleon dominant. The gist and essence of the Ultimatum to Cetywayo—to which the other demands were but corollaries—was the demand for the abolition of the military system which enforced celibacy until the spears were washed, and which made aggressive war sooner or later a necessity for him. As long as the Transvaal was independent this menace had not been directed mainly, much less exclusively, against the British

power, but now the country of the Zulus was surrounded—save where the Portuguese and the comparatively small and powerless country of Swaziland bordered it on the north—by British territory and British subjects. There were no longer any other enemies for the Zulus to fight, no longer any blood but that of British subjects in which their spears could be washed.

Many, amongst whom was Colenso, thought that Cetywayo might and would comply with the conditions demanded. There was no idea or intention of annexing his country. Frere would at this time have opposed any such proposal, just as he had opposed the annexation of Sattara thirty years before. He would have left the internal administration of the country—the changes demanded having been complied with—to be exercised by the chiefs, putting pressure only in extreme cases to put down flagrant abuses, such as “smelling out,” and similar excuses for causeless slaughter, just as in an Indian Native State a Resident would insist on the suppression of Thugs or of Suttee.

Frere, however, had little hope of Cetywayo's yielding without a struggle. He had studied him, and the native movement of which he was the leader, too well to cherish any illusions. He saw with clear prescience how much was at stake, how the future of South Africa for generations depended on the firmness and consistency of the policy to be followed during the next few months, how great the risk was lest the vacillation of a Minister or the incompetence of an officer should ruin all. In India he had had tried colleagues to work with, and lieutenants whose careers he had watched or whom he had himself trained, whose merits and capabilities he knew, and whom he could trust to the uttermost. But now, at the crucial moment, he was isolated and alone. He had never feared

responsibility and he did not shrink from it now ; but the burden lay heavy upon him, for he was as sensitive as he was strong.

“When shall wars cease on this poor earth?” were his first words in a conversation with Stegmann—which, impressed by later events on Stegmann’s memory, the latter never forgot—as the two rode together out of Pietermaritzburg on the afternoon of the day when the Ultimatum had been finished and lay sealed on his table ready to be despatched. And with deep feeling he confided to Stegmann his sense of the gravity of the step he had taken, of the duty before God and man which lay upon him not to shrink from it, adding with an emphatic “mark my words” that if anything went wrong he foresaw it would lead to his recall and that he would be the scape-goat on whom the blame would be laid.

In view of the present disturbed state of Zululand, and of Shepstone’s narrow escape from being killed there in 1861, Frere was unwilling that any English officer should incur the risk of injury or insult to which the bearer of so unwelcome a message might be exposed in delivering it to the Zulu King. Sir H. Bulwer therefore sent word (November 16) to Cetywayo, requesting him to send duly qualified messengers to the border to receive the Award and the demands which accompanied it.

The place agreed upon for the delivery and reception of the Award was Tugela Drift, on the Natal bank of the Tugela river, which divides Natal from Zululand. The English envoys, Mr. John Shepstone, Mr. Brownlee, Mr. Fynn, a Natal resident magistrate, and Colonel Forestier Walker, with Mr. Littleton as a spectator, arrived there on December 9. Early on the day but one after, thirteen Zulu delegates, with John Dunn and forty or fifty followers, crossed over from the Zulu side. The meeting

was held at eleven o'clock on a small flat ledge of the steep river bank, whence eastwards across the broad, shallow stream were to be seen the rolling downs of Zululand, and to the south in the offing the tall masts of the shipping. Two large trees grew there, and an awning stretched between them gave a partial shelter to the assemblage from the scorching midsummer sun. A small escort of marines, blue-jackets, and Stanger mounted rifles were present, at whom the Zulus seemed a little alarmed ; but they were soon dismissed, as the heat was very great. The award concerning the disputed territory was first read by John Shepstone, and translated into Zulu. The Zulus said that it did not give all they were entitled to, but from their manner and the expression of their faces this was judged to be only bombast, to hide the fact that they found it as favourable, or more so, than they expected. The meeting was then adjourned for an hour, after which the second document, containing the demands, was read. This evidently disturbed them ; they were anxious and concerned, and tried to argue the question. But Mr. J. Shepstone quietly but firmly told them that he had no authority to discuss the matter, and had simply to deliver to them the words of the Government for them to take to their King ; and the meeting broke up.

Meantime in the Transvaal matters had been going from bad to worse. In July a petition setting out their grievances had been signed by a number of Boers at Pretoria, complaining that the promises made at the annexation had not been fulfilled. The chief complaints were that the Volksraad had not been summoned, and no constitution of any kind had been given them ; that an unfamiliar system of administering justice had been introduced ; that the contract for the Delagoa Bay Railway, which was to give the Transvaal access to the

coast, had been repudiated ; that public meetings had been in some instances prevented ; that Shepstone, although possessed of many desirable personal qualities, was politically unfit to represent British interests in that State under the existing peculiar state of affairs, and in view of the intense political dislike and personal antipathy (from many old Natal grudges) with which he was regarded by the bulk of the community. But the greatest grievance of all was that the British Government had failed to give them the protection against Secocoeni and against the Zulus, which had been the chief inducement to acquiesce in the annexation.

It was Frere's habit to seek and avail himself of any private source of information from which he could learn the true feeling of the people, especially, as in the present case, when discontent existed. In October he received a letter from Mr. Bührmann, a Transvaal Boer of weight and experience. The writer expressed himself respectfully, but very frankly, avowing that he had always been, and continued to be a republican, and opposed to the annexation. He called upon Frere to redress their grievances, reiterating those enumerated in the petition, with the addition that the promise to use the Dutch language in official documents, concurrently with the English, had not been kept, and complaining bitterly of Shepstone. Frere replied in detail, and more letters passed between them. Frere's dignified and courteous expressions had their usual conciliatory effect, and the tone of Bührmann's letters gradually became more and more pacific and friendly. Frere repeated his promise to visit the Transvaal and redress such complaints as he should find to be reasonable, although the annexation was an act which, he said, could by no possibility be reversed.

The discontent among the Boers was now so great that it was doubtful what part they would take in the event of war between the British and Zulus. Colonel Evelyn Wood, on December 4, addressed a meeting of them at Utrecht, at which they repeated their grievances, and he so far satisfied them that, after discussion, many of them agreed to serve with him in case of war, on being paid five shillings a day with rations and ammunition.

The second Transvaal deputation to England, Messrs Krüger, P. Joubert, and E. Bok, arrived at Maritzburg on their return, on November 28. Frere had an interview with them and explained to them very fully how they would be able to enjoy perfect freedom and independence as to local matters as a province of the South African Union under the British flag; and that the form of their provincial government would be fully discussed at his intended visit, when he would give them every opportunity of stating their views and wishes. They were very favourably impressed with him personally. Of Krüger Frere entertained a good opinion, and considered that he conducted affairs on the part of the Transvaal with ability and fairness; though he, too, at the time of the annexation, had taken steps privately, as appeared from a letter afterwards found in the Government office, to obtain some post under the British Government.

Frere had written to England, supporting and pressing Lord Chelmsford's demand for reinforcements, on September 10; and again on September 14; and on the 23rd he writes again: "The urgency of supporting Thesiger's request is much greater even than I supposed. I trust there will be no delay." On the 30th of the same month he had written: "The position of affairs is far more critical than I expected. . . . We shall want *all* the troops asked for." And to ensure compliance with Lord Chelmsford's

request, he wrote at the same time privately to Mr. Robert Herbert at the Colonial Office.

“September 30, 1878.

“I have only time to beg you to read, as soon as you can, my official despatch by this mail and to move the Cabinet by all means in your power to send out the reinforcements Thesiger asks for. . . .”

And to Sir M. Hicks-Beach he writes—

“October 27.

“My official despatches will show you that the prospects of peace are fainter than ever. The forbearance of the Lieutenant-Governor has been tried to the utmost by the insolent answers and menacing attitude of the Zulu Chief, and but for the drought which impartially hampers both friend and foe, we should, I think, have had a collision as soon as the Zulus heard of Colonel Rowland’s withdrawal from his operations near Lydenburg, which have been watched by Zulus as well as Boers as a test of power.” \*

And again on October 28 :—

“I can only repeat my own conviction that the continued preservation of peace depends no longer on what the servants of the British Government here may do or abstain from doing, but simply on the caprice of an ignorant and bloodthirsty despot, with an organized force of at least forty thousand armed men at his absolute command.”

Up to the time of Lord Carnarvon’s resignation, Frere’s action and policy had been cordially accepted and endorsed by him. So long ago as December 19, 1877, Frere had written to him: “Your object is not conquest, but simply supremacy up to Delagoa Bay. This will have to be asserted some day and the assertion will not become easier by delay. The trial of strength will be forced on you, and neither justice nor humanity will be served by postponing the trial if we

\* Colonel Rowland’s expedition against Secocoeni had been frustrated by drought and horse-sickness.



start with a good cause." Since Sir M. Hicks-Beach's accession to office, there had not been a hint or a word from him to indicate any disagreement with Frere's views, which had been expressed as fully and candidly as ever in frequent letters and despatches. Nothing, for instance, can be plainer as to his policy and intentions than the following letter to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, which is only one amongst many others to the same effect.

"August 10, 1878.

"You must be master, as representative of the sole sovereign power, up to the Portuguese frontier, on both the East and West Coasts. There is no escaping from the responsibility which has been already incurred, ever since the English flag was planted on the Castle here. All our real difficulties have arisen, and still arise, from attempting to evade or shift this responsibility. The attempt always ends in and can have no other result than that of substituting the gun-runner and canteen-keeper for the English magistrate. There is often an interregnum of missionary influences, but guns and brandy carry the day, ultimately, unless there is a civilized magistrate of a settled Government to keep peace and enforce order. I have heard of no difficulty in managing and civilizing native tribes in South Africa which I cannot trace to some neglect or attempt to evade the clear responsibilities of sovereignty. Nothing is easier, as far as I can see, than to govern the natives here, if you act as master; but if you abdicate the sovereign position, the abdication has always to be heavily paid for in both blood and treasure."\*

This letter crossed one from Sir M. Hicks-Beach of July 25, expressing satisfaction at the troops being moved

\* Sir George Grey had spoken to the same effect seventeen years before. Writing to the Duke of Newcastle (August 12, 1861), he said: "I now wish to point out to your Grace that it is not in this country sufficient to preserve our territories in a state of peace and good order. In fact, you cannot maintain your own frontier in a state of prosperity and advancement if that frontier abuts on a barbarous race, who are under no government but that of force." (C. 2740, p. 40.)

to Natal, so as to be ready, if necessary, to enforce the observance of the Award.

And Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes again (October 2), expressing his opinion that the boundary line indicated by the Commission must almost necessarily be accepted, though he fears it will be most unpopular in the Transvaal, and may encourage Cetywayo to war, from the natural belief of a savage that we only yield from weakness. He adds that of course Cetywayo must be kept in order, and compelled to give up Zulus who violate—as lately—Natal, or Transvaal territory.

Frere's surprise and anxiety may therefore be imagined when, on November 4, he received from Sir M. Hicks-Beach the following message by telegraph : \*—

"October 12, 1878.—It may be possible to send out some special service officers, but I feel some doubts whether more troops can be spared. As the hostilities in the Cape Colony are now at an end, would not the police and volunteers be sufficient for the Cape, and might not all the Imperial troops be sent to Natal and Transvaal, with the exception of a small garrison for Capetown?"

Frere's reply by telegraph to the message was as follows :—

"November 5, 1878.

"Your telegram of 12th ultimo received. Special service officers useful and acceptable, but troops asked for urgently needed to prevent war of races. Cape Colony and Diamond Fields have done their duty nobly and are relying almost entirely on Colonial forces recently raised and only half-organized, with small garrison, five companies King William's Town, for whole of old Colony and Diamond Fields.

"State here as described by Sir Garnet Wolseley three years ago. On the other side of fordable river Zulu army, forty to sixty thousand strong, well armed, unconquered, insolent; burning to clear out white men. Wolseley's

\* C. 2222, p. 16.

estimate of force\* required to bring them quickly and surely to reason not too large. Since then Transvaal difficulty added. Diplomacy and patience have absolute limits. In such case, by setting tribe against tribe, and race against race, victory may follow war, or practical extermination, but if victory is to be ensured on terms which will bear examination hereafter, a sufficient force of Her Majesty's disciplined troops under Her Majesty's officers should be employed."†

Sir M. Hicks-Beach's telegraphic message of October 12 was followed by a despatch dated October 17, which stated that—

"Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to comply with a request for a reinforcement of troops. All the information that has hitherto reached them with respect to the position of affairs in Zululand appears to them to justify a confident hope that by the exercise of prudence and by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of forbearance and reasonable compromise, it will be possible to avert the very serious evil of a war with Cetywayo."‡

Sir M. Hicks-Beach's despatches of October 17, and many of his subsequent ones, were like those of a man from whose memory had suddenly been obliterated not only all that Frere had written to him and to the Colonial Office, but all that he himself had written to Frere.

In answer to Frere's and Lord Chelmsford's renewed applications, dated September 20, for reinforcements, he wrote (November 7) that the decision of the Cabinet remained the same, and deprecated a Zulu war in addition to the other greater and too possible troubles.

This letter reached Frere on December 13. Two days previously (December 11) the Ultimatum had been delivered to the Zulu envoys at Tugela Drift. It was as impossible for Frere at this eleventh hour to reverse his

\* *I.e.* when Sir Garnet Wolseley was in Natal in 1875.

† C. 2222, p. 8.

‡ C. 2220, p. 273.

policy and withdraw from the position he had taken, as it would have been for Wellington to decline a battle on the eve of Waterloo.

Fortunately, however, the Cabinet's decision not to send the reinforcements had in the mean time been reversed. A message sent by telegraph to St. Vincent, and again by telegraph from Capetown to Pietermaritzburg, reached Frere on the following day (December 14), and gave a summary of a despatch of November 21, in which he was told that the reinforcements would be sent out, but that they were only to be used for defensive purposes, "to afford such protection as may be necessary at this juncture to the lives and property of the Colonists."

He wrote to Lady Frere :—

"December 14, 1878.

"Your telegram just received of Herbert's news of reinforcements coming has been the greatest possible relief to me. Our mail-bag was mislaid for a day in the Durban Post-office, and I got on the 13th, only one day before, Sir M. Hicks-Beach's of November 7, which seemed to me to show they were determined neither to send troops nor to face a Zulu war, and that unless all was successful they would throw me overboard, as Jonah."

Three more letters from Sir M. Hicks-Beach followed (dated Nov. 28 and Dec. 11 and 25) to the same effect, urging a postponement of warlike operations owing to the danger of war in Europe, the last of which was not received till a week after Isandhlwana.

A fortnight after the Ultimatum had been delivered and during the suspense as to whether there would be peace or war, Frere writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach :—

"December 23, 1878.

"It is quite as impossible to get any news from Zululand as if we were at war. And the Secretary for Native

Affairs knows no more than his neighbours. The best opinions are, in fact, mere guess-work. Bishop Colenso, who, as you know, is an ultra philo-Zulu, thinks Cetywayo will give in and promise everything demanded. I had a long discussion with the Bishop over the messages, of which he generally approves, though he thinks some of the statements of fact hard on the Zulus.

"My own impression] is that it is quite impossible for Cetywayo to submit without calling in our aid to coerce the Frankenstein he has created in his regular regiments. Even if he were sincere and convinced of our superior power—neither of which I believe—he would find a large residuum of his soldiers who are fully convinced of their own superiority to us and will not give in without a trial of strength. I judge from the almost universal impression I find among natives out of Zululand that the natives are the stronger power and will beat the English. Cetywayo may promise anything to get rid of Lord Chelmsford and his troops, but that he will perform what is necessary for our security I do not believe, and we prepare accordingly.

"I hope the preparations already made will secure our own borders from any inroad in force, and if the time allowed passes without complete acceptance of our terms, I hope that Lord Chelmsford's plan for moving in three converging columns on the Royal kraal, will go far to paralyze opposition and to secure success with as little sacrifice of life as possible.

"I do not think you need be the least anxious for the future government of the country. Once taught who is master, the Zulus will, I expect, not be difficult to manage under their own petty chiefs. I find here in Natal a population of refugee Zulus, at least half as large as Cetywayo's, living in a state of little improved barbarism, it is true, but in perfect peace and quiet under their own chiefs, with a very few and very ordinary Europeans to look after them. An English gentleman as Resident and supreme chief in place of Cetywayo will, I expect, make all the difference between war and peace as the *summum bonum* of Zulu aspirations.

"Colonel Evelyn Wood has done admirably on the Utrecht frontier. He has got a large number of the Boers to meet him, and won their hearts by a frank, soldierlike address. They volunteered to go with him, and he has, I think, done

more than local service by turning the flank of Boer sulkiness.

"I cannot tell you what a relief it was to me to hear by Mr. Herbert's message through Lady Frere that you were sending out reinforcements. I can assure you that I have asked for no more than were absolutely necessary to secure speedy peace with the least possible bloodshed, here and in the Transvaal. The die for peace or war had been cast long before I or Bulwer or even Sir Garnet Wolseley came here. You will find clear proof of this in every one of Wolseley's important despatches, and every month since has aggravated the crisis. 'Nowhere so dark as under the candlestick,' is as true in Natal as in Norway, and we must not be misled by Natal optimists. I have every hope before I return to Capetown, that I may be able to ask you whether some of the regiments we now have should go on to India or return to Europe, but meanwhile I hope you will trust me not to ask for more help than is absolutely necessary to enable these Colonies hereafter to defend themselves."

Writing to Mr. Herbert the same day, he says—

"Our infrequent mail-service has left me for nearly a fortnight without the means of telling you how great was the relief of getting your message through Lady Frere, regarding the reinforcements Government are sending out. I had foreseen the effect our Affghan difficulties so suddenly created; but the fact is, for years past there has been no retreating with safety, no possibility of standing still on this border. The annexation of the Transvaal only slightly hastened what had long before been the inevitable effect of the Natal system of playing off Boer against Zulu, and hanging up all troublesome questions—which they call here 'native diplomacy,'—the immediate effect of which is to leave all great difficulties to your successors, with the permanent result of making every one distrust the Government.

"Had the Indian and European difficulties developed earlier, and had I got the pressing exhortations to avoid war before I left Capetown, it is just possible the evil day might have been put off. But there would have been simply an armed truce; no security except where the

troops were, probably native risings in Natal and Kaffraria, and almost certainly a Boer rebellion in the Transvaal.

"I hope this is realized by you and will be borne in mind, for I certainly did not come here to spend the fag end of my life, away from all I care for, in stirring up strife. I hoped and still hope to do something for permanent peace and good government in South Africa, and should be sorry to be regarded as the evil spirit of war.

"As it happened, a letter urging the postponement of all operations for war with the Zulus reached me some days too late to enable us to recede with any regard to either safety or honour. The aid you are now sending us will, I hope, enable us to settle the Zulus finally, speedily, and with the least possible bloodshed, but it is really not possible, without some loss of life, to render innocuous to his neighbours a savage with thirty or forty thousand armed men at his absolute command, whose system of government and personal pleasure rest equally on bloodshed, who was never known to forgive, never to observe a promise, who believes himself the greatest potentate on earth, and whose outposts are on one side of a river fordable for eleven months of the year, and our farmers on the other.

"He is now virtually surrounded by Natal, the Transvaal, the Swazies, and the Portuguese, and must, sooner or later, succumb. But it is to me a standing marvel how he grew to such dimensions without doing more mischief to Natal, or inspiring more dread. The only explanation I can find is that he was always anti-Boer and therefore philo-Natal, and one sees a good deal of the feeling for him thus engendered among people here, some of whom would sooner see us join the Zulus to teach the Boers manners, than join the Boers to prevent the Zulus from murdering.

"Shepstone's letters, of which I enclose copies, will give you all our news from Transvaal. I hope to meet him now in a few days, and hope I may help him to escape from the very false position he now occupies between old Zulu and new Boer friends. You will see more than one indication in his letters that his difficulty in this respect must occasionally interfere with the public service.

"P.S.—You may remember Shepstone's objections to helping Colonel Wood by calling on the Transvaal Boers to assist our troops with waggons and natives, and his suggestion that we should get the aid we wanted from

Natal. I asked whether the difficulties he started to calling for aid from the Transvaal Boers were owing to their want of resources or their want of will. This seems to have induced him to look up the Transvaal Commando laws, which, as you will see from his letter to me of the 14th, he proceeded to put in force, thereby rather thwarting what Wood was doing to obtain *volunteers*. I have asked him to hold his hand till he meets Wood at Utrecht, on his way down hither. I have done my best to get him to look on Wood and other officers in his position as our comrades and coadjutors—but it is not easy to get really cordial and intelligent co-operation out of any of these Colonial officials. They will work very well by themselves, but there is always a feeling of jealousy when you offer to help them—even when they cannot do without it.”

He writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach :—

“ December 30, 1878.

“ We hear little from Zululand save confirmation of my belief that Cetywayo has no intention of complying with our demands. . . .

“ I have had much communication with Colenso on the subject, and had ascertained from him that he had really no solid foundation whatever, in fact or act, or in any binding speech or writing, for his confidence in Cetywayo's intention to be reasonable or just. ‘ He had,’ simply, ‘ no doubt the king would comply.’ . . .

“ Our Ultimatum demanded compliance with what we had previously required within twenty days. If within that time Cetywayo had given us the redress we required, he would then be allowed ten days more, or thirty days in all, to consider our further demands for future security and better government in Zululand. But if he refuses us the redress demanded within twenty days for our own wrongs, it would be absurd to ask for anything further on account of the Zulus.

“ I would have kept the 2nd Class till after we had obtained compliance with the first, but the Zulus are so suspicious that there would have been danger of their complaining of bad faith had we not let them know at once all we intended to demand.

“ I hope we shall avoid all necessity for crossing the border till after the thirty days have elapsed ; but there is



a great danger of raids into Natal, which might cause very serious panic among both natives and Europeans; and if Cetywayo refuses us just redress at the end of the twenty days given him, I think the lives of Her Majesty's soldiers and subjects should be our first consideration, and that we should not risk any further loss of life by giving him more time than we had promised.

"You must not suppose from what I have said that Colonial opinion is adverse to our proceedings generally so far. We have, I think, a great majority of the straightforward common-sense [people] of the colony entirely with us—the only fault they find being that we do not go far or fast enough. But there are enough of an opposite way of thinking to give much trouble hereafter, if we are not careful."

He writes again to Sir M. Hicks-Beach :—

"January 6, 1879.

"A day or two after I wrote to you on the 30th a great change came over most people here. They began to doubt whether I might not be right about Cetywayo's intentions and Mr. Dunn's good faith. Reports poured in proving that the King did not intend, and had never intended, to give up the offenders for trial, and finally Mr. J. Dunn avowed his intention to cross into Natal, as he believed war to be inevitable, and showed his gratitude to his former protector and benefactor by offering the services of the Zulus who came with him, some five hundred in number, to fight against Cetywayo! I do not think there are many now who think the notification has been issued a day too soon, and I hope Her Majesty's Government will approve of it. . . .

"I had till lately little notion of the intensity of the Boer's feeling against the Commissioners' award. The Boers knew at once, what I have only discovered by painstaking inquiry, how one-sided and incomplete was the work of the Commission, and how essentially inequitable were the really technical grounds of the Commissioners' finding."

The British force though small was not inadequate; it amounted to about five thousand five hundred British soldiers of all arms after the reinforcements came, and a

number, not accurately ascertained, of volunteers and native troops. An insufficient portion of the force was mounted, the cavalry asked for not having been sent. And unfortunately there existed in the minds of some of the officers on Lord Chelmsford's staff an overweening confidence in the ease with which they believed that any resistance the Zulus might make could be overcome. In the Gaika and Galeka wars the attacks of the natives had been invariably repulsed, not only by the regular troops but by the Colonial forces, with little difficulty, the issue having been in no instance doubtful. These officers imagined that a no less easy task was before them now, and that the stories of Zulu prowess were exaggerated traditions. One of them talked of meeting a Zulu attack in skirmishing order. In these ideas they were encouraged by the common opinion of the Natal Colonists, most of whom were strangely ignorant of their neighbours across the Tugela. Frere writes to Sir Alfred Horsford :—

“ March 3, 1879.

“ One leading member of the [Natal] Legislative Council, after telling me ‘ he had thirty years’ experience of the Zulus, and did not believe they would fight, because he had never seen them do so in his time,’ wound up by assuring me ‘ that with two hundred red-coats you might march from one end to the other of Zululand.’ ”

Some rules and principles as to the methods and tactics to be employed in a war with Zulus, and describing their methods of attack, were compiled and published in a pamphlet by Colonel Bellairs, the Deputy Adjutant-General, copies of which were distributed among the officers ; but the pamphlet met with little attention or regard, and was nicknamed “ Bellairs’ Mixture.” Information of the movements of the Zulus, collected and transmitted with no little trouble and risk, was received by some of

the Staff with so little appreciation and such scant courtesy as to discourage the bringing of intelligence in future.

Frere, who had taken counsel with the old Dutch colonists, some of whom had borne a part in the Zulu wars of thirty-nine years before, was under no such illusion, and did his utmost to dispel it. At his request, when Krüger and Joubert passed through Natal, Stegmann took them and other Boers to have an interview with Lord Chelmsford. In Stegmann's diary are the following entries:—

"*Nov. 29.*—I took them to the General. Mr. Krüger gave him much valuable information as to Zulu tactics, and impressed upon him the absolute necessity of laagering his waggons every evening, and always at the approach of the enemy. He also urged the necessity of scouting at considerable distances, as the movements of the Zulus were very rapid, mentioning how even he had once been surprised, and was extricated only by severe hand-to-hand fighting inside his laager."

And Stegmann adds, in a note written subsequently:—

"Mr. Krüger referred to this interview at a meeting with Sir Bartle at Pretoria on April 17, 1879, saying, 'I just wish to remind your Excellency that I honestly gave the General the best advice with regard to the Zulus, and I feel confident that had he followed it, matters would have taken a different course.'"

The diary continues—

"*Dec. 3.*—Took Mr. Paul Bester, at Sir B. Frere's request, to the General. He gave most valuable information regarding Zululand and Zulu tactics, having fought them under Mr. Andries Pretorius, when the Boers went in to avenge the massacre of Piet Retief and his companions. He urged the same precautions upon which Mr. Krüger had laid so much stress. At all these interviews Colonel Crealock took notes." \*

\* Krüger and Bester proceeded to catechise Lord Chelmsford. "How have you arranged your troops? . . . Ah! well, that is very

Commandant Bowker, an old Colonial soldier, also warned the military authorities not to be over-confident.

Complete uncertainty prevailed as to what Cetywayo would do. The most common opinion was that he would endeavour to temporize and defer hostilities for two or three months to a time of year more favourable to him, when the Zulus would have got in their mealie harvest, and the grass would be so dry as to burn readily and leave nothing for cattle to eat, by which means a hostile advance into his country would be greatly retarded. As time went on it became clear that he had no intention of yielding, no authorized message since the delivery of the Ultimatum having been sent by him showing any disposition to treat. On January 1, 1879, the twenty days named by the Ultimatum for the surrender of Sirayo's sons expired. On the 4th the enforcement of the demands was formally placed by Frere in the hands of Lord Chelmsford and the military authorities. On the 9th the reinforcements arrived in time to take part in the war, though too late to have any influence in inducing Cetywayo to yield. On the 10th, the full thirty days having expired, the troops began to enter Zululand.

To have maintained a purely defensive attitude, as suggested by Sir M. Hicks-Beach, would, after war had been declared, not only have been a dangerous confession of weakness, but would have involved defending a frontier of more than two hundred miles with numbers inadequate for such a purpose. A sufficient force could not have been collected in time to resist a raid made by ten or twenty thousand Zulus, who could choose their own time and

good. There are too many troops as we Dutch fight, but not too many for you." Krüger said, "Ask what precautions the General has taken that his orders should be carried out *every* evening, because if they are omitted *one* evening it will be fatal."

place of attack. The only way of effectually meeting the danger was for the British troops to enter Zululand, and there occupy, if possible, the undivided attention of the Zulu armies. Even thus it was feared by some that an "Impi" might evade the British columns and make a raid into Natal.\*

The force under Lord Chelmsford's command was divided into four columns. The first, under Colonel Pearson, crossed the Lower Tugela not far from the sea. The second, under Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., which consisted mainly of native troops and Natal Volunteers, was to act in concert with columns two and three. The third column was under Colonel Glyn, but the General himself being with this column, its movements were in

\* Bishop Colenso was at that time of that opinion, as appears from the following letter which was written by him to Major Mitchell, then Colonial Secretary of Natal.

"Colonial Secretary's Office, January 9, 1879.

"MY DEAR MAJOR MITCHELL,

"The information I give will, no doubt, not be new to you. But I think it right to let you know for his Excellency's [Sir H. Bulwer's] consideration, that I have reason to believe that Cetywayo's plan is to march direct for Maritzburg and Durban, and not waste time upon the country districts. This intelligence has reached me to-day from native sources, and can only be received for what it is worth.

"But as I believe it myself to be substantially correct, I think it to be my duty to report it to his Excellency.

"Of course I do not believe a Zulu force will ever *reach* Maritzburg or Durban.

"Very truly yours,

"J. W. NATAL."

Lord Chelmsford, in a memorandum dated Helpmakaar, January 8, says—

"All the reports which reach me tend to show that the Zulus intend, if possible, to make raids into Natal when the several columns move forward, always supposing that they can muster up courage enough to do so with a large force of armed Natal natives in their front, and our regular columns on their flank, and, perhaps, rear."—C. 2242, p. 26.

almost every detail directed by him, so as to take away almost all responsibility from Colonel Glyn. It commenced crossing the Buffalo river on the 10th. The fourth column, under Colonel Evelyn Wood, entered Zululand from near Newcastle on the north-west. The plan was for the four columns to converge upon Ulundi, near to which was the King's kraal, and where it was expected the decisive action would take place.

The crossing of the river was effected without difficulty or resistance, and for some days there came to Pietermaritzburg, where Frere remained, regular accounts from the third column, some sixty miles distant. Then came a pause; no intelligence came. As the silence continued, the anxiety increased, till it became intense. Between six and seven o'clock on the morning of Friday the 24th, Littleton brought a message to Frere's bedside, that there were two men arrived from the camp speaking, but not very intelligibly, of a disaster having happened to the General and the army. Their uniform showed them to belong to the Natal Volunteers. A suggestion was made that they ought to be arrested for spreading false reports. One was quite off his head. The other could only repeat incoherently that Colonel Pulleine was killed. Presently some one perceived the condition they were in, and ordered breakfast to be given them before they were further questioned. They were escaped fugitives from Isandhlwana, with minds confused, and tongues tied by want of food and rest, and were the bearers of a written message to the High Commissioner from the Commanding Officer at Helpmakaar (the nearest detachment to Rorke's Drift), countersigned at all the stations along the line of communication. Food revived them, and they told the terrible story as far as they knew it. During the day it was from time to time

confirmed by other fugitives, accounts differing as to whether Lord Chelmsford was killed or not, till the worst was known.

This is not the place to describe in detail, much less to criticize the military operations, or to attempt to apportion the blame for this great disaster.

Lord Chelmsford had advanced with the main body of the division at daybreak, on the 22nd, leaving the camp at Isandhlwana in charge of a force of about eight hundred regulars and volunteers, and a few native troops, to which strict orders, written as well as verbal, were given to defend the camp. About ten o'clock, or shortly afterwards, in spite of these orders, portions of the force were detached to a considerable distance from the camp. Some of these falling in with the enemy, provoked an attack by a large Impi of fifteen or twenty thousand Zulus, whose presence so near the camp had escaped discovery. This overwhelming force advanced against the British detachments and surrounded them before they could unite; and the right horn of the Impi, sweeping unobserved round the rock of Isandhlwana, with almost the rapidity of cavalry, seized the camp, and separated the British from their reserves of ammunition. Only a very few escaped; of the six companies of the 24th, constituting more than half of the Infantry engaged, only six men survived, and crossing the river reached Natal. As for the rest, when their ammunition failed, in a few minutes every man lay stone dead, for there was no torture and no quarter.

To Frere the shock was probably the most terrible he had ever experienced. The slain officers of the 24th were the companions with whom he had lived for six months in barracks at King William's Town. He saw at once how fatal the disaster was to all hope of a speedy end to the war, what a source of danger and what an encouragement

to resistance and rebellion elsewhere it would be, and how it would prejudice English opinion against adherence to the policy whereby alone permanent peace could be secured.

For the next fortnight there was a panic in Natal, such as Frere had not witnessed even at the most critical time of the Mutiny in India. At Durban, distant though it was from the frontier and from the scene of the war, the scare was worst of all. The town authorities came in great alarm to Commodore Sullivan and Captain Adeane, and begged them to land some guns from the *Tenedos* to defend the town. At Maritzburg, during the first few days, the tension and suspense were almost insupportable; nothing was known for certain or in detail, not even whether Lord Chelmsford were killed or not, and an idea got about that the Government was in possession of information which it was withholding. Frere's calm, unruffled face was conspicuous in the general dismay; and as in Sind in 1857, every one looked to him for encouragement, and guidance. He was to be seen intent upon his usual occupations, and in his afternoon ride, visiting those especially who had lost husband or son at Isandhlwana; for there was hardly a family in Maritzburg that was not in mourning for some relative or friend in the Colonial Contingent who had fallen. Some of the women he persuaded to seek safety by going with their children to Capetown. The town was put in a state of defence. The quiet of Sunday (January 26) was broken by the rumbling of waggons laden with stores and ammunition, by the noise of carpenters barricading doors and windows, and of workmen sinking wells. Six buildings, or groups of buildings, in a central situation in the town, flanking and connected with each other, and capable of containing in all about four thousand persons, were



prepared for defence. These were to serve as "laagers" in case of need, and notice was given to the inhabitants to be prepared with cooked food, bedding, and other necessities to last at least a week. Three guns, fired in quick succession, were to be the signal to enter the laager within two or three hours. If a fourth gun was fired, they were to enter it with all possible speed.

On the first news of the disaster, Frere had despatched a request, to be telegraphed to England, for reinforcements ; at the same time he telegraphed to Capetown for the three companies of the 4th Regiment which were there. The Cape Colony was thoroughly roused. Mr. Gordon Sprigg immediately responded by sending every English soldier from Capetown, King William's Town, and elsewhere in the Colony, leaving the entire military duty to be performed by the newly constituted Colonial forces, two hundred volunteers going to King William's Town on the 1st of February. The Cape Ministers at the same time begged Frere to leave Maritzburg for some safer place ; the last thing, of course, he would think of doing. He had also telegraphed to Commodore Sullivan for men to man the ponts ; and begged him also to send to Mauritius and to St. Helena for reinforcements, which was immediately done.

On the evening of the same Sunday (26th), Lord Chelmsford arrived at Pietermaritzburg, so changed and worn with anxiety and sleeplessness as to look many years older, and to alarm Frere lest he should break down. There was now undue despondency in the place of the former excessive confidence. The native levies had disbanded and vanished, and the third column in its crippled state had recrossed the river into Natal. On the other hand, the Zulus had suffered severely. The British soldiers who fell at Isandhlwana had not died without inflicting

a loss on the Zulus, far exceeding their own numbers.\* The Impi, which on the afternoon of the same day had crossed the river into Natal and attacked Rorke's Drift, had been beaten back time after time with great slaughter, by less than a hundred soldiers contending against greater odds, numerically, than the Isandhlwana force, proving conclusively—if proof were needed—that it was the dispersion of the force, and the neglect to laager the camp, not mere disparity of numbers, that had caused the disaster. Colonel Pearson's column, enlivened by the alacrity and cheerful spirits of its naval contingent, after repelling all attacks and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, established itself at Ekowe, in the heart of the Zulu country, and decided to remain there. Colonel Evelyn Wood's force had defeated the enemy on the 24th, and was intact in the north-west. Frere, knowing well the ways of savage warfare, and feeling sure that the Zulus would not, without a considerable interval after such great mingled success and loss, take the offensive, but that they would first disperse to their homes with their booty and their wounded, urged that the third column should advance again from Rorke's Drift and take up a position near Isandhlwana, so that at least the dead might be buried. But he urged in vain, and for four months their bones lay whitening in the sun.

In answer to Sir M. Hicks-Beach's letter of December 25, he writes—

“January 29, 1879.

“I need not tell you that I came out to South Africa

\* Their loss, as stated by some Zulus to Captain Macleod (who writes from Derby, Natal, February 4), amounted to four thousand, or about four times the British loss; but this was probably an excessive estimate. The Zulus do not understand numbers. Only a small part of the force returned to Ulundi. A large proportion had been killed, and of the survivors comparatively few presented themselves to Cetywayo ten days after the fight.

purely on a mission of peace. Had I foreseen the warlike troubles in which I have been since involved, I should have suggested to Her Majesty's Ministers to look for some younger man. . . . I have never, I think, deceived Her Majesty's Government by prophesying smooth things, nor needlessly alarmed it by conjuring up phantoms, and I wish you to give every weight to advice on what I believe is essential to early and complete peace in South Africa.

"First, as to the Zulus. When I telegraphed by last mail, I had not realized the utter prostration and demoralization of every Colonial resource, caused by our reverse on the 22nd. The Government has received a warning from a source which has rarely been wrong—that Cetywayo was determined on a raid to destroy this town or Durban; and it is not easy for regular forces to intercept a body of thousands of naked savages travelling by bye-ways forty miles in a night, living on plunder, overwhelming by numbers any post they surprise, and then dispersing as they came by bye-paths to their own country not sixty miles off.

"The Colonial material for self-defence is good, and the native material, which is simply Zulus untrained to war and slaughter, is ample. But it will take time, some years, probably, to get over this shock and organize them so as to give the aid the regulars require.

"Meantime you must strengthen the regular force and effectually crush the Zulu King's power. This is not really so difficult as it seems. His thousands of young gladiators, so irresistible while they believe themselves invincible, will succumb when only once fairly defeated. Theirs is the courage of maniacs and drunkards, or of wild beasts infuriated and trained to destruction, and once cowed they will not rally.

"But the force you will require must be larger than I thought last week. I think you should send out not less than two brigades, with brigadiers and their staff as complete as for Abyssinia. Of the six battalions in the two brigades, two battalions might be Indian sepoy regiments, if really of the best kind. The artillery should not be less than three batteries (of a hundred and twenty-five men each) and two regiments of really good Indian Irregular Cavalry and two companies of Engineers.

"The Indian regiments might come as volunteers, with

the option of remaining after a tour of duty, on the plan I recommended some time ago. I believe a large proportion would stay here for good if reasonable facilities for settling on land were offered. They would be a most valuable addition to Colonial population.

"I do not think you need be in the least alarmed at the expense. I take it for granted we shall not leave the country a prey to anarchy, but govern it, and make it pay for keeping it in peace and quietness through its own people. Nothing is easier if you will only consider that four hundred thousand is the highest estimate of the whole population of Zululand, little, if at all, larger than our Zulu population here, who are mostly refugees from Zululand within the last thirty years, who pay Government fourteen shillings per annum hut-tax, and, on private farms, sometimes pay as much as £5 per hut. If not bred up as wolves, they are an easily managed people, and will rapidly improve and civilize if treated as our Cape Fingoes have been; the Fingoes in fact *are* Zulus—refugees, within the last sixty years, from Zululand.

"The country is not difficult, and is naturally fertile, and has an outlet by water into Delagoa Bay, the river Maputa being navigable by steam launches direct from the bay.

"The country, in fact, is likely to prosper and pay its own expenses far more rapidly than Natal has done, when once life and property are safe, and it will add immensely to the value of Natal itself, where at present there is no such security within a hundred miles of the border."

He writes to Mr. R. W. Herbert :—

"February 8, 1879.

"An accidental steamer enables me to tell you that we are still in suspense, awaiting the result of the attacks, which we have good reason to believe were ordered by Cetywayo on the 4th, to be made on Wood, Glyn, and Pearson. The two former are well supplied and entrenched, and cannot well be cut off from their base. Pearson is more isolated than he should be, and has not the means of moving, but I hope Lord Chelmsford's visit to the Lower Tugela will improve his position. . . .

"For any really useful purposes, the framework of Government, always weak, has entirely collapsed. De-

partments and offices go on as usual, but all behind the scenes could see, if they were not officially blind, the real weakness of the administration for any defensive purpose.

"This is especially the case in native affairs. We have no real hold on the native, no real knowledge of their feelings and views. Fortunately they are simply cowed, not at all inclined to join the Zulu King, and they will, we may reasonably hope, come round in time; but little help is to be got from them meantime in defending the Colony, and I fear few would do anything but hide, if a Zulu Impi came within twenty miles of them. . . ."

Frere's anxieties were not confined to Natal and the Zulus. In a letter to the Duke of Cambridge, giving the reasons why such large reinforcements were asked for, he mentions, in addition to the war, his uneasiness about the Kaffirs in and near the Cape Colony, and goes on to say—

"February 7.

"The diamond diggers at Kimberley are a very peculiar set of people. Under Colonel Lanyon they have kept the peace of their district in a wonderful way for the last year, without help from regular troops. I hope they will continue to do so under Colonel Warren, whom I have just put in to act for Colonel Lanyon, pending Her Majesty's approval; but the state of things there is altogether unnatural and exceptional. There are great numbers of Zulu labourers and natives of other tribes greatly excited by messages from the Zulu King, and till he has been effectually coerced, there will be no peace there.

"Still less can we hope for it in the Transvaal. I have not yet given up hope that when the Boers fully understand the position in Zululand, they will rally to Colonel Lanyon. But at present they are most defiant and seditious in their talk, and Shepstone evidently expects an immediate rising. I hope to get up there if we have any breathing time from this. Meanwhile nothing can be more critical than the position. . . ."

On February 18, a Zulu war party of fifteen hundred men, led by Umbelini and Manyanyoba, crossed the

Pongolo and attacked Mr. Wagner's mission station, four miles from Lüneberg in the Transvaal. Men, women, and children were killed; the houses of the natives were set on fire, and seven children burnt alive. They went on to two other kraals, killing men, women, and children, and carried fire and sword through the district, sparing neither age nor sex.\*

But, in Natal, days and weeks slipped by without the anticipated raid taking place. This immunity was ascribed to various causes, all of which may have contributed to it. The Zulus in Natal, most of whom were refugees from the tyranny of native rule in Zululand, were not far inferior in number to those whom they had left. It was feared after the disaster of Isandhlwana that they might, from belief in Cetywayo's power and coming supremacy, have turned against the Europeans. But they remained everywhere quiet and loyal; and, though they dreaded him, they showed no sympathy whatever with his cause. Pearson's intrenched position, far advanced in Zululand, and Evelyn Wood's at Kambula, as well as the heavy losses the Zulus had sustained in every conflict, were doubtless the main causes which deterred Cetywayo from attempting a raid into Natal. The Tugela, too, was, more than usually, in almost constant flood, and an Impi, fording it at an interval when it was practicable, might have found it difficult to recross. Small detachments of British troops kept arriving by sea, first from Capetown, then from St. Helena, brought by Captain Bradshaw in the *Shah*, then from Mauritius; and, few as they were, the fact of their coming thus by dribblets from unknown lands, fostered the idea in the native mind that there might be no limit to the number of the red warriors of the great Queen who would arrive sooner or later.

\* Wilmot's "Zulu War," pp. 82-3.

And Cetywayo may have thought that it would be well for him not to commit himself too far by letting the Natalians have experience of the horrors of a Zulu raid, in case there should be a chance of making terms for himself with the white men hereafter.

The first gleam of encouragement which had revived the spirits of the General and his shattered column and of the anxious colonists, had been the arrival by telegraph of a prompt and gracious message from the Queen. Though the military situation had not materially changed, and the small reinforcements which had as yet arrived were not sufficient to enable the General to resume the offensive, the panic had abated. Other troubles were, however, arising. Frere, who, it must be remembered, had no administrative authority in Natal, had the greatest difficulty in inducing the civil and military authorities to work in harmony and in preventing a serious difference of opinion between the Lieutenant-Governor and the General, as to the organization of native levies and other matters, which, at last, in spite of all his efforts, did occur, to the great detriment of the preparations for the successful prosecution of the war.

He writes to Colonel Evelyn Wood :—

“ March 8, 1879.

“ I have expressed very plainly my sense of the evil which must result, unless the Lieutenant-Governor can aid the General more effectually during the next three weeks than he has during the past three months, and Sir Henry has gone to-day to meet Lord Chelmsford, at Pine Town, and to discuss matters. But I am not sanguine as to the result. . . . And I much fear that when Lord Chelmsford's reinforcements from home are ready to move forward, he will find a lack of good native auxiliaries of all kinds. . . .”

And he adds in a postscript :—

“ My best compliments to Mr. Pict Uys. Is there

anything I could send him or Mrs. Piet—if he is married—which would please him, as a mark of our sense of his good work? I can think of nothing but gigantic coffee-pots and brass feet-warmers.”\*

This Piet Uys was an influential Transvaal Boer, whose father and brother had been killed in the war against Dingaan, forty years before. Though opposed to the annexation of the Transvaal, he recognized, in spite of the opposition of many of his friends, the duty and necessity of uniting with the British against Cetywayo. He joined the column commanded by Colonel Wood,† to whom his loyalty, experience, knowledge of the country, and wise and prudent counsel were of the greatest assistance.‡ He armed, mounted, equipped and provided his sons, down to the two youngest, aged fifteen and thirteen, at his own expense, steadily refusing to take any pay; and, when one of his farms was injured in the operations of war, abstained from making any claim for the compensation to which he would have been entitled.

But, unfortunately, few of the Boers followed Piet Uys' example. Some were too discontented with British rule under Shepstone, and others too much in fear of the malcontents to venture to do so. A meeting had been held at Potchefstroom on January 13, to hear the report of the delegates, Krüger and Joubert, on their return

\* Familiar objects in Boer houses.

† Colonel Wood to Military Secretary to the Lieutenant-General, April 13, 1879. C. 2454, p. 109.

‡ Colonel Wood would sometimes announce his intended movements for the next day at the camp-fire in the evening. On one occasion Uys objected, and at length said, “You can go with your men where you like and be killed, but I shall not go there.” Colonel Wood replied warmly, “I suppose you think you can command better than I.” To which Uys answered quietly, “No, I cannot command your men; but I know the country and you don't.” Wood wisely yielded.



from England. This meeting passed resolutions declaring their resolve to be satisfied with nothing short of regaining their independence, and Joubert was deputed to go and see Frere, and arrange for a public conference with him to hear what he had to say. Soon after the disaster at Isandhlwana, when matters looked darkest, Joubert came to Maritzburg and had his interview with Frere, Sir H. Bulwer and Colonel Lanyon being present, and Stegmann and Littleton taking notes of what passed. Frere told Joubert that there could be no discussion as to the annexation, which was irrevocable. But he was anxious, he said, to inquire how the promised self-government of the Transvaal could be granted so as best to meet the wishes of the people, and added, "I have asked your people to meet me and discuss the subject when I can come up." He reminded Joubert that he had twice before told him this, and trusted that he had not failed to report it faithfully to his countrymen, otherwise great harm might happen. He then referred to the great disaster which had occurred a fortnight before, bidding Joubert warn the Transvaalers that if they stood aloof and did not help to defend their own border, terrible events might happen, though, in the end, the British could not fail to crush the Zulu power; for this was a war not only between the English and the Zulus, but between Cetywayo, as the ruler and champion of all the native races, and the white races, Dutch as well as English. Should the former succeed in driving the English into the sea, the state of those who remained by purchasing a temporary peace would be that of serfs under Zulu masters. He mentioned this, as he had only an hour before received information of messengers who had been intercepted on their way from the Zulu King to Krüger and others, to suggest that this was a

favourable opportunity for the Boers to rise against the British Government, or at least to remain neutral.

In a letter to Mr. R. W. Herbert (February 8) describing this interview, Frere says—

“Joubert came down, talking very largely to his friends on the way of the impossibility of preventing the Boers from either fighting or trekking. But from all he said, as well as from what he did not say to me and others here, I believe he will do his best to let the Boer excitement evaporate in talk. He seemed, from all we could learn, fully convinced that this is their only course which can avert disaster ; but he is afraid to tell his Boer friends the truth, and wishes me to do it for him. This I will do, please God, as soon as I can get away from this, but I cannot leave for some days, till matters are a little quieter and safer here. . . .”

Shepstone, whose presence was desired in England by the Colonial Office, ceased, early in January, to be Administrator of the Transvaal, and in his place the Secretary of State had temporarily appointed Colonel Lanyon, who was afterwards confirmed in his appointment. On this account, and as the correspondence between the Colonial Office and the Transvaal now passed through Frere's hands, he had more direct authority and responsibility there, and was able to act more on his own account. Joubert having assured him of the determination of many farmers to trek, he sketched out a scheme for buying their farms with the option of repurchase within two years. In order to deal with the grievance about the Dutch language, he sent a circular to Colonel Lanyon by which he might ascertain how many of the Government officials were acquainted with it. He also conveyed to the Boer Committee his formal consent to their having provincial self-government and a flag of their own.

The disaffected Boers had assembled in numbers, which

they claimed to amount to four thousand, armed, and with horses and waggons, to discuss their grievances. They formed a camp on the road from Newcastle to Pretoria, between the latter town and Heidelberg, intending to remain there till the High Commissioner came to them. They frequently stopped the mail-cart, and travellers complained of rough usage and detention; and, though as yet no serious harm had been done to any one, their language became more and more seditious and threatening, and the camp was a standing menace to the civil authorities and to the very small British force at Pretoria, and might at any moment become the focus of actual rebellion.

Thus by the middle of March, the reinforcements from England having arrived, Frere found that it was more necessary that he should at once pay his promised visit to the Transvaal, than that he should remain any longer in Natal. He therefore left Pietermaritzburg on the 15th, accompanied by Littleton, Captain Hallam Parr, Mr. Dalrymple, and Stegmann, for Pretoria, a distance of over three hundred miles. Sir H. Bulwer went with him as far as Ladysmith.

He travelled either on horseback or in a "spider,"—a light four-wheeled covered waggon on springs—drawn by never less than six, and often by twelve mules, for the road was only a track over the Veldt, and at intervals passed over abrupt ascents and descents, and through swampy places where the waggons might be in danger of capsizing or sinking in a mud-hole. A desk had been rigged up in the "spider," on which Frere could write. The servants, and luggage, which included some small tents, travelled in "Cape carts," two-wheeled vehicles on springs. The staff generally preferring riding.

"In this way we could get over from twenty to thirty miles a day, at two stages, halting in the middle of the

day as grass and water afforded a convenient 'outspan,' where the animals unharnessed, had a roll—the great refreshment of a Cape horse on his journey—and after being knee-haltered, grazed till called to the 'inspan.' We lodged at the hotels or canteens where there were any. These, with rare exceptions, were little more than a couple of rooms for travellers, attached to a trader's store; but wherever there were farm-houses near the road we always, if possible, paid them a visit, and were always welcomed with ready hospitality. Coffee was at once prepared and offered; and if it happened to be near the midday or evening meal, we were invited to a more substantial repast, or to take up our quarters for the night. I usually accepted the offer of a room, but my companions, very generally from choice, slept in the waggons or out of doors, in a tent, or often in the open air; rarely seeking shelter unless wind or rain prevented them from enjoying the pure air of the open Veldt. . . . Our road lay through Howick, Estcourt, and Colenso, to Ladysmith, where we took leave of the Lieutenant-Governor.

"On our way to Ladysmith we passed through the scenes of the Zulu massacres in 1838, when, after the treacherous murder of the heroic Piet Retief and his seventy companions, Dingaan's Impis were sent out to cut off the families whom Retief and his followers had left encamped, unsuspecting of danger or treachery, in what has since been known as the county of Weenen or weeping. . . .

"Of the few survivors, I had the pleasure to meet several men and women, some living on farms near the scenes of the massacres, others who had migrated to the Transvaal. None of them willingly recurred to those days of horror; but on being questioned, they related with a simplicity and directness which gave the stamp of truth to their narrative, and often with tears starting to their eyes as they spoke, how they had fought or fled, as the case might be, and how they had seen relations and friends put to death or had found them slaughtered. . . .

"By a curious coincidence, among the Zulu prisoners in the gaol at Estcourt I found two elderly, but not old or inactive Zulu warriors, who said they had been in the Impi which swept that valley forty-one years before. They were then young men anxious to 'wash their spears,' and described with great *sang froid* and in the most business-

like manner, all the scenes of carnage and plunder in which they then took part.”\*

Most of the wayside hotels they came to had preparations for barricading and defence by musketry. Strong permanent laagers had been constructed at Howick, Estcourt, and Ladysmith, large enough to shelter the whole European population of the townships and neighbourhood. Most of the Dutch farms and many of the English ones had been abandoned by their owners, who had fled for safety to the Orange Free State; but here, as elsewhere, it was evident that the Dutch realized the danger more than the English did.

From Ladysmith to Newcastle the Drakensberg chain of mountains was on their left; and on their right, on the horizon, the heights over Rorke's Drift, Helpmakaar, and Dundee. They were near enough, one day, to the scene of Colonel Wood's fighting to hear the boom of his guns. The night before they reached Newcastle was spent on the open Veldt, and so near to the enemy that they ran considerable risk of being attacked by any stray party of them that might come that way. The escort of twenty-five Natal troopers who had accompanied them thus far were not numerous enough to add materially to their security, and they left them next day to join Colonel Wood. At Newcastle Frere went (March 30) “to church in the Magistrate's little office in the gaol end of the laager, the largest room in the village, but never capable of holding fifty people, and much reduced in size by boarded banquettes to fire from, below the loop-holes in the wall, and heaps of sand-bags to close the doors and windows when attacked.”† Here he heard from Colonel

\* This extract is taken from an account of this journey written by Frere two or three years afterwards, but never finished.

† Sir B. Frere to Miss G. Frere, March 30, 1879.

Wood, who wrote almost daily, of the loss of a detachment of about ninety men, and also of the death of Piet Uys, who had fallen, with one of his sons, whom he had gone back to rescue, fighting surrounded by numbers of the enemy.

"To my great grief Piet Uys was killed yesterday," Colonel Wood writes to Frere on March 29. "If I am killed, kindly 'father' his children\* and estimate his services, directly and indirectly, at not less than £50,000, though of course I don't mean any such sum should be given—nor indeed any money." This same letter gave an account of Colonel Wood's successful action at Kambula, which lasted four hours, and was the hardest fought and most critical battle of the whole war, the enemy, estimated by him at twenty thousand strong, being better armed than usual by the help of the rifles and ammunition taken at Isandhlwana. It was in fact the turning-point in the campaign, and the victory came at a most opportune moment for Frere's coming conference with the Boers.

Leaving Newcastle, they crossed the Ingogo river, and, skirting the Amajuba mountain, passed over Laing's Nek—afterwards of sad notoriety,—and came upon the high rolling plains of the Transvaal, where the air struck bitterly cold in contrast with the hot lowlands of Natal.

Henceforth Frere was continually visited at his different

\* Colonel Wood was *not* killed, but Frere, all the same, kept up his interest in Piet Uys's children. He writes to one of them, Dirk Uys, July 22, 1880.

"My dear young Friend,—I received with great pleasure your letter and the photographs you were so kind as to send me, which I shall value greatly for your father's and grandfather's sake, and as reminding me of those who will, I trust, follow the steps of their predecessors, as brave men and true patriots.

"I have the pleasure now to send you a photograph of our beloved Queen, which is very like Her Majesty, and which will remind you of one who constantly thinks of her South African subjects.

"May God bless and prosper you and make you a brave and good man, as your father was."

stopping-places by Boer farmers asking for advice, and claiming his protection against the violence with which they were threatened if they did not join the malcontent camp. These men frequently accompanied him during his day's journey, and left him reassured and confirmed in their loyalty by his encouragement and promise of protection and support.

In a despatch written to Sir M. Hicks-Beach from Standerton, Frere says—

“April 6.

“I was particularly impressed by the replies of a very fine specimen of a Boer of the old school. He had been six weeks in an English prison, daily expecting execution as a rebel, and had been wounded by all the enemies against whom his countrymen had fought—English, Zulus, Basutos, Griquas, and Bushmen.

“‘But,’ he said, ‘that was in the days of my youth and inexperience. Had I known then what I know now, I would never have fought against the English, and I will never fight them again. Old as I am, I would now gladly turn out against the Zulus and take fifty friends of my own, who would follow me anywhere; but I dare not leave my home till assured it will not be destroyed and my property carried off in my absence, by the men who call me “rebel” because I will not join them against Government. My wife, brought up like a civilized woman in the Cape Colony, has had five times in her life to run from the house and sleep in the Veldt when attacked by Zulus and Basutos. One of our twelve sons was assegaied in sight of our house, within the last ten years, by a marauding party; and in my absence from the house, when it was surrounded by Basutos, my wife had to fly in the night by herself, leading one child and carrying another on her back. She walked nearly fifty miles through the Lion Veldt, seeing three lions on the way, before she reached a place of safety. It is not likely we should forget such things, nor wish them to recur; but how can I leave her on my farm and go to Zululand, when the malcontent leaders threaten me that if I go they will burn my house and drive off all my stock? Assure me that we are not to be deserted by the English

Government and left to the mercy of these malcontent adventurers, and I and my people will gladly turn out to assist Colonel Wood.'

"I find that this idea that the English Government will give up the Transvaal, as it formerly did the Orange Free State, has been industriously propagated, and has taken a great hold on the minds of the well-disposed Boers, and is, I believe, one main cause of reluctance to support the Government actively.

"They argue that what has been done before may be done again, and they have no feeling of assurance that if they stand by the English Government to-day they will not be left to bear the brunt of the malcontents' vengeance when a Republic is established."\*

In the course of another despatch to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, written April 9, from Heidelberg, Frere says—

"Along the whole road, since I entered the Transvaal, I have met with unquestionable evidence of the terrorism exercised by the malcontents to induce their moderate and loyal neighbours to join the meeting, simply to swell its numbers.

"I have met Boers of the neighbourhood at every halting-place, and in numbers along the road, and we rarely parted without one or more of them begging for a few words in private, and asking me, 'what he was to do in face of the threats used by malcontents to induce him to join them?' No sooner was he assured that the law would be supported in protecting them against intimidation and violence, than he would bring his fellows to hear the good news. In the few cases where the elder men were not present at the farms we visited, the wives would account for their absence at the meeting with evident regret, and hint that they had not gone willingly or with any disloyal intent, but through fear or curiosity, or, as one earnestly assured me, in hopes of helping to prevent any breach of the peace.

"If I might judge from what I myself have heard and seen during the last ten days since I entered the Transvaal, I should say that but a small portion of those who live within reach of the line I travelled had gone to the meeting, and that most of those had attended from

\* C. 2367, p. 18.



motives other than a real wish to see the act of annexation reversed.

"Almost every one complained of the want of protection against intimidation, but they generally added their testimony to substantial improvements in administration since the country was annexed. 'The few officials are regularly paid, and diligent in the discharge of their duties;' 'they no longer afford or deny redress according as the applicant has voted for or against them when elected to office;' 'the law is justly administered;' 'prices are better;' 'there is money now which they never used to see;' and 'every one would thrive if only assured of peace and freedom from scares of Zulu or Basuto Impis, or visits from malcontents, whose threats peaceable and loyal men feared more than Zulu inroads. . . .' The idea that we should somehow be compelled or induced to abandon the country, had taken great hold on the minds of some of the more intelligent men that I met. It has been sedulously written up by a portion of the South African press, English as well as Dutch. I marked its effect particularly on men who said 'they had come from the old Colony since the annexation, but would never have done so had they believed that English rule would be withdrawn and the country left to its former state of anarchy. . . .'

"But there is great practical difficulty in conveying to the mass of the people any idea of the real power of Government.

"The leaders have no wish that the truth should be known till they have displayed to me their own numbers. Stories of Zulu triumphs and of our insuperable difficulties in Zululand have been sedulously circulated. . . . The Boers have lately, with the avowed purpose of providing more pasture for their cattle, moved their camp closer to Pretoria, giving thereby some colour to the reports that they intend trying to blockade the town and cut off the supplies. . . . It is said that a party, estimated at various numbers above eighty, are determined on violent courses, under the guidance of Solomon Prinsloo. This man . . . is one of the persons generally charged with invoking the aid of native tribes to expel the English. It is obvious that unless some change in the position or intentions of the encamped Boers takes place, they can no longer be regarded as a harmless or lawful assembly, and a very

slight indiscretion on either side may lead to civil bloodshed.

"A desire to do anything in my power to avert such a calamity, induces me to risk more than I should otherwise think prudent. From what I have seen of the Boer character I have much hope of success, and should I fail, it will, I think, be impossible to say that any possible means of averting civil strife have been neglected."\*

Passing through Standerton and Heidelberg, they came to Klipspruit, where Colonel Lanyon had pitched his tent to await their coming, and whence a letter was sent to the Boers' camp, agreeing to meet the Committee at Ferguson's hotel.

The next day, as Frere was starting early in the morning, a letter was brought from the Committee, saying that they had heard that he intended passing on to Pretoria without visiting their Camp, contrary to his promise. Frere was very angry; there was no time to answer the letter, so he bade the messenger follow him and rode on. On nearing Ferguson's hotel, half an hour later, Pretorius, Chairman of the Committee, Viljoen, Bok, and others came up. On Pretorius being introduced, Frere, refusing his proffered hand, at once took him severely to task for the letter, demanding how he ventured to suggest that the promise which he, not only as a gentleman, but in the name of the Queen, whose representative he was, had made, could be broken. Pretorius, astonished and abashed, admitted his fault and apologized, and Frere then shook hands. The rest of the Committee were, at Frere's request, introduced, and Frere introduced his Staff.

He told Pretorius that they would go on to the little roadside inn and breakfast, and then be at his disposal to visit the camp, and talk over matters till it was time to go on to Pretoria; and he went on to suggest

\* C. 2367, p. 91.

a time and place for a formal meeting with the Committee. The members of the Committee were evidently surprised at his taking matters so coolly, and speaking with so much authority ; it had a good effect, and they got on very well afterwards.

After breakfast they started together for the camp, which was now plainly visible, at a distance of two or three miles, on the hillside, the waggon tilts and tents gleaming white on the green grassy slopes, which were alive with four or five thousand cattle and about two thousand horses. In the valley to the right was the river winding far away, and for miles and miles treeless, rolling downs, bounded by mountain ridges in the far distance.

Stegmann happened to be particularly well mounted, and Frere, whose horse, though a good one, was not so ~~fast as his~~, asked him to change horses with him, which he did. Frere presently increased the pace, riding at a gallop over rough and hilly ground for the remaining distance till the camp was reached, so fast that the others could not keep up with him. What his motive was Stegmann never quite knew. Since leaving Maritzburg he had received many warnings that his life and liberty would not be safe in the Boer camp, and had been advised to take another road. Probably he wished to show that he trusted the Boers, but was resolved that, if danger there was, he would be the first man to enter the camp and to face it, and that there should be no mistake as to his identity if they wanted to kill him.

He had expected that the Boers, to show their strength, would have been all drawn up outside the camp, but it seems that if they had turned out mounted, they would have been also armed, and this, the leaders feared, might have been the occasion of some mischance, and thus few were met outside the enclosure of waggons. The camp, or

enclosure, was pitched on a slope by the roadside ; three or four hundred waggons were drawn up, not in a laager of defence, but without order, except that a wide passage led through their midst. On either side of this passage stood the Boers in a row two or three deep, in number about twelve hundred—all told there were about fifteen or sixteen hundred in the camp. Frere drew rein and entered it in front of his party, riding slowly between the lines of men ; and as he went by, he raised his hand to his sun-helmet in salute. Not a man acknowledged it. They stood, their eyes fixed on him as he passed, in moody and deathlike silence. But these were chiefly the younger and more ill-mannered men ; and as he proceeded—rejoined now by his companions—he came to a couple of hundred, mostly older men, grouped round the Committee's tent, who received him coldly, but with all due courtesy and respect. He was asked presently what he would drink, and on his replying "coffee"—thinking, as it was the common drink of the country, it would be most easily obtainable—Stegmann perceived a slight embarrassment amongst them, and guessing the cause, that none was prepared, whispered to Frere to ask for champagne, which was ready provided.

The scene which followed resembled an episode of Homeric life rather than of modern times within the British Empire. Upon Frere's demeanour, upon what he said and did within the next hour might not improbably—as he knew—hang the issues of peace or civil war.

At a table in a large tent, laid open on one side, he took his seat with his Staff. On each side, or in front of him were the members of the Committee, and in the opening of the tent, and for a long distance beyond, was a vista of faces of men looking on and listening intently.

Unable to speak to his hearers in their own language, all that he said had to be interpreted by Stegmann, and

repeated sentence by sentence. This deprived him of any adventitious, rhetorical persuasiveness attaching to fluent speech or pointed phrases, and for that very reason may have led his hearers to watch his face and expression the closer in order to gather his meaning and purpose.

He was now in his sixty-fourth year. Age had whitened his hair, but it had as yet but little enfeebled him, and it had dimmed none of the brightness of his keen, steadfast eye, weakened nothing of the expression of intelligence, firm will, and calm, genial frankness written in his countenance. His face, though worn, was comparatively little changed, but years of ceaseless mental strain, and especially the wearing anxiety of the last eighteen months, had cast over the delicately-cut features a still greater refinement and a graver expression.

He explained the circumstances of his coming, and told them of the warnings he had received, and that nevertheless, as they saw, he had come without a single soldier to guard him.

After he had been speaking some time, he referred to the message which, at their interview at Maritzburg, he had given to Joubert, in writing as well as by word of mouth, to deliver to them.

"But we did not understand this," the chairman, Pretorius, said ; " we never heard of it."

"Send and fetch Joubert," was Frere's reply.

Joubert was not in the tent, and for some time was not to be found, and "Piet Joubert ! Piet Joubert !" was called all over the camp. At last, after some wrangling, he came, reluctant and shame-faced, into the tent.

"Did I tell you so and so ?" Frere said to him.

"Yes !"

"Did you understand it, and that you were to give it as a message ?"

“Yes!”

“Then how dared you fail to deliver the message that I gave you? You may leave the tent. I have done with you!”

He went on to tell his hearers that they might look to having complete freedom and ultimately local self-government under the British Crown, such as was enjoyed by the Cape Colony, and called upon them to aid in the common cause against the Zulu King.

Puritanism shows to better advantage in adversity than in prosperity. The Boers have lost, it is said, in the course of generations, under changed conditions of life, and by their contact with savage races, much of the truthfulness of word and act which marked their Puritan ancestors of the seventeenth century. But if the old ideal is not so well acted up to, it is still held in reverence, and the assembled crowd gave due honour to a man through whose every word and glance and gesture shone out absolute fearlessness, candour, and good faith. The incident with Joubert, instead of rousing resentment, told immediately in Frere's favour, and the expression on the faces of his hearers relaxed and passed from sullenness to sympathy. As he went on, the good impression was strengthened, and he so gained their good-will that when the conference ended and he left the tent, one after another of the men who had received him with sullen or angry looks, pressed forward to shake his hand and greet him as a friend.

This happened on the Thursday in Passion week. The next day being Good Friday, it had been agreed that Frere should meet the Committee on the Saturday. As they objected to meeting at Pretoria, where Frere would then be staying, probably because they knew the townspeople were not favourable to them, the conference was arranged

to take place at Erasmus Farm, about six miles from the town, where a tent had been pitched for the purpose.

It was held accordingly, and lasted from ten o'clock to four, with an interval of an hour in the middle, the proceedings commencing with a prayer by Stegmann.

During these five hours Frere sustained the controversy, practically single-handed, against the members of the Committee, several of them able men, and all of them familiar with every fact and allegation that could be brought to bear upon the case.\* They began by insisting that they spoke in the name of the whole people, and that the "people" would be satisfied with nothing less than absolute independence of the British Crown. Frere replied that he had already met with abundant evidence to the contrary on his way thither, and inquired whether by "independence" they meant a return to the condition of things when Burgers was President. To this question they would give no answer, but again and again reiterated their demand; to which Frere as often replied that the annexation was quite irrevocable and outside the pale of the discussion. "I can only repeat," he says, "what the Secretary of State has twice said to your deputation that the annexation cannot be undone, and that I have no power beyond that given me by Her Majesty's Government to ascertain what are the wishes of the people for the future government under her Crown."† Finally, Joubert said: "We have a last request to put before your Excellency: Will your Excellency be our

\* The report of the meeting, taken down in shorthand, and given for the most part verbatim, covers twelve pages of the Blue-book (C. 2367, pp. 84-97). The Boer Committee numbered twenty-one in number, with Bok as secretary, and Jorissen as legal adviser. Frere was accompanied by his Staff and by Colonels Lanyon and Rowlands. Stegmann acted as interpreter.

C. 2367, p. 93.

advocate for our interests to the British people assembled in Parliament, and tell them that the people of the South African Republic abhor the annexation? . . . The people will draw up and sign a memorial to this effect if your Excellency will support it." To which Frere replied: "I am afraid I have spoken to very little purpose if Mr. Joubert thinks I will support with my own recommendations such a memorial as he describes. Whatever has passed it shall be my anxious endeavour to lay as exactly before Her Majesty's Government as if they were here present to-day. Whatever memorial you may entrust to me I shall forward to Her Majesty, and I shall be very happy to report that it was presented to me by gentlemen for whom I have the greatest respect. . . ." And in an answer to a question from Krüger, he said: "I will not only send home the memorial, but show Mr. Krüger what I will write regarding it." "Is the meaning of this," Krüger asked, "that your Excellency will give your support to the case as it will be stated therein?" "Now, my good friend, Mr. Krüger," Frere answered, "after all I have said, do you think that I can give such support, that I can say one thing now here, and another then?" Krüger then said, "Whereas we have perfect confidence in your Excellency as Her Majesty's representative, we do not see why your Excellency could not do it." Frere replied, "I have told you and Mr. Joubert that to give back the Republic as it was before would not be for your good, and how could I say, in sending the memorial to Her Majesty, that I think it would be for your good? The whole argument is this, that what is done cannot be undone, and our business, as practical men, is to make the best of it." After more conversation, Joubert said: "In order to prevent misunderstanding, I would say very distinctly that I have endeavoured to



bring these matters to this definite conclusion, and therefore propose the memorial, and now that this support is refused I shall have nothing to do with the memorial."

The Boers drew up their memorial, and, as he had promised, Frere enclosed it in a letter written to the Secretary of State, setting out their arguments, which was shown and approved by them before being sent. He also sent the shorthand-writer's report of the meeting, and this too was first shown to the Boer Committee that they might see that it was correct.

The letter was as follows :—

"April 17, 1879.

"I have the honour to forward a report, drawn up from notes by a shorthand-writer, of what passed at a meeting which Colonel Lanyon and myself held with a Committee from the Transvaal at the Boer meeting, near Erasmus Farm, about six miles from this town.

"I have also the honour to forward a memorial, since presented to me by the Committee, for submission to Her Majesty's Government.

"At the particular request of the Committee (a request to which it is evident that they attach great importance) I have promised them to state in my own words, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the arguments they have addressed to me, as I understand them, and which will no doubt receive your earnest consideration.

"They maintain that their independence was unjustly taken from them by the Act of Annexation, an Act which, they alleged, was grounded on incorrect representations of the state of the Transvaal, and of the feebleness of its government.

"They desire that their independence may be freely and unreservedly restored to them.

"They desire nothing more in the shape of concession and they cannot be content with anything less.

"By 'independence' they understand the same entire freedom from all control in choosing their own form of government, and their own administrative machinery, as was guaranteed to them by the Sand River Convention of 1852.

"In making this demand, they claim to represent the wishes of the very great majority of the Boer population of the Transvaal.

"They consider that the Boers now assembled represent the very great majority of that population.

"In proof of this they give me the strongest assurance that, besides those whom I saw there on the occasion of my visit to the camp, and who I may state undoubtedly represented a strong party, there had been from time to time many more, fully five thousand burghers of the land, who they state all cordially agree with their expressed wishes and views, and that such a number would certainly be a decided majority of the burghers of the land, as estimated by the latest official authority. How far this is the case, I have, of course, had no opportunity of judging personally, but there can be no doubt that I may say, as the result of my own observations in the camp and elsewhere, that it certainly is a very strong party that has kept up this movement to the present time. As a proof of their earnestness, I can confirm the fact that they have been in an open camp for four weeks waiting my arrival.

"And looking to the bearing and the temper of the members of the Committee whom I met, who are men of position in the country and respected, and leaders who have, since the earliest establishment of the Republic, taken a prominent part in the government of the country, I think I may say that their representations are worthy of your earnest consideration.

"They maintain that they are voluntarily assembled, and that what the Committee states is the voice, not of delegates or representatives, but of the very great majority of the people.

"They, therefore, pray that Her Majesty's Government, taking these facts as herein represented into consideration, will restore their independence.

"I have endeavoured in the above sentences as correctly as possible to epitomize their statements and view of the case, as explained to me at great length, and I have requested the members of the Committee, named in the margin, to inform me, after the perusal of this letter, whether I have truly described what they said to me.

"They have this day assured me that they are fully satisfied with my summary of their arguments."

The names in the margin are M. W. Pretorius, Chairman, S. J. P. Krüger, J. Maré, J. S. Joubert,\* and H. J. Schoeman.

Frere writes from Pretoria to Sir M. Hicks-Beach about the meeting at Erasmus Farm :—

“April 14, 1879.

“They were evidently much disappointed. . . . Our meeting separated with no more definite decision than that they must report to the ‘people,’ and be guided by their decision as to what was to be done.

“If I may judge from the gentlemen composing the deputation, and others of their class, whom I have had the honour of meeting since coming to the Transvaal, the leaders are, with few exceptions, men who deserve respect and regard for many valuable and amiable qualities as citizens and subjects. . . .

“The few exceptions are mostly foreign adventurers of various sorts and nations, English, Irish, and Scotch, Jews, Americans, Hollanders, Germans, Belgians, and Portuguese, who though often well educated and naturally able, are rarely men of high character or disinterested aims. They acquire great influence among the less educated Boers, but foster the tendency to suspicion, which, mixed with extraordinary credulity in many things, is a marked feature in the Boer character, and makes them very difficult to manage by any one who does not enjoy their entire confidence.

“They are extremely sensitive to ridicule, and to opprobrious or slanderous imputations, feeling most keenly unjust charges against their race by any in authority. Hence perhaps they are very liable to be deceived by men who, for their own ends, flatter and pretend to sympathize with them.

“Of the results of our meeting it is impossible at present to say more than that it must have cleared away misconceptions on all sides. If they have learnt anything as to the finality of the act of annexation—that I have no power to undo it, and do not believe it will ever be undone, in the only sense in which they will ask it—I have on the other hand been shown the stubbornness of a determination to be

\* Not to be confounded with Piet Joubert, who refused to sign.

content with nothing else, for which I was not prepared by the general testimony of officials who had been longer in the country, and who professed to believe that the opposition of the Boers was mere bluster, and that they had not the courage of their professed opinions. . . . I feel assured that the majority of the Committee felt very deeply what they believed to be a great national wrong. . . . But what I have seen during the last few days has strengthened my conviction that the real malcontents are far from being a majority of the whole white population, or even of their own class of Boer farmers.

"I have no doubt whatever that if the Executive were in a position to assert the supremacy of the law, to put an effectual stop to the reign of terrorism which exists at present, the discontented minority would cease to agitate and would soon cease to feel grievances which a very brief discussion shows to be in the main sentimental, not the less keenly felt on that account, but not likely to survive the prosperity and good government, with a fair measure of self-government in its train, which are within their reach under British rule.

"Unfortunately till Colonel Lanyon came little had been done to strengthen the hands of the Executive so as to enable it to support the law, and to defy forcible attempts at revolution.

"At the present moment, thanks to Colonel Lanyon's energy and to the well-directed efforts of Colonel Rowlands, it is no longer as easy as it was a few weeks ago for the malcontents to execute their threats of 'entering Pretoria,' 'hauling down the British flag,' 'putting the officials over the border,' and 're-establishing the Republic.'

"But there is an absolute want of power to disperse the meeting should the members proceed to acts of open violence. . . . And meantime the taxes, which ought to have been paid three months ago, are uncollected, and the government of the country is virtually in abeyance or on sufferance, everywhere outside the capital.

"Nor should I omit to point out the proof afforded by the present position of affairs here, that the annexation was almost the only step which could have saved the country from anarchy or foreign domination.

"It is obviously almost impossible, in the present state

of the population of the Transvaal, that so vast a territory should have been governed, as a single state, by any such simple machinery as the Boers could provide from their own ranks. Unless the law were better respected and enforced than could have been the case under such a constitution as the Republic, it seems to me almost a necessity that all power should have fallen into the hands of a few enterprising and educated foreigners. They could hardly have been Englishmen, they might, and possibly would have been extremely hostile to England, and would probably have made anything like peace in South Africa an impossibility for generations to come. I am told that when the Republic collapsed there was not a single man in high office who was a native or a genuine Boer of the Transvaal."

Great as was Frere's anxiety to bring about the breaking up of the camp, he was scrupulously careful not to use a word or an expression which could leave any doubt as to the annexation being irrevocable. But he had the more sympathy with the Boers, and was more patient with their insubordination, because of his conviction, strengthened by personal contact with them since his arrival in their country, that sadly too little progress had been made in the two years since the annexation in providing them with good administration, and giving them the constitutional privileges which, from the promises held out to them, they were entitled to expect, and which it had been his constant and anxious wish to secure for them. He had come to perceive also, more and more plainly, that Shepstone, with all his great courage and ability, and with his unrivalled local information, had made little advance towards establishing firm and settled government; that his reticence, diplomatic subtlety, and habit of procrastination had raised their suspicions instead of winning their confidence, and had made him intensely unpopular with them.

In January Shepstone was in Natal, on his way to England—though his departure was afterwards postponed till May—and Frere, knowing that the Colonial Office would naturally attach considerable weight to the opinion of so experienced an officer, felt it incumbent on him to give the Secretary of State his own impression of Shepstone's administration of the Transvaal. The letter in which he does this is quoted here, as it is the key to the course of events there during the two preceding years.

“ February 3, 1879.

“ He is a singular type of an Africander Talleyrand, shrewd, observant, silent, self-contained, immobile. Forty years ago he might have been great in Continental diplomacy. Here he has had to be the Native Department of a small Colony, to manage an ever-growing population of Zulu refugees, streaming in singly, without property or means of subsistence, and only begging to be allowed to go to some friendly kraal, and there earn their living under some Chief Headman.

“ Had he been well directed and supported, Shepstone had the capacity, if I may judge from a few early papers, to have organized them into some sort of community. But he was quite alone. . . . Hence he was driven, more and more, to trust to his naturally excellent memory, and to shut himself up in an irresponsible isolation, as the only man who knew anything about native affairs.

“ Like many of his countrymen, he is inclined to resent inquiry or control, and to treat in a hostile spirit all the information and all the suggestions about his department which do not come from himself. Hence it is not easy to help him, and his reticent habits make him very dangerous in troublous times. During the last year had he been more ready, full, and frank in telling somebody—you, or me, or Bulwer—what had happened with the Boers or Secocoeni, and with the Zulus at their first meeting, we might have escaped many dangers and calamities.

“ He knows the Boers well, but has no sort of sympathy with them, and I doubt whether he can ever have their confidence and goodwill. . . . One never feels sure that

one has got his whole and his real opinion and all the information he can give one. . . .

"He has, of course, a vast fund of useful information, if one could get at it ; but he is apt to regard it as his own private armoury, and not as belonging to the State. And I always feel, when I think he has gone entirely with me, that he may have said nothing about some fact or opinion which would have entirely altered my view."

On the same subject Frere writes to Mr. R. W. Herbert :—

"March 27, 1879.

"I could not give you a better instance of the difficulties in which Shepstone's reticence lands him and those who trust to him than by referring to what I think I mentioned to you regarding the Natal native levies. Shepstone was at the General's camp two days before Isandhlwana, and told me before I left Pietermaritzburg that he would probably have remained on, and might have been in the camp when it was destroyed but for the strongly expressed feeling of dissatisfaction in the Native Contingent, and their constant reference and appeals to him, which were so disagreeable that he decided not to remain. This is a thing which he ought at once to have mentioned to Chelmsford, but Chelmsford tells me Shepstone gave him no hint of anything of the kind.

"I could multiply such instances . . ."

And in a letter to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, written after leaving Pretoria, he says—

"May 2, 1879.

"Shepstone wrote to tell me that Bulwer and Chelmsford both said they did not wish to detain him in Natal any longer, and I have therefore consented to his going homewards at once, and he will probably arrive soon after you get this. . . .

"His friends here think he wished for retirement and a pension, but he told me in Pietermaritzburg that he felt he could work for some years to come, and had no wish to be shelved. . . . I think he is entitled to the highest pension you can give him, for he has given his life to exceptionally distinguished public services.

"Unless I had seen it, I could not have believed that

in two years things could have drifted into such a mess. They were obviously bad enough when the country was annexed, but nothing save lifelong habits of trusting that 'something would turn up' can explain to my mind the apparent absence of all effort to devise or substitute a better system. . . . When you come to talk to him you find him full of good sense as well as of information, but it never seems to occur to him that he has any duty but to sit still and let things slide.

"It is this absence of constructive or administrative power, which, joined to his apparent want of sympathy with the Boers, will prevent his being of much use to you in devising a constitution for the Transvaal. If you ask him why the Boers, submissive and acquiescent two years ago, are now clamouring for the repeal of the annexation; why the revenue is in some districts two years in arrear; why there is no demand for payment of taxes, and the Landdrosts collect only what is voluntarily paid; why there is little or nothing collected from the natives; no police; no representative organization of any kind; he will doubtless give you many intelligent reasons for the whole machinery of administration being in abeyance, but I shall be surprised if he suggests any means of setting it going again. . . .

"Were I Governor of Natal, Shepstone is a man I should wish to have at hand to refer to for information and advice, which, when you get it out of him, is sure to be sagacious and worth having. He would rule a Zulu community well, after White-Zulu fashion, but would reform and report nothing unasked, and would tolerate no partner in his realm."

Frere remained at Pretoria till the end of April as the guest of Colonel Lanyon. During the first part of this time, the younger and more violent of the Boers in camp were with difficulty restrained by Krüger and the elder men from entering the town and attacking the garrison. There were frequent alarms; and the townspeople had mounted patrols out all night, and erected barricades in different parts of the town, for there were only two hundred infantry and two small Krupp guns,



with twenty-five rounds of ammunition each, to defend it. Frere had more interviews with the Committee on the 16th, 17th, and 23rd. They would not yield anything of their demand for a restoration of their independence, and spoke plainly and somewhat bluntly. Frere courteously, but with equal firmness and emphasis, reiterated that this was out of the question. Nevertheless, the mutual good understanding and cordiality which had sprung up at their first meeting was maintained and increased. What passed was written down—generally verbatim as it was spoken—and made public, and in the course of one conversation Krüger said—

“The people and the Committee have all conceived great respect for your Excellency, because your Excellency is the first high official of Her Majesty who has laid bare the whole truth; and that esteem will not easily be lost, whatever men may say, for the people have seen for themselves in writing what your Excellency has said.”\*

In the mean time he was mixing freely, as was his wont, with the people of Pretoria and the neighbourhood. He visited them in their houses, and with a companion and interpreter so congenial to himself and so popular with the Boers as Stegmann, he was able to converse freely with them, their wives and their children; and among these people so proud, sensitive, ignorant and suspicious, his natural simplicity, friendliness, and courtesy rapidly gained him their confidence and good will. “As for this Governor of yours,” one of them said to Stegmann, “from all I hear he might be a ‘regt Dopper.’”†

As to the administration of the Transvaal, Frere wrote, after he had left Pretoria, to Mr. Herbert :—

\* C. 2367, p. 150.

† *I.e.* a double Boer, or Boer of the Boers.

" May 16, 1879.

" We have very heavy cases which must come before the Courts in the Transvaal, and I cannot answer for the consequences of having judges and law-officers ill-paid or in debt. The men we have now got are good colonial lawyers, and men of unblemished characters, and I would gladly keep them so. They are highly appreciated, and the remarks I have heard on the subject from old residents showed me how terribly inefficient and how corrupt was the administration of justice under the Republic.

" Do not let any fear of deficient revenue prevent what is right being done for the administration of justice. The collection of the revenue has been even more lax than the administration of justice, and I will answer for Lanyon providing more than Sargeant estimated for the receipts into the Treasury. You can have no idea of the extreme laxity of all departments hitherto, and the extreme inefficiency of the administration in every branch. . . . "\*

\* In an article in the *Nineteenth Century* (February 1881), Frere writes—

" Before leaving [Pretoria] we had arranged the measures which we agreed to recommend to Her Majesty's Government for the future government of the Transvaal. These embraced—

" 1. The creation of an Executive Council, in which some of the Boers should have a part as salaried members.

" 2. The creation of a temporary Legislative, capable of passing laws immediately necessary to strengthen the administration, and to prepare the way for a representative Volksraad, or House of Assembly.

" 3. More efficient organization and better payment of the High Court of Justice.

" 4. Some improvement in the position of the worst paid officials.

" 5. A careful, scientific examination of the line of the Delagoa Bay Railway.

" 6. Administrative reforms, which were much needed, and included the provision of an efficient police force.

" 7. The Finances were to be made the special charge of a Financial Commission, with a view to equalize revenue and expenditure.

" 8. As regarded representative institutions for the Transvaal, a great mass of materials had been collected, including opinions from the Ministry at the Cape, from the Chief Justice of the Cape, and more especially from Mr. Brand, the popular President of the Orange Free State, who most generously gave all the aid that his experience enabled him to afford, regarding the changes which he thought might suit the wants of the Transvaal. These materials were forwarded to Her

There was at that time telegraphic communication from England only as far as Madeira. Thence it took about a fortnight for a steamer to reach Capetown. From Capetown there was now a telegraph to Pretoria and to Pietermaritzburg. Letters addressed to Frere from England were opened at his desire by Lady Frere, who telegraphed to him in cipher anything of importance in them, so that the substance of them reached him from ten days to a fortnight earlier than the letters themselves.

Up to the middle of April the views of the British Government as to the situation had not reached Capetown. On April 18 a Reuter's telegram made it known throughout South Africa that the Government had, in a despatch to Frere, laid on the table of the House of Commons, censured his action.

Not only had Frere not received the despatch, but no intimation of it had yet reached him. The bad effect of the censure in encouraging all malcontents and enemies of the British Empire throughout South Africa was very great. And as regarded the Transvaal it narrowly escaped being especially fatal, for the message announced that "annexation" was negatived, without expressing that the prohibition referred to Zululand, and not, as might easily have been supposed by the Boers, to the Transvaal.

Frere writes to Mr. R. W. Herbert :—

Majesty's Government, and it was my intention, as soon as the views of the Home Government had been expressed, to have convened a Conference at which the Transvaal remonstrant party would have been adequately represented, with a view to draw up such a Constitution as might satisfy the reasonable desires of the Transvaal people for representative institutions. Mr. Pretorius had intimated his willingness to consider with his colleagues on the Commission my proposal that he should assist as a member of the executive. Hopes were entertained that Mr. Krüger might be willing to take a similar part in the measures which must precede the enactment of a representative Constitution."

"April 18.

"I much fear the effect on the Boers of the discredit the telegram will throw on all I can say or do. I hoped yesterday that Lanyon and I had brought them to the dissolving point, but I shall be anxious to know the effect when the intelligence of the telegram has slowly penetrated into the Boer comprehension."

Happily on this very day, before the purport of the telegram could be published, the camp, to Frere's intense relief, broke up and the malcontents dispersed.

He writes to Lady Frere:—

"Pretoria, April 20, 1879. '

"My last letter had not been gone many hours by the mail express, when Lanyon ran into my room, to tell me that the Boer camp was actually broken up and the Boers dispersing!

"I need not tell you how thankful I was. The one thing I dreaded was civil war and bloodshed, and had a single malcontent been shot I should have considered it a greater misfortune than the death of a dozen Piet Retiefs—or Uys—dying like heroes in the field of battle for their country and brethren. So you may imagine how thankful I felt to the Giver of all good, who has guided and protected us through life.

"I was doubly glad that it came through Lanyon, who has so gallantly and truly helped us in all our difficulties. Had he been on my own staff he could not have helped me more loyally and truly. . . .

"Will you tell Mrs. Stegmann and also Sprigg and Mills that I consider our success with the Boers greatly owing to the very efficient help we have had from Stegmann. He is not only so judicious and conciliatory but as bold as a lion—or as Piet Uys himself,—and every now and then in his quiet, humorous way puts a home truth to one of the honest malcontents which makes the good fellow open his eyes and laugh as he sees things, his own pet grievance perhaps, in an entirely new light, till he begins to think that the 'verdompt' English Government is not so bad after all.

"I am to see a deputation from the Boers' Committee again to-morrow, and then I hope we shall have done with meetings and grievances *for the present*, a phrase which they carefully put into all references to their breaking up,

and which they evidently mean. It was clear to me that it was not the annexation so much as the neglect to fulfil the promises and the expectations held out by Shepstone when he took over the government, that has stirred up the great mass of the Boers and given a handle to agitators."

The telegraphic message announcing the disaster of Isandhlwana had reached England on February 11, three days before Parliament met. Ignorant and unconcerned as most English people were about the affairs of South Africa, the loss of eight hundred British soldiers in a quarrel they knew little or nothing about made a profound impression. Clinging to the tradition that the British soldier is invincible, they refused to believe the simple fact that what had happened was a purely military disaster, for which military men alone were responsible; and, looking about for some one else to blame, fixed upon Frere as the foremost and most responsible non-military man.

It was a tactical opportunity for the Opposition, which they were not slow and not scrupulous in using. A storm of invective was poured upon Frere. He was set down as an unprincipled assailant of native life and property, the leader of colonists who were actuated by foolish or pretended fear of the Zulus, and by desire to rob them of their land and take it for themselves.\* The Opposition

\* The following extract is from a letter to the *Times*, by Sir Henry Acland:—

"April 7, 1879.

"Sir Bartle Frere before he left England was, without question, one of the most popular of men. No one was more acceptable wherever he went, and he went everywhere. No one was more beloved by a circle of friends as large as any public man ever had, of every occupation, country, and state of life. It must have struck some of your readers as strange that none hardly of these friends have sent you, in your usual letters, their vote of public and private confidence. The reason is not far to seek. The sudden outbreak of violence which assailed an absent man, in whose province a grave military disaster had occurred, astonished, but did not affect his friends.

were the more ready to attack him, owing to his authorship of the Affghan Frontier Minute, which had been published five months before.

Nor were the Opposition journals the only ones that assailed him. A general election was not far distant. The disaster which had occurred would tell heavily against the Government, and to retrieve it would entail large expenditure and consequent taxation. If the responsibility, or some part of it, could be shifted from the shoulders of

They have full trust in the breadth of his views, the fulness of his capacity, and the sobriety of his judgment. This sentiment of trust is as firmly rooted as affection for his whole character and respect for his busy life. One of the most staid of your weekly contemporaries, immediately the news of Isandhlwana had reached us, spoke of the anxieties of the High Commissioner in South Africa as 'Sir Bartle Frere's amusements;' of 'his paltry method of escaping his obligations;' of his 'being intoxicated by the chatter of Colonial journalists;' of his 'hustling out of sight the mass of his demands;' and then hinted that Cetywayo is 'to be put down' by Sir B. Frere 'in the interests of Sir B. Frere's reputation.' It was certain every friend of Sir B. Frere who knows the brave heart that beats beneath that courteous and gentle nature, and is aware of his deep interest in all native races throughout the world, would keep silence till the nation had, through Parliament, pronounced its verdict. . . ."

It is enough to quote, as a specimen of the volumes of anonymous vituperation that was poured out upon him, the following passage from an article in the *Daily News* of July 8—when there had been time for the first excitement to cool down.

"The enthusiasm which is felt for the High Commissioner is only too easily intelligible. He has allied himself with the worst passions and sinister motives of the colonists—their fear and hate of a savage race, outnumbering their own; their desire for conquest and spoil, for the subjugation of the Zulus, with the view of annexing their territory; and their disposition to sponge on the Empire, to prosecute their own gain at the cost of the mother country. They are to make war with the British taxpayers' money and the British soldiers' blood. Instead of elevating, Sir Bartle Frere has done much to deprave the conscience of the colonists of the Cape, and to poison and contaminate the fountains of what might be a healthy national life in these new communities. He has wrapped up the policy in the phrases of religion and pretences of superior morality, etc."

the Government to Frere's, it would be a gain when the election came.

*Nemo repente fuit turpissimus.* The leopard does not change his spots. Frere's career of forty-five years was before the world, and however ill-informed the general public might be concerning it, writers for the press, members of Parliament, and others who joined in the hue and cry against him, or listened to it in silence, knew, or could easily have ascertained, that such a charge against him as making unprovoked war against harmless natives from panic or motives of greed, or any other motive, was as inadmissible and as monstrous as would have been a charge of cowardice against Bayard or Chinese Gordon, or of treachery against Pitt or Wellington.

Thus much as to Frere personally.

Upon the general question of his policy and action, it was unfortunate that the matter had to be debated, and public men were led to commit themselves to an opinion, before there was time for a full statement of the facts, which was essential to a right understanding of the case, to be received and published. Notice was given of a hostile motion in both Houses of Parliament, and Ministers had to make up their minds whether to defend Frere or to sacrifice him.

Unfortunately, also, their judgment as to the course of action pursued seems to have been clouded by their keen sense of the ill consequences of the disaster which had happened; for it had occurred most inopportunately, just when critical negotiations were pending at Constantinople and in Egypt, and when a deduction from England's military force at home and in Europe tended to impair her authority in European Councils. The majority of the Cabinet were inclined to recall Frere. Lord Beaconsfield, the Prime Minister, supported him. The result was a

compromise. A despatch was to be sent censuring him, but accompanied by a general expression of continued confidence.

Whether, if Sir M. Hicks-Beach had stood to his guns and had pointed out the plain truth that, up to the second week in October, Frere had been supported and encouraged in his policy, and that it was then too late to change it, the decision of the Cabinet would have been different, can only be conjectured. Instead of forming his own judgment, and standing to it, he seems to have been inclined to invite and accept the opinions of others. It was not till March 13, more than a month after the news had reached him by telegraph, that he took pen in hand to write his views on the subject to Frere.\* He had delayed doing so to ascertain what public opinion and what his colleagues in the Cabinet had to say about the matter. He was at length able to announce the decision of the Cabinet, which was that he ought not, without first obtaining the sanction of the British Government, to have insisted on the disbandment of Cetywayo's army, on his receiving a Resident, or on the fulfilment of his promises of better government. For this he would be censured ; but he earnestly appealed to him not to take the despatch in the light of a recall, or of such a censure as would justify his resignation.

The part of the despatch containing the censure was as follows :—

“ Her Majesty's Government . . . cannot but think that the forces at your disposal were adequate to protect Natal from any serious Zulu inroad, and to provide for any other

\* The same hesitation is shown by the despatches. Between February 13, when the Queen's message was sent on first hearing the news, and March 19, when the despatch containing the censure was written, the only despatch on the subject (except formal acknowledgments) was that of March 6, in which there is no suggestion of blame.



emergency that could have arisen during the interval necessary for consulting Her Majesty's Government upon the terms that Cetywayo should be called upon to accept ; and they have been unable to find in the documents you have placed before them that evidence of urgent necessity for immediate action, which alone could justify you in taking, without their full knowledge and sanction, a course almost certain to result in a war, which, as I had previously impressed upon you, every effort should have been used to avoid.

"The communications which had passed between us as to the objects for which the reinforcements were requested and sent, and as to the nature of the questions in dispute with the Zulu King, were such as to render it especially needful that Her Majesty's Government should understand and approve any important step, not already suggested to them, before you were committed to it ; and if that step was likely to increase the probability of war, an opportunity should certainly have been afforded to them of considering the time as well as the manner of coming to issue—should it be necessary to come to issue—with the Zulu King. And though the further correspondence necessary for this purpose might have involved the loss of a favourable season for the operation of the British troops, and might have afforded to Cetywayo the means of further arming and provisioning his forces, the circumstances rendered it imperative that, even at the risk of this disadvantage, full explanations should be exchanged.

"Her Majesty's Government do not fail to bear in mind the unusual powers reposed in you, and the corresponding responsibility which attaches to your office, as Her Majesty's High Commissioner in South Africa ; and they gladly record their high appreciation of the great experience, ability, and energy which you have brought to bear on the important and difficult task you have undertaken. It is with great regret that they feel constrained to adopt the view which I have expressed of your omission to follow a course which appears to them, for the reasons I have stated, to have been peculiarly incumbent upon you in this instance. They cannot, however, doubt that your future action will be such as to prevent a recurrence of any cause for complaint on this score ; and they have no desire to withdraw, in the present crisis of affairs, the

confidence hitherto reposed in you, the continuance of which is now more than ever needed to conduct our difficulties in South Africa to a successful termination.”\*

The weak and half-hearted attitude of the Government gave an additional impulse to the attacks on Frere. In the debates that followed, though individual members of the Government spoke warmly of his past services; though Lord Carnarvon, now out of office, told the plain truth that no one would have thought of blaming him but for the disaster of Isandhlwana, yet the general effect of the debates in both Houses was condemnatory on one side and apologetic on the other, the Government being supported on a division by less than their normal majority. Lord Elcho almost alone followed the more honourable traditions of the House of Commons by casting aside all party considerations, and defending Frere with vigour as having taken the only course which he rightly could have taken. The neutral part of the Press and public naturally assumed that an officer of the Crown who was so fiercely attacked and so feebly defended must needs be in the wrong.

As between Frere and the Government how did the matter stand?

Two years before, the Government had decided—rightly or wrongly—that confederation under Imperial sovereignty was the best and wisest policy for South Africa. They had gone out of their way to select Frere, a man of Indian, and not of Colonial experience, in view of his known ideas of Imperial policy, to carry it out, and he had accepted the office with reluctance, in obedience to an appeal to his patriotism. Within six months he began to discover, and soon became fully convinced, that there was an insurgent spirit pervading the natives, which it was necessary to put

\* C. 2,260, p. 109, March 19, 1879.

down ; that in justice to all, and especially to the natives themselves, it should be suppressed speedily and once for all by the direct action of the Imperial power, and not by setting Dutchman against Kaffir, or native against native, in chronic internecine war. He became aware also that this insurgent spirit had its focus and strength in the celibate military organization of Cetywayo, and in the prestige which impunity for the outrages he had committed had gained for him in the native mind. That organization and that evil prestige must be put an end to, if possible by moral pressure, if not possible—and this, Frere declared, was only too probable—by force. Till that was done there could be no permanent peace in South Africa.

All this, for more than a year, Frere had been telling the Colonial Office. It had been said by him, not once or twice ; it had been repeated or implied in almost every letter he wrote. And the correspondence shows that as late as October 2, Sir M. Hicks-Beach entirely acquiesced in Frere's action. Then came a sudden change of purpose. The telegraphic message of October 12 gave the first, and that only a slight indication of it. The despatch of October 17 refused the reinforcements and expressed a confident hope that peace might be maintained. Sir M. Hicks-Beach's private letter of November 7 deprecated war on account of troubles in Europe, but it did not reach Frere till December 13, two days after the Zulu envoys had received the Ultimatum. A telegraphic summary of this last letter, sent on by Lady Frere, had indeed reached him on November 30, but even that was a fortnight after notice had been sent to Cetywayo to despatch his envoys to the meeting-place on the Tugela. After all that had occurred, after the demands that had been already made by Sir H. Bulwer, it was far too late to recede without increasing

the risk of war and bloodshed, and to have shown any signs of hesitation or fear at the critical moment would not only have been fatal to any hopes of obtaining a satisfactory settlement with Cetywayo, but would have encouraged the natives throughout South Africa to rise, and also probably have provoked the malcontent Boers into immediate insurrection and civil war.

Writing on December 31,\* Sir M. Hicks-Beach, who was then in possession of the substance, though not of the details of the Ultimatum, takes no exception to it, but reserves his opinion. Two days later (January 2, 1879) † the details reached him; but it was not till January 23—a mail having gone in the interval without any letter from him—that he wrote as follows in a despatch, so worded, and with observations so balanced as to leave him the opportunity of saying “I told you so,” whatever the event might be.

“I regret that the necessity for immediate action should have appeared to you so imperative as to preclude you from incurring the delay which would have been involved in consulting Her Majesty’s Government upon a subject of so much importance as the terms which Cetywayo should be required to accept, before those terms were actually presented to the Zulu King.

“In making these observations, however, I do not desire to question the propriety of the policy which you have adopted in the face of a difficult and complicated condition of affairs. . . . I sincerely trust that the policy you have adopted may be as successful as the very careful consideration which you have given to it deserves, and that if military operations should become necessary, the arrangements which you have reported may secure that they should be brought to an early and decisive termination, with the result of finally relieving Her Majesty’s subjects in Natal and the Transvaal from the danger to which they are exposed.” ‡

\* C. 2222, p. 115.

† Ibid., p. 197.

‡ Ibid., p. 298.

In ordinary circumstances Frere would have resigned his office on receiving the despatch. His task had been arduous enough hitherto, in all conscience; how could he hope to accomplish it when discredited by the censure of the British Government? But the same Secretary of State who censured him in a published despatch had begged him for the sake of the public service not to resign. And a still stronger and more earnest and cogent appeal—and this time a manly, generous, and straightforward one—had been made to his patriotism by a higher personage.

The despatch, too, reached him at Pretoria, at the moment when the prevention of an outbreak of the Boers might, and probably did depend on his individual personal influence.

Though the weight of uninformed public opinion in England was bearing heavily against him, the post brought him letter after letter from those who had knowledge more or less complete of the true bearings of the situation, and from old friends who knew him too well to believe that either his perception of what was right or his policy could have been in fault, begging him for his own and for the country's sake to remain.

Lord Carnarvon wrote (March 27)—

"I cannot allow the mail to go without a few lines to repeat my earnest hope that you will consider well before you resign your office. I readily understand the difficulties in which you are now placed; I do not hesitate to say that I think you have much of which you may complain; but I greatly fear that your resignation of office at this juncture would involve grave embarrassment—perhaps even disaster. . . ."

Lord Granville was heard to say, "I hope to God Sir Bartle won't take huff and resign!" \*

\* Mr. Albert Grey to Sir B. Frere, March 27, 1879.

Colonel Yule wrote—

February 11.

“What can I say at such a time but that I rejoice, with most honest men, that England’s trust is in such hands as yours. . . . In all that you have done there, though there is much that there is not time to learn to understand properly, I go with you heartily in faith where knowledge does not extend, as I go heartily in the spirit of those papers of yours which were published here about Affghan-istan politics, heartily and with pride in our old and kind friend.”

“March 4.

“Would not old Jacob have gloried in your work and been delighted to see it?” writes Sir W. Merewether.

Sir Robert Morier, who was well acquainted with the situation, and had been lately engaged in negotiating with Portugal for a railway from the Transvaal to Delagoa Bay, writes (March 27, 1879), denouncing in strong and indignant words the “cowardly and brutal” attacks made on him in and out of Parliament, and “the cowardly manner in which Government has given in to them.” He goes on to say—

“. . . I have been fighting your battles *à outrance*, *per fas et nefas*, for the last week, and find, of course, that most respectable people agree with me, but have not *le courage de leurs opinions*. What I mainly write for is to tell you that in my opinion, carefully thought over, both from your point of view and that of the country, the really high-souled patriotic course for you to follow is *not* to resign but to hold on till you have finished your work.

“I have only to add that this view has the more weight as coming from me that I have always been against the annexation of the Transvaal and the policy it represented, but what I said at the time and repeat now, was, that *if* we annexed, we *necessarily* had to do two things—demilitarize the Zulu armed polity, and acquire the right of way to the sea. . . .”

An old friend, an officer highly distinguished in India, wrote :—

“ March 27.

“ I really have been half out of my senses during the last ten days or a fortnight, with rage at the disgraceful treatment you have received in this country. . . . I suppose privately the cowards have written you a letter begging and praying of you not to resign. Why did they not do that publicly, and if they disliked your policy, say so privately? The fear now is that you will resign, and of course it would serve the Government and the country right if you were to resign. Then what a fix you would put them in! I believe, my dear Sir Bartle, anybody but you would resign, but you are so far more good and patriotic than anybody else I know, that I shall not be surprised to hear you treat the Government with your unequalled Christian generosity and remain at your post.”

Mr. Gordon Sprigg's appeal, though expressed in more measured language, yielded to none of them in its urgency.

“ April 24.

“ If you were now to retire, the consequences to South Africa would be simply disastrous. . . . I hope you will not come to a decision adverse to the wishes of nearly every man in Africa without giving me an opportunity of discussing with you the whole question. . . . In my representative character as First Minister of the leading Colony of South Africa, and on behalf of its inhabitants whose opinion has been expressed through public meetings in every important town, I do urge you not to think for a moment of giving way to public opinion in England on a question which no man who has never been in Africa is competent to understand.”

What could he do but yield and consent to toil on to the end, with an additional burden of difficulty laid upon him by this pitiful despatch, and all that it boded as to want of support in the future—doing a strange double service to the Government as its scapegoat and as its chosen officer !

In reply to Sir M. Hicks-Beach's letter of March 13, and before receiving the despatch containing the censure, Frere wrote—

"April 25, 1879.

"Since receiving your letter I have read a good deal of what the English press has said on the subject of the Zulu War. I was not surprised at the party bitterness of the *Daily News*. It was too good an opportunity of trying to inculcate the Government to let slip. Nor was I unprepared for the natural party vexation of the *Standard*, and many others on the Government side, who could only see an unexpected aggravation of Budget difficulties, and who would gladly throw the blame on a distant proconsul, too far off to be heard till the S. P. Q. R. had decided; but I confess to some surprise that men, with some pretensions to statesmanship, and to a judicial frame of mind, such as Lord Blachford, for instance, should have forgotten that no ship-captain can well, without the gift of prophecy, write his reasons for being caught in a hurricane before it begins to blow; and that whilst he is, as we are now, labouring to save the ship from foundering, it is no time to put him on his defence for being dismasted. He has enough to do to keep his log, and must wait for calmer weather to report why he was caught in the storm, and to justify his seamanship after it overtook him.

"Some of the evidence of the urgent necessity for immediate action was not before the public, and was probably not before Her Majesty's Government when you wrote, *e.g.* my despatch of November 8, which I do not find in any Blue-book,\* and which certainly indicated little hope of a peaceful solution; but much of the evidence of such necessity was certainly not before you . . . including the evidence of Boer discontent—which weighed greatly with me in convincing me that any delay in acting would incur (involve) dangers far greater than those of a Zulu war.

"I do not mean merely the risk of an invasion of Natal. As to the probabilities of such an invasion, you had Bishop Colenso, the *Cape Argus*, and some Natal officials, against my opinion, supported by nine-tenths of all Colonial and native experience, and you might have

\* It was not published till July, 1879. (C. 2367, p. 107.)



reasonably doubted whether Colenso and Saul Solomon might not be right and all the rest of us wrong.

"But there could be no doubt as to the state of Boer feeling, of which at the time you had little evidence before you. I felt, however, quite certain that, even if I could postpone for a few weeks or even months the inevitable Zulu War, it would be impossible to avoid a Boer rebellion. You will, I think, agree with me when you read my recent despatches about the Transvaal, and reflect how much the danger we have so narrowly escaped here would have been aggravated had the malcontent Boers been able to point to Piet Uys and his gallant band, driven from their homes to make them over to Zulus.

"Some act of violence the Boers would certainly have committed—hailed down the flag, stopped the mails, put the administrator over the border, or done some other of the many acts of rebellion they have threatened ever since they knew we were fighting their inevitable enemies, the Zulus. We must have moved some of our troops from Natal to support law and order here, and some bloodshed would have been the inevitable result.

"What would the Zulus have done? Observed a strict armed neutrality? I doubt if all Cetywayo's power could have enabled him to observe it. His young men would certainly have washed their spears in some white man's blood, whether Dutch or English would matter little to them. If Dutch, as is more probable, the Orange Free State would have been drawn in, and the Boer rebellion might have extended to Cape Colony, the ill-blood and lifelong race hatred certainly would. Such Zulu allies would have been far worse for us than a Zulu inroad into Natal, and how should I have answered you for incurring such a misfortune, and shirking the responsibility of bringing Cetywayo at once to an account?

"In fact, it seems to me a simple choice between doing what I did—risking a Zulu war at once, or incurring the risk of still worse—a Zulu war a few months later, preceded by a Boer rebellion.

"You must not think I was insensible to your difficulties in Turkey and Asia. I doubt whether you felt them more acutely than I did; but you must remember they were not present in their late aggravated form, till we had gone too far in Zulu affairs to recede with honour

or even with safety. You will remember that Bulwer's very proper demand for the surrender of Sirayo's sons was made in August last ; there was no drawing back with any safety after that.

"Had things gone wrong in Turkey or Affghanistan you would not have thanked me for putting off war, when it involved both war and rebellion while you were in the midst of a European war.

"The 'full explanations,' which your telegram says 'should have been exchanged,' would have involved four or five months' delay, at the least. I feel quite sure we could not have kept the peace here so long. You are not yet convinced of this, but you will be, I think, when you have all the evidence before you ; and you will see that we have, in fact, fallen on a time of national excitement and revolution when events will not wait for our convenience, and we can only meet dangers as they arise.

"But I will keep what I have further to say on this point till I get your despatch.

"As to its effect on me personally, I cannot, of course, tell till I receive it, how it may affect my position here, any expression of want of confidence might paralyze all my power for good. But you may rely on one thing, that I will think first of the public service, and of what is due to Her Majesty's Government and the country, before I give a thought to what is merely personal.

"I need not tell you that I came here for no personal object of my own, and, had I consulted only my own ease and welfare, I should have returned in six months. But I was honoured with a charge to stand on sentry for other purposes than my own personal benefit ; and whilst my strength lasts, I will not desert my post till Her Majesty's Government either relieves or removes me."

Three weeks later, after receiving the despatch, he writes to Mr. Herbert :—

"May 16.

"I had hoped to have answered the Secretary of State's two despatches regarding the war and settlement of Zululand, but it is quite impossible, harassed and overworked as one is on such a journey, when forty miles of progress

in a mule waggon as completely absorbs the energies of the day as if one were rowing in a cross sea.

"I can quite understand its being necessary to write such despatches for parliamentary purposes. How they can be expected to do anything but trip up and fetter an officer placed as I am, is to me inexplicable, and this I will in due time explain officially.

"What my personal feeling is I am sure I need not tell you; nor need I assure you that it will never interfere with the discharge of my duty. I shall never forget your kind and intelligent sympathy, nor all the generous things which Lord Carnarvon, Lord Salisbury, Lord Beaconsfield, and Lord Cranbrook said in the debates.

"But my course must depend on the degree in which I find that the censure or faint praise of official despatches may interfere with my power to do my duty, and of that I can scarcely judge till I get to the Cape."

His detailed answer to the Secretary of State's despatches was not sent till more than a month afterwards (June 30). It is a long paper, covering thirteen pages of the Blue-book,\* too long for indifferent people in England to read through; and it came too late to influence members of Parliament, journalists, and others, who had long before taken their line. It was an answer not merely to the censure of the Government, but to attacks from other quarters. Sir M. Hicks-Beach, in acknowledging it, expressed his annoyance that it should have been written at all, as he presumed that Frere would wish it to be published. He did not see why Frere should take notice of attacks; and as for the war, all African wars had been unpopular, and this was especially so, and it would have been better not to raise a fresh storm by justifying it. It does not seem to have occurred to him that it was because the Government had not adequately defended him that Frere had to defend himself; nor did he seem to be aware that, to Frere at any rate, the important point

\* C. 2454, p. 129.

was not whether the war was popular, but whether it could be proved to have been necessary and right.

Frere answered as follows :—

“September 22, 1879.

“I can assure you that I am by no means, as you suppose, unaware of the state of public feeling in England regarding the Zulu War, nor of the unanimity of all parties in England regarding it. No one can realize more keenly than I do its unpopularity, or regret it more sincerely as a costly but necessary evil.”

“I cannot, however, but feel that the more the facts are looked into and sifted, the more clear it will be that the war was inevitable and righteous—forced ‘on us by Cetywayo, begun by him and not by us, and that it could not possibly have been postponed without the certainty of greater evils—to wit, a repetition of bloody Zulu inroads into British territory, and a simultaneous Boer rebellion in the Transvaal.

“Few, as you say, will now be found to agree with me in this view. Few, I fear, in this generation.

“But unless my countrymen are much changed, they will some day do me justice. I shall not leave a name to be permanently dishonoured. Meantime many thousand colonists and hundreds of thousands of native subjects will feel secure in the Queen’s dominions, who could not sleep in safety before the war.

“Your warning is a kind one. ‘Why raise a fresh storm by replying to the Opposition?’ Simply because, finding no complete and formal reply had been made to them, I wished to place one on record.

“No fresh storm can be more desolating in its effects on me than that which has passed over me, and apparently wrecked for the time such repute as I had, as a prudent, just, and loyal public servant. If a fresh storm will in any way embarrass the Queen’s Government, then, indeed, I shall regret it, and I will gladly, as long as my present relations continue, at all times bow to the exercise of your discretion in reserving as much of my despatches as you think proper from publication till such time as they can be published without inconvenience to Her Majesty’s Service.

“You will pardon me if I find it difficult to take your

view in thinking that the attacks on me are not harder to bear than those on Her Majesty's Government.

"*You* can reply at once, whether in Parliament or in the press. Your Governor cannot hear of an attack on him for three weeks, and cannot make any reply till the attack has long passed out of public recollection. Hence the necessity to him of effectual defence at home.

"Of course I cannot expect you to take the same view as I do in this matter, and if you think that all has been done that public opinion and the necessity for carrying on the Queen's Government allowed to be done with a view to my defence, I bow in this, as in all questions of the kind, to the decision of Her Majesty's Government.

"I am very glad to be assured by you that what I endeavoured to do has really met with your approval and that of Her Majesty's Government, for I must confess that though open censure had been confined to one or two points—no communication public or private that I have received this year had led me to feel myself warmly supported or approved in my attempts to carry out the instructions laid down for me by Her Majesty's Government in appointing me to this Government. As long, however, as they do not meet with the open disapproval of yourself and the Cabinet, my actions shall be guided as they have ever been, by the sole desire to uphold to the utmost of my power the authority and influence of Her Majesty's Government in these Colonies; and to endeavour conscientiously to discharge the duties you have intrusted to me."

The following is from a letter to Mr. Albert Grey, written in the following year:—

"June 28, 1880.

"Not only did Cetywayo's own people say 'Here is Chaka come back,' but he himself, as a 'Zulu of Zulus,' claimed to be Chaka, and have a right to all Chaka's dominions, including, emphatically, Natal, as his right, though he disclaimed any present intention of insisting on his full rights.

"Consider the impression this made on his people and on ours. Among Zulus the war party was in the ascendant. All the younger men were clamorous to 'wash their

spears' in blood, which must be the blood of British subjects or allies.

"They clamoured to be led to war, and long before the Transvaal was annexed or any of the later excuses for the war with us given, Cetywayo had distinctly told our agent Mr. Fynney in a confidential conversation officially reported at the time, that he could not restrain the young war party.

"Our people in Natal fully understood this danger. From the time Wolseley first went to Natal in 1875 till the war broke out in 1879, no one ever doubted that war would ensue, though a small party (Colenso, etc.) argued that it would be our fault. With this small exception the idea that war was ultimately avoidable has been entirely an afterthought since the war, as far as Natal is concerned. I doubt whether a single despatch of Wolseley's in 1875, or of any official or public writer in the press up to 1879, could be quoted which does not prove the almost universal conviction that war was inevitable—sooner or later. . . .

"I hold that we must accept facts as we find them, that the English, Dutch and other white races are here, in temperate South Africa rooted by a residence of nearly two hundred and fifty years, growing and dominating weaker and less civilized and cohesive races. The Kaffirs, the finest and strongest of these native races, seem to have arrived here from tropical Africa about the same time that the white man landed on the Southern Coast. Since early in this century the two races have come in collision. Experience of these wars and their results shows that while the white races are the stronger of the two, the Kaffir once vanquished is as capable of accepting European civilization, of living under it, and of assimilating with his conquerors, as the races conquered by our ancestors when they broke into Northern Europe. Here in the Cape Colony and in that only, black and white live on equal terms, are under the same laws and enjoy the same liberties and franchises, under a system of complete self-government.

"There is nothing in the law to prevent a black man from being Prime Minister of the Colony. This healthy constitution I would wish to extend over other colonies and territories—Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State,

and outlying native territories like Basutoland, Transkei, etc., in all of which the native races are under exceptional laws and generally governed as an inferior race.

"If these are sound aims then I maintain that the discretion allowed me 'was wisely used.' Cetywayo had repaired and reconstructed a vast machine, quite able, if well directed, to have overwhelmed such weakly settlements as Natal or Transvaal, unless they had the support of British troops.

"He prepared and commenced war against us, not we against him, and he was crushed. . . .

"But there are other aims favoured by disciples of Colenso who regard the Zulus as the 'coming race' of South Africa, who are about to absorb and assimilate the white man and dominate wherever the two races come into contact.\* If this is a sound view, my action was

\* This statement of Colenso's views concerning Cetywayo, the Zulus, and their destiny may seem exaggerated, but it is more than borne out by the following passage from Miss North's "Recollections of a Happy Life," vol. ii. p. 279 :—

"We came in sight of Bishopstowe, with its many-gabled house and gum trees, like an oasis in the desert. It stood on the top of a small hill, and every tree there was planted by Dr. Colenso. Under the verandah, covered with creepers, he stood to receive me, giving me his arm with as much courtesy as if I had been a princess. It seemed quite a dream of old days to meet such a gentleman again, and difficult to understand how one so genial and gentle could have made himself so hated by the majority of the country. His conversation was delightful ; but he gave me the impression of being both weak and vain, and very susceptible to flattery. His two elder daughters seemed to manage him. They were perfectly devoted to him and to Zuluism ! which governed everything. The dear natives were incapable of harm, the whites incapable of good. They would, I believe, have heard cheerfully that all the whites had been 'eaten up' and Cetywayo proclaimed King of Natal. His portrait was all over the house, and they mentioned him in a hushed voice, as a kind of holy martyr, and had hardly a good word to say for any white man, except Colonel Durnford, whose life poor Frances wrote. . . . I was taken to see the printing-press, which was continually contradicting every fact stated by the Government or officials, who in their turn contradicted every fact published by it. Messengers were continually arriving with fresh lies (I believe) from the 'King,' over which the Bishop and his daughters passed all their time. It would have driven me mad to have stayed long in such a strained atmosphere."

worse than a failure, it was a crime. If by leaving the Zulus alone they can evolve civilization and liberty from among themselves—if they can live alongside the white race in Natal and Transvaal without coming into a struggle for supremacy, then the course we have taken during these last three years, as during the preceding fifty, has been wrong.

“But I have always regarded that view as a mischievous dream, the folly of which is proved by history everywhere, but especially by four thousand years of negro existence without one single step of spontaneous advance throughout this vast continent, every step out of their general animal existence being clearly traceable to some external impulse or impression.”

While in England Frere was being censured and vilified, in South Africa an overwhelming majority of the colonists, of whatever race or origin, were declaring, in unmistakable terms, that he had gained their warmest approbation and admiration.

The first note was sounded (March 24) at Capetown, at a public meeting, called to protest against the gross misrepresentations of the *Argus* newspaper of the state of public opinion at the Cape. The *Argus* was Saul Solomon's paper. The editor was one McLoughlin, an Irishman, formerly a private soldier, who had got into some trouble, for which he had been suspended from the Capetown City Club; afterwards some evidence which he gave at a trial was so strongly animadverted upon by the judge, that there was a question of his indictment for perjury, so that Solomon, to his regret, for he was a clever man, had to drop him. Solomon was an influential politician, who had at first professed to be friendly to the Government; but for some personal reason he changed his ground, and the *Argus* became the organ of an incongruous minority, comprehending the Opposition led by Mr. Merriman, Bishop Colenso, the Aborigines Protection



Society, and the Dutch Afrikaner party, who agreed only in wishing to oust Mr. Sprigg's Ministry and thwart his and Frere's policy.

The meeting was the largest and most enthusiastic known at Capetown since the days of the anti-convict agitation. An attempt by Solomon and his friends to move an amendment failed utterly, and resolutions of enthusiastic approbation of Frere's action were carried by acclamation.

The note thus sounded was taken up wherever British rule extended in South Africa. From town after town and village after village kept pouring in addresses and resolutions, in different forms, and mixed up with different local questions, but almost without exception \* agreeing in enthusiastic commendation of him as the one man who had grasped the many threads of the South African tangle, and was handling them so as to promise a solution, in accordance with the interests of all the many and various races which inhabited it.

"In the opinion of this meeting," one of them (from Cradock) runs, "his Excellency Sir Bartle Frere is one of the best Governors, if not the best Governor, this Colony has ever had, and the disasters which have taken place since he has held office, are not due to any fault of his, but to a shameful mismanagement of public affairs before he came to the Colony, and the state of chaos and utter confusion in which he had the misfortune to find everything on his arrival; and this meeting is therefore of opinion that the thanks of every loyal colonist is [are] due to his Excellency for the Herculean efforts he has since made under the most trying circumstances to South Africa. . . ." †

Another, from Kimberley, says—

"Your Excellency may rely upon our assurance that

\* There is *one*, in a contrary sense, amongst them all.

† C. 2367, p. 28.

you have had our entire sympathy and confidence, that at no time have we doubted your ultimate success, and that our only anxiety has been lest your powers of physical endurance and health might give way under the terrible pressure of work and responsibility which has been forced upon you.

"It has been a source of much pain to us that your Excellency's policy and proceedings should have been so misunderstood and misrepresented. The people in this country know that the Zulu War was unavoidable; and the time, we hope, is not far distant when the wisdom of your Excellency's native policy and action will be as fully recognized and appreciated by the whole British nation as it is by the colonists of South Africa."\*

At Pretoria, in the heart of the Transvaal, within a week of the breaking-up of the camp which had been threatening its safety, a public meeting was held (April 24), which resolved that—

"This meeting reprobates most strongly the action of a certain section of the English and Colonial Press for censuring, without sufficient knowledge of local affairs, the policy and conduct of Sir B. Frere; and it desires not only to express its sympathy with Sir B. Frere and its confidence in his policy, but also to go so far as to congratulate most heartily Her Majesty the Queen, the Home Government, and ourselves, on possessing such a true, considerate, and faithful servant as his Excellency the High Commissioner."†

A public dinner also was given to Frere at Pretoria, at which his health was drunk with the greatest enthusiasm; there was a public holiday, and other rejoicings.

Frere was intending to go to Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State to visit President Brand, with whom he was on cordial terms, and with whom he wished to talk over his plans for the Transvaal; but instructions came from Sir M. Hicks-Beach to proceed without unnecessary delay to Capetown. He therefore left Pretoria on May 1,

\* C. 2454, p. 57

\* C. 2454, p. 56.

travelling as before in the spider. He was welcomed everywhere with the utmost cordiality and enthusiasm. At Potchefstroom there was a public dinner and a reception. On approaching Bloemhof he was met by a large cavalcade and escorted into the township, where a triumphal arch had been erected, and an address was presented.

Thus far he was in the Transvaal. At Kimberley he had to be sworn in as Governor of Griqualand West. Fifteen thousand people, it was estimated, turned out to meet and welcome him. There were triumphal arches, a torch-light procession, the Kimberley mine was lit up with coloured fire, there was a banquet, and an address of sympathy and congratulation. From thence to Capetown his journey was like a triumphal progress, the population at each place he passed through receiving him in flag-decorated streets, with escorts, triumphal arches, illuminations, addresses, and banquets. At Worcester, where he reached the railway, Lady Frere met him, and there was a banquet at which Mr. Gordon Sprigg was also present. At Paarl, which is the head-quarters of the Dutch Afrikaner league, and where some of the most influential Dutch families live, a like reception was given him. Finally at Capetown, where, if anywhere, his policy was likely to find opponents among those who regarded it from a provincial and western point of view, the inhabitants of all classes and sections and of whatever origin gave themselves up to according him a reception such as had never been surpassed in Capetown.

In England complimentary local receptions and addresses to men in high office or of exalted rank do not ordinarily carry much meaning. Party tactics and organization, love of notoriety, or a sense of favours to come from the personage to be honoured account for a large proportion of such manifestations. But the demonstration on this

occasion can be explained by none of these causes. There was no party organization to stimulate it. It was too general to confer notoriety on any of its promoters, and Frere had not personally the power, even if he had had the will, to requite compliments. And what made it the more remarkable was that there was no special victory or success or event of any kind to celebrate. The war still dragged on without, as yet, any decisive success, though it was now some time since the reinforcements from England had arrived; and a deep shade of gloom had just been thrown over the Colony by the death of the young Prince Napoleon.

Some of the English newspapers were not ashamed to revive the old calumny which had done shameful duty eighteen years before during the Maori War in New Zealand, and to suggest that colonists *like* wars with the natives, because they bring British troops who spend money in the Colony, and that they are ready to do honour to those who advocate a war policy. The allegation is as senseless as it is false.\* Colonists, whose native

\* "All classes are very sore at the persistent slanders of the English Press, and of many who ought to know better in England, as well as here, who assert that the Cape Colony finds any profit in the Zulu War or approves of it because it is profitable to them. It would be quite as true to attribute English approval of a war in Turkey to interested motives."—Sir B. Frere to Mr. R. W. Herbert, August 19, 1879.

The Committee of the Aborigines Protection Society took upon itself to write a letter to the Mayor of Pietermaritzburg expressing regret that the citizens should have passed resolutions approving the Zulu War, and saying that they had hoped that they would have supported the cause of peace and justice, and expressed their sympathy with the course taken by their "noble bishop." The reply of the Mayor (Mr. Francis) is a complete and a dignified one. After pointing out the chief errors in the letter, and stating concisely the main facts of the case, he goes on to say :—

"As to the unworthy misstatement in the memorial you enclose to me—that the Zulu War is no doubt popular in the South African

wars are fought in their midst, or on their borders, whose families may be slaughtered, whose farms may be harried, and who may lose the savings of a life's labour by a night's raid, who have no glory, no plunder, no advantage to gain by it, however successful, have their minds opened by the stern teaching of experience to the miseries of war far more than the average Englishman who takes his ease at home, without risk of life or limb or property, and whose acquaintance with the realities of warfare is confined to what he reads of it in his daily paper.

Colonies, because the colonists are not required to bear the heavy burdens which it will entail—I fearlessly assert, as regards the Colony of Natal, which, though approving of war, if necessary, had no more to do in causing it than the inhabitants of the Diamond Fields ; that the burdens Natal has borne and is bearing are heavy in the extreme, almost unbearable ; that she finds her trade and industrial pursuits dislocated and paralyzed ; that the expenses of living have enormously increased over the whole Colony ; and that in proportion to her means and population, she has already lost more than the Mother Country, while those who have principally and largely benefited are a few contractors and transport riders. . . .

“It is because the colonists of Natal are staunch friends of peace and justice that they have supported the policy of Sir Bartle Frere and approved of his meeting the war that was forced upon him, as they well know that in no other way can peace and justice be made secure in South Africa.

“The colonists of Natal have no sympathy, as a body, with the course taken by their ‘noble bishop.’ I suppose by this expression you mean bishop Colenso ; because though most willing to admit his many amiable qualities, they altogether doubt the soundness of his judgment, and his ability to see and weigh both sides of the question. In their opinion he has merely the mind of a keen partisan or an able advocate. In this opinion I coincide, and although he is my bishop, I am convinced that he never has and never will lead public opinion in this Colony, in consequence of a pretentious self-sufficiency which throws aside facts and experience in favour of ingenious but unfounded theories.”

## CHAPTER XX.

### SUPERSESSION AND RECALL.

The High Commissionership divided—Sir Garnet Wolseley—Ulundi—Cetywayo a prisoner—Basutoland and Pondoland—The Zulu Kinglets—Missionaries—Sir Garnet Wolseley in the Transvaal—Secocoeni taken—Special correspondents—Colonial defence—Sir George Colley succeeds Sir Garnet Wolseley—Dutch feeling—The Midlothian speeches—Mr. Gladstone in office—South African policy unchanged—The Aborigines Protection Society—The Basuto disarmament—Confederation postponed—Attacks on Frere—The “Unity of the Party”—Frere’s salary—His recall—General indignation—Loyalty of Colonists.

IF the British Government still placed confidence in Frere, as it professed to do, it took a strange method of showing it.

A week after he had returned to Capetown there came (June 14) a telegraphic message, of the purport of which he had had no previous hint or warning, that Sir Garnet Wolseley was on his way out to supersede Lord Chelmsford in the command of the army, and Sir H. Bulwer as Governor of Natal, and also that he was “for the time” to replace Frere as High Commissioner of the Transvaal, Natal, and all the adjoining eastern portion of South Africa.

The command had been first offered to Lord Napier of Magdala ; but he, when he found that his acceptance of it involved a curtailment of Frere’s authority, chivalrously

declined to supersede an old friend, in whose character, judgment, and ability he had, by long experience, learnt to repose such confidence.\*

The want of cordial agreement which prevailed between Lord Chelmsford and Sir H. Bulwer, more particularly as to the system of raising, organizing, and employing the native levies, made it expedient that, in order to bring the war to a conclusion, a change should be made, and that the offices of General-in-Command and Lieutenant-Governor of Natal should be held by the same person. But the High Commissioner had nothing to do with the conduct of the war. To deprive Frere of his authority as regarded Natal, Zululand, the Transvaal—the Transvaal, which almost by his single hand and voice he had just saved from civil war—and expressly to direct Colonel Lanyon to cease to correspond with him, was to discredit a public servant before all the world at the crisis of his work.

Sir M. Hicks-Beach, indeed, assured him that no slight was intended, that the pushing forward of confederation, which was the great end in view, required Frere's constant presence and advocacy at Capetown, and would suffer by his having to attend to affairs in Zululand, the Transvaal, and elsewhere.† But this was entirely an error. The Cape Ministry needed no persuasion. Confederation was a leading feature in their programme; they had a large majority in the Legislative Assembly, and they were well supported in the country. What was wanting to bring

\* A year later (July, 1880) Lord Napier writes—

“You will hardly know how near I was joining you at one time. I however, felt and said it was impossible that I could in any way take away any part of his authority from one with whom my ties of friendship were so strong as with yourself.”

Would that he had accepted! Had Frere had such a coadjutor how different might have been the future of South Africa!

† Sir M. Hicks Beach to Sir B. Frere, May 28, 1879. C. 2318, p. 84.

about confederation was confidence, founded on the permanent pacification and settlement of Zululand, the Transvaal, the Transkei, Pondoland, Basutoland, West Griqualand, and the border generally. How could there be confidence any longer? There was no doubt what Frere had meant to do. By many a weary journey he had made himself personally known throughout South Africa. His aims and intentions were never concealed, never changed. In confederating under his superintendence all men knew what they were doing. But in obedience to clamour against him in England he was to be superseded. Was his policy to be changed, and how? To tell Frere to effect confederation while discrediting him and depriving him of half his authority, was to bid him weave a web, the threads of which were taken from him and put under another man's control.

Nor was this all. To divide into two the High Commissionership, the authority by which the sovereignty of the Crown and the Mother Country is exercised, was obviously a step in the direction, not of union and confederation, but of separation and disintegration. Thus, to take a single instance, there was a marked difference between the native policy of the Cape and that of Natal; the former was much in advance of the latter, where the natives, being in overwhelming numbers, had been left for the most part untaught and unimproved. This divergence, which Frere sought to get rid of, would now be likely to increase.\*

Still he felt it to be his duty not to resign.

"I have no wish" (he writes, June 23, to Mr. R. W.

\* Frere to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, C. 2374, p. 144. The difference was fully appreciated by the natives. Compare the speeches of the Basuto chiefs at their interview with Mr. Gordon Sprigg in December 1879. C. 2482, pp. 488-509.



Herbert) "to follow the dictates of Her Majesty's Opposition, of the *Daily News*, or of those who would wish ill to all South Africa save Cetywayo and his Zulus. So I shall not consult my own feelings after being made a shuttlecock for party purposes. I hope to see South Africa out of the first Act, at least of her present difficulties, before thinking of rest for myself; but it is very weary work."

And in another letter to him, he says—

"June 27, 1879.

"As regards the new departure—the substitution of one man (Wolseley) for three (Chelmsford, Bulwer, and Lanyon)—I fully concur in the wisdom of the arrangement which concentrates supreme authority, civil as well as military, in one hand, instead of dividing it among three. I regret, indeed, for Chelmsford's sake, it was not done earlier. . . .

"As for the mode in which Wolseley's appointment affects me, I need not say anything to you, for you see, I have no doubt, as clearly as I do, that an apparent slap in the face such as would satisfy Dilke and Sir R. Peel cannot easily be administered without the recipient feeling it. . . . It is impossible to give half the High Commissioner's duties and responsibilities to Wolseley without what remains to me being lessened.

"There were, it seems to me, many ways in which what was needful might have been done without casting any slur upon me; but I do not care to dwell on this, the personal aspect of the question, for I really care less for it than for the effect the supersession—whether partial or complete, whether temporary or permanent—must have on the question of confederation and on the future peace and prosperity of South Africa.

"For *immediate* peace on a basis to ensure security to Natal, I have little fear. Government would not, I trust, order, nor is Wolseley the man willing to make 'peace at any price,' and whenever he makes peace I have little doubt that he will, before making it, create in the Zulu mind a strong conviction that they have been well beaten.

"But how about the future settlement of Zululand, so

that the country may be *kept* in peace? How about Natal itself, with the swarming tribes of natives? and the Transvaal?

"I have the highest opinion of Wolseley, whom I have known for years; but I doubt whether he has the requisite patience, or has ever thought much of the principles on which the future administration and constitutions of such countries must be framed. His attempt at a Constitution for Natal\* has been a deplorable failure. He is so shrewd and sensible, as well as clever, that with good advisers he might do well; but where are such men to be got? . . . Without a thoroughly sound settlement of all these questions, confederation is out of the question.

"There was only one expression in your letter (I might almost say in *any* letter you ever wrote me) which I regret. You say that you hope I will not surrender the work of confederation, and that 'to become the first Governor-General is the fit coping' of all my work.

"I can assure you no hopes of that kind are among the inducements to me to remain out here. I hope, before I go, to see an end of this Zulu War, and some real progress towards an Africa Pacificata, meantime to put on record some of the things I have learned, and which, I fear, people in England do not yet know, which may help to make this country more united, more prosperous, and more useful to England as an honoured division of the British Empire. This done—and it will not, I hope, take long to do it, or at least fairly to start it—I will leave my task to be completed by men who can work more in accordance with party views and traditions, and ask Her Majesty's Government to let me have some rest after forty-five years of almost incessant labour in the public service. There is no position out here they could offer me at all comparable to that I had the honour to hold after the mutiny in India, more than twenty years ago. I shall never lose my interest in Africa, and may, perhaps, yet do her good service before I die. But I am not made of cast iron, either body or soul, and it is wearing work always up-hill against the collar. A puppy dog in Bond Street or Fleet Street is bigger and stronger than any elephant in Africa, and I may do more real good 'havering' to members, or writing answers at the 'Athenæum' to

\* In 1875. See p. 237.

such genial critics as Morley and Blachford, than by writing despatches here, which, except yourself and a very few others, no one reads for any purpose but to frame indictments."

The prospects of confederation were made still worse by a despatch \* from Sir M. Hicks-Beach on the subject, which arrived a week later (July 6). This document evinced a strange ignorance of the situation. It was tacitly assumed that it was the Cape Parliament that was stopping the way, and it was suggested that "general proposals for the establishment of a South African Union or Confederation" should "be submitted to the Cape Parliament," which "might assume the form of resolutions" affirming the expediency of establishing a union, and suggesting such a definite form of Parliamentary Constitution as would secure a fair share of representation to each of the several members.

Abstract resolutions such as these were exactly what the cautious Cape people were afraid of, because they could not foresee what effect they might have in practice. And in the present case they were especially unwelcome to the Ministry and to the colonists generally, because they contained suggestions which were at once recognized as having been inspired by Mr. John Paterson, a politician of some note but small following, and a more than doubtful supporter of the Ministry, who had lately been in England.

It was the old story. The Secretary of State was ready to listen to the advice of any one rather than the High Commissioner, the Queen's representative.†

Frere writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach :—

\* June 12, 1879. C. 2454, p. 50.

† Frere to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, August 28, 1879.

" July 12, 1879.

" As regards confederation, I much fear your action and the two despatches on the subject, which I received last week, have had an effect the reverse of what you intended.

" You tried, no doubt, to avoid anything like coercion or threatening. But colonists are very sensitive, and their backs had already been put up by very similar arguments and proposals having been put before them by Mr. Paterson, with the assurance that if they were not accepted willingly, they would be forced on all the Colonies concerned. When, therefore, the same plans were recognized in your despatch, even confederationists took alarm, and neither I nor Mr. Sprigg are able to satisfy some of his staunchest supporters that their fears are groundless. They believe that Wolseley has secret instructions to confederate the Transvaal and Natal forcibly, and the almost universal feeling here is to wait till they can see what is done in Natal and Zululand and Transvaal, before they commit themselves.

" I do not think you have realized that a peremptory tone, which would be quite justifiable where nothing had been done towards Union, was not required here in the Cape Colony, where the present Ministry and Parliament were quite in accord with you, and had been steadily working for a year and a half past in your direction. Nothing more was needed than that Government should express approval and bid them go on; but they were pulled up in mid career, when they were carrying out your own principles in Kaffraria. Their supporters now ask them, 'What has been disapproved by the Secretary of State?' 'Is it your Kaffrarian policy?'\* 'Or Sir B. Frere's proposals for Natal?' 'Or is peace at any price

\* "In reply to our request for certain powers to deal with Galekaland and other portions of Kaffraria, you told us you would consider the matter as a part of the confederation question. You might as well have said 'at the Greck Kalends' or 'during the discussion on the Berlin Treaty.' Poor Mr. Sprigg was in despair, for the settlement of Galekaland, etc., was to be one of the results of his year's work, and everything like settlement must be deferred, to the imminent risk of adding to the incentives to a Kaffir rising, and unsettling everything on the eastern frontier. I could not help him, for I really could not imagine what the Secretary of State was driving at. . . ." (Frere to Mr. R. W. Herbert, June 27, 1879.)

to be made with Zululand?' 'Or is the Transvaal to be given up?' My Ministers can only say they have no reason to believe in any such change of policy; but this will not satisfy their supporters in the face of definite assertions of the Opposition, and the obvious disapproval expressed by your treatment of me; and their supporters say, 'We must wait to see what is done in Natal, Zululand, and Transvaal before we take any steps towards confederation.'"

Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived at Capetown on June 28. From that time forward Frere ceased to have any share in the affairs of the Transvaal, Natal, or Zululand. Frere received him cordially, and gave him all the information and assistance in his power, "talking all day and half the night" to him. He went on without delay to Natal; but before he could reach the seat of war and assume the command of the army in the field, the battle of Ulundi had (July 5) been fought and won by Lord Chelmsford. The fighting was now at an end. The Zulus confessed themselves beaten, and did not again attempt resistance.

Cetywayo was taken prisoner on August 28, and was afterwards sent to Capetown, and had rooms given to him in the Castle, where the quarters of the General and Staff officers were.

Frere writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach:—

"October 20, 1879.

"I told Captain Poole, R.A., who has the immediate charge of him, to treat him exactly, as far as difference of customs admitted, as he would any European officer of rank who might be in his charge as prisoner of war, and I think you may trust Captain Poole to do so. . . . He had begged to have a suit of English clothes. He is very particular about what he gets, and seems well pleased with all that Poole has given him. . . . In all these things, if you can imagine an extremely shrewd, wily, sensual man, with many of the habits, tastes, and ideas of a very vicious, childish lad, who had never mixed with any but flatterers and inferiors, and had hardly ever known what

it was to be crossed in his will without taking ample vengeance, you will have as good an idea as I can give of him. Long habit of uncontradicted command gives great dignity to his general manner, and takes in casual observers with the belief that he is a very superior being ; but you will look in vain for kingly attributes, as we understand them, apart from those associated with superior force and cunning."

Had Sir Garnet Wolseley been sent out immediately after the news of Isandhlwana, it is probable he might, by combining the authority of General of the Army and of Governor of Natal, and by his great military ability and energy, have brought the war to a speedier conclusion. But as matters were, nothing could have been more ill-timed and unfortunate than his appointment.

A keen and ambitious soldier, he had come out in the expectation of making a brilliant finish to a chequered and tedious campaign. Arriving too late for this, he had before him the work of making a settlement of Zululand and of arranging the government of the Transvaal, tasks for which he had not the requisite aptitude, experience, or inclination. Under the altered circumstances he was the square peg in the round hole ; and of this he seems to have been conscious, for his letters, one after another, express his impatience to get the business over and go home. "The sooner I can complete my work, the sooner I can 'clear out' so as to leave the coast clear for your arduous task of confederation," he writes to Frere (July 29), quite unaware, apparently, that the feasibility of Frere's arduous task depended greatly upon the quality and stability of the settlements which he himself had to make.\*

\* He never could understand this, and always assumed that the cart was to go before the horse. He writes to Frere from the Transvaal (November 11): "I wish you could carry out confederation quickly, as that might calm the sullen anger of these Dutchmen."

The evil consequences of the division of the High Commissionership might have been minimized had Sir Garnet Wolseley been willing to keep Frere informed if not to consult him at each important step that he took. But so far from this, he omitted to give him any information as to what he proposed to do, sent his despatches home without allowing them to pass through Frere's hands, and left him when the most important arrangements were pending to get his earliest information from the newspapers.

On the subject of confederation, Frere writes again to Sir M. Hicks-Beach :—

“ August 28, 1879.

“ Union, after the fashion indicated in the South African Act of last year, is so much to the advantage of all concerned, that nothing but party tactics and party perversity can long delay its acceptance by a great majority of thoughtful colonists. But they cannot be dragooned into it, nor made to accept it by ‘Imperial pressure,’ as Paterson would call it, for they are at least as obstinate and self-willed as the stock they come from, whether Dutch, English, Scotch, or Irish.

“ By careful explanation, perseverance, and some ‘give and take,’ we may induce all to agree to any really useful measure. To be useful or acceptable it must include the grant of some form of self-government, either immediate, or immediately prospective, to all members of the Union. We were on the fair road to this when my supersession by Wolseley threw us all back. It is always difficult to revert to the exact *status quo ante*. To weaken the influence of your Governor and his Ministers here, when those Ministers are thoroughly loyal and English in feeling, is simply playing into the hands of Messrs. Colenso, Saul Solomon, and Merriman—the bitter anti-English opposition here and in Natal.

“ They are sedulously courting the Dutch party, and swaying the loyal Dutch (a great majority of the Cape Dutchmen) to swell the already considerable minority who are disloyal to the English Crown here and in Transvaal, and who would prefer a Holland (*i.e.* remember a *German*) Government or Protectorate in the Transvaal to an English

one, and a Republic here to a Dominion under the British Crown.

"If the special correspondents are right as to Wolseley's plans for Zululand (of which I know nothing from him) his settlement of Zululand is not likely to mend matters. You may with the greatest ease so rule Zululand that the Zulus shall pay their share of the cost of the war and be a strength and not a weakness to Natal and the Transvaal. To leave them to themselves, with no restraint but 'moral suasion' from Residents carefully instructed that the Zulus are to be left to rule themselves after their own will and fashion, is simply to invite a repetition of the history of Cetywayo and Krelî—who in ten or fifteen years built up a strong military power out of the remnants of a defeated and dispersed tribe.

"This is not avoiding increase of responsibilities. It is merely inviting their increase by turning your back and shutting your eyes whilst they are growing.

"All colonists know this well—and except crotchety philanthropists and political partisans, all acknowledge it—and if they see us so acting, none will feel secure nor consent to confederate, except with some strong military power on which they can depend for help in time of need.

"We are meantime drifting into very awkward relations with these Colonies. What you are now doing seems to me uncomfortably like what was done more than a century ago, when we drove the American Colonies into war and forcible separation.

"From the Treaty of Paris in 1763, to the end of the War of Independence in 1783, it took twenty years for the quarrel to arise, culminate, and be fought out in separation. We do things faster nowadays. The whole history of causes of difference—the character of the disputes between the British Government and the States, and the mode in which they were carried on were, *mutatis mutandis*, very like the storm now brewing here. . . .

"I wish you to be warned in time, and having warned you I have done my duty. If you think I am an alarmist, I wish you would refer to Lord Salisbury or Lord Halifax, or others who have known me long, and can judge whether I am wont to be deluded or deterred by phantom fears."



Unfortunately this was by no means the only instance in which Frere failed to receive the consideration and support he naturally looked for.

The news of the disaster of Isandhlwana, exaggerated by Cetywayo's emissaries, had spread among the natives all over South Africa. The British army had been represented as totally destroyed, and the British race as no longer able to hold its own. Even amongst the Boers the same idea, though to a less extent, prevailed. The spectacle of a couple of regiments marching through Basutoland, Pondoland, Tembuland, and the Transvaal, would have tended to dispel the delusion immediately and effectually, as nothing else would ; and the expense would have been the merest trifle compared with the moral effect produced, and the trouble and bloodshed in future years that might have been saved. But Sir Garnet Wolseley would not listen to Frere's suggestions that this should be done. The one thing to be aimed at, it seemed, according to his instructions, was the saving of present expense ; the future must take care of itself.

In Basutoland a chief named Morosi had been encouraged by the early troubles of the Zulu War to raise a rebellion, which extended over nearly one-fifth of the province. He had entrenched himself with his robber-band in a strong hill-fort in the heart of the country, and there he was being blockaded by the Colonial troops, yeomanry and volunteers. Frere asked Sir Garnet Wolseley for the assistance of two or three hundred British Infantry to finish the business at once, but he refused them. The Colonial troops did at last (November 20) take the fortress unassisted, but at a much greater expenditure of men and money than had the help asked for been granted.

Pondoland, the country between the Transkei and

Natal, was in a very disturbed condition. Mrs. Jenkins, the missionary's widow, had proved to be an inadequate guardian and mentor to the Chief Umquikela. The latter had refused to give up for trial a gang of murderers who had fled to his territory just before the Transkei War began, had allowed a well-armed contingent of Pondos to join the Griqua rebels, and had listened to overtures from Cetywayo. There had been differences between Umquikela and his neighbours, which had led to frontier fights, murders, and wholesale plunder of cattle. The powers of the Government there and in Galekaland, Tembuland, and Bombanaland, were vague and undefined, and it was essential that they should be duly considered and authoritatively laid down. The Government wished to take the telegraph across a narrow strip of Umquikela's territory ; he objected "as if he had been the Emperor of Germany," and the Government gave way and took it a long way round. "Any troublesome trader or missionary might any day bring into our Colonial courts the right of our best and most humane officials to do what they have been doing for many years past," Frere writes, "and there is a small party of renegade white men who for their own purposes wish to keep the country to themselves and helped to oppose everything the Government did to quiet and open up the country." \*

It was obviously necessary that this state of things should be inquired into on the spot by a competent and experienced officer. Frere could not spare any of his staff and had no one whom he could send. He therefore applied to Sir Garnet Wolsley to assist him by placing at his disposal for this purpose one of the many trustworthy officers who had come out for special service with the army, and were then being sent home on the ground

\* Frere to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, October 7, 1879.

that their services were no longer required. Sir Garnet however, refused, saying that he would not permit his officers to be employed on duties which properly belonged to the police. Pondoland being outside the limits of the Cape Colony, the Colonial troops could not properly act there, and Frere asked that in view of the disturbed condition of the country small detachments of troops might be placed "in the visible neighbourhood" of Pondoland to support the police. But this also was refused. "I thought it might have been in your power," Frere says in reply to his refusal, "to have materially assisted us in preserving the peace on the Natal border, where law and order are as yet but imperfectly established. The aid I asked being refused, I accept your decision, but I do not concur in the grounds on which it is founded, nor can I, of course, accept any responsibility for the possible future consequences of the refusal."\*

The refusal was subsequently approved by the Secretary of State. The consequences were that the inquiry was necessarily postponed and, though disturbances were for a time staved off by Umquikela's falling seriously ill, Pondoland became one of the centres of native disturbance and an additional anxiety when the Basuto troubles came and when Sir George Colley had to deal with the Boer insurrection.† Within its boundaries the worst features of barbarism—murder, rapine, cruelty, "smelling out," and sacrifices of life on charges of witchcraft—have been of continual occurrence up to the present time, when it has at length (1894) been made British territory.

The following extract from a letter of Frere's to the Secretary of State describes its condition, and the channels

\* Frere to Sir Garnet Wolseley. C. 2505, p. 7.

† "I can ill spare 58th in view of daily-expected outbreak of Pondos."—Colley to Lanyon, November 26, 1880. C. 2740, p. 125.

through which information was supplied to members of Parliament and others who wished to get up a case against the Government. It was a typical example.

"February 8, 1880.

"The position of Pondoland is not easily defined in the terms of modern European diplomacy. It was a very common position in feudal times, when there were infinite variations in the position of vassal on one side, and feudal superior or sovereign on the other. The position was a common one in the old Turkish Empire, and is still occupied by many states in India. Many of our great Scotch and Irish houses have passed through it, and still survive as subjects. It is a position which gives to the vassal much liberty of internal administration subject to the control of the superior State in extreme cases of abuse of authority, but allows to the vassal none of the attributes of really independent sovereignty. Our trouble with the Pondos arises from not recognizing this position. After being saved by Sir Peregrine Maitland from the Zulus, they accepted by treaty a position which obliged them to subordinate all their foreign relations to the general control of the British Government. Since then our territory has closed round them, and they have now no neighbours but British subjects, and can make war on no one else without crossing British territory. They are a purely pastoral set of barbarians, with no agriculture save a few patches of Indian corn in each kraal, no commerce save barter of cattle and skins for European manufactures, with European traders or pedlars, not even a canal or any river or estuary, no manufactures better than skin karosses, mats, and baskets of rushes and palm-leaves, wooden beer jugs, and assegais.

"To deal with such people as a really independent sovereign state would obviously be as ridiculous as for George II. to have dealt with Campbells, Macleods, Macphersons, and O'Neills on the same terms and in the same way as with the King of Sweden or a German Elector.

"But they have among them a few Europeans, traders, missionaries, and adventurers, some respectable people, others fugitives from the Colonies, and all, with rare exceptions, imperfectly educated, who find their account

in stuffing up the Pondos with ideas of their own importance as an independent State.

"They write for the Pondo Chief to Government or the newspapers, and if the Government does anything they or the Pondos dislike, a letter appears, sometimes confirmed by a worthy but not over-wise missionary, whose knowledge of administration, law, and politics, is little, if at all, superior to that of his brother minister in a small English country town; more often the letter is the work of a storekeeper, bankrupt or prosperous, or of a runaway clerk, who prefers the free life of a Pondo kraal to the desk of a trader or attorney in Natal.

"Duly distilled through some intermediate channels, these criticisms on the measures of Government are the materials for Parliamentary and press criticism in England. Little is heard on the Government side till long after, and we are then surprised that South African affairs are so ill understood at home!

"I have said more than I intended about the present state of Pondoland, but you must remember that the case of every tribe on or near our border is very similar. Zulus, Swazis, Amatonga, on the East Coast, and all the tribes to the north and west are now, or will be ere long, in the condition I have described—practically managed by white men, good or bad, who are not Government officials, who have the power and too often the desire to checkmate the Government official when at last he appears on the scene where he ought to have been supreme years before.

"In India there has always been some representative of Government who speedily follows, if he does not precede, the trader or missionary, and a British protectorate has always been in advance of the British frontier proper, *i.e.* the frontier of territory where British law is supreme. The absence of this intermediate stage is one of our great difficulties and a main cause of all our wars in South Africa."

Frere could not get any information from Sir Garnet Wolseley as to what sort of settlement he proposed for Zululand. Sir Garnet did indeed send him a copy of the despatch containing the terms of settlement, when the matter was concluded; but even this, by some mistake, did

not reach him till it had been to England and back in the portmanteau of the officer charged to deliver it at Cape-town ; and the first he heard of it was from the newspapers.

To settle Zululand was not a specially difficult matter. The Zulus had accepted their defeat without a thought of further resistance and without even sullenness. They were an intelligent, teachable, and easily governed race, and would have cheerfully accepted the imposition of British authority. To annex the country and govern it by British magistrates was the obvious course ; and it would not ultimately have been a charge on either the Colonial or the British Exchequer, for a hut-tax would have been cheerfully paid, which would have defrayed the whole expense.\* Or, failing that, something like the plan indicated in Frere's Ultimatum might have been carried out. The Zulus might have been left with their tribal government subject to the influence and, in case of need, the control of a British Resident. This plan had succeeded with the savage races of South Africa, as it had succeeded with the semi-civilized native states of India ; but in South Africa, as in India, it was essential to success, first, that the Resident should be known to have the whole power of the empire behind him ; and, secondly, that he should not only be a man of firmness and ability, but a gentleman, and respected by his own countrymen.

How far Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement was of his own contriving, and how far moulded on instructions from the Secretary of State, did not transpire. What is certain is that not a single Colonial official of weight or experience was consulted about it, or approved of it when it was made. By it Zululand was divided into thirteen independent little kingdoms, to each of which a chief was assigned to

\* This was proved after the annexation in 1887, when a hut-tax was levied which left a surplus of receipts over expenditure.

rule over it.\* One kingdom, which was next to Natal, and was three or four times as large as any of the others, and thus conferred a sort of hegemony, was given to John Dunn, an Englishman who had adopted Zulu customs and had several Zulu wives, who had been implicated in gun-running transactions, and who had been on terms of intimacy with Cetywayo up to the outbreak of the war and had then abandoned him. There was to be a British Resident who was to proffer advice and be the "eyes and ears" of the British Government, but who was expressly interdicted from exercising any active interference whatever. The missionaries who had been forced by Cetywayo to leave their mission-stations were not to resume possession of them unless invited to do so by the chiefs.

Frere writes to Sir Garnet Wolseley :—

" September 15, 1879.

" The copy of your despatch describing the settlement you have made in Zululand, which you mention as sent by the same post, has not yet reached me, so I have nothing but imperfect and possibly erroneous press telegrams, which I feel sure cannot do justice to your work. Meantime much mischief is done by the opportunity afforded to Her Majesty's Opposition to misrepresent and find fault.

" For instance, I only learnt on Saturday that the terms signed by the thirteen chiefs started with a declaration that the chief recognizes the supremacy of the British arms and Her Majesty's right to deal with Zululand and its chiefs and people as they may think fit.

" Now, this is most important, if I have been correctly informed (for I have it only from an unofficial source). It is the essential root of any sound and permanent settlement.

\* " Of the chiefs appointed, some were so carelessly chosen that they have no authority whatsoever over the districts to which they were appointed, their nominal subjects preferring to remain under the leadership of their hereditary chief. Several of Sir Garnet's little kings cannot turn out a hundred men, whilst the hereditary chief, who has no official authority, can bring up three or four thousand."—"Cetywayo and his White Neighbours" (Rider Haggard), p. 31.

"With it, a vigorous Resident may do almost anything; without it, the ablest man must fail.

"The Residents are to be the 'eyes and ears' of the British Government.

"The first question which occurs is, where are the 'arms and legs'?

"Head is provided by the acknowledgment of the Queen's supremacy. But how about 'arms, legs,' etc., *i.e.* the power to enforce the decisions of the Government?

"The Resident is told he is to give advice to chiefs, but to exercise no authority over them. Now, advice to civilized or semi-civilized people may be of use. But to uncivilized men even as intelligent as Zulus are it is of no use, unless backed by power of some sort—moral, intellectual, or physical, and best of all by all three combined. Hence, unless the Residents are men of power they will be of little use, and as you propose to give them no physical force to back them they will have to depend exclusively on such moral and intellectual power as they may possess.

"Hence the importance of the question: Who are to be the Residents?

"The only name I have heard which I can credit is —, a good man in his way, but hardly up to a task which would test Livingstone's or Chinese Gordon's powers to the utmost, if the Resident confines himself to advice and to reporting to the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal.

"Then what is the Lieutenant-Governor to do?

"If he does no more than Lieutenant-Governors in times past, it will be simply nothing; and if you have among your thirteen chiefs one man with the capacity of Krelî or Cetywayo (you have probably among them three or four as good or better), you will have another war in a few years, as soon as the chief has, by attracting idlers and active spirits and by the natural increase of population, begun to find his borders too narrow for his wants and for the wishes of his people. *Vide* the history of Gaika, Makomo, Sandilli, Hintza, Krelî, etc., *passim*.

"Then, as we hear, the Resident is charged to remember that the chiefs have been told that no white men are to be encouraged to settle. You will find this, I fear, quite inoperative for any purpose but to create causes of dispute between the Resident and chiefs. I cannot find in past history or in any present quarter a single tribe which has



succeeded in excluding white men. Name the tribe anywhere this side the Zambezi and Cuanene, and I will undertake to send you in a few weeks the names of from half a dozen to two or three score of white men, some with a single waggon, some, like Mr. Erickson in Damaraland, with sixty, who have crept in unknown to Government, and, keeping their hunting and trading field and the privileges they have got there a secret even from their friends in the Colony, have acquired great influence in the tribe so that they sometimes actually rule it. The only effect of discouraging the white man's entrance is to ensure all who come being of a bad stamp—either damaged men or unruly spirits—but to exclude them is beyond the power of all the chiefs or Residents in South Africa combined.

"I say nothing about the discouragement of missionaries settling, for it is too long an argument when, as I fear, we do not agree on the basis of discussion. It would have been a great mistake to have actively encouraged them; but it is, in my opinion, a far greater to discourage them. The only plan is to treat them exactly as you do the 'smouser' and 'winkler,'—the hunter or trader—let them alone to depend on their own powers of recommending themselves.

"As for making Zululand a home for the natives exclusively, I more than doubt the possibility of success. I know of many cases in which the creation of such a black Alsatia has been tried. In none has it ever succeeded.

"For a few years Alsatia takes off the scum (white as well as black) of the law-governed neighbourhood; the rogue or vagabond, the idler and outlaw from Natal crosses the Tugela to John Dunn, and if routed out thence, goes on to Oham or further, but after a time the scum becomes noxious, and civilized law-abiding and law-sustaining force has to come in to cleanse the foul den. For instances you may refer to every frontier and every part of it from 1819 to the present time."

But his words fell unheeded. Sir Garnet Wolseley merely replied that all his arrangements had been made with a view of keeping Zululand for the use and enjoyment of its present inhabitants, without any interference from either the Cape or the Natal authorities. The Resident

was to be strictly debarred from exercising any authority whatever. The representatives of the three great tribes paramount before Chaka's time had been reinstated. White men were to be especially precluded from owning land.

John Dunn proceeded at once to 'warn off' some missionaries who had come to reoccupy their burnt stations. Sir Garnet supported his action, saying that it was not right to "force" Christianity on any one. Subsequently on some stir being made in England about their exclusion, the prohibition was withdrawn and permission to settle was given to missionaries and traders "in a way to delight equally Exeter Hall and Manchester; whilst John Dunn's retention in full vigour secures the adhesion of all polygamous Bohemians and imperfect Christians. . . . You will have trouble in a very few years unless a really able and vigilant man in Natal takes an active oversight of Zululand."\*

Six months later he writes to Sir Henry Ponsonby:—

"April 3, 1880.

"Gradually the information regarding the settlement of Zululand, which ought to have been given direct to Wolseley's coadjutors in South African work, is coming back to us from England through various channels, official and unofficial, and the course of events is pretty clear. The Government seem early to have recognized the fact that the settlement had few if any elements of real permanence, and was not calculated to last beyond the present generation of officials, most of whom are already departed from South African life. As a consequence many of the essential features of the 'settlement' have been altered and otherwise are altering themselves; but some of the most objectionable still remain. I do not anticipate any dangerous results for, perhaps, years to come. But the certain seeds of future disturbance are there and will require more firm and judicious management to prevent their germinating than we have as yet seen in Zululand.

"This affects us here by disinclining the cautious

\* Frere to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, January 24, 1880.

Dutchmen to listen to any plan for uniting their interests with those of Natal, and if we can get them to look the thing in the face and discuss the advantages and possible terms of a union, it will be as much as we can expect at present."

Frere's views as to the attitude to be observed by the British Government towards missionaries in territories beyond the Colonial border have been so persistently misrepresented, that an extract from a despatch on the subject written by him to the Secretary of State is given here at some length.

"December 2, 1879.

"To begin with Zululand. Missionaries were first permitted to settle there by Dingaan. His successor, Panda, allowed them to establish themselves at more than sixteen stations, all of which had been abandoned shortly before the war broke out, in consequence of the increasingly hostile spirit evinced by Cetywayo.

Her Majesty's Government very clearly laid down the course which should be followed in our communications on the subject with Cetywayo; and I will only observe that I never contemplated any further interference with his freedom of action in regard to missionaries than I would have recommended in the case of secular persons of European race who had been allowed, under the laws of Zululand, by special permission of the reigning chief, to settle there for their own gain and profit.

"I would always have advocated the same respect for the national rights of Zulus as would have been shown by Her Majesty's Government in the case of Turkey or Spain, but I would have advocated no more.

"I would not have attempted to force the Zulu ruler against his will to permit either a mission to be established or a sugar-mill to be erected; but if, with his express permission, and with the deliberate consent of his national council of chiefs, leave were once given to Europeans to settle, I would not have allowed either the missionary or the sugar-planter to be terrorized out of the country without remonstrance, as long as no charge of breaking the laws of the country or the conditions of his settlement was stated against the person whom it was proposed to expel.

"I beg to make this statement in contradiction of the

assertion industriously circulated, that I had proposed, or intended to impose, either Christianity or civilization on the Zulus by force of arms.

"But since the downfall of the Zulu King, the circumstances of the case are materially changed, and it appears to me that it will be for Her Majesty's Government and for no chief in Zululand to consider and decide whether, under the present state of things, missionaries should or should not be prohibited from returning to, or settling in Zululand on the same terms as sugar-planters or store-keepers.

"I would observe that there is in South Africa no such reason as formerly existed in India for avoiding giving any cause for alarm lest Government should attempt forcible conversion by the use of its secular power. There is not, and never has been in South Africa, any such alarm, nor any cause for it, for the simple reason that the native tribes in South Africa have for the most part nothing in the shape of a definite religion to be converted from. The Zulus and Kaffirs generally have many superstitions about lucky and unlucky, good and evil influences; but no theistic belief in any active agency, good or evil; no God, no demon, nor even any powerful fetish, like their neighbours to the north of the equator. They are simply materialistic Sadducees, and like the same class in other lands, care little for what others believe or disbelieve, as long as it does not interfere with their own enjoyment of life.

"Hence, almost invariably, the native chief and his tribe in South Africa, when white men first appear in their country, have no objection to letting missionaries settle among them. They are, in fact, very glad to get missionaries, as more permanent residents and having more interest in the country than travellers for sport or pleasure; as being more disinterested, more truthful, and more useful to the chief and his tribe in various ways than the casual trader; and as being actuated by higher motives and more sincere good will toward the tribe than the ordinary white adventurer.

"At this moment there are missionaries who have for years been settled hundreds of miles beyond our border in Damaraland, at the capitals of great chiefs like Kama and Lobengula, besides numerous stations among smaller tribes. All these had settled by express invitation from the chief and his tribe and without any intervention of

Government in the way of encouragement or discouragement, and are in every case, as far as I can learn, almost the last of the white races the chief or his people would willingly part from.

Their position seems to me almost in every respect similar to that of the early Christian missionaries in heathen Britain, Germany, or Gaul. After a while, no doubt the chief finds now, as he did then, that a power is growing up which is in some respects antagonistic to his own, and he feels that the pupils of the missionaries are not so subservient to his purposes as his untaught and unsophisticated savage subject. 'The Zulu converted,' is, as Cetywayo expressed it, 'a Zulu spoiled.' The blind obedience which places at the chief's disposal every man, woman, and child, every head of cattle, and every species of property in the tribe, gives place to duties and obligations unknown before; to allegiance to other powers than the chief; to occupations other than herding the King's cattle or executing his behests by 'impis' on persons obnoxious to him.

"When this state of things arrives, as it always must sooner or later, the chief may feel inclined to take part against the missionaries, and, if he has favoured them before, to withdraw his countenance and expel them. But unless favoured by exceptional circumstances, he finds his opposition met by a party among his own subjects in favour of the new order of things, and he is obliged to go with the stream or give place to some rival who does. . . .

"Here, as everywhere else, there are many different types of missionary, but the worst are more potent in their influence on native races than most men who are actuated by avowedly selfish and worldly aims.

"Among missionaries in South Africa, as in every other profession, may be found unworthy professors, political busybodies, sordid traders, and idlers, but the great majority are, at their worst, superior in influence over savages to most of their countrymen who, as hunters or traders, may enter the country, and many are worthy to be ranked with the noblest of their profession, or of human kind, who in two thousand years have Christianized and civilized Europe.

"All, as a rule, are in favour of the nearest sovereign

civilized power, in this case the English ; all, in profession at least, are friends of the best interests of the native races, and a large proportion are their true friends, long tried and much trusted."

From Natal, Sir Garnet Wolseley went to the Transvaal, reaching Pretoria September 29. He made speeches in every village he visited, declaring the Act of Annexation to be irrevocable, and afterwards published a Proclamation to that effect. At Standerton, which is on the Vaal River, he told the people that the Vaal would flow backward through the Drakensberg before the British would be withdrawn from the Transvaal territory.\*

Nevertheless there were indications, sufficient to disquiet Frere, that either Sir Garnet or the British Government did not consider the matter as altogether outside the pale of discussion.

Frere writes (December 2) to Sir M. Hicks-Beach : ". . . I am very certain that to give up the Transvaal is as little to be thought of as surrendering Ireland or India." And in an exhaustive despatch, going over all the aspects of the question, he gives his opinion that the malcontent Boers were neither numerous nor formidable, the leaders and instigators being many of them foreigners, actuated by personal motives, who induced others to join them by intimidation, and owing to the idea that was prevalent that the country was going to be given up.† He urged

\* *Times*' correspondent's letter, October 23, 1879.

† "When our power of enforcing the law and upholding the authority of Government were at the lowest, in April last, . . . experienced men at Pretoria gave me, through Colonel Lanyon, the following estimate of the strength of parties in the malcontent camp. The educated and intelligent men of influence who advocated the most extreme measures, or were prepared to acquiesce in them, were reckoned at not more than eight. Three, or perhaps four, were men of property in the Transvaal ; the rest foreign adventurers, with no property and little weight beyond that due to their skill as political

firmness, and the immediate promulgation of a Constitution with a nominee Council, coupled with a promise that an Elective Council would be granted if they showed themselves fit for it. As to the effect of abandonment of the Transvaal on the prospects of Confederation, he says—

“December 3, 1879.

“To every Colony concerned, such a step must appear as a confession of weakness, of infirmity of purpose, and of disregard for solemn pledges and obligations which would destroy all respect, all wish to belong to a Government which could so behave.”

The native chief, Secocoeni, who was called by the natives “Cetywayo’s dog,” and who, it will be remembered, had helped, by the repulse he had inflicted on the Boers nearly three years before, to bring about the collapse of their Republic, had been in arms and conducting raids into the Transvaal with impunity; and, his stronghold being within the country and not outside its borders, it was the more necessary to repress him. Colonel Rowlands had started with an expedition against him in November, 1878, but had been baffled by fever and horse-sickness. After the Zulu War broke out no British troops could be spared to act against him; but, in June, Colonel

agitators. Their unflinching and uncompromising followers in the Boer camp were not reckoned at more than eighty. The disaffected waverers who, according to circumstances, would follow the majority either to acts of overt resistance to Government and lawless violence, or to grumble and disperse, ‘accepting the inevitable,’ were reckoned at about eight hundred at the outside. The rest of the camp, variously estimated at containing from sixteen hundred to four thousand in all, but probably never exceeding two thousand five hundred present at one time, were men brought to the camp by intimidation, compulsion, or curiosity, who would not willingly resist the authority of Government, and would, if assured of protection, prefer to side with it.”—Frere to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, December 3, 1879.

Lanyon had raised some troops, Europeans and natives, and was succeeding so well with them that he was hoping within a short time to force him to surrender. In July, however, Sir Garnet Wolseley sent Colonel Lanyon orders to cease operations, and the force had to be disbanded. But when he arrived in the Transvaal he found that Secocoeni could not be neglected, and had to be attacked with much greater risk of loss than if Colonel Lanyon had been left to do so at an earlier and healthier season of the year. The natural strength of his fortress was great, and careful dispositions had to be made in order to take it without excessive loss. The campaign began on November 20, and on the 28th the stronghold was taken with a loss of about fifty Europeans, and about five hundred Swazi allies, killed and wounded.\*

Frere writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach :—

“December 8, 1879.

“The success has been more complete and brilliant even than I at first supposed. It was a difficult task at any time of the year, owing to the extent of very strong country, full of scrub, ravines, boulders, and caves. . . . At this season, but for unusual rain, the task would have been almost impossible, and Sir Garnet Wolseley seems to me to deserve great credit for determining to make the attack at once, and, still more, for his dispositions, which, as far as I can judge, left nothing to be desired in thorough thoughtfulness or completeness, and nothing could be better than the decision, punctuality, and courage with which every movement seems to have been executed. It seems to have been a complete and, what is better, a well-deserved success, and I hope, in reporting it, he will do justice to all who contributed to it, as well as to those of his own staff.”

Frere goes on to mention Colonel Lanyon, Captain Clark, R.A., and Captain Carrington, as deserving a

\* C. 2505, p. 110.



share of the credit for the accurate information they had collected during the previous months or years.

Secocoeni was taken prisoner and sent, as Cetywayo had been, to Capetown. A public dinner was given to Sir Garnet Wolseley at Pretoria on December 17. He took the opportunity of returning thanks to announce a new Constitution for the Transvaal. It was to have a nominated Council, instead of an elected one, such as would have been granted but for the insubordination of the malcontents. He went on to declare, with emphasis, that there could be no question of giving up the sovereignty of the country. "There is no Government," he said, "Whig or Tory, Liberal, Conservative, or Radical, who would dare under any circumstances to give back this country. They would not dare because the English people would not allow them." Speaking of the malcontents then out in camp, he said, "I think the Transvaal has never had such formidable enemies either outside or within its limits than [as] the fifteen hundred or two thousand Boers assembled near this Town." \*

This announcement was emphatic enough. But notwithstanding these strong words his attitude towards the malcontent Boers was still vacillating. They had held a meeting on the High Veldt, threatening any who should absent themselves, on December 10, at which rebellion was openly advocated; parts of the country were disturbed and ammunition plundered. After taking the opinion of his Attorney-General, Sir Garnet caused two Boer leaders, Bok and Pretorius, to be prosecuted on a charge of high treason. Bok was arrested at Pretoria on January 3, 1880, some evidence against him was taken, and he was bailed. Pretorius was arrested at Potchefstroom on the 5th, and bail being refused he was sent to prison. He did not, however, remain there long. Sir Garnet

\* C. 2505, p. 112.

changed his tactics, sent for him, and nominated him a member of the new Legislative Council. In both cases the prosecution was subsequently dropped and they were not committed for trial.\* It is difficult to say whether the institution of these prosecutions or their abandonment had the worst effect.

Early in March, on the eve of the meeting of the new Legislative Assembly of the Transvaal, Sir Garnet still deemed it necessary to telegraph to the Secretary of State for an explicit assurance that the Queen's sovereignty would not be withdrawn,—which was thereupon given.†

To avoid the sometimes inconvenient presence of special correspondents with an army in the field, or for other reasons, it had been arranged, before Sir Garnet Wolseley left England, that certain members of his staff should act as correspondents to the leading London newspapers. It may be a matter of opinion whether or not it was desirable that officers in the field should undertake to be the anonymous chroniclers in the Press of their own and their General's actions. At any rate, in such employment they were skating upon thin ice, and it behoved them to be careful.

One of them was not careful. A letter from "our own correspondent" appeared in the *Times* of October 23, charging Frere with having been the cause of opposition to Sir Garnet Wolseley's government by forwarding the Boers' memorial to Her Majesty's Government in terms which created a formidable impression that the question of the restoration of the country to the Dutch was under deliberation at home. The statement on which this allegation was founded had appeared in one of the Boer malcontent papers; but there was no excuse for giving

\* C. 2584, p. 193. At a Boer meeting held March 11, 1880, a man was overheard to say in reference to this incident: "Yes, it appears you must be first placed in prison before you can get a good appointment."—C. 2676, p. 28.

† C. C. 2584, p. 208.

credence to it. Lanyon had been present and could be referred to. And all that had passed on the occasion had been taken down, printed and published in a Blue-book, and Frere's repeated and emphatic refusal to support the prayer of the memorial stood recorded.

"Our own correspondent" was Sir Garnet Wolseley's private secretary.

That one of the two High Commissioners who were working side by side should be anonymously attacked in the Press by the private secretary of the other, was a breach, not of good manners only, but of official discipline.

Frere wrote (November 23) to Sir Garnet, calling his attention to it. His reply was that it was not his affair what the officers of his staff might or might not write, and that he should be very sorry to call any newspaper correspondent to account for any views he might express, no matter who that correspondent might be.

As it was a matter materially affecting the public service, Frere called the attention of the Secretary of State to it. He writes afterwards to a friend on the question :—

"February 3, 1880.

"I have seen a good deal of such difficulties for thirty years past, and Wolseley's is not a bad solution if honestly and wisely carried out, but a *staff* correspondent ought to have as strong a conscience as regards his duty to Government as his Chief has, and he ought to be as careful not to fire a broadside into an ally or brother official, as not to betray military secrets to the enemy. *If* you can get staff correspondents to write in this spirit, and if generals are self-denying enough not to make press laudation their object, this would be a perfect system, but such correspondents and generals are rare, and you must henceforth make up your mind to have your generals looking more to the daily Press, than to the Commander-in-Chief as the judge of their merits." \*

\* Frere wrote (July 31, 1882) to one of his nephews : "I do not

Various indications were rousing Frere's anxiety lest the Government should be meditating some change of policy either as regarded the Transvaal or in other matters. "I have had no word of official acknowledgment or approval," he writes to Lord Carnarvon, "unless I may accept as such official abstention from the fierce condemnation with which all I have done has been assailed by both sides in English party warfare." His misgivings were partly suggested by the appearance in English periodicals usually supporting the Government of articles wavering, to say the least, upon this and other important points. In the *Quarterly Review*, not long after the news of Isandhlwana, had appeared an article deprecating enthusiasm about confederation, and expressing a preference for "the opposite policy of *divide et impera*;" it spoke of the suspension of the Cape Constitution as the "clearest and completest expedient," and asserted that the Kaffirs and Zulus, "if left to the colonists, are doomed to degradation and destruction." Frere speaks of it as "an essay in which for whole pages a truth expressed in brilliant epigrams regularly alternates with mistakes or misstatements which would be scarcely pardoned in a 'special' war correspondent hurriedly writing against time." Its importance did not arise from its intrinsic worth, but from the fact that it found a place in the leading Conservative Review, and was known to be from the pen of Mr. Froude, formerly Lord Carnarvon's apostle of federation.

This feeling of uncertainty, whether the Secretary of like the idea of your going as a newspaper correspondent. It is a false position for a soldier on the active list. From H.R.H. downwards, all officials and authorities would resent it, and it would not be pleasant either for yourself or comrades and acquaintances if you had to choose between writing unpleasant truths or being silent when things went wrong. You could not be an impartial historian without damage to your own feelings and interests."

State meant to stand to his guns, tended to paralyze the progress not only of confederation, but of many other important matters.

For instance, the military defence of South Africa was a question which required to be settled. How many English troops were to be left there, and who was to pay the cost? Some people in England were complaining of the expense of the Zulu War as if it were no affair of theirs, forgetting that it was due, not to any action of the Cape Colony, but to the Imperial Government and its management or mismanagement in past years of the native question in the Crown Colony of Natal and elsewhere; forgetting too that whatever the addition caused to English taxation might be, the burden laid on the Colonies was far heavier in proportion to their wealth and population.

A Commission on Colonial Defence was sitting in London, of which Lord Carnarvon was chairman. Lord Carnarvon wrote to Frere for his views, to which Frere replied in detail.

“December 14, 1879.

“The Cape Colony,” he pointed out, “so far from having been backward in taking its part in recent military and defensive operations, had, under the present Ministry, honestly set to work to get up a defensive force of their own, passed four useful and well-intentioned measures for organizing police, volunteers, yeomanry, and Burghers, and, what was more indeed, taxed themselves to pay for it—the Brandy, Excise, and House-tax Acts were substantial evidence they were in earnest. .

“They were sorely tried by the Zulu War and its consequences, Morosi’s rebellion on the Basutoland border, and the rebellion of the Kaffirs, Korannas, etc., on the Orange River and in Griqualand West, before their forces or any one class of them were fairly formed. However, they have got over all and have proved their sincerity by dispensing entirely with Her Majesty’s troops in the Cape Colony during the worst part of the Zulu War.”

To complete their system of defence they required officers with military training and experience to instruct and organize them, and reasonable assistance to procure guns and arms of the best pattern.\* Assistance to this very moderate extent Frere pleaded for as a preliminary to the South African Colonies undertaking ultimately the entire cost of their defence, except that of the Cape Peninsula, which was of importance to the empire at large and to the communication between England and India, Australia and China.

But the foundation of the whole scheme of defence was a confederation of colonies which, like the Cape, were to be self-governing. If Natal and the Transvaal were to remain permanently Crown Colonies, there was an end of it. And therefore he goes on to ask Lord Carnarvon: "Are these apparent indications of a change of policy accidental? Are Froude's articles in the *Quarterly* or *Fortnightly* inspired political feelers? Or are they merely his own uninspired lucubrations?"

"February 16, 1880.

"If there is any idea of a change of policy, of attempting

\* It had been too much the custom for the War Office to supply the Colonies with inferior material. In December, 1879, a battery was completed and armed on the Cape Peninsula which, if efficient, should have been a sufficient protection against any ordinary attack by single ships or filibusters. Frere asked the Colonial Ministers to join him and the military officials in seeing the guns tried in their new positions. A few rounds were fired, in the course of which two out of the five guns were disabled owing to defects in the apparatus for meeting the recoil. Fortunately, though fragments of metal, nuts, and bolts flew about, only two men were hurt, and nobody was killed, and the matter was treated as an inevitable accident. Frere afterwards happened to mention the incident to one of Sir Garnet's Staff, who had been present. He smiled and said, "You probably are not aware that the recoil apparatus which has been furnished to you for those guns has been long since condemned in our own service, and would never be put into a battery in Europe." (Frere to Lord Carnarvon, February 16, 1880.)

to restrict the establishment of responsible government to its present limits by preventing its extension at a reasonable time to Natal and Transvaal, still more if there is any idea of attempting to resume what has already been given to the Cape, as so many of our political physicians recommend, then I am convinced that your labours on the Colonial Defence Commission will be in vain as regards limiting the responsibilities of Great Britain in South Africa, and we may prepare for events not less grave than those which led to the separation of our North American Colonies, a century ago.

"Here in the Transvaal and Natal unless we are careful we shall foster the formation of a powerful anti-English party whose dogged resistance to authority as authority will be quite as troublesome as active rebellion.

"You remember the attempts made by the Transvaal republicans to enlist the sympathy of the German Government. They did not then succeed, but they may have better success if they appeal to the German Socialists, and a few score of them would be a very formidable addition to the ranks of the disaffected in South Africa."

In view of Sir Garnet Wolseley's repeated expressions of impatience to return to England, Frere wrote in January to ask what arrangement was to be made when he left. The ostensible reason given for his appointment as High Commissioner of the eastern provinces had been to bring the Zulu War to a close. No such reason existed any longer. Was Frere to resume his old functions?

If there was to be a United South Africa under British influence, the British Government must speak with but one voice; there must be one High Commissioner, not two. One paramount influence and one consistent native policy, able to overcome local jealousies and selfishness, and destined to make itself felt sooner or later over all the country south of the Zambesi, were essential, not merely to confederation, but to stay the outbreak of native wars, and to relieve England of the burden of them for the future.

Such an extension and unification of British influence had from the first been what Frere contemplated. It was no visionary dream. It was an end quite capable of realization. Amongst the white men in South Africa there was a general desire for union of some kind. "Most men," he says, "*at present* would desire such union under the British Crown; others, both here and in England, would prefer it on the model of the United States of North America, as a South African Republic, which, according to my own convictions, would mean, for many years to come, an internecine knot of Republics, some of them with a filibustering element of the South American or Mexican type, but all under the influence of some great European Power, possessing a navy, and appreciating as well as, or perhaps better than we do, the dominion of the Southern Ocean, of which the Cape Peninsula is the key." \*

The only part of this territory then belonging to another European Power was Delagoa Bay and the strip of east coast north of it. To prevent this strip being an obstacle to intercommunication, and to utilize the important port of Delagoa Bay, Frere was anxious for more intimate commercial relations with the Portuguese, and for the construction of a line of railway thither from the Transvaal. The necessary preliminaries for this were ably accomplished by his old friend Sir Robert Morier, then Minister at Lisbon, who having acquired a special knowledge of and interest in this coast in connection with the suppression of the Slave-trade, had by the most strenuous efforts succeeded in overcoming Portuguese prejudice, and securing the consent of the Portuguese Government to a treaty which promised great advantages to the South African Colonies, and especially to the Transvaal—as the Boers well knew—in giving it direct

\* Frere to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, Jan. 17, 1880.



communication with the nearest sea-port, and opening the port on equal terms to British and Portuguese ships.\* But the matter was delayed in England till the Portuguese Ministry favourable to the treaty had left office, and the opportunity was lost. Before getting Sir R. Morier's letter, Frere had written to him (March 5, 1880): "My Ministers see, I think, as strongly as you and I do, that a continuous railway from Capetown to Delagoa Bay is by no means an impossibility within this present generation, and that of all the curbs and bonds that could be invented for keeping the country quiet and attached to the British Crown, none could be stronger."

But the Secretary of State paid no heed to Frere's representations as to the High Commissionership—one wonders sometimes if his letters and despatches were read—and he was informed (March 4) that Sir George Colley was to succeed Sir Garnet Wolseley as Governor of Natal and

\* Sir R. Morier wrote (March 4, 1880) to Frere, giving an account of all his difficulties in obtaining assent to the treaty, and asking him to try to hasten its ratification by the British Government, which was waiting—needlessly, as he pointed out—for the assent of the Colonial Legislatures.

Six years before, the question whether the south side of Delagoa Bay was British or Portuguese territory had been referred to the arbitration of MacMahon, the French President, who decided in favour of the Portuguese. Sir George Clerk wrote to Frere at the time (1874): "What could have reconciled Her Majesty's Government to going to arbitration on our right in Delagoa Bay? Why, it was ceded to us, that is a moiety of it, from head to embouchure, by its chiefs in a more deliberate manner, and by more formal documents than the other half was ever ceded to the Portuguese! I once gave you a copy of my letter to the Duke of Newcastle, from South Africa, enclosing copy of the treaty, and urging that we should not hesitate to declare and to stand upon our rights. . . . The reply of the Duke signified to me in private note that Her Majesty's Government were averse to broach a subject that might be disagreeable to the Portuguese Government. . . .

"I fancied I had an undoubted right to my hunter 'Sultan.' . . . Alas! I may have to go to arbitration."

High Commissioner of South-East Africa. Sir Garnet left South Africa early in May.

The curtailment of Frere's jurisdiction as High Commissioner had given him more leisure to attend to the details of administration in the Cape Colony. Railway extension, telegraphic communication—among other projects the overland line to Khartoum—agriculture, vine culture, land and coast surveys, water-supply, sanitation, education, native and European, and the lepers at Robben Island, all engaged his attention.

He had from the first been impressed with the loyalty of the old Dutch population within the Cape Colony, and his impression was strengthened the more he saw of them. They did not fail to appreciate the consistent fairness to all races evinced in his policy and public acts; and socially there was something about his manner, and about the receptions and hospitalities of Government House, a certain undefinable air of ceremony, mingling gracefully and naturally with its cordiality, which was congenial to the quiet stateliness of their old-world manners, and especially attracted them to him personally.

In September, 1879, he had visited the farmers in some of the old Dutch districts of the west; and again in January, 1880, he went to Beaufort West to open a railway extension, and was in the neighbourhood of Stellenbosch, Swellendam, Graaf Reinet, and other places, where the old Dutch population largely predominated. The farmers came from considerable distances to meet him. They seemed to him, in their quiet, Dutch way, intensely loyal to the English Crown, speaking and writing not of "*the* Queen," "*the* Governor," but of "*our* Queen," "*our* Governor," and "as little disposed to make experiments of other forms of government as a Gloucestershire farmer." "Dutch disaffection," he writes, "of a dangerous kind is

confined to a small clique of Hollanders and Colonial Dutch Republicans, who have little influence except through a temporary alliance with English humanitarians and Radicals now in Opposition." \*

But these loyal Dutchmen did not forget that the Transvaal Boers were their kith and kin. The way in which things were being managed there was beginning to put a heavy strain on their loyalty, and great efforts were being made by the anti-English party to induce them to make common cause with the malcontents in the Transvaal, efforts which were ultimately too successful.

Frere writes to Sir Henry Ponsonby :—

"April 3, 1880.

"Whatever Sir Garnet Wolseley may say or think of the general feeling up in the Transvaal, the Dutch population down here who have relations up there, is seriously uneasy and angry, and a feeling has been created here about the Transvaal and its annexation which certainly did not exist a few months ago ; and reacts in a manner very prejudicial to the present Ministry here who are Englishmen and known to be thoroughly loyal to the English Crown.

"What may be the precise extent and results of this change of feeling I shall hardly be able to judge till the Colonial Parliament meets next month. I am made aware of it whenever I meet a genuine Dutch Afrikaner farmer, who is apt to let me know that his good-will is personal to me and my office, and is 'not to be misunderstood as implying any approval of our doings in the Transvaal.' But the most obvious evidence is to be found in the Radical and Republican English Press in the Colony, which tries to ally itself with the Dutch Afrikaner party and has some success with the Dutch Republican section. But the great body of the Dutch are not more Republican at present than our English Whigs, the Dutch Church (Reformed) especially being very strong and rarely disloyal to the British Crown, though disliking most things British, including the English language and Church

\* Frere to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, February 8, 1880.

Doctrine, and, not unnaturally, English aggressiveness and Cockneyism.

"I do not think I ever mentioned to you that the Dutch Reformed Church is identical in doctrine, and very similar in its divisions, to the Scotch Kirk. You easily recognize parties here precisely similar to the Established and Free Kirk parties in Scotland, with all their subdivisions of Narrow and Broad and a small phalanx of Neologians and Rationalists—strong in literary ability, and generally bitter anti-English Republicans, but cordially disliked and dreaded by most of their clerical brethren.

"The Church, as a body, has immense influence, and is generally loyal to the English Crown, after the fashion of Welsh and Highland pastors, not liking English language, or ways, but very loyal to the sovereign, and to all that belongs to Her Majesty's personal authority. . . .

"These Dutchmen are slow to move, but bitter and obstinate when roused, and apt to move in an angry crowd. If any number of them join the Republican faction there will be serious trouble in South Africa, and the drifting may end by these colonies drifting away from the empire."

The uncertainty of the prospect in South Africa was greatly aggravated by the fact that an active section of the Opposition in the British Parliament not only denounced the Zulu War as wrongfully undertaken and unnecessary, but had lately taken to sympathizing with the Boers, and calling for a reversal of the annexation of the Transvaal. A General Election was pending, and all sections of malcontents in South Africa looked to a change of Government in England as involving a possible reversal of all that had been done there for the last three years.

This expectation was strengthened when Mr. Gladstone, who at the time of the Transvaal being annexed had taken no exception to it, in one of his Midlothian speeches described it as "the invasion of a free people." \* In another Midlothian speech he spoke of "the Transvaal, a country

\* Midlothian Speeches, vol. i. p. 209.

where we have chosen, most unwisely, I am tempted to say insanelly, to place ourselves in the strange predicament of the free subjects of a monarchy going to coerce the free subjects of a republic, and to compel them to accept a citizenship which they decline and refuse." \*

The agitators who pulled the strings of the malcontent Boer movement were not slow to take note of his words and to utilize them for their own purposes. At a Boer meeting held on March 18, a letter to Mr. Gladstone was read, in which he was thanked for his sympathy, and a hope expressed that in case of a change of Government in England, "the injustice done to the Transvaal might find redress." †

In April, 1880, the elections took place and Mr. Gladstone came into power with a large majority. Would he maintain the pledge given over and over again to retain the Transvaal, or would he act in accordance with the tenor of his Midlothian denunciations?

Frere, anxious to allay the general anxiety, and in view of the meeting of the Cape Parliament on May 7, telegraphed (April 27) to the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Kimberley, to know if any change of policy was contemplated in regard to either the Transvaal or Confederation. On May 1 the answer came that the matter required consideration. On the 3rd Frere telegraphed again, saying that there was great uneasiness and that abandonment might entail civil war. On the 6th he telegraphed again that Krüger and Joubert had arrived at Capetown as emissaries of the malcontents, and begged for an early announcement of policy respecting the Transvaal. On the 12th Lord Kimberley replied that the sovereignty of the Queen over the Transvaal could not be relinquished, that he hoped for the speedy accomplish-

\* Midlothian Speeches, vol. i. p. 63.

† C. 2676, p. 29.

ment of confederation which would enable free institutions to be given to the Transvaal and Natal as already proposed.\*

But Mr. Gladstone could not so easily quench the fire which he had done so much to fan into a flame. Krüger and Joubert had come to Capetown to endeavour to hinder any advance towards confederation, and to do all they could to embarrass Mr. Sprigg's Government as representing loyalty to England; and they endeavoured to rekindle the embers of animosity between Dutch and English which Frere had in the last three years done so much to extinguish.

The turn of events sometimes causes public opinion to be greatly and justly excited, as on this native question in South Africa, after Isandhlwana, in a matter as to which it has little or no knowledge. In such a case it is apt to "put its conscience in commission," as Frere used to phrase it, and blindly follow any man or set of men who with sufficient self-assertion lay claim to superior knowledge. During these years a Society in London, called the Aborigines Protection Society, took upon itself the function of judging between the white and the black races in South Africa, and of arraigning the conduct of the white race whenever there was a question between the two. That a Society in London, with paid officers bound to justify their employment by finding something to complain of, should take upon itself to pronounce judgment upon difficult and complex questions between races in South Africa was, on the face of it, not more reasonable than

\* C. 2586, p. 12. Lord Kimberley to Sir B. Frere, May 20, 1880. On June 8, Mr. Gladstone wrote to the same effect to Krüger and Joubert in answer to their letter to him, "Our judgment is that the Queen cannot be advised to relinquish her sovereignty over the Transvaal." The Queen's speech on May 20 made a similar announcement. C. 2676, p. 466.

that a Society should be started at Capetown, say, to protect women and children in London. By its constitution, which was practically that of *advocatus diaboli* against the white man, such a Society must almost of necessity take a one-sided view, from which misapprehension and mischief could hardly fail to result, however carefully considered were the methods employed.

The methods employed by the Aborigines Protection Society bore some resemblance to those of mediæval Venice. The Blue-books of the time are full of letters from the Society to the Secretary of State, detailing stories of alleged oppression or cruelty, and demanding an inquiry ; or sometimes a question was asked to the same effect in Parliament. It would be many months before the reply to the inquiry could come back from the Cape, and in the mean time the story was circulated, and the refutation came too late to be listened to. The Society generally refused to give the name of its informant, or the particulars of time and place, so that, like the Lion's mouths at Venice, it offered an opportunity to any one—agitator, place-hunter or criminal—having a spite against a magistrate or official, to injure him anonymously ; and as the alliance between the Cape Opposition, the malcontent Boers, and the English Radicals became established, the Society practically acted as their instrument in prejudicing the English public against Frere and Mr. Sprigg.\* The fear of being denounced

\* The Society went so far as to charge Mr. Sprigg individually, as the Prime Minister, of having advocated the establishment of slavery in the Colony. He replied in a letter to Frere (September 15, 1879) : "Few men in this country or any other have a stronger aversion to slavery than I have. . . . All my early associations and sentiments were adverse to slavery. My father was a neighbour and friend of Clarkson's, and has stood by him on many an anti-slavery platform. One of my brothers bears the name of that great philanthropist. And in all my intercourse with the coloured races in this Colony I have been mindful of their rights and liberties as subjects of the

by some scoundrel to the Society, in some districts seriously interfered with and perverted the administration of justice.\* For, by keeping the names of its informants secret, it was necessarily imposed upon. In one instance a man, on whose testimony it placed special reliance, was discovered to be a disrobed clergyman, who had been in custody for swindling; another informant was a trader who had been in jail for gun-running.

The natural and constitutional place for making and investigating such charges was the Cape Parliament, where all concerned were within reach, and evidence could be tested when it was produced. Some vague denunciations and assertions were made there by the Opposition. "But when challenged by the Ministry to fair investigation and proof, in no instance did they succeed in fixing on the Government any blame for proved abuse or harsh disregard of native rights and interests." †

A conspicuous instance of sham philanthropy in alliance with unprincipled party-spirit interfering with the action of the Government and producing the most unfortunate consequences, occurred in the case of Basutoland.

The Basutos were a tribe who had been driven south by

Queen. But I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that though the object of the Aborigines Protection Society and their friends in this Colony is noble, they are utterly wrong in the course they pursue to attain that object."—C. 2482, p. 298.

\* Mr. H. Nixon, writing to Frere (March 4, 1880) from "Balmoral near Uitenhage," after giving instances of unpunished outrages and of the inefficiency of the police, says: "The lawlessness of the coloured races and their hopeless state of degradation, their drunkenness, and general dissolute habits may fairly be laid to the baneful influence of the Aborigines Protection Society, which has done everything it possibly could to paralyze the arm of the law in the execution of justice, and I consider the demoralization of the natives is entirely due to their persistent agitation. The drunkenness in this province is quite alarming and unprecedented."

† Unfinished manuscript of Frere's.



the Matabele branch of the Zulus in Chaka's time, half a century before, and after many wanderings and privations, which often reduced them to actual cannibalism, had settled under their chief Moshesh in an unoccupied tract of mountainous country in the Drakensberg chain, between the north-east corner of the Cape Colony, the Orange Free State, the Colony of Natal, and Kaffraria. There they thrived and increased, but, taking to cattle-lifting from the Boers of the Free State, got involved in a war with them, in which they would have been exterminated but for the intervention in their favour of Governor Sir P. Wodehouse in 1868. Basutoland was attached in 1871 to the Cape Colony, not by the desire of the Colony but by the action of the Colonial Office; and the Basutos continued to prosper. When diamonds were found at Kimberley many of them flocked thither and earned money as labourers, with which, amongst other things, they bought guns. They had no legitimate use for guns. There were no wild beasts and no game to shoot in their country. They carried their guns out of swagger, as proofs of independence, and some of them under the idea, which more or less pervaded the natives everywhere, that they only needed guns to profit by their numerical superiority and drive the whites into the sea. Morosi's rebellion in Basutoland and its suppression by the Colonial forces have been already mentioned. What was the Cape Colony to do to prevent a recurrence of rebellion and bloodshed? It was not their doing that they had the Basutos on their hands; but they had lately been warned that, unless by the special direction of the Secretary of State first obtained, they were not to expect any assistance whatever from British troops in case of another war with the natives. The Cape Government became therefore solely responsible for the public safety. A Disarmament Act had been passed about two

years before, under which the native tribes were being gradually disarmed and the natives prohibited from possessing guns. What reason was there to justify an exceptional treatment of the Basutos? The question was brought before the Cape Legislature, and after a long debate, the Cape Government was supported in its decision to carry out their disarmament.\*

The provisions of the original Disarming Act had been generally copied from the Irish Disarming Acts of the British Parliament. The Cape Ministers did not put it in force precipitately. They repeatedly extended the term for the voluntary surrender of the arms; they issued precise instructions to ensure a fair valuation and prompt payment for them, and provided for the issue of licenses to all who could show good cause for carrying arms. But, nevertheless, the Basutos were many of them unwilling to part with their guns, and, unfortunately, they were encouraged to persevere in their opposition by the French Protestant missionaries settled in the country, excellent men according to their lights, to whom the natives owed much, but, like too many missionaries, impatient of any authority other than their own amongst their converts, and not disposed to inculcate obedience to law as a virtue. The Aborigines Protection Society and a section of the English Radicals took the part of the Basutos, though it was distinctly the side of war as against peace. Lord

\* In a speech (June 1, 1880) Mr. Sprigg said: "I went to the Pitso in Basutoland and I saw a large body of cavalry almost as numerous as that which enabled Marlborough to win his great victory of Blenheim. The force amounted to something like seven or eight thousand men. I thought what a terrible thing it would be for this country if such a body of men, disciplined and trained to the use of their horses, and to a certain extent to the use of their arms, were to break out into open rebellion. . . . It was a force ready to obey at a moment's notice the word of the barbarous chiefs of that country."

Kimberley followed suit, and the Cape Opposition took up the same cry as a party weapon wherewith to assail the Government. The substance of every despatch and of every speech of a prominent speaker disapproving disarmament was promptly telegraphed to them. "The amount of sedition," writes Frere to Captain Mills (April 27, 1880), "preached by their friends from Saul Solomon, at Sea Point, up to the reverend Frenchmen on the skirts of the Drakensberg, is enough to inflame a much less excitable population."—"It will be little short of a miracle," he writes to Sir G. Colley (July 19), "if the poor Basutos are not talked into a rebellion; but I trust we may be spared such a calamity."

Mr. Sprigg went, in August, to Basutoland to do what he could to allay the storm. He writes to Frere from Maseru:—

"August 29, 1880.

"From numerous sources I have obtained information which satisfies me that the Peace Preservation Proclamation is not the real cause of the disaffection. It has simply discovered that which was latent. The late Chief Morosi, and the Chief Masupha, and a few others, never approved of the action of Moshesh in handing over the country and the people to the Queen. They have always been rebellious in their hearts, and frequently so in their actions. Advantage is now taken of the discontent excited by the Proclamation to induce the people to help two or three of the chiefs to attain the object of their desire—complete independence. . . .\*

"I regret to say that the close proximity of the Frere

\* Mr. Rose Innes, writing to Mr. Littleton, October 7, 1880, speaks of a "disclosure of widespread understanding among all tribes within and without the Colony. Basutos sent messengers in all directions to point out the favourable circumstances for such a combination. The colonists, they said, had nothing to depend on save Cape Mounted Rifles and Burghers, who would not be likely to turn out. Sir Bartle Frere's recall indicated that the Colony would not receive support from England."

State is very disadvantageous. Certain persons there are openly encouraging the Basutos in rebellion—selling them guns and ammunition and brandy extensively—telling them that all the English soldiers were killed at Isandhlwana, and that the Colonial Government is in a helpless condition as regards military forces.”

The Basuto Chief Letsea obeyed the Proclamation and was followed by the industrious, semi-civilized, and progressive portion of the tribe. But there was another party which clung to the ancient customs, the witch-doctor and the impi, in preference to the British magistrate and the native constable, vain and headstrong semi-savages, whose desire was a life of idleness, varied by war and plunder. Between the two parties there was constant discussion whether they should submit or resist. With so many flatterers and evil counsellors it would, indeed, have been a wonder if the counsel of the malcontents had not prevailed. But there can be little doubt that if it had not been for the sympathy shown to the insurgent party by the Aborigines Protection Society and the British Parliamentary clique who were working with it, by the Cape Opposition, and, lastly, by Lord Kimberley, there would have been no serious resistance to the disarmament, and no Basuto war.

The British Government had two courses open to them. They might have supported the disarmament, or, if they really considered the disarmament unjustifiable, they might have directed Frere, or his successor, to forbid any movement against the Basutos by the Colonial forces. Mr. Sprigg, the Colonial Secretary, would unquestionably have acquiesced in such a direction, for, on taking office in 1878, he had given adhesion to the constitutional principle, that the Colonial forces are under the orders of the Queen's Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kimberley took neither course.

He gave moral support to the Basutos, while acquiescing in the action of the Colonial forces in endeavouring to disarm them.\* The result was the unfortunate Basuto war, which broke out immediately after Frere's departure, and lasted intermittently for more than three years.

Nothing could be more indefensible than the course taken by the British Government in thus repudiating responsibility. It left the conviction on the minds of the colonists, and assented to the principle that the Crown had abdicated its prerogative of declaring war and peace, and that in future the Government of a colony might levy war on its own responsibility. Before any step had been taken by the Cape Government beyond giving notice that the law would be carried out, the malcontent party, led and instigated by Letsea's son Lerothodi and his half-brother Masupha, made an attack upon Letsea and those who like him had just sent in their guns, thus rebelling not only against the authority of the Colonial Government, but against their own paramount chief. Several loyal natives were killed, many more were plundered of all their property; and the rebels not only drove away or intimidated all who were loyally disposed to Letsea and the Government, but sent notices to the magistrates to evacuate the country.† In September nearly the whole tribe was in revolt, and was followed by a rising of the Basutos in East Griqualand, and of the

\* Frere writes from England (October 21, 1880) to Mr. Sprigg: "General Leicester Smyth, who will arrive with this, tells me he has the strictest possible orders on no account to allow the regular troops or their officers to aid in any operations against the natives without express permission from the Home Government. I hope to write and speak very strongly against this policy, which seems to me as cruel to the natives as it is unfair to the Colony."

See also a letter of Frere's to Lord Derby, published in the *Morning Post*, June 21, 1883.

† Frere to Colonial Office, November 18, 1880. C. 2740, p. 104.

Pondomese, Amaquate, Tembus, and other tribes on the eastern side of the Drakensberg. By the end of January, 1881, matters looked a little brighter, and there were hopes of peace. But these hopes were not realized. Mr. Sprigg writes to Frere :—

“March 1, 1881.

“You will see the messages which have passed between the Government and the Basutos, which I suspect will end in nothing ; and how can any good be expected to come of negotiations when the Home Government publicly censure the Colonial Ministry in the House of Commons, and practically tell the rebels to fight on for better terms ? And this is the way in which we are treated when we are the only loyal party in the Colony. . . . I now fully believe, what has often been said, that a section of the English Cabinet desire to dismember the Empire. Cannot some member of the House of Commons be got to take this matter up for us ?”

And again :—

“March 26, 1881.

“The Basutos have been constantly encouraged to anticipate the intervention of the Home Government in their favour and against the Colonial Government. And the rebels still hold out in the expectation of such relief being afforded them. General Clarke assures me that the censure of our proposals for peace pronounced by Grant Duff in the Commons (and which was immediately telegraphed here), has operated in Basutoland most distinctly in the direction of prolonging the rebellion.”

But to return to what was passing in Capetown in May, 1880.

The Boer emissaries, Krüger and Joubert, by way of embarrassing Ministers, set themselves to raise opposition to the Government proposals for a Confederation Conference. In the course of the past year fresh obstacles had arisen. The unsatisfactory settlement of Zululand, the condition of the Transvaal, the unrest of the natives

in Pondoland, Basutoland, and elsewhere, the unscrupulous virulence of a section of the Radical party in the British Parliament, who were in communication with the Boer leaders and with the Capetown opposition,\* the severance of the High Commissionership, and the want of any warm and judicious support from the British Government, made the mischievous ends of the malcontent emissaries only too easy of attainment.

Sir George Colley, Sir Garnet Wolseley's successor, arrived at Capetown the third week in June. He was received by Frere with his usual cordiality, stayed ten days with him at Government House, and fully reciprocated his kindly feeling, as was shown by the frank and friendly tone of their correspondence.

In a letter to Colley, Frere describes what happened in the Legislative Assembly as to the confederation proposals.

“ July 4, 1880.

“ It soon became evident that the Transvaal deputies had made a very effective impression on Dutch constituencies here. One member of the habitual supporters of the Government after another begged Mr. Sprigg to let him off voting, or to allow him to vote against the conference—not that he or his constituents disapproved of it, but that ‘they felt bound to show their sympathy with the Transvaal by voting against any conference till the Republic was restored.’ At last it became evident that if they pressed for a division, Ministers would be in a minority, and the question would be regarded as decided for some time to come. So, as the smaller of two evils, Ministers elected to accept the ‘previous question,’ which does not prevent the question of confederation coming on next session should circumstances be more favourable.” †

\* Mr. R. W. Herbert writes (June 24) : “ I hear that there is a system of press telegraphing, by which everything tending to show that you will not be supported here is promptly transmitted, while acts and words in your favour are suppressed.”

† In a letter to Mr. Leonard Courtney, M.P., a Dutch translation

Frere was not surprised by the result of the debate. "Since Sir Garnet Wolseley came out, every act of the Government at home has been to disintegrate and separate, instead of combining and uniting," and under the circumstances no decisive step in the direction of confederation could be looked for.

He writes to Sir George Colley again :—

"August 26, 1880.

"I hold that it is very immaterial to the best interests either of this country or of England whether union be effected by confederation, annexation or any other 'ation.' The thing wanted is unity of purpose and action in all matters which concern more than one province, and the utmost possible freedom for self-action with regard to matters which concern only one province or part of it.

"One great mistake hitherto seems to me to have been trying to hasten and push on what can only result from natural growth, which must of necessity be tardy if it is to be enduring. I saw this from the very early days of my stay in South Africa, and resisted, as well as I could, the precipitate action to which we were urged by indiscreet advocates of confederation both at home and out here. I was not at all surprised or disappointed by the result of the debate on the subject in our House of Assembly. Had the proposal for a conference been carried, the discussion at the conference would no doubt have done good. As it was, there was much valuable discussion in and out of Parliament on the subject, and it is well advanced by what passed. More might have been done could we have foreseen the great effect produced on the Dutch constituencies by the stumping oratory of Krüger and Joubert. . . . The best step Her Majesty's Government can now take is to interfere as little as possible with the

of which appeared in the *Zuid Afrikaan*, Messrs. Krüger and Joubert claim credit for this result : "We have done our duty," they say, "and have used all legitimate influence to cause the Conference proposals to fail." . . . "It is a satisfaction to us candidly and without reservation to inform you that the Conference proposal has failed also through our efforts" (C. 2655, p. 95). Immediately afterwards, however, a vote of confidence in Mr. Gordon Sprigg's Ministry was passed by an unusually large majority.



responsible Ministers of this Colony, but as soon as possible to reverse the disintegration policy of the past fifteen months and revert to the system which had been in force for some months before Wolseley came out, when all subjects of Imperial moment . . . passed through my office under 'flying seal,' thus giving me an opportunity of knowing what was proposed in Natal or the Transvaal, and expressing an opinion upon it. This alone would soon have proved a great step towards a virtual union of all South Africa, as regarded such subjects as customs, postage, steamer lines, railways, and the like."

Another cause of the failure of support to confederation was the impression that the hostility to Frere on the part of the English Liberal party was such that he was not likely to remain long in office. The colonists knew well enough what Frere intended by confederation, but they were reluctant to commit themselves to it if it was to be carried out by a new and unknown High Commissioner.

From the time of the receipt of the news of Isandhlwana to the General Election a year afterwards, the attacks of the English Radical party and Press on him had continued. He had been defended, if at all, feebly and inefficiently.\* A special correspondent in Zululand during the war, on being remonstrated with by an officer on Lord Chelmsford's staff for what he had written, replied, "Oh! but you should see my instructions;" which he said were "to write down Frere, whatever he might do." "For some time past it has been impossible for you to get any honest treatment from the Press," writes Mr. R. W. Herbert (August 5, 1880); and he encloses as an example a cutting from the *Pall Mall Gazette*, in which Mr. John Morley, the editor, "who has given much study to South African affairs, prints, and

\* Some speeches by Lord Carnarvon, Lord Cranbrook, and Lord Elcho are almost the only noteworthy exceptions in Parliament.

so endorses as correct, the allegation of the *Scotsman* that the appropriation of the Transvaal and the settlement in Zululand are parts of the 'foolish and dangerous policy of Sir Bartle Frere.' "

Constantly thwarted by the action of the Secretary of State, and never sure of being supported, his influence and his power for good were so impaired that the question frequently recurred to him whether in the interest of South Africa he ought not to resign ; but it seemed to him that his duty was to remain at his post—speaking his mind very plainly to the Secretary of State as he saw occasion—and to stand by the Cape Ministers who had done such loyal service to the Crown and to the Colony.

To Sir Robert Morier he writes—

"April 6, 1880.

"Some day I may be able to recount to you all I have had to go through since Isandhlwana caused a demand for scapegoats. I should have objected as strongly to being victim, as I should do to officiating as priest in such a sacrifice, but the solemn inquiry in Press and Parliament was over, judgment passed, and the victim condemned and sent off into the desert whilst we were still fighting Cetywayo.

"I sometimes wish now I had gone home at once and placed the blame on the shoulders which really deserved to bear it. But the Government at home assured me of unabated confidence and begged me to remain ; and the Government here begged me with obvious sincerity not to desert them, and I thought the work deserved more consideration than the workman. My only regret now is from doubts whether the course which would obviously have been best for my personal interests might not have been also best for the work. Time will show.

"Meanwhile I have seen no reason to doubt the soundness of any one principle on which I have acted, nor the truth and soundness of any advice I have given ; and as I do not serve either press or party, I am content to leave the result to time, and hope when I am gone that men like

you will judge that I served my Queen and country truly and well."

Mr. Gladstone, in courting the constituency of Midlothian in December, 1879, had joined in the hue and cry against Frere. He spoke of the Zulu war as "the record of ten thousand Zulus slain for no other offence than their attempt to defend against your artillery with their naked bodies their hearths and homes, their wives and families." \* . Naturally, therefore, it was expected that the chief actor in this alleged monstrosity would be recalled as soon as Mr. Gladstone came into power. But it soon became apparent that his words—like those about the Austrian Empire—were not so much the expression of his convictions as rhetorical phrases and sentiments adapted to the exigencies of an election contest. Lord Kimberley, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, treated Frere's continuance in office as a matter of course ; there was no indication of departure from the policy of the late Government, either as regarded the Transvaal or confederation, nor was there any expression of disagreement with Frere's course of action in any respect, either in Lord Kimberley's despatches or in his private letters.

But when the new Parliament met at Westminster in May, Ministers found many of their supporters greatly dissatisfied at this sudden cooling of the heat of the Midlothian invective. Notice of motion was given of an address to the Crown praying for Frere's removal.†

\* "Midlothian Speeches," vol. i. p. 209. He also said of Frere (p. 209) that he had not "ever been in a position of real responsibility," or "ever imbibed from actual acquaintance with British institutions the spirit by which British Government ought to be regulated and controlled." He attacked him also in reference to the Afghan policy. See chap. xxii. p. 436.

† Frere's recall prevented any debate taking place specifically on

Several members of Parliament met together two or three times about the end of May, and, at the suggestion of Mr. Courtney and Mr. Dillwyn, a memorial to Mr. Gladstone was drawn up, which was signed by about ninety of them, and sent to him on June 3, to the following effect:—

“To the Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., First Lord of the Treasury.

“We the undersigned, members of the Liberal party, respectfully submit that as there is a strong feeling throughout the country in favour of the recall of Sir Bartle Frere, it would greatly conduce to the unity of the party and relieve many members from the charge of breaking their pledges to their constituents if that step were taken.”

The first three signatures to this document were those of L. L. Dillwyn, Wilfred Lawson, and Leonard Courtney.

A more cynically candid document, perhaps, never was penned. The “unity of the party” and “pledges to constituents” are the only considerations even alluded to.

Probably the memorialists knew the man they were addressing. At any rate they must have felt that the following action of the Colonial Office was a move in anticipation of the formal expression of their wishes.

On May 31, the Colonial Office addressed the Treasury, suggesting that the special allowance of £2,000 a year,

that subject, but there was a debate (September 1, 1880) on the question of the annexation of the Transvaal, which incidentally raised the same matter. The speeches, though more temperate than in the debate of April, 1879, showed little acquaintance with the facts, for which there was no longer the same excuse; and Frere, as before, was very inadequately defended except by Lord Elcho. “I have given your memorandum and letter to Lord Elcho, who is the only man I know who has consistently stood by you, and who is willing and eager to fight your battle now,” writes Mr. Albert Grey; “at present members remember that they have committed themselves blindly to certain views at the General Election.”

granted to Frere at Lord Carnarvon's instance, and which was part of the conditions upon which Frere accepted office, should henceforth be stopped "under the altered circumstances of his position as High Commissioner." The Treasury concurring, on June 1 Lord Kimberley wrote in a despatch to Frere—

"I have the honour to acquaint you that, looking to the diminution of your duties, and the necessity of asking for a grant of £2,500 as a supplement to the salary of Sir G. Pomeroy Colley as Governor of Natal, in consequence of his appointment to be High Commissioner for South-East Africa, they have come to the conclusion that they could not justify the continuance of your special allowance."\*

It was not even correct that the Exchequer was at the extra cost of £2,500 in consequence of Sir G. Colley's appointment. The £2,500 was allowed him only on the understanding that his pay allowance as Commander of the Forces, as well as his own half-pay, should be included in it; and the Colonial Office took credit, when recommending the grant, for the saving of some £1500 effected in the military budget, so that the extra cost was only one, and not two thousand pounds.† And when the

\* C. 2601, p. 7.

† Sir G. Colley to Frere, June 28, 1880. Sir G. Colley arrived at Cape-town on his way to Natal, and went to stay with Frere just after the telegraph had announced to the public the docking of Frere's salary. He, however, did not hear of it till the morning he was leaving Government House after a ten days' visit. In the Colony it was interpreted as an intentional rebuff to Frere. Sir G. Colley was greatly pained at it. He wrote to Frere from Durban (June 28): "I cannot let this mail go back to Capetown without a line to thank you for all your kindness and hospitality to Lady Colley and myself during our stay at Cape-town, and to tell you how deeply I feel your warm kindness and ever-ready help and advice under circumstances hardly calculated to ensure a cordial welcome. One telegram in particular has been a constant source of pain and vexation to me since I saw it, for the

office was pressed upon Frere, he had accepted it only on condition of receiving such a salary as would enable him, notwithstanding the smallness of his private fortune, to "provide everything necessary to maintain the dignity of the position." In the course of three years, the duties and obligations of his office had greatly increased; and as he had anticipated, his salary, even with the extra allowance, had not sufficed to cover his expenses, and had left him with a deficit to be paid from his private means.\*

By Frere himself, and by the Cape press and public, the despatch was interpreted as a hint from the Government to resign. Lord Kimberley afterwards repudiated this interpretation. But, whatever was intended, it only strengthened Frere's resolve to remain at his post till actually recalled, lest it should be supposed that a question of personal emolument had any influence on his conduct at such a time.†

first time, in your room, and it does not diminish the annoyance to know that that telegram is not strictly true."

\* Sir B. Frere to Mr. G. T. Clark, October 16, 1880. See ch. xviii. p. 163.

† This was not the only attempt at docking Frere's salary.

Sir M. Hicks-Beach, before leaving office, had written a despatch in which he had treated the £2000 extra allowance to Frere as having been granted to meet travelling expenses, so that no extra sum could be claimed by him on that account. Lord Kimberley took up the point, but it had no foundation, and ultimately it was dropped.

But even this was not all.

The travelling expenses of the High Commissioner had always been paid by the Colonial Office as extras, and repaid by the Colonial Government of the Colony in which he travelled. This had already been done by the Cape Government in the case of Frere's expenses when he was living for seven months in barracks at King William's Town during the Transkei war. On the same principle the expenses of his journey, in 1879, through Natal and the Transvaal—which, being at the seat of war, and with war prices, were necessarily heavy, though he had not a single soldier in the Transvaal to guard him—would, in the

In the course of his reply to Lord Kimberley, he says—

“July 15, 1880.

“The duties which it was proposed to entrust to me when I first came here appeared so honourable and important that I would, as far as my means allowed, have undertaken them without any special reference to salary; and I only hesitated to do so from a doubt whether I could afford to undertake their proper discharge on a salary which I was assured was hardly adequate to the expenses of the office in the quietest time. Nothing was further from my intention than to haggle for payment then, and nothing is further now.

“It is unnecessary to assure Her Majesty’s Government that I have throughout thought less of the amount of salary withheld than of the important duties and useful influence withdrawn, rendering my task in future so much more difficult than it was before.

“If Her Majesty’s Government think the office can be better filled by another, the only favour I would ask is that they would distinctly say so. In making this request I may be permitted to remind your lordship that in the case of both Sir Garnet Wolseley’s and Sir George Colley’s appointments I was informed that my supersession was only temporary,\* I am now left to infer that it is intended to be permanent. Under such circumstances I am sure your lordship will not think it unseemly or unreasonable that I should ask for an explicit assurance of confidence to enable me to do the work still remaining to be done.”

But it was not long before the sacrifice to the “unity of the Liberal party” was completed.

natural course, have been reimbursed to the British Government by Natal and the Transvaal. But before the claim was made on them, all accounts relating to the war time had been by arrangement closed as between the Home Government and Natal; and the Transvaal had broken away all together. The Home Government, having thus by their own act lost the means of reimbursing themselves, demurred to paying what was due on this account to Frere. Ultimately, on his representing the facts and pressing his claim as a matter of right, it was paid, though with an ill grace.

\* This is distinctly stated in Sir M. Hicks-Beach’s last letter (April 22, 1880) before he went out of office.

On August 2, Frere received a telegraphic despatch from Lord Kimberley announcing his recall. It ran as follows:—

“August 1, 1880.

“There has been so much divergence between your views and those of Her Majesty’s present Government on South African affairs that they would not have thought it either desirable or fair towards yourself that you should remain at the Cape, had it not been for the special reason that there was a prospect of your being able materially to forward the policy of confederation. This special reason has now disappeared, not through any want of earnestness and ability on your part, but through the recent action of the Cape Parliament in refusing to take even the preliminary step of a conference, and Her Majesty’s Government have therefore with regret come to the conclusion that Her Majesty should be advised to replace you by another Governor.”

It was the first word Frere had heard, officially or privately, from Lord Kimberley, of any “divergence of views” between the British Government and himself; and it was the first time that it had been suggested to him that he was retained in office only for the special purpose of promoting confederation. But the news of the Cape Parliament having declined for the present any further step in the direction of confederation had reached England at a convenient time to constitute a plausible excuse for satisfying the anxiety of the memorialists as to the storm which threatened to ruffle the harmony of the Liberal party, and Frere was the Jonah thrown out to allay it.

At the news of his recall there arose for the second time a burst of sympathy from town, village, and farm, throughout the country, in terms of mingled indignation and sorrow.\* The addresses and resolutions, being

\* There are between sixty and seventy resolutions and addresses recorded in the Blue-book, all passed unanimously except in one case, at Stellenbosch, where a minority opposed the resolution. The



spontaneous at each place, varied much, and laid stress on different points, but in all there was a tone of deep regret, of conviction that Frere's policy and his actions had been wise, just, and merciful towards all men, of hope that the British Government and people would in time learn the truth. Some were worded in terms so strong and indignant as regarded the British Government that Frere had to insist on their being modified before he would forward them.

It is impossible to summarize them so as to convey an adequate sense of their collective force. One, from farmers in the East London district, expresses "sorrow and alarm" at his recall. "It is to your wise policy," it says, "we are indebted for the remnant of our property preserved to us from the late war and rebellion, which your Excellency nipped in the bud. . . . Although we have suffered severely by the late war, we know matters would have been even worse had the enemy been allowed to mature its plans for the destruction of the Colonies. May God Almighty bless you and grant you and yours a safe passage to the Mother Country, give you grace before our Sovereign Lady the Queen, and eloquence to vindicate your righteous cause before the British nation." \*

The Natal colonists say—

"We shall never forget that your Excellency personally shared with us in Natal the anxieties and perils that beset the Colony during the first weeks of the Zulu war. . . . We feel that in you we have had, and shall ever have, a true and earnest friend. . . . We confidently believe that when the truth is better known at home, justice will be done to your Excellency." †

spokesman of the minority, however, based his opposition not on Frere's general policy, still less on his character, but as a protest against an Excise Act, which was one of Mr. Sprigg's measures.

\* C. 2740, p. 22.

† C. 2740, p. 23.

The Malays and other Orientals, of whom there is a considerable population at Capetown, looked upon Frere, an Indian statesman, as their special property. The address from the Mahomedan subjects of the Queen says:—

“We regret that our gracious Queen has seen fit to recall your Excellency. We cannot help thinking, it is through a mistake. The white subjects of Her Majesty have had good friends and good rulers in former Governors, but your Excellency has been the friend of white and coloured alike.” \*

The address of the natives\* of Mount Coke tells with pathetic simplicity the old story of the failure of the British Government to place confidence in their South African Governors.

“Our hearts are very bitter this day. We hear that the Queen calls you to England. We have not heard that you are sick, then why have you to leave us? . . . By you we have now peace. We sleep now without fear. Old men tell us of a good Governor Durban (Sir Benjamin Durban) who had to leave before his good works became law; but red coals were under the ashes which he left. Words of wicked men, when he left, like the wind blew up the fire, and the country was again in war. So also Sir George Grey, a good Governor, good to tie up the hands of bad men, good to plant schools, good to feed the hungry, good to have mercy and feed the heathen when dying from hunger. He also had to leave us. We do not understand this. But your Excellency is not to leave us. Natal has now peace by you; we have peace by you because God and the Queen sent you. Do not leave us. Surely it is not the way of the Queen to leave her children here unprotected until peace is everywhere. . . . We shall ever pray for you as well as for the Queen. These are our words to our good Governor, though he turns his back on us.” †

What the feeling of the Natal Zulus towards Frere was,

\* C. 2740, p. 63.

† C. 2740, p. 46.

is expressed in a letter from Mr. J. Eustace Fannin, who was Border Agent in Natal, during the war, to Mr. Littleton:—

“August 14, 1880.

“From all parts of South Africa Sir B. Frere has received from the European colonists expressions of approval and gratitude . . . but he has not had the same opportunity of knowing the Natal natives’ view of the matter, and as I have had many chances of ascertaining what their true opinion is, both whilst holding office during the war and since while travelling through this Colony, I think I am justified in stating what it is.

“They all believe that Cetywayo had determined to try conclusions with the white man, and that had he not been stopped by the decided action of the High Commissioner, the Zulu impis would have overrun Natal as they did in Chaka’s time. I have overheard the natives in discussing the matter among themselves applaud his Excellency’s action as the best proof they have yet had of the wisdom (ukuhlakanipa) of the English Government.

“Any one who knows what a hostile inroad of a Zulu impi means can understand their thankfulness at being saved from its ruthless cruelty. Had it crossed into Natal, the Natal natives would have been the principal sufferers; each Zulu warrior was anxious to wash his assegai, and he would have done so to his heart’s content among the thousands of unprotected women and children living in the native locations near the Zulu border.

“His Excellency is being recalled because of the clamour raised by people at a distance unable to understand the true state of affairs, but he may rest assured that by those on the spot his memory will be long cherished with gratitude for his quickness in discerning the great danger that threatened them, and his promptitude in averting it.”

Mr. Sprigg writes (August 29, 1880)—

“I don’t feel able yet to give expression to my sentiments of profound regret that Her Majesty’s Government have thought it advisable to recall you from the post which you have held for more than three years with such conspicuous advantage to South Africa. They have given way to pressure on the part of a section of their supporters who in their ignorance and passion have driven from South Africa

the best friend it has ever known. . . . For myself I may say that in the midst of all the difficulties with which I have been surrounded, I have always been encouraged and strengthened by the cheerful view you have taken of public affairs, and that I have never had half an hour's conversation with your Excellency without feeling a better, and, I believe, a wiser man."

The following letter is from Mr. (now Sir John) Akerman, a member of the Legislative Council of Natal, who, though an advocate for confederation, had thought Lord Carnarvon rather too impatient and too hurried in the methods he employed :—

" August 9, 1880.

" Having become aware of your recall to England from the office of Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, etc., etc., I cannot allow your departure to take place without conveying to you, which I hereby do, the profound sense I feel of the faithful and conscientious manner in which you, to the best of your judgment and belief, have in my opinion endeavoured to fulfil those engagements which, at the solicitation of Great Britain, you entered upon in 1877. The policy was not your own, but was thrust upon you. Having given in London, in 1876, advice to pursue a different course in South Africa from the one then all the fashion and ultimately confided to yourself, it affords me the greatest pleasure to testify to the consistency of the efforts put forth by you to carry out the (then) plan of those who commissioned you, and availed themselves of your acknowledged skill and experience. Though my own advice was unheeded, I yet feel that you have done your duty in South Africa in accordance with your promises. I rejoice, therefore, that you did not resign your post, but elected to impose the responsibility of a recall on those who have by so doing broken their faith with South Africa and especially with yourself. As a public man of long standing in South Africa, I would likewise add that since the days of Sir G. Grey, no Governor but yourself has grasped the native question here at all. Britain, through her local officials, has bolstered up, protected, and conserved a system of heathendom unworthy of her instincts and pretensions and injurious to the natives, and I feel confident that had your full

authority been retained, and not harshly wrested from you, even at the eleventh hour initiatory steps of a reformatory nature with respect to the natives would have been taken, which it is the duty of Britain to follow while she holds her sovereignty over these parts."

"I can never forget the many kindnesses I have received from you, and how much I owe to your action when I served with you, for you made service a pleasure," writes Colonel Lanyon (August 14), using almost the same words as Sir H. Green and Sir W. Merewether in old Indian days.

The valued companion of his journey to the Transvaal, Stegmann, who had means of knowing better perhaps than any one every pulsation of opinion among his Dutch countrymen, both in the Cape Colony and in the Transvaal, writes, regretting his inability to be present to see him sail—

"September 7, 1880.

"I venture to think there is no one there whose attachment to your Excellency is greater, whose conviction that you have been wronged is stronger, or whose grief at your leaving is intenser than mine. . . . I rejoice to think how the well-nigh unanimous expression of opinion throughout the country must have cheered your Excellency; and I have no doubt the Home Government have by this time discovered how little aware they were of the confidence reposed in your Excellency by the people whom you came to unite, and who would in due time have been delighted and proud to see you at the head of the South African Union. . . . Had I been on the staff, or on the spot, . . . I might have been presumptuous enough to ask your Excellency to point out to Lord Kimberley [in reply to the despatch of recall] that unless they meant to annul the annexation the effect of the recall on the Boer mind must be sorely detrimental to the prospects of a speedy settlement of affairs in the Transvaal and of the greatly desired union."

The feeling of the old loyal Dutch families is shown in a letter written to Frere two months after he had left, when native and other troubles were gathering fast. It is

from Madame Koopmans de Wet, a lady of old family, Dutch of the Dutch, written in sore grief and trouble, public and private.

“November 16, 1880.

“It is with feelings of the deepest sorrow that I take the liberty of addressing these lines to you. Yesterday brought the startling news that that Christian soldier Commandant von Linsingen is killed, as also his noble boy of fifteen years old.

“Sir Bartle, Captain von Linsingen went to try and put down this fearful rebellion in Tembuland. Never need his precious blood have been shed had not these poor misguided savages been encouraged and almost told to revolt. What will those in England who have made it a business of their lives to proclaim to the world that the Imperial Government would not assist in any wars of ours, now say? This general rising is due to those words. Surely might they have waited till asked to refuse,—the more so as the Basutos are a legacy from them to us. And what is to be the end of all this now, and now particularly do the Cape people miss *their* Governor, for now superior qualities in everything is [are] wanted. Dear Sir Bartle, you know the material we have; it is good, but who is to guide? It is plain to every thinking mind that our position is becoming more critical every day. . . .

“But with deep sorrow let me say, England’s, or rather Downing Street’s treatment has not tightened the bonds between the mother country and us. You know we have a large circle of acquaintances, and I cannot say how taken aback I sometimes am to hear their words. See, in all former wars there was moral support in the thought—England, our England, is watching over us; it strengthened us and kept, to a certain measure, the savage in control. Now there is but one cry, ‘We will have no Imperial help.’ Why is this? We have lost confidence in a Government who could play with our welfare; and among the many injuries done us, the greatest was to remove from among us a ruler such as your Excellency was.”

Frere’s successor was to be Sir Hercules Robinson. As he was in New Zealand and could not get to the Cape for

some months, Sir George Strahan was appointed *ad interim* Governor. But Frere was directed not to await even the latter's arrival, but to leave by the mail steamer early in September.

As the day drew near, the Capetown people were at their wit's end to express adequately their feelings on the occasion. It was suggested that on the day he was to embark, the whole city should mourn with shops closed, flags half-mast high, and in profound silence. But more cheerful counsels prevailed.

He was to leave by the *Pretoria* on the afternoon of September 15. Lady Frere had been so ill that it was doubtful whether he would not have to leave, in compliance with orders, without her. But she recovered so as to be able to go, and went on board an hour or two before him, so as to avoid the excitement of the scene which followed.

After midday all business was suspended. Special trains had brought in contingents from the country to swell the crowds in the town. The open space in front of Government House, Plein Street, Church Square, Adderley Street, the Dock Road, the front of the railway station, the wharves, the housetops, and every available place whence a view of the procession could be procured were closely packed. The carriage with the Governor, two of his daughters, and Mr. Littleton left Government House at half-past four,—Volunteer Cavalry furnishing the escort, and Volunteer Rifles, Engineers, and Cadets falling in behind,—and amid farewell words and ringing cheers moved slowly along the streets gay with flags and decorations. At the dock gates the horses were taken out and men drew the carriage to the quay, where the *Pretoria* lay alongside. Here the General, the Ministers, and other leading people, were assembled; and the 91st Regiment, which had been drawn up, presented arms, the

Band played "God save the Queen," and the Volunteer Artillery fired a salute as the Governor for the last time stepped off African soil.

There had been some delay at starting, the tide was ebbing fast, the vessel had been detained to the last safe moment, and she now moved out slowly, and with caution, past a wharf which the Malays, conspicuous in their bright-coloured clothing, had occupied; then, with a flotilla of boats rowing alongside, between a double line of yachts, steam-tugs and boats, dressed out with flags and dipping their ensigns as she passed; and lastly, under the stern of the *Boadicea* man-of-war, whose yards were manned and whose crew cheered. The guns of the castle fired the last salute from the shore, which was answered by the guns of the *Boadicea*; and in the still bright evening the smoke hung for a brief space like a curtain, hiding the shores of the bay from the vessel. A puff of air from the south-east cleared it away and showed once more in the sunset light the flat mass of Table Mountain, the "Lion's Head" to its right festooned with flags, the mountain slopes dotted over with groups thickening to a continuous broad black line of people extending along the water's edge from the central jetty to the breakwater basin. The vessel's speed increased, the light faded, and the night fell on the last, the most glorious and yet the saddest day of Frere's forty-five years' service of his Queen and country.

For intensity of feeling and unanimity it would be hard in our time to find a parallel to this demonstration of enthusiasm for a public servant. The Capetown people are by race and habit the reverse of demonstrative; yet it was noticed that day, as it had been noticed when Frere left Sattara thirty years before, and again when he left Sind twenty-one years before—a sight not uncommon two



or three centuries ago, but almost unknown among men of English or German race in our day—that *men* looking on were unable to restrain their tears. At Sattara and in Sind the regret at losing him was softened by the knowledge that his departure was due to a recognition of his merit; that he was being promoted in a service in which his influence might some day extend with heightened power to the country he was leaving. It was far otherwise when he left the Cape. On that occasion the regret of the colonists was mingled with indignation, and embittered by a sense of wrong.

No one who has not associated with colonists in their homes can rightly enter into the mixed feelings with which they regard the mother country. As with a son who is gone forth into the world, there is often on one side the conceit of youth and impatience of restraint, shown in uncalled-for acts of self-assertion or in dogmatic speech; and on the other side a supercilious want of sympathy with the changed surroundings, the pursuits and the aspirations of a younger generation. It seems as if there were no bond left between the two. But a day of trial comes; parent or offspring is threatened by a stranger; and then it is seen that the old instinct and yearnings are not dead, but only latent. Amid many mistakes, the mother country had hitherto not been forgetful of its natural obligations to its South African offspring. Lately, at a critical time, it had bestowed the best of its gifts, it had sent as Governor, a statesman trained from youth and practised in carrying out the best traditions of the old country, and with a varied experience such as probably no other living Englishman possessed—such as could not possibly be gained by any colonial politician, to whom statesmanship in the early days of a Colony comes but as an interlude in the struggle for subsist-

ence. He had not flattered the colonists. So far from it, he had single-handed dismissed a Ministry commanding a majority in a Legislative Assembly sensitively jealous of any interference with its prerogative. Yet so completely had he gained their confidence and seized upon their affections, that with him and him only of living statesmen as their guide, east and west, Cape colonist and Natalian, Englishman and Dutchman, were ready to join in one great confederation, bound together by common loyalty to the British Crown. With strange perversity the consummation of this great work was marred by one British Ministry and destroyed by the Ministry which succeeded it. The gift of bread from the parent country was exchanged for a stone. Those who on that fateful evening watched the hull of the *Pretoria* slowly dipping below the western horizon felt that if, as seemed only too probable, dismemberment of the British Empire in South Africa were sooner or later to follow, the fault did not lie with the colonists. It was not they or their Ministers who were disloyal, it was the mother country which was looking on in apathy while its Government sacrificed the welfare of South Africa and endangered the integrity of the Empire, in order to conciliate an ignorant and fanatical clique and to maintain a party majority in the House of Commons.

## CHAPTER XXI.

### THE BREACH OF FAITH.

The Boer Emissaries at Capetown—Outbreak of the Rebellion—Aylward—The Surrender—Sufferings of Loyalists—Bechuana-land—Zululand—Cetywayo restored—Frere policy in South Africa.

BEFORE following the course of the few remaining years of Frere's life after his return to England, it will be convenient to anticipate and to trace shortly the chain of events in the Transvaal and Zululand after his departure from South Africa. For although his responsibility for the administration of those provinces had ceased finally upon Sir Garnet Wolseley's arrival to supersede him in July, 1879, yet events there had so important a bearing on Cape questions, and especially on that of Federation, that, as has been related, he had had frequently to express his views in reference to them in writing to the Secretary of State from Capetown. Nor did his endeavours to make the truth known, and to bring about—if it were possible—that right should be done, cease after his return to England.

The Boer leaders, Krüger and Jorissen, when, as already described, they came to Capetown in May, 1880, had not confined themselves to intrigues in the Legislative Assembly. They had begun to make preparations for

armed rebellion. A Dutch gentleman of high standing, an intimate and attached friend of Frere's, hearing this, went, on his own responsibility, to remonstrate with them. Frere, he reminded them, had always recommended that the Transvaal should have local self-government granted it, and ultimately a constitution as liberal as that of the Cape Colony. What more could they reasonably ask? Would they have an interview with Frere? They declared their willingness to accept such a constitution, provided the annexation were rescinded and the English flag hauled down for a single day as a confession of national error and apology for national wrong-doing. They declined, however, to allow this proposal to be officially laid before Frere, "because the Governor's power was gone, and he was, they were assured, to be recalled." \* Frere asked them to postpone their departure from Capetown till Sir George Colley, then daily expected, arrived. They did so, and Colley, on his arrival, was applied to by the same peacemaker and asked if he would see the Boer emissaries. This, however, he declined to do, and in the course of the conversation which ensued, he indicated that he attached little importance to the strength of any resistance which might be made by the malcontents. The other ventured to remonstrate, assuring him that he underestimated their fighting power.† But Colley was not to be persuaded.

When Frere left South Africa, he added to his telegraphic message of farewell to Colonel Lanyon the following words:—"Tell Pretorius and all sincere

\* Frere to Mr. J. M. Maclean, April 22, 1881.

† He mentioned, as a proof of their skill as marksmen, that a boy of thirteen or fourteen would be sent out to bring home a head of game for the table, and—powder and lead being expensive—as a matter of course only one cartridge was given him, the contingency of his making a miss not being admissible.

Transvaal men they have my best wishes for their prosperity, and that they will see, in joining you to give good government to the country, the best road to the same independence as their friends here [*i.e.* at Capetown] have achieved." And soon after reaching England he took an opportunity of impressing on Lord Kimberley the necessity of speedily granting the Boers a constitution "otherwise there would be serious trouble there."

Matters at first seemed to be quieting down. Colonel Lanyon, though he objected to the too rapid reduction in the numbers of the troops, which, in spite of Colonel Bellairs's protest, were, in obedience to pressure from the British Government, being sent home, reported on the whole favourably. But the encouragement given to the malcontents by British sympathizers during the elections had produced an effect not to be easily overcome. Mr. Gladstone, speaking at Peebles of Cyprus and the Transvaal, had said—

"If these acquisitions were as valuable as they are valueless, I would repudiate them, because they are obtained by means dishonourable to the character of the country." \*

These and similar words had flattered the vanity of the Boers, increased their confidence, and given permanence to their attitude of disaffection. Nor was their excitement allayed, or their respect for British rule increased, when they were made aware that these expressions, after

\* In another speech he had said: "They [the Conservative Government] have annexed the Transvaal territory inhabited by a free European Christian Republican community, which they thought proper to bring within the limits of a monarchy, although out of eight thousand persons in that Republic qualified to vote upon the subject, we are told, and I have never seen the statement officially contradicted, that 6,500 protested against it."

serving the purpose of the Opposition speaker at Midlothian, were repudiated by him in practice, when he became Minister, without so much as a word of apology or excuse to those whom they had deceived.

In December came the news that on the 16th the Boers had issued a proclamation declaring the re-establishment of their Republic, but deprecating an appeal to arms, pending negotiations. Nevertheless, on the same day a Boer force made an armed attack on Potchefstroom.

On the 20th two hundred and fifty men of the 94th Regiment, with a long column of baggage and several women, were marching with no suspicion of hostilities towards Pretoria. When the column was near Brouckers Spruit, thirty-eight miles from Pretoria, it was met by five hundred armed and mounted Boers. A parley ensued, during which the Boers took up sheltered positions surrounding the column; and when Colonel Anstruther, who was in command, declared his intention of proceeding to his destination, notwithstanding the Boers' prohibition, a fire was poured in upon his force, which in a few minutes killed or wounded 157 of them, only two of the officers being left unwounded. The rest had no choice but to surrender.\*

\* Much was said at the time by British sympathizers of the kindness shown by the Boers to the prisoners and wounded of their antagonists. Colonel Lanyon, writing from the scene of action at Pretoria, gives a different account. He says—

“The Boers were very clever in being kind to our wounded soldiers, for they well knew that such action would obtain sympathy at home. But where it was impossible for their deeds to become known their conduct was far from creditable to them. Poor Clarke and Raaf were kept for two months in a dark room, and were only allowed out twice for exercise. Barlow was robbed of everything, and only left the clothes he stood in. A Hollander, who is secretary to Cronji at Potchefstroom, is still wearing the rings of poor Captain Falls, who was shot. Englishmen have been murdered, flogged, and robbed of everything. The Boers at Potchefstroom forced the prisoners

Frere, at the first intelligence of the outbreak, at once suspected who might be the principal instigator.

It was not a Boer, or a man of Dutch descent, who had applied the match which had kindled the combustible elements of insurrection.

In a memorandum for the Colonial Office, Frere says—

“December 21, 1880.

“It may be well to inquire the present whereabouts of Mr. Aylward.

“He was one of the principal advisers of Messrs. Krüger and Joubert when they attempted to turn the Zulu war to their own account in 1879. He was said to be an ex-Fenian, pardoned for turning on his accomplices in the murder of the policeman at Manchester, subsequently tried for murder at the Diamond Fields, and a leader of foreign mercenaries under President Burgers.

“He offered himself to me for employment in Natal during the Zulu war, professing to be in correspondence with Mr. Froude and others whom I knew in England. He is a clever but very dangerous and untrustworthy man. When I last heard of him he was editing the *Witness* newspaper in Natal, and generally writing in a very seditious and mischievous strain, and if still in that neighbourhood, I have no doubt he has taken an active part in advising the present outbreak as a diversion in favour of his Irish friends.”

And he writes to Mr. F. Greenwood, editor of the *St. James's Gazette* :—

of war to dig their trenches, and some were shot from the Fort while so employed. Woite and Van der Linden were shot as spies, because they had been in the Boer camp and left it some days before they proclaimed the Republic. Carolus, a Cape boy, was shot by Boer court-martial because he left the Fort when food became scarce. A white man and nine natives were similarly shot without any trial. Explosive bullets were used, notwithstanding that Colonel Winsloe pointed out to the Boer leader in a letter that such was against the rules of war.”

There is abundant evidence that many acts of treachery and barbarity similar to and worse than those referred to by Colonel Lanyon were perpetrated by the insurgent Boers.

"December 28, 1880.

"Birdwood tells me you would like to know my reason for believing the present outbreak in the Transvaal to be of Irish origin. I have told the story so often officially and unofficially that I thought it an oft-told tale; and you must pardon me if I only repeat what you have heard before.

"In 1879, when I was among the Boers in the Transvaal, I found that the real wire-pullers of their committee were foreigners of various nationalities, notably some Hollanders (not Africanders) imbued with German Socialist Republicanism, and an Irishman of the name of Aylward. I was told he was a man of great natural ability, educated as a solicitor, an ex-Fenian, pardoned under another name (Murphy, I think) for turning Queen's Evidence against others who had murdered the policeman at Manchester. Emigrating to the Diamond Fields, he was tried, convicted, and suffered imprisonment there for homicide. When he came out of prison he betook himself to the Transvaal and had a command of foreign free lances under Mr. Burgers, then President of the Transvaal Republic, in his unsuccessful attempt to take Secocoeni's stronghold. After the annexation of the Transvaal he came to England and published one of the few readable books on the Transvaal, and went out to Natal during the darkest hours of our Zulu troubles, seeking employment; but he was an impossible man, and was urging the Boers to rise at the same time that he was offering his services to me and Lord Chelmsford. Finally he settled at Pietermaritzburg, where he was, when I last heard of him, as editor of the *Witness*, writing anti-English republicanism and sedition with much ability, especially when opposing the Cape Government and its governor, whom he never forgave for warning the Boers against following Fenian advice. When I was in the Transvaal and afterwards I found him always connected with any opposition to the English Government. He knew all the leaders of the simple-minded but very suspicious Boers, and had gained their ear, so that he had no difficulty in persuading them to reject any good advice I offered them, — 'Wait-a-bit' being always the most acceptable suggestion you can offer to a Boer.

"Directly I heard of the attack on our troops in the Transvaal, I felt assured that my old acquaintance was



pulling the wires with a view to create a diversion in favour of his old colleagues in Ireland.

"The attack took place apparently near the farm of Solomon Prinsloo, one of the most bitter malcontent Boers, who was always a firebrand, and who, when I visited the Boer camp in 1879, was with difficulty held back by Pretorius and Krüger from directing an attack upon us in Pretoria. I very much doubt whether without some such external instigation, the Boers would have broken out. . . .

"The facts I have mentioned and many more about Aylward are on record in Scotland Yard,\* and in the Colonial Office, and I am anxious you should know the truth and not attribute too much of the blame in this sad business to the unfortunate misguided Boers, the victims of his bad advice, still less to any fault of Colonel Lanyon's administration." †

\* Sir E. Henderson, then commanding the London police, writes to Frere in answer to a letter of his (March 6, 1881): "I just managed to get a note to Sir Frederick Roberts, as he left yesterday morning, enant Mr. Aylward. The record of him at Scotland Yard tallies so far entirely with the account recently published in the newspapers. He is a born traitor and conspirator, and would betray and conspire against any one and anything. There can be no doubt that to the best of his not inconsiderable ability he has helped to foster this unhappy movement on the part of the Boers, and incurred an amount of responsibility which may some day prove inconvenient, unless he gets a chance to betray them."

† That the legitimate Boer leaders were not at first prepared to proceed to extremities appears probable from the following letter of Colonel Lanyon's, written from Pretoria:—

"Once more we are in a state of siege here, only this time affairs have suddenly and, as it were, unexpectedly, even to the leaders of the Boers, assumed a much more serious aspect than was the case before. I say unexpectedly, for I believe the decision that they should start their Republic was entirely an impulse of the moment and acted upon there and then. I know that the leaders were very anxious to get a bridge to retreat over, for they wanted some of the town people to go out and interview them in order to bring about mediation, and I was in great hopes that it would have been possible. — came in on the 15th and stated that both Krüger and Pretorius had had a long talk with him the day before to this effect. Whether they were in earnest or not remains to be proved, but it is strange that on the evening of the 15th the whole camp moved away to Heidelberg, and that their proclamation was sent to Potchefstroom to be printed. . . ."

Frere proved to be correct in his conjecture. Aylward had at once joined the insurgents; he was on Joubert's staff and was one of their acknowledged leaders.\* Sir George Colley had been warned against him, but had replied that he found him useful in getting him information. Afterwards, when Colley was killed, it was Aylward who, as "military secretary" to Joubert, objected to giving up his body, on the ground that the messenger sent for it was not of sufficient rank. Nor was he a solitary, unsupported adventurer. Money to stir up the insurrection was coming in from the Irish rebel societies. The Transvaal was one of the points of attack of the anarchical plots which had their head-quarters in Ireland and America.†

The insurrection did not draw its forces from the Transvaal alone. Many joined from the Orange Free State and from elsewhere. It had attractions for the vagabond and floating population which on the borders of civilization "loathes a law," and in Africa, especially a law which has anything to say in restraint of dealings with, or conduct towards the natives. Burger's Republic had been an aggregation of farmers and adventurers doing each pretty much what was right in his own eyes. Anarchy

\* Major-General Hope Crealock writes to Frere (January 7, 1881): "A young Irishman named S——, who knew Aylward in Natal, and who was under my command in the Natal Pioneers, called on me to-night and told me Aylward formerly used to boast of being a Fenian, and vowed he would pay the English Government off for what he had got, by raising the Boers whenever Ireland was rising; and within the last few days has written to him saying he gloried in being one of the instigators of the present Boer revolt, etc., etc. He wrote from Utrecht. . . ."

Aylward was the author and composer of the Boers' "Solemn Oath and Covenant."

† Major Le Caron stated in his evidence before the Parnell Commission and repeated in his book that money was sent by the Irish Rebel Societies to stir up the Transvaal rebellion.

and licence had brought them to the brink of destruction by the Zulu impis, and they had cheered the red-coats as they entered Pretoria to support Shepstone and maintain order. But they had looked on, unaiding, as though indifferent to the issue, while the red-coats, shedding their blood like water, had relieved the Transvaal once for all from the Zulu terror. Anarchy and licence would be safer now, and now they would shoot the red-coats and get rid of them, and henceforth have, as far as might be, no laws and no taxes.

And they did shoot the red-coats. Colley entered upon the campaign with a force so inadequate that the insurgents, confident of success, repulsed the British troops with great loss on three separate occasions, in the last of which Sir George Colley was killed. These successes had the additional bad effect of obtaining for them sympathy and adhesion among the Dutch population elsewhere, and there was danger lest out of the war should arise a bitter hostility between Dutch and English throughout South Africa.

All this was bad enough. What followed was far worse. In the Queen's speech (January, 1881) was the following sentence: "A rising in the Transvaal has recently imposed upon me the duty of taking military measures with a view to the prompt vindication of my authority, and has of necessity set aside for the time being any plans for securing to the European settlers that full control over their own local affairs, without prejudice to the interests of the natives which I have been desirous to confer." The method chosen of vindicating the Queen's authority was to treat with successful rebels in arms. From the time of the outbreak of the insurrection the British Government had, through Brand, the President of the Orange Free State, been endeavouring to negotiate with the

insurgents. And after Colley's death at Majuba Hill, it gradually became known that the plighted word of the British Crown, over and over again pledged to retain the Transvaal, on the faith of which hundreds of Europeans had settled in the country and staked their all, and on which seven hundred thousand natives relied for protection, was to be deliberately repudiated and broken.\*

The details of the surrender were entrusted to a Commission, of which the British representatives were Sir

\* Mr. Rider Haggard, who had been Shepstone's private secretary, writes to Frere from Newcastle, Natal, close to where the fighting had taken place :—

“June 6, 1881.

“I do not believe that more than half of those engaged in the late rebellion were free agents, though once forced into committing themselves they fought as hard as the real malcontents. . . . The natives are the real heirs to the soil, and should surely have some protection and consideration, some voice in the settlement of their fate. They outnumber the Boers by twenty-five to one, taking their numbers at a million and those of the Boers at forty thousand, a fair estimate, I believe. . . . As the lash and the bullet have been the lot of the wretched Transvaal Kafir in the past, so they will be his lot in the future. . . . After leading all these hundreds of thousands of men and women to believe that they were for once and for ever the subjects of Her Majesty, safe from all violence, cruelty, and oppression, we have handed them over without a word of warning to the tender mercies of one, where natives are concerned, of the cruelest white races in the world.

“Then comes the case of the loyal Boers, men who believed us and fought for us, and are now, as a reward for their loyalty, left to the vengeance of their countrymen, a vengeance that will most certainly be wreaked, let the Royal Commission try to temper it as they will.

“Lastly, there are the unfortunate English inhabitants, three thousand of whom were gathered during the siege in Pretoria alone, losing their lives in a forsaken cause. I can assure you, sir, that you must see these people to learn how complete is their ruin. They have been pouring through here, many of those who were well-to-do a few months since, hardly knowing how to find food for their families.”

Hercules Robinson, Sir Henry de Villiers, and Colonel Evelyn Wood. Every point, however unjust and unreasonable, demanded by the Boers was yielded. Those who had murdered Englishmen, or who had otherwise violated the usages of war, were to have been tried. Even this was in no instance carried out. Either they were not brought to justice at all, or a jury was impanelled from which Englishmen were excluded. Upon the report of the Commission was founded the "Convention of Pretoria" (August, 1881). Nominally the Queen's supremacy as "Suzerain" was retained. How much that was worth was indicated shortly after at a banquet at Pretoria, at which the British representative was present, when the Queen's health was drunk, with ironical cheers, *last* of all the political toasts.

Amongst the English in South Africa the consternation and resentment were intense and universal. But there were no adequate means for loyal men to give expression to their feelings, for it was practically impossible, in the midst of a population of mixed races, to denounce an act of the British Government without at the same time appearing to denounce the British connection. It was difficult to restrain the people, but it was done. Mr. R. W. Murray of the *Cape Times* even refused to advertise a notice of a public meeting in his paper, fearing lest if a meeting were called the British flag should be pulled down.\*

Letter after letter reached Frere from his friends in South Africa full of grief and indignation. They knew

\* Mr. R. W. Murray to Sir B. Frere, May 16, 1881 :—

"Ask your English statesmen," he writes, "if, in the history of the world, there was ever such a cruel desertion of a dependency by the parent State. How can England hope for loyalty from South Africans? The moral of the Gladstone lesson is that you may be anything in South Africa but loyal Englishmen."

that, if he could not help, he would at least sympathize with them.

Colonel Lanyon, who since the first outbreak had been shut up in Pretoria, writes:—

“March 29, 1881.

“Last night the saddest news I ever received in my life came in the shape of a letter from Wood. . . . After three Secretaries of State, three High Commissioners, and two Houses of Commons had said that the country should not be given back, it seems a terrible want of good faith to the loyalists that this decision should have been arrived at. The scene this morning was a heart-breaking one; the women, who have behaved splendidly all through the siege, were crying and wringing their hands in their great grief; the children were hushed as if in a chamber of death; and the men were completely bowed down in their sorrow—well they might, for the news brought home ruin to many and great loss to all. I am ashamed to walk about, for I hear nothing but reproaches and utterances from heretofore loyal men which cut one to the very quick. . . . How I am to tell the natives I know not, for they have trusted so implicitly to our promises and assurances. . . . One man who has been most loyal to us (an Englishman) told me to-day, ‘Thank God my children are Afrikaners, and need not be ashamed of their country!’” \*

\* Colonel Lanyon writes again:—

“April 26, 1881.

“The Boers are practically dictators, and have been ruling the country in a manner which is simply humiliating to Englishmen. Active persecution is going on everywhere, and, consequently, all that can are leaving the country. Thirty families have left Pretoria alone; B—— and M—— have left, having been frequently threatened because of their having been members of the Executive, and those two poor fellows J—— and H—— are completely ostracised for the same reason. They are both ruined men, practically speaking, and all because they trusted to England’s assurances and good faith. . . .

“But, hard as these cases are, I feel that the natives have had the cruellest measure meted out to them, and they feel it acutely. The most touching and heart-breaking appeals have come from some of the chiefs who live near enough to have heard the news. They ask

Amongst the comparatively few in England who were acquainted with the facts the indignation was deep. In the House of Lords the surrender was denounced by Lord Cairns in powerful and unanswerable language. But in the House of Commons there was no debate adequate to the occasion. The breach of public faith, the betrayal of and cruelty to British subjects, white and black, involved in the surrender became known in England only by degrees, and was never fully realized by the British people.

To cover the disgrace and to conceal the true issues of the case, Mr. Gladstone invented a rhetorical phrase which served its purpose well enough. In a published letter he declared that "it was a question of saving the country from sheer blood-guiltiness." The phrase had no foundation in fact. Sir Frederick Roberts had been sent to the Cape with force enough to have put down the rebellion with an amount of bloodshed which, compared with the bloodshed the surrender has since caused, is causing now, and may cause for generations, would have been as nothing. No conceivable crime—for it is no less—in matters where uncivilized races are concerned, is more certainly conducive to shedding of blood than a breach of faith. It was the fear, not of shedding blood, but of endangering the unity of their party, which actuated the British Government in the course they had taken.

why they have been thrown over after showing their loyalty by paying their taxes and resisting the demands made upon them by the Boers during hostilities. They point out that we stopped them from helping us, and that, had we not done so, the Boers would have been easily put down. They say that, as we so hindered their action, it is a cruel wrong for us now to hand them back to the care of a race which is more embittered against them than ever, and who have already begun to harass them because of their loyalty. These points are unanswerable, and I do not see how we can well reply to them. . . ."

In a letter to Miss Trench, Frere writes—

“March 31, 1881.

“Let no one ever say that England lost prestige through Sir George Colley. I do not like the word so much as ‘character’ or ‘conduct,’ which create it. But no country ever lost real prestige through defeat. Nelson, wounded and repulsed at Teneriffe; Grenvil, overpowered and dying on the deck of the *Revenge*, did as much for England’s prestige as Marlborough at Blenheim or Wellington at Waterloo. Sir George Colley miscalculated his own and his enemy’s strength, but he had nothing to do with disgraceful surrender, and I am sure had rather be where he now rests than sign a disgraceful peace, which is the only thing that can injure England’s prestige.”

To Mr. Gordon Sprigg he writes—

“April 21, 1881.

“What has come over the nation I cannot imagine, for while without a single exception every one seems ashamed of the course the Government has adopted in South Africa, there is no public movement, and a superficial observer might suppose there was acquiescence. . . .

“The apparent apathy is due partly to Lord Beaconsfield’s illness and death and the consequent disorganisation of the Opposition; but more, I think, to the feeling that negotiations are still in progress, and that it is not right or wise to anticipate the disgraceful ultimate issue which seems almost inevitable but which is still in the future. . . .

“I only hope that both colonies [the Cape and Natal] will remain loyal to England as England, and not believe that the unpatriotic and timid course adopted by the present Government at all represents the real feeling of the nation.”

In a letter to Mr. Albert Grey, dated July 25, 1881, in reference to an impending debate in the House, Frere thus sums up the situation at that time :—

“No doubt the non-fulfilment of our promises of some sort of self-government was the cause which kept in the



ranks of the malcontents many Boers who would otherwise have reluctantly acquiesced in the annexation of the Transvaal.

"For this breach of faith Liberals and Conservatives are equally to be blamed, perhaps the Conservatives most, for it was they who divided the authority Lord Carnarvon had united in my hands, and prevented the consideration of my proposals for a constitution such as Mr. Sprigg and Mr. Brand concurred in suggesting. But the Liberals cannot escape blame, for it was they who allowed six months to elapse without any sign of willingness to repair the omission of their predecessors, which I specially brought to Lord Kimberley's notice in the only interview I had with him after my return home.

"But if the gunpowder was laid by the late Government, the match was applied by the present. 1. In the Midlothian Speeches. 2. By sympathizing correspondence of Members of Government and their friends, leading the malcontents to believe that if they threatened loudly and imitated Fenian tactics, concessions would be made to them. . . .

"I do not agree with Mr. Gladstone that if the annexation was wrong we can correct that wrong by breaking faith with the people we have wronged. You cannot redress a murder by robbing the man who inherited at his death. . . . No doubt we could secure fair treatment for the natives if we could persuade the Boers that annexation would be the penalty if the Boers hereafter maltreated the natives. But how can we persuade them of this? Who will believe us after what has passed? The Boers know we have retracted pledges given by two successive Governments and by three Secretaries of State, and they believe they can beat us if we attempted to interfere. . . ."

After the conclusion of the Pretoria Convention, Frere writes to Mr. Brampton Gurdon :—

"December 10, 1881.

"I have never been able to discover any principle in our present colonial policy except that of giving way whenever they find opposition or trouble. They seem to me to have thoroughly alienated both English and Dutch and to have irritated the natives, earning contempt from every quarter ;

and the entire severance from all useful connection with South Africa seems to me only a question of time, unless we change our mode of proceeding. I should regret this less did I not feel sure that if we go, other Europeans will step in with a protectorate or alliance, which will render our retention of the Cape Peninsula a costly and difficult task."

A year and a half after the Convention of Pretoria had been signed, Frere writes of its results as follows to Mr. J. M. Maclean :—

"February 23, 1883.

"The Convention under which the Transvaal was given up, stipulated for many things to be done by the new Government of the Republic, none of which have yet been accomplished and for the most part they have not been attempted. The chief reason given for retaining a British 'Suzerainty' (whatever that may imply) over the Transvaal was that it would be some protection to the 700,000 loyal native subjects against any aggression by the Boer Government.

"It has not, however, been of the slightest use for that or any other visible purpose. The natives scattered among the European farms have been reduced to the same condition of serfdom in which we found them before the annexation.

"Mapoch and other chiefs to the east and north-east, who had been loyal to the British rule, have been attacked, and great numbers of their followers have been slaughtered. A large 'commando,' said to comprise two thousand Burghers with two cannon, supplied by the Cape Government, is at present engaged in crushing this tribe, blowing up their caves with dynamite; their greatest offence is fidelity to the British Government. To the south-west, tribes beyond the Transvaal boundary, as fixed by the Convention, are being attacked by Boer commandoes, and the chiefs who had been loyal to the British Government are being despoiled of their lands, whilst their people are murdered in cold blood. The Transvaal Government, when appealed to, say 'the country is beyond their jurisdiction.'

"To the natives of Transvaal and its neighbourhood the surrender by the British Government has brought loss of all security for liberty, life, or property.

"To the white population of the Transvaal the consequences of surrender have been scarcely less disastrous. Though many months have passed since the Convention was signed, no settled government has yet been organized. The English banks have withdrawn, following a large proportion of the settlers, and the only districts where industry is not paralyzed are the gold-fields, to which there has been of late a considerable immigration of diggers, amongst whom it will require a strong Government to keep order. This stagnation seriously affects the neighbouring British Colonies of Natal and the Cape, where trade suffers and where the loyal party have not recovered from the disgrace and alienation consequent on the abandonment by the British Government of the loyal party in the Transvaal; so that in short it cannot be said that either in the Transvaal or in our older colonies any benefit has resulted from the pusillanimous conduct of the British Government either to Europeans or natives. We have got nothing to show as a set-off for our disgraceful loss of character."

The Transvaal war had left behind a bitter feeling, against the British Government, and there was a general sense of insecurity.

Baron Hübner, the veteran Austrian diplomatist and traveller, then, in his old age, on a tour round the world writes to Frere:—

"September 12, 1883.

"I cannot refrain from confiding to you that things here are far from satisfactory. In the highest sphere I see a want of confidence and an uncertainty quite natural, as no one is able to penetrate the views and wishes and intentions, if there any exist, of the Home Government, and the public at large is dissatisfied with the South African policy of Mr. Gladstone. Business is also very slow. But notwithstanding all that, people are quiet and patient. It seems to me that there are so many elements of prosperity in South Africa, and that the whole population is so law-abiding, that with more consistency at home it cannot be very difficult to govern the two colonies. But in the last twenty-five years all \* the governors have been recalled in

\* Not, of course, literally all, but the most eminent.

disgrace! This fact alone speaks louder than books could do. Your name is on everybody's tongue; I wish you could listen to what they tell me." \*

The effects of the surrender were as injurious to the natives outside the Transvaal border as to those within it.

For nearly half a century British missionaries, of whom Livingstone was one, had been settled in Bechuanaland, the country on the north-west boundary of the Transvaal. By them the natives had been reclaimed from utter barbarism to an unusual degree of civilization. Khama chief of the Bamangwato, was and is a conspicuous instance of a native chief having adopted Christian morality and doctrine, and exemplifying them by ruling his people with justice, firmness, and self-restraint. But in general the power of the chiefs diminished in the presence of the white man, and devolved in greater or less degree on the missionary. Several of the chiefs formally resigned their authority and begged the British Government to undertake the protectorate of their country. This Frere was prepared to do, and he had a plan for carrying on the administration by native officials under a British Resident's supervision; but before he could obtain the sanction of the Home Government he was superseded.

Ever since the Boers had occupied the Transvaal, the Bechuanas had been exposed to marauding attacks by them, the Boer Government being too weak—even if it had had the will—to exercise restraint over those of its subjects who were inclined to filibustering. Sir George

\* In a former letter (July 23, 1883), Baron Hübner had written :—

"Je dois vous dire une chose, c'est que jamais gouverneur, ni ici ni ailleurs, a laissé de meilleurs souvenirs et de plus universels regrets que vous. Tout le monde, même ceux qui peut-être n'ont pas complètement partagé votre manière de voir, m'ont parlé dans ces sens."

Grey had intervened to protect them in 1858, and under subsequent governors the protection had been continued. During the Zulu troubles several attempts were made by Boers to "jump" farms in Bechuana territory, but they were promptly checked by Colonels Lanyon and Warren by means of police and volunteers from Kimberley, and the Boers were made to understand that extensions of frontier in that direction would not be tolerated. By the Pretoria Convention also the right of the British to protect the Bechuana was expressly recognized. But the attitude of the British Government gave little reason for supposing that their promises to the natives outside the Transvaal boundary would be any better kept than their obligations to those within it had been. Marauding began at once, and little more than a year elapsed before a body of Boers and European adventurers, driving out the lawful owners, seized and marked out a slice of territory dividing Bechuanaland in two and cutting off one of the best roads from Kimberley to the interior, so that traders who still ventured to go had to take a circuitous route through the desert, where in case of a breakdown they had to abandon everything and make the best of their way to water.\*

\* Mr. J. Layton Mitchell, to Sir Bartle Frere (April 18, 1883). He writes from Batlaros and goes on to say—

"At Flockfontein, in June, 1882, thirteen natives were shot down while trying to save their cattle. Mr. Howard, a trader, was there and only saved his by reaching the Griqualand West boundary line. The men who did this were under the orders of De la Rey and an outlaw called Honey, whom they have since murdered. . . . It is estimated by men who know this part well that upwards of twenty thousand head of cattle have been taken from the Batlapins and other adjacent tribes. Mooro, who is the chief of the Batlaros, has assured me that he never in any way whatever interfered with the Boers, yet they have shot down his people and taken their cattle. . . . Should any doubts exist in England as to the Transvaal being connected with Stellaland, I can get the evidence of a man who wrote out the agreement between a Transvaal official and six men whom he equipped

Here, within sixty miles of Kimberley, they proclaimed a Republic, which they named after the star which they carried on their flag—Stellaland. Another similar filibustering attempt at a Republic was named Goshen. The Transvaal Government, on being remonstrated with, had nothing to say, but that they were powerless to restrain their own people.

Was faith to be kept with these natives, or was it to be broken, according to the last precedent? The British Government inclined at first to the latter course. The Convention, it was said, gave it a right, but did not impose an obligation to interfere.

Frere put forth all his influence on the side of fulfilling our obligations. In communications to the Colonial Office, and in letters and articles in the Press, he earnestly strove to convince the Government and the public of the wrongfulness, folly, and danger of failing in our duties and abdicating our position of authority.

In a memorandum he writes—

“November 15, 1883.

“Any recognized agent of the English Government has, like the missionary, without seeking it, much ruling power forced on him by circumstances. Up to 1880 this power was often used by the English officials in the interest of peace. Since 1880 this has been forbidden, and the result is the present anarchy. . . . The difficulty and cost of protecting the Bechuanas from aggression have been greatly exaggerated. Why should they be more than in 1877 to 1880, when Colonels Lanyon and Warren kept the peace, after putting down actual rebellion with no other force than police and volunteers? They scarcely called in

on their promising to give him half the cattle they captured, and they were to return horse, saddle, and gun to him; he kept a copy of this for future reference. Cattle known to have come from here are publicly sold in the Transvaal, and yet the Transvaal Government in the Colonial Blue-books denies having anything whatever to do with the new Republic.”

a single English soldier, and what is wanted now is not ten thousand or even one hundred soldiers, but two or three English officers, who will do what Lanyon and Warren did—organize and direct the local forces for self-defence, and be just and considerate to the Transvaal and all men.

“At first, no doubt, their proceedings might be unpopular in the Transvaal and in the Orange Free State, and even among the Dutch at the Cape. But I am quite sure we may in the long run rely on the good sense and respect for law which actuates the majority of the Dutch population, and which will support us in what we can clearly show is a duty.

“Even under the Sand River Convention the filibustering proceedings in Bechuanaland would have been illegal, and we should have been justified in opposing them. The Boers, if we are just and considerate to them in other matters, will soon recognize the justice of our protecting the Bechuanas.

“As regards the possibility or probability of interference by other European nations there can, I think, be no doubt, if England stands aloof. Before the Franco-German war there was much pressure put on the German Government by influential commercial bodies in Frankfort, Bremen, and Hamburg, to acquire a German colony in some temperate climate. A scientific expedition was sent out to South and Eastern Africa to report on it with a view to colonization. President Burgers, of the Transvaal, was in favour of the project, but the report of the scientific men sent out from Germany was not so favourable as to overcome the objections of Prince Bismarck. He approved of the idea on general grounds, but considered that Germany had then, as the objection was expressed to me, ‘too much hay on the fork’ to make any large scheme of colonization prudent. Latterly the commercial agitation in favour of a German colony has been revived, and permission has been given to hoist the German flag at Angra Pequena, a small fort on the west coast, north of the Orange river, heretofore held to be English territory.\*

“Whatever we may think of it here, this step is regarded

\* Germany then acquired Damaraland and Namaqualand, the protectorate of which Frere had in vain pressed on Lord Carnarvon in 1877 (chap. xviii. p. 191).

at the Cape as important and significant. There are Berlin missionaries in Eastern Bechuanaland who, four years ago, threatened Colonel Warren with the displeasure of the German Government if he did not respect their claim to freedom from his control within the limits of their own mission; and German traders will not be slow to follow the example thus set, if we withdraw from the paramount position we have hitherto held in those regions.

"Why should we gratuitously open the door to such trouble by abandoning the Bechuanas, who for fifty years have been considered under our protection?"

Nothing effectual was done during Frere's lifetime, and anarchy and misery continued. Ultimately, in 1884, the British Government assumed the protectorate of Bechuanaland; a force of more than four thousand men was sent out under the command of Sir Charles Warren, who cleared the country of freebooters, and at a heavy cost, though without firing a shot, successfully accomplished what Frere had proposed to do, had he been allowed, four years before, and which might then have been done almost without the aid of a soldier.

Still more disastrous was the course of events in Zululand.

As Frere immediately after Isandhlwana had told Sir Michael Hicks-Beach would be the case, the Zulus, once decisively beaten, had accepted their defeat. After Ulundi an Englishman could travel unguarded anywhere in Zululand. All that the Zulus asked for was that the white men who had destroyed the old Government should provide them with a new one.

This the British Government refused to do. They did, indeed, send a Resident to Zululand, but with the way cleared for native administration, as it had never been before, by the collapse of the power of Kreli and of Cetuyayo, and with the ever-present example of the good work done by British Residents in Indian Native States



before them, they rendered him useless by giving him strict injunctions to abstain from exercising any authority or any judicial functions. The Zulus, Frere writes to Dr. Acland (May 5, 1882), "only want to be ruled, and we give them advice and a fresh fancy policy every three years. No one could rule a nursery on such conditions. It is Ireland over again on a minute scale, and would be ludicrously foolish were not the lives and happiness of so many hundreds of thousands at stake." \*

Bad as Cetywayo's rule had been, it was better than the anarchy which England's refusal to perform its duty as paramount power occasioned. Undecided disputes ripened into chronic civil war between tribe and tribe. Captain Hallam Parr writes from Pietermaritzburg (August 26, 1881): "John Dunn's impi has eaten up Sitimela's men. The butchery, I hear, was very great. What has become of the deposed Chief Umhandela

\* Mr. Osborn, the first British Resident in Zululand after the war, says in his report to Sir George Colley (August 4, 1880)—

"On first entering Zululand on 15th March last . . . I received a very friendly welcome from all the Chiefs. . . . Very shortly after this applications were frequently, I may say almost daily, made to me by the people, and sometimes by Chiefs of considerable rank and standing, for my personal interference in their disputes. These were invariably referred by me to the appointed Chiefs for redress; and I availed myself of every opportunity to explain to the people that I could take no part in judicial administration, which function was to be exercised by those Chiefs. To the latter on different occasions I made as clear as I could their duties, and the responsibilities attaching to them in the positions they now hold. Notwithstanding these explanations, applications of the kind stated, and especially for my interference as a Court of Appeal against decisions of the Chiefs, continue to be made. . . . This action on my part is, I have often noticed, a cause of serious disappointment. The desire to have their disputes and affairs settled by the Queen's officers, as is the case in Natal, is very strong with the people, who seem to be unable to understand that after conquering their country the Government should relinquish all authority there in favour of the Chiefs, and leave them no means of appeal from the Chief."

(deposed by his own men) I have not heard. There is complete anarchy in Zululand at the present time." In October, 1881, about fifteen hundred natives were killed in a single intertribal broil.\*

Early in 1883 the crowning act of folly was committed of sending Cetywayo back to Zululand. When this course was suggested, Frere, in an article (November, 1882) in the *Fortnightly Review*, had written as follows :—

"The English Government may simply turn Cetywayo loose in Zululand, or it may protect and support and attempt to control him. Either course would be equally inconsistent with all that has been done or said or promised hitherto, but neither could be effectual in giving peace and prosperity to Zululand, or securing its neighbours against Zulu troubles.

"If Cetywayo is merely let go and left to his own devices, what is likely to happen? He may be killed at once as Secocuni was, and as, with rare exceptions, all his predecessors have been. If he lives, will he be content? Certainly not, unless he is able to recover somehow all he has lost, and of that he has little chance. His power rested on force, on a general conviction that he had power and could and would keep it; that belief has been effectually dissipated. He can only recover his power by fresh exercise of force, by slaying or terrorizing all his adversaries; but those adversaries are neither few nor powerless, and the process of getting rid of them will not tend to rest or peace. He may, of course, be protected and supported by the British Government. This, however, can hardly be done unless the British Government takes some responsibility for controlling his acts. . . . To send back Cetywayo on such terms would be not to restore Cetywayo, but to supplant him, and it may be doubted whether such

\* Mr. John Robinson, M.L.C., of Natal, writes from Durban, October 23, 1881 :—

"The Wolseleyan settlement is breaking down everywhere. I hear that Oham scarcely left a male of the Bagulisini tribe alive. The latter were a very troublesome lot, and in one sense their annihilation is a good riddance, but it could scarcely have been contemplated that it was to [be] the firstfruits of Sir Garnet's paternal beneficence."

a plan would content Cetywayo or insure rest. . . . He may submit to his fate, but he cannot be content, and he is not likely to submit without an effort to recover the power he has lost."\*

Not many months elapsed before Frere's anticipations were fulfilled. Within a week of his restoration civil war broke out between the Usitus, or King's party, and Usibepu, one of the thirteen kinglets in alliance with Omahu, a brother of Cetywayo.† The combined forces of the latter fell upon Cetywayo's men, killing six thousand of them, and held a "sanguinary carnival in Cetywayo's territory, killing all the King's people, regardless of age or sex."‡ Cetywayo took refuge in the bush, and afterwards surrendered to the British Resident at Ekowe. He died suddenly in 1884.§

\* Frere and the members of his family used frequently to visit Cetywayo when he was a prisoner of war in the castle at Capetown. When he was in London, in August, 1882, Frere went to see him. "I am very glad to see you," Cetywayo said to him. "It is very kind of you to come and see me. Ah! now I see my father. It is of a piece with all your kindness to me while I was at Capetown."

† Mr. Seymour Haden writes (August 17, 1883) from Natal:—

"Every one was, I think, a little startled to see the determined disregard by Cetywayo of all conditions, from the moment he landed at Port Durnford. At the same time it must be confessed that his advisers—his irresponsible advisers—have much to answer for."

‡ Noble's "Hand-book of the Cape and South Africa," p. 195.

§ The Rev. Horace Waller, who went out in 1860 as Bishop Mackenzie's companion to Central Africa, and afterwards was occupied with Livingstone in what is now Nyassaland, writes as follows to Frere (June 14, 1882):—

"Colenso and Chesson [Secretary of the Aborigines Protection Society] are the greatest burdens under which South Africa labours. To me it is always one of the saddest signs of the times to witness how the Press can be turned to incalculable mischief in the hands of an unscrupulous fellow like Chesson, who is able to insert, and get inserted, all sorts of decoy paragraphs in newspapers to catch public opinion, which, aided by ignorance on the subject, is easily entrapped. When the whole history of the troubles of Africa comes to be written, Colenso and Chesson ought to be credited with the loss of thousands of lives and millions of money."

Prime Minister who in 1893 was responsible for the employment of still more deadly artillery against the equally naked bodies of the Matabeles, in a cause perhaps equally righteous, but in which no imminent peril to a British colony existed as in the former case. Frere, from the first, had declared that the extension of the British Protectorate as far as the Zambesi was ultimately inevitable in the interests of peace and civilization amongst the natives, and of union and harmony between the South African colonies. This had been, in 1880, condemned in the Midlothian speeches as a dangerous and aggressive policy. In 1893 Mr. Gladstone accepted the same policy at the hands of Mr. Rhodes which he had denounced when suggested by an old and tried servant of the Crown.

Mr. John Robinson, M.L.C., writes to Frere (February 12, 1884):—

“Cetywayo, you will see, has gone at last. No one here really regrets it. How could they? He was treacherous, mendacious, and self-willed up to the last, and had only just formed a plot to massacre the Resident and garrison, foiled by the summary refusal of the military to let him find a place within their lines. . . . How many Zulus have perished since Cetywayo's restoration it would be hard to estimate. Several thousands at least. One could weep to compare the Zululand of to-day with what it might have been now, had your policy and plans had full and free development and fruition. . . .”

Still the British Government declared that it had not responsibility in Zululand beyond the “Reserve.”

The Boer farmers on the Transvaal border were less indifferent to the strife. They installed Dinizulu, a son of Cetywayo, King of Zululand, and assisted him to defeat Usibepu. To recompense themselves they established a new Republic, with Vryheid as its centre, on Zulu territory, which they afterwards annexed to the Transvaal.

As in India, so in Africa, time has amply vindicated Frere's policy and prescience. In 1879 his advice to establish an effective protectorate over Zululand was summarily rejected and denounced. In 1887 the remnant of the Zulus, whom the consequences of “masterly inactivity” and of the misrepresentations and meretricious rhetoric of the Midlothian and other speeches had left alive were silently and without a protest from any English politician made British subjects; and what remained to them of their country unappropriated by the Boers was annexed to the Empire. The Midlothian speaker who in 1880 held up to execration the policy which “mowed down by hundreds and thousands” the Zulus “who, in defence of their own land, offered their naked bodies to the terribly improved artillery and arms of modern science,” was the

## CHAPTER XXII.

### THE RECALLED GOVERNOR.

Frere lands at Southampton—Visits the Queen and the Prince of Wales in Scotland—Correspondence with Mr. Gladstone—The occupation of Candahar—The Ilbert Bill—Irish Police—Gordon—Press attacks—Last illness and death.

THE *Pretoria* reached Plymouth Sound on October 5. On her arrival being telegraphed to London, a special train brought Sir Barrow Ellis, Sir Henry Yule, and a number of Frere's personal friends to Southampton to greet him on his landing there, and also a deputation of Cape merchants, who presented him with an address, expressing regret at his recall. Nothing could be more cordial than his welcome home.

Wressil Lodge, their house at Wimbledon, being let, Frere and his family occupied a house in Hyde Park Gardens, lent them by his old friend Mr. Arthur Mills. They had scarcely arrived when an invitation came to visit the Prince of Wales at Abergeldie.

Thither he went on the third day after his arrival, and met with a cordial and gracious reception from the Prince and also from the Queen, who twice sent for him to Balmoral and showed him the greatest kindness. During his stay in South Africa he had, at the Queen's desire, written regularly to her, and she evinced the greatest

interest in and clearest understanding of what had passed there.

Nothing could exceed the solace and gratification afforded to him by this reception. Writing to his old friend Mr. G. T. Clark, he says—

“October 16, 1880.

“At one time I felt almost convinced that the vindictive spirit of party politicians would have insisted on putting me in the felon’s dock to answer for such high crimes as telling the truth and daring to do my duty, and in that case I should not have escaped ruin from law expenses, however satisfactory might have been the verdict; but I think I see some mitigation of the storm of abuse, which improvement I value, as I have not bowed to the storm, and I have some hopes that I may yet live to be acquitted by my countrymen otherwise than by the verdict of an Old Bailey jury. . . . Nothing could be more kind or more *constitutional* than the kindness of the Queen to her recalled Governor, and I felt as I travelled home that there were other beings besides Katie’s dog who would gladly ‘die for the Queen.’”

He lost no time in going to see old friends and acquaintances, mixing freely in society, and often meeting political men of both parties, many of whom had been amongst his assailants. At the Colonial Office there was some embarrassment when he appeared there, till he “told the under-secretary and the permanent officials that he had not come to ventilate any personal grievance, and that he should be glad if any of the knowledge he had acquired could be of use towards the better government of South Africa.” “Of non-officials,” he writes, “I have not met one on either side who does not abuse the opposite party for the way they have treated me.” Mr. Albert Grey, for instance, as a Liberal, writes: “I attribute the false ideas about you entirely to the fact that the late Government having thrown you over, it was not the interest of either party to stand up in your behalf at the last General Election.”

A dinner was given to him by more than two hundred of his friends on November 10, at Willis's Rooms, at which his reception was most enthusiastic, and which gave him extreme pleasure. Whenever he appeared on any public occasion, as at a scientific meeting or at a public dinner, or was recognized by any chance assemblage of people, he invariably received an unmistakably enthusiastic welcome, which contrasted strangely with the generally hostile attitude of political speakers and of the Press.

In November he learnt that he had been chosen Chancellor of the Cape University. Dr. Dale, the Vice-Chancellor, in writing to announce it, said: "We are still feeling the impetus which your own words and presence imparted to our Art Machinery. . . . The hiatus caused by your departure is felt more keenly every day." In March, 1882, a hospital, built in the Colony at East London, was by acclamation named after him the "Frere Hospital."

As time went on and troubles gathered in South Africa, many of the leading colonists were in frequent correspondence with him, in the hope of his being able to make the true state of affairs known to the British Government and to the public. He made a point of transmitting to the Colonial Office any information which reached him; and from time to time he wrote letters on the subject to the daily papers, and published articles in the magazines. "You can have little idea," he writes to Mr. R. W. Murray (October 21), "of the pertinacity of the ultra-Radicals and pseudo-humanitarians, or of the extent to which they have poisoned our English opinion by false statement of fact." "I do not find the ignorance at all wilful," he writes (January 26, 1881) to Mr. Gordon Sprigg; "people generally are glad to get information, but they do not know where to go for it, and that which comes to them in authentic Blue-books, is merely raw material, not



chronologically arranged, and necessarily long after date in publication."

On one occasion only did he enter into a controversy in which a personal question was involved.

There were three matters as to which he had been persistently charged with having pursued or advocated a policy of aggression and war—the invasion of Affghanistan, the annexation of the Transvaal, and the Ultimatum to Cetywayo. For the last only, as has been shown, was he responsible. He had never advocated the invasion of Affghanistan, and had had no hand in the annexation of the Transvaal.

The general public, which has no time to read despatches or to compare dates, had excuses for the misapprehension. Frere had been cited, and rightly cited, as an authority for abandoning the "masterly inactivity" policy on the Indian frontier, which in his opinion was leading not to peace but to war; and many, under the guidance of Liberal speakers, and in the silence of Conservatives, jumped to the conclusion that the only alternative was a policy of aggression and war.

For the mistake of believing him to be responsible for the annexation of the Transvaal, the excuse was that it happened a few days after he arrived at Capetown. *Post hoc ergo propter hoc* was the pardonably erroneous conclusion of people who had not time to inquire.

These three matters had been made the subject of bitter invective by Mr. Gladstone, in attacking the Government in his Midlothian speeches. Common fairness, under the circumstances, required that when he attacked Frere by name he should make it clear that he did not attribute to him a responsibility beyond that which really attached to him. Far from doing this, he mixed the three questions up together in such a way as to confirm instead of contradicting

the impression that Frere was responsible for them all. After speaking of the "enormous guilt, the immeasurable responsibility" of undertaking "wilful, unjust, and destructive wars;" after denouncing in scathing language the iniquity and horrors of the war in Affghanistan, he says: "Now, what happened? There were two gentlemen, men of distinguished names, who supported the Indian policy of advance into Affghanistan. Who were they? Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Bartle Frere. These were the two great authorities." And a few sentences later on he says: "Sir Bartle Frere's mode of action at the Cape does not tend to accredit his advice in Affghanistan." \*

In another speech he said—

"Sir Bartle Frere, who was the great authority for the proceedings of the Government in Affghanistan, has announced in South Africa that it will be necessary for us to extend our dominions till we reach the Portuguese frontier on the north." †

It was impossible for Frere to reply with any effect from

\* "Midlothian Speeches," vol. i. p. 205.

† "Midlothian Speeches," vol. i. p. 49. Frere had written, May 13, 1878 (C. 2220, p. 35), on the subject of the tribes between the Transvaal and the Kalahari desert.

"It will be seen that they are all of them more or less anxious to be under the British flag. . . . It will be found necessary, sooner or later, to extend the British dominion or protectorate, in some form or other, over all the tribes between the Orange River and Lake N'gami, and between the sea and the present Transvaal frontier, and the longer it is deferred the more troublesome will the operation become. . . .

"By refusing to accept the position of a protecting power habitually acting as arbiter in inter-tribal disputes, we escape nothing save the name of responsibility. Its realities are already incurred, and when at length we unwillingly undertake the burden of dominion, we shall find it greatly aggravated by delay and neglect. . . .

"To declare such a protectorate as I have suggested, appears to be a large scheme of annexation, but it is not so in reality. It is simply an authoritative declaration of facts." ("The Military Occupation of South Bechuanaland," by Sir Charles Warren, 1883, p. 5.)

the Cape, where it took nearly two months to get an answer from England ; and the answer which he did make in writing to the Secretary of State (January, 1880), was not published in the Blue-book. When he had been about nine months in England, finding the old misrepresentations, to which the Midlothian speeches had given emphasis and currency, "constantly recalled and used by Mr. Gladstone's political followers to the prejudice of the interests and the ruin of the prosperity" of South Africa, he wrote to Mr. Gladstone, calling his attention to the matter, and enclosing the memorandum he had prepared in January, 1880, for the Secretary of State, explaining his views in detail.

Mr. Gladstone's answer contained the following passage :—

"August 15, 1882.

"The mode in which I connected your name with the recent Affghan war is fully explained in page 205 of vol. i. of my 'Midlothian Speeches.' It was simply treating you as an advocate of the 'policy of advance.' With the actual proceedings of Lord Lytton I never directly or indirectly connected you.

"You will, I think, agree with me that the lengthened passage in page 205 explains the short one in page 49. Had I been myself the corrector of my speeches, I should probably have inserted the word 'cited' after 'authority.'"

It is impossible to accept this explanation as a valid or a candid one. Whoever corrected, or ought to have corrected the "Midlothian Speeches," the word "cited" is not there, and, if it had been, it would have been of no avail to correct the meaning and the impression left by another speech made at another place and time. The interpretation contended for by Mr. Gladstone is not the obvious one, and would never occur to any one reading the speeches dispassionately ; much less would it have

occurred to any of his hearers under the circumstances and at the time when they were spoken. The more closely the passages relating to South Africa and Affghanistan are examined, the more does it appear that their rhetorical effect was mainly produced by the cumulative force of the three distinct imputations—each charge conferring an appearance of probability on, and enhancing the gravity of the other two. It is impossible to suppose that such a master of rhetoric did not understand and foresee how his words would be understood. They were understood only too well. To this day it is common to hear even well-informed persons speak of Lord Lytton's action in Affghanistan and of the annexation of the Transvaal as matters for which Frere was directly responsible.

The correspondence was printed in the *Times*, and afterwards published in a pamphlet.

On other questions also Frere took up, as far as might be, the threads of his old interests. Indian and Egyptian matters came naturally under his notice.

In the course of the late Affghan war Candahar had been occupied by the British troops. It became known that the Government now proposed to evacuate it. Frere wrote a letter to the *Times* (March 3, 1881) deprecating this. Whether or not it had been right to occupy it in the first instance, he considered that the British force should not be hastily withdrawn now that it was there, both from the point of view of British interests, and also because its retention would probably be advantageous to and popular with the inhabitants, who were in close commercial connection and in constant intercourse with Sind. Affghan patriotism is clannish and tribal, not national; and the other Affghans would not resent the continued occupation of Candahar by British troops if the Candaharis were content.

He writes—

“What do the people of Candahar themselves wish? The balance of all the evidence I have heard or seen goes to prove that the great bulk of the industrious and quietly disposed people wish us to stay, at least till a strong, settled Government can be established which will not tyrannize over them more than we should do. . . . The trade of Candahar and Herat is almost entirely in the hands of Hindoo merchants, whose homes and chief houses of business are in Sind, especially at Shikarpur; and the few Mahomedan houses of Tereens, Kojaks, etc., are very closely connected with, often dependent on, their Hindoo correspondents and bankers, who are generally British Indian subjects, and with few exceptions take care to keep their spare capital and principal house of business in British territory.

“I had constant intercourse with the leading men of these mercantile classes whenever they visited Sind, as they did very frequently in the course of their business, and hence I can speak with some confidence as to their wishes and views. I doubt whether there were half a dozen merchants in South Affghanistan drawing Bills of Exchange on distant marts who were not British-Indian subjects, or completely under the influence of British-Indian firms, and I doubt whether one of them would vote for our quitting Candahar if he were here to express his real wishes.”

The Government of Lord Ripon, then Viceroy of India, had introduced a Bill, known as the Ilbert Bill, which made fundamental changes in the judicial procedure. It was strongly opposed by the Europeans in India, and the “British India Committee,” anxious to counteract this opposition, wrote to Frere for his support. In his reply he says—

“I could see in the Bill only the removal of very salutary provisions which all Indian experience tells us are necessary to ensure a fair trial to a large and most important class of Her Majesty’s subjects—I mean, of course, British-born Europeans, a class on which depend the preservation of peace and the political cohesion of all the varied races

throughout India. The Bill legalized the indiscriminate entrusting of high judicial powers over this important class to men who, experience shows, are frequently not qualified for the due discharge of such judicial functions over alien races either by 'education, ability, or integrity.'"

On the same subject he writes to Mr. F. Greenwood :—

"May 24, 1883.

"The whole action of our Government in this matter is strongly wanting in common sense. The old Indian law was that any British-born subject might, if he pleased, plead his nationality, and demand to be tried by a particular tribunal of his own countrymen where he would be sure of a fair trial. There was no inconsistency, injustice, or partiality in this. It was simply applying to our own countrymen the old privilege secured to aliens under the English law of demanding, if the accused desired it, to be tried by a jury of which a certain portion were aliens. As matter of practice, few Englishmen who knew they were guilty ever insisted on this right, because they knew that they would probably get heavier punishment from a Supreme Court judge than from a native magistrate. But Englishmen who knew they were innocent always insisted on their rights as the only security for a fair trial. The sole good reason for altering the law was a wish to reduce the delay, expense, and trouble to witnesses which the old law *sometimes* caused. But this object could have been attained in half a dozen other ways without exciting race hatred or jealousy. I have often talked over the subject with wise old native judges and magistrates, and they almost invariably wished that the old law should continue in force on the ground that, to extend the power of native tribunals in cases where Europeans were the accused would be to confer a very invidious power, and to increase the chances of the guilty escaping as well as of the innocent being unjustly convicted—to impair, in fact, instead of improving their tribunals."

At the time of Frere's return home, Ireland, which for nearly a generation had enjoyed a period of comparative tranquillity and prosperity, was again falling back in the direction of anarchy and confusion. Old secret criminal

organizations had been revived, and new ones had sprung up, at whose instigation murders and outrages were being perpetrated with impunity, and many parts of the country filled with terror and misery. Month after month the evil increased and took deeper root. Secret criminal societies constitute a form of crime of which British statesmen have had comparatively little experience, and the Government then in office had not the skill or the resolution—if, indeed, it had the will, at the risk of diminishing its parliamentary following—to grapple boldly with the evil. In India, on the other hand, such criminal associations are common, and to unravel and extirpate them is a special duty of a department of the police. Frere, as an Indian statesman of experience, was asked privately by an official employed upon Irish legislation, to describe the systems of police in India with special reference to their applicability to Ireland.

This he did in detail, distinguishing the duties of Preventive, Protective, and Detective police, and laying stress upon the fact that when any particular form of crime, such as infanticide, Thuggee, or Wahabeeism, baffled the ordinary police, special detectives were selected and appointed *ad hoc*, and instructed to learn all they could about it, and to devise the means they thought necessary for eradicating it. They always, he said, succeeded sooner or later. "I do not recollect any case of failure in India." But he added significantly—

"Success depended, as you will gather from what I have said, not only on the ability of the man employed, and on the wisdom of the Government which employed and supported him, but on both parties being in earnest and having a definite purpose which they were determined to carry out. It is necessary at starting to determine whether it is a primary object to detect and eradicate the crime which makes life and property insecure, or whether such

object is to be subordinate to conciliating political or religious prejudices. It is useless to talk of making the highways safe from Thugs if you are in doubt whether our English notions of the sanctity of life and property are to prevail, or whether they are to be subordinate to the notions inculcated on his pupil in murder by the votary of the goddess Kali." \*

To Mr. C. Forjett, a man of distinguished service in the police in India, and who was applying for police employment in Ireland, he writes—

" May 20, 1882.

" I feel sure there is nothing in the Irish difficulty to compare with those you surmounted when you were keeping Lord Elphinstone acquainted with the movements of rebels and mutineers in 1857, but no one save yourself can judge whether you can do any similar service to the State in Ireland. . . ."

" I wish you were in Ireland under Lord Elphinstone as Viceroy," he writes in another letter.

Upon Egyptian affairs Frere wrote, in answer to questions he was asked about them, a series of articles in the *St. James's Gazette*.

General Gordon's extraordinary powers and saintly character were well known to Frere. He had followed his career with keen interest and sympathy, as that of a man who, like Livingstone, was a heaven-born messenger of peace and goodwill to uncivilized races. Frere, when at the Cape, had asked for his services as a pacificator and civilizer of the natives.† Gordon was not sent there then, but afterwards, in 1882, he was appointed Commandant-General of the Colonial Forces in South Africa, and thus brought into close relations with the Basutos, with whom hostilities were

\* Kali was the goddess of destruction, to whom the victims of the Thugs were nominally sacrificed.

† Gordon writes to Frere, October 27, 1880 : " I feel much sympathy for all you have had to put up with. However, you will not mind these are only petty, ephemeral trials."



going on intermittently. With his usual success, he was rapidly gaining an extraordinary influence over them ; but before he had held his command many months he was driven to resign it by an act of the Cape Government, which in his view was wanting in good faith towards them. In January, 1884, he was sent to Khartoum, to the scene of his former command from 1875 to 1880, to effect the safe evacuation of the Soudan by the Egyptian civilians and soldiers. The story is too recent to need repeating. The British Government refused to sanction the measures which he told them were essential to success and to the safety of those whom he had come to rescue, and listened to advice from the Anti-slavery Society and from any quarter rather than from their own chosen and devoted officer, who alone was competent and in a position to give it. His task was thus made hopeless. Abandoned and cut off from communication with the world outside, he remained at his post at Khartoum through long weary months, and in the end—though Frere did not live to see it—laid down his life, a sacrifice to his duty and to the neglect of his country's Government.

Thus in North-Eastern as in South Africa was filled up the measure of British disgrace.

The following letter to Miss C. F. Frere is from one who knew Frere well, Sir Dighton Probyn—Probyn of Probyn's Horse :—

“ I loved your father and admired his character. Who would not who had ever known him at all? His courage, his generosity, his unselfishness, his thoughtfulness for others, his absolute fearlessness of responsibility, and his deep sense of religion, all these qualities seem to have been born in him, they came so naturally to him. He had no fear either bodily or mental. He could not have done an ungenerous thing, no matter how he had been tried, or in what situation he had been placed, and whenever

and wherever he possibly could do so, he was always anxious to help others. Indeed his was a most lovable nature. It often struck me that there was a great resemblance in many ways between his character and Gordon's. As Gordon wrote (in his Diary I believe), so dear Sir Bartle always must have thought, 'I feel sure of success, for I do not lean on my own understanding, and He directs my path.'

"Sir Bartle never seemed to waver. He was very quick of perception, perfectly free from bias or jealousy, open to conviction, and then, having made up his mind what ought to be done, he never seemed to doubt or hesitate, but went straight on till he had completed the task which he had undertaken.

"I never met a man who had a higher sense of duty. He had no wish to go to the Cape, but he thought it his *duty* to go, and therefore, unhesitatingly, when asked to accept the Governorship of the Cape of Good Hope, he did so. . . . He accepted the thankless office without a murmur; and then, last but not least, he accepted, again it may be said 'without a murmur,' the cruel treatment of the two successive Governments he had served under during his term of Governorship in that Colony.

"I pray that history may not be so ungrateful, but do justice to his actions and to his memory."

Not only in South Africa, but in Ireland and in Egypt, Frere beheld the British Government humiliating or abandoning its tried officers, thwarting and discouraging its adherents, and yielding to, and even taking into its councils, rebels or criminals, under the leadership of a Prime Minister who seemed to follow no other policy than, in the spirit of a courtier, to trim his sails to every passing gust of popular opinion, and to take small account of the honour and permanent interests of the Empire, or even of the simplest principles of right and wrong, in comparison with the present advantage to his party's game. To Frere, who for forty-five years had served his country with the single-minded devotion of a

knight of romance, this national degradation was a bitter and ever-present grief.

He was a servant of the Crown no longer. Such service as he could now render was only from the outside, through whatever influence he could exercise on the Government or on the public. He had returned from the Cape a heavily accused man, entitled in some form or other to a trial and a verdict. He had obtained neither. With all his wide experience, in full possession of his mental powers, and still, physically, comparatively vigorous, he found himself put on one side as one no longer needed. Both parties in the political world had in ignorance or prejudice, in greater or less degree, committed themselves against him, and politicians for the most part lacked the courage or the honesty to reconsider and to avow their opinions in the light of fuller knowledge. The attacks upon him by a section of the press continued to be virulent to a degree which, in default of any personal feeling on his part—for he was no man's enemy—and which, in the absence of any act or word which could be pointed to or quoted as unworthy of his reputation or inconsistent with his declared principles, is almost unaccountable. It seemed as if the very simplicity of his character, the plainness and candour with which he spoke and wrote, and the very impossibility of finding a solid basis for a charge, stimulated the ingenuity and recklessness of his assailants into inventing such as were not only not true, but were the very opposite of the truth.\* Frere was the last man on earth to be

\* For instance, it was again and again repeated that he aimed at forcing Christianity and Christian missions on the natives at the point of the bayonet. It is scarcely necessary to recall the fact that when in India he had actively opposed even the moral influence of the Government being used for this object, when others advocated it.

The *Spectator* of November 13, 1880, wrote as follows of him :—

“As Governor of Bombay, he believed fully in that gigantic bubble

moved one iota in his conduct by attacks or misstatements ; but he was also overflowing with kindness and goodwill to all men, and genuinely humble, and it could not but be painful to him to be the subject of suspicion and attack, however unjust and unreasonable.

Incapable of nursing a personal quarrel, he was ever ready to meet on friendly terms even those who had most bitterly assailed him. This often happened at the dinners of the Grillon Club, where leading men of very different

—Bombay Company-making,—under which the old Bank of Bombay perished and half the well-to-do men of a Presidency were ruined—so believed in it that he proposed a large permanent increase of all official salaries, from members of council down to the police. . . .

“At the Cape he fought a war off his own bat, laid down his own foreign policy, and carried it out in defiance of instructions when he was so wholly unready that Cetywayo could have swept Natal, and that the British were nearly defeated, suffered a great disaster and gained absolutely nothing by the war. . . .

“All that survives of Sir Bartle Frere’s Bombay policy is some hundreds of impoverished families. All that has resulted from his Affghan policy is a ruinous occupation of unneeded foreign territory. All that has come of his South African policy is the Basuto war.”

These are concise statements, the truth or falsehood of which the reader of this book is able to estimate. The following passages (*Spectator*, August 27, 1881, p. 1098) are declamatory rather than concise. Of these too the reader can now judge.

“Sir Bartle Frere is perhaps the most conspicuous example of the class of men who will deliberately conceive and carry out an iniquitous policy, thinking all the while that they are doing God service and conferring benefits on the victims of their policy. . . .

“He was allowed to remain in South Africa till the event proved that he had no influence but for evil. . . .

“The truth is Sir Bartle Frere believed that he had a mission to civilize and evangelize the Zulus, and he seems to think . . . that bullets and bayonets are the most effectual instruments for propagating the gospel of Christianity and civilization.

“So much for Sir Bartle Frere’s policy in South Africa. The obliquity of moral vision which is so evident there is still more conspicuous in Sir Bartle’s too successful policy in Affghanistan. . . .

“We are thankful that a man so fanatically and sincerely colour-blind as to the fundamental laws of political morality no longer occupies a position of official responsibility.”

types are wont to meet. "I hope you will not refuse to shake hands with an old enemy," said to him a former member of the Conservative Government who had on several occasions attacked him. "By no means," he answered, "you were only firing into your own outposts."

On one occasion he had accepted a dinner invitation from his old friend Sir Harry Verney. Before the day arrived Sir Harry wrote to him :—

"My dear Sir Bartle Frere,— — will be here on the 24th, and my wife says that he has expressed opinions so different from yours on South African matters that she thinks it might be disagreeable to you to meet him.

"I should not have thought so. I think that we in England hold and proclaim opinions differing from each other and yet live together quite comfortably. But after what Lady Verney says, I think it right to tell you."

Frere replied—

"My dear Sir Harry,—Lady Verney is almost always right, but will you tell her, with my kind regards, not in this case.

"I have always felt that of those who spoke and wrote most strongly against the course I had taken in South Africa, some did so in blind reliance on party leaders, and all from very imperfect knowledge of facts, and I felt sure that in time, though perhaps not in my time, my countrymen here would do me the same justice as they who live in South Africa have done from the first. Hence I never felt personally sore at what was said in good faith, and had great pleasure in meeting those who differed from me on South African questions as widely as — did, especially at the house of friends so constant and true as you and Lady Verney."

His burden lay the heavier upon him because he was a man who clung to his convictions with the utmost tenacity, for they were formed with the greatest care and deliberation. He was incapable of putting aside the interests and the aspirations cherished through a lifetime, and of taking to

other pursuits. Patient and unselfish, he bore his trouble in silence. No word of complaint concerning his own treatment ever passed his lips, even to his most intimate friends. Few who looked on his serene countenance knew that like the weight of public calamity which the tidings of Chæroneia brought to Isocrates, and the news of Austerlitz to Pitt, the burden of public disgrace was more than he could bear. Baron Hübner, who knew him well, said to a friend shortly after his death, "he died of a broken heart." If it was not literally true, still less was it wholly untrue. The iron had entered into his soul.

The last time he ever appeared in public was on January 15, 1884, when he took the chair at the meeting of the Universities Mission to take leave of Bishop Smythies of Zanzibar, and spoke the farewell with even more than his usual vigour and earnestness. The next day he caught a bad chill in London and was attacked by violent pain in the chest.

He himself believed that his illness was the beginning of the end, and busied himself in arranging his affairs. To those about him it did not at first appear serious ; but after some days, his temperature having risen, Sir James Paget was called in, and subsequently Sir William Jenner. On February 3 he was seized by the first of a succession of fainting-fits, which were all but fatal, and for several days was in imminent danger from hour to hour.

From this time for sixteen weeks, till the end came, his weakness was such that he could not even turn himself in bed or lift his food to his lips. One form of illness succeeded another, till it seemed as if few parts of him were left untouched except the brain. There were paroxysms of agonizing pain, which wrung from him moans of anguish (for his highly strung temperament was keenly sensitive), but never one murmur. The thought of thankfulness was

ever present with him. "I have looked down into the great abyss," he said afterwards to Sir William Mackinnon, "but God has *never* left me through it all." "Name that Name when I am in pain," he once said to his wife, "it calls me back." For his wife and daughters who tended him throughout with devoted care and tenderness his constant thought was lest they should be overtaken. "I never did the slightest thing for him without his thanking me," one of his nurses said.

In March the immediate danger passed, and there was a rally of several weeks, during which he was able to see some of the many friends who called. From all sides, even from personal strangers, came overflowing sympathy and kindness. The Queen desired Sir W. Jenner to bring her the latest news of his health whenever he came. The Prince and Princess of Wales made constant inquiries, and Sir Dighton Probyn came with a message, to ask if His Royal Highness might come and sit with him; but he was just then too ill. The Secretary of the Athenæum asked for a daily bulletin. The diamond-cutters of Clerkenwell, to whom he had delivered a lecture in 1882, sent a letter of sympathy. He was able to take his usual keen interest in current events. One day Sir Henry Green called and told him—to his great gratification—that the railway to Quetta, for which he had contended so long, was now at length to be completed. He was deeply distressed at the neglect of the Government in respect to Bechuanaland; and even more at their desertion of Gordon at Khartoum. "Oh, this disgraced country!" he exclaimed.

On May 26 his weakness increased, and his thoughts seemed to wander and to be collected with difficulty. Lady Frere, watching by him in the early dawn of a May morning, heard him murmur, as he lay half-conscious, "I

they would only read the 'Further Correspondence' they would surely understand—they *must* be satisfied."

On May 29 the end came, peacefully, and he was at rest.

For one who so loved his early home, a resting-place in Bitton churchyard or at Clydach might have seemed appropriate. He himself thought to have been laid in Wimbledon churchyard. But many zealous friends were anxious to claim a place for him among the honoured dead of his countrymen. The Dean of Westminster was asked that he might be buried in the Abbey, where lie Pollock, and Lawrence, and Outram, and many another Indian worthy. But Arthur Stanley was gone, and his successor was ignorant, like too many of his countrymen, that there was a great man fallen that day in Israel, and pleaded want of space. The crypt of St. Paul's—the very central point of the vast empire on whose seething and unquiet borders Frere's life's work had been done—was therefore selected; and thither on the June morning were gathered together not only his friends, many in number, and full of personal sorrow, but also, either in person or by their representatives, an assemblage from far and near of the noblest and worthiest of Englishmen, to testify to the worth and to do honour to the memory of the great and good man who had passed away.

\* \* \* \* \*

I, too, a posthumous witness, who have gathered up these records, who never saw his face, or heard his voice, or grasped his hand, who in my youth sat at the feet of Maurice and of Kingsley, and there learnt to accept no mean standard as the measure of the stature of a strong and righteous man—I too bear my testimony.

Men and women, in numbers more than I can recall, when they knew of the work I was engaged in, have with



glowing countenances and unloosed tongues, some of them by the hour together, spoken to me of him. Amongst them were statesmen, soldiers, naval officers, civilians, lawyers, men of science, travellers, merchants, missionaries, lonely workers whom he had cheered at their toil, women to whom as children he had been kind, and whom, after the lapse of many years, he had recognized and greeted in the throng of a crowded room. In what they told me there were no contradictions, no inconsistencies to reconcile. It was like a song in perfect harmony of parts. Again and again it was said, "I have never known his like ; it was impossible to talk with him for a few minutes without being the better for it." More than once old and almost dying men have roused themselves painfully from sick beds to impress upon me in faint but earnest words something that needed to be said to do justice to his memory. Amongst others came a venerable Oxford Professor. There was scarcely a man of mark in Church or State who had passed through the University, for sixty years past, whom he did not know or know all about. Each had his merits, but in front of them all he placed Bartle Frere, and to Frere, before any other man, he turned not only for personal advice, but, as he said, if, "in the cause of suffering humanity, in any quarter of the world," he had need for helpful and intelligent counsel.

All his manuscript official letters and many private ones, to the number—it is impossible to count them accurately—of at least six to seven thousand,\* have passed under my eye. There is not one letter, not one sentence of a letter which could be wished unwritten, or which, if printed in these volumes, would mar the harmony of the rest. The

\* Exclusive of such as have been printed in Blue-books and elsewhere, and of Minutes, reports, narratives, memoranda, and all other written documents.

letters written to him, which by the diligent and anxious care of those nearest to him have been so preserved, arranged, and catalogued as to be readily accessible, are almost as numerous. Extracts from them have been given here and there in these pages, but no printed volumes could, within a reasonable space, give an idea of the amount of gratitude expressed in them for kindnesses received, or of the weight of their combined testimony to the value of his public life.

The inner history of a good man's life is the record of the conflict in which, under the education and with the aid of God's Spirit, evil tendencies are checked, passions bridled, delusions dissipated, weaknesses overcome, the intellectual and spiritual vision cleared, the standard of right and wrong made purer and simpler, crude theories of God's government modified and rectified. I have searched in vain in the records of Frere's life for the evidence of such a conflict. The description given me of him by those who knew him seemed too good, too faultless to be true. I asked for the reverse of the shield, for the shadows without which the lights seemed monotonous and unreal. I asked in vain. It was as though the battle had been fought and won in some previous existence. The same qualities—courage, energy, chivalry, loyalty, unselfishness, modesty, gentleness, patience, right judgment, quickened by a simple and unwavering faith in the ever-present government and guidance of God—were claimed for him from boyhood. The same sagacious and prescient qualities of statesmanship which made the veteran pre-eminent throughout India and at the Cape, distinguished the young civilian in the Deccan and at Sattara.

If it is too good to be true, I cannot help it. I cannot paint shadows which I do not see. If I am blind, at least I am blind in good company.

A last tribute of gratitude too I must pay for more than four years spent with seldom a day's intermission as in his very presence, steeped in the records and incidents of his daily life, and struggling to rise to the level and comprehension of his character and aims. It has been a rare privilege to live in such companionship. It has been a great honour to be called to assist in endeavouring to clear away the mists which have hitherto darkened the memory of the man in whom, if my judgment is right, were combined, in a greater degree than in any British statesman of his generation, mental power, sagacity, and sympathetic knowledge of men, with a simple, unselfish, and untiring devotion to duty, and who humbly, under God's guidance, used these gifts for the benefit of so vast a number of the countless millions whose lot was cast within the limits or the influence of the British Empire.

# LIST OF ARTICLES, SPEECHES, ETC.,

BY SIR BARTLE FRERE,

WHICH HAVE BEEN SEPARATELY PUBLISHED IN BOOKS  
OR PAMPHLETS, OR IN THE CASE OF PAPERS READ  
BEFORE SOCIETIES, PUBLISHED IN THE  
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIETY.

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*"Rifle Musketry."* (*Bombay Quarterly Review*, vol. iv., July to October, 1856.)

*Letter to Colonel Durand on the Reorganization of the Indian Army*, 1858. (Printed as a pamphlet for private circulation.)

*Speeches and Addresses of Sir Bartle Frere*, 1859 to 1867. Compiled by Balkrishna Pitalé. (Bombay : Printed at Ganpat Krishnaji's Press.)

*Opening Address at Geographical Section of the British Association at Exeter*, August, 1869. (*Proceedings of the British Association*.)

*Notes on the Ruin of Cutch*. Paper read before the Royal Geographical Society, February, 1870.

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*Foreign Missions*. Paper read before the Church Congress, October, 1873, at Bath ; also a paper at the Working Men's Meeting (*Church Congress Report*).

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# INDEX.

## A

Aborigines Protection Society, ii. 335, 377  
 Abyssinian Expedition, ii. 38  
 Acland, Sir Henry, ii. 43, 312  
 Aden, i. 513; ii. 81  
 Adderley, Sir Charles, ii. 43  
 Adcane, Admiral, ii. 274  
 Adoption Despatch, i. 372  
 Affghanistan, invasion of, 1838, i. 36, *et seq.*; Frere's opinion as to our relations with, 236; ii. 437; Frere's view as to intercourse with, i. 483, *et seq.*; a barrier against Russia, 494, *et seq.*; Lord Mayo's policy towards, ii. 49; Frere's letter to Lord Salisbury as to, 145; Frere wrongly charged with advocating invasion, 436  
 Affghans, Jacob's opinion of, i. 142  
 Akerman, Sir John, letter from, ii. 399  
 Akhajee, i. 282  
 Albany Settlers, ii. 192  
 Annexation of Transvaal, ii. 179, *et seq.*, 361, *et seq.*  
 Anstey, Mr. C., ii. 17  
 Anstruther, Col., ii. 409  
 Appa Sahib, i. 57  
 Arabs, ii. 108

Argus Newspaper, ii. 331  
 Argyll, Duke of, ii. 45  
 Arms Bill (India), i. 328  
 Army Control Department, ii. 43  
 Arthur, Mr. John, i. 171  
 Arthur, Sir George, i. 42, 80  
 Ashburner, Mr. Lionel, i. 27  
 Ashley, Hon. Cecil, letter to, ii. 219  
 Asiatic Society, ii. 52  
 Auckland, Lord, ii. 77  
 Award as to disputed territory, ii. 241, *et seq.*  
 Aylward, A., ii. 175, 410, *et seq.*

## B

Back-bay Scheme, ii. 3  
 Badger, Dr., ii. 71, 151  
 Balfour, Sir George, i. 319; ii. 44, 45  
 Banians, ii. 97  
 Barkly, Sir H., ii. 171, 173  
 Baroda, ii. 139  
 Barracks in India, i. 419  
 Bassein, Treaty of, i. 20  
 Basutoland, ii. 348  
 Basutos, ii. 379, *et seq.*  
 Battiscombe, Lieut., i. 208  
 Beaconsfield, Lord, ii. 63  
 Bechuanaland, ii. 423  
 Beila, Jam of, i. 244



Belgaum, ii. 10  
 Bellairs, Col., ii. 408  
 Bellairs' Mixture, ii. 269  
 Beloochees, Chivalry of, i. 154  
 Beloochistan, i. 154  
 Benares, Durbar at, i. 381  
 Bester, Mr. Paul, ii. 270  
 Bigaree Canal, i. 119  
 Bijapur, i. 55  
 Bitton, i. 6  
 Boadicea, the, ii. 403  
 Boers' Camp, ii. 286, *et seq.*  
 Boers' Memorial, ii. 300  
 Bok, ii. 257, 364  
 Bolan Pass, i. 77  
 Bombay, Frere's first arrival at, i. 16; Bank of, ii. 17, *et seq.*; Census of, i. 459; Council of, 396; Death-rate of, 463; Defences of, 464; Municipal Act, 462; Rebuilding of, 462; University of, ii. 32  
 Boogtees, i. 145, 163  
 Boomplatz, battle of, ii. 169  
 Bouchier, Mr., letter to, i. 325  
 Bowker, Commandant, ii. 271  
 Bradford, Sir Edward, ii. 132  
 Bradshaw, Capt. R.N., ii. 281  
 Bramshill Lodges, pensioners at, i. 481  
 Breakfasts, public, i. 296  
 British India Steamship Company, i. 298  
 Brownlee, Mr., ii. 194, 248, 255  
 Bruce, Col. Herbert, i. 314  
 — letter to, ii. 23  
 Brunswick Rifles, i. 450  
 Bührmann, Mr., ii. 257  
 Bulgarian Horrors, ii. 55  
 Bulwer, Sir Henry, ii. 187, 229, *et seq.*, 245, *et seq.*, 338  
 Bungalows, travellers', i. 112  
 Burgers, President, ii. 165, 175, 176, 181  
 Burghash, Seyyid, ii. 83, 111, *et seq.*

## C

Cadwallader, Molly, i. 4  
 Cairo, i. 13  
 Cairns, Lord, ii. 418  
 Coke Mount, address from natives of, ii. 397  
 Cambridge, H.R.H. Duke of, letter to, ii. 280  
 Camel-dawk, i. 191  
 Camels, use of, in Sind, i. 107  
 Canara, i. 405  
 Candahar, occupation of, ii. 439  
 Cape of Good Hope, ii. 161  
 Capetown, ii. 164; Meeting at, 331; Departure from, 403  
 Carnarvon, Lord, offers Governorship of Cape, ii. 161; First Confederation Scheme, 171; resignation, 218, 317, 320, 388  
 —, letters to, ii. 163, 180, 186, 190, 202, 208, 230, 238  
 Carpenter, Miss, i. 475  
 Casaria, Lodovico da, ii. 73  
 Cathcart, Sir George, ii. 170, 214  
 Cavagnari, Col., ii. 157  
 Censure, despatch containing, ii. 315  
 Centralization, i. 417  
 Cetywayo, ii. 182, 227, *et seq.*, 344, 429; death of, 430  
 Chaka, ii. 225, 232  
 Chamberlain, Gen., i. 365  
 Chandernagore, i. 323  
 Chapman, Lieut., i. 99  
 Chapman, Mr. F. S., ii. 19  
 Chelmsford, Lord (Gen. Thesiger), ii. 214, 268, *et seq.*, 338  
 Chesson, Mr., ii. 430  
 Chinsura, i. 324  
 Christianity, attitude of State to, in India, i. 259; in Government Schools, 256, 359  
 Church Missionary Society, i. 470  
 Ciskei, ii. 194

Civil War, American, i. 397  
 Clare, Lord, i. 17 ; Memorandum by, 43  
 Clarendon, Lord, ii. 49  
 Clark, Mr. G. T., letters to, i. 40, 96, 128 ; ii. 434 ; reminiscence by, i. 44  
 Clerk, Sir G. R., Governor of Bombay, i. 307, 394 ; ii. 112, 170, 372  
 —, letters to, i. 238, 239, 308, 314, 375, 384, 386, 402, 445, 489 ; ii. 7, 9, 11, 13, 434  
 Clibborn, Major, i. 251  
 Clydach, i. 1, 3  
 Coffey, Mr., i. 110  
 Coghill, Lieut., ii. 237  
 Coghlan, Sir W., i. 512  
 Colaba, ii. 2  
 Cold weather tours, i. 132  
 Colenso, Bishop, ii. 223, 247, 272, 330, 331, 336, 430  
 Collegio dei Mori, ii. 73  
 Colley, Sir George, ii. 372, 386, 407, 414. Letters to, 386, 387, 392  
 Colonial defence, ii. 369  
 Commercial Education, lecture on, ii. 36  
 Commondouros, Mr., ii. 134  
 Confederation of South Africa, ii. 161, 342  
 Conference of Public Works, i. 412  
 Coompta, i. 405  
 Cotton, i. 397, *et seq.* ; adulteration of, 411 ; large profits on, ii. 1  
 Court-martials, native, i. 215  
 Courtney, Mr. Leonard, ii. 386, 391  
 Cradock, address from, ii. 332  
 Cranbrook, Lord, ii. 388  
 Crawford, Mr. W., i. 463  
 Crawshay, Mr., i. 4  
 Crealock, Maj.-General, ii. 270, 413  
 Cunynghame, Sir Arthur, ii. 183, 201, 214, 220

## D

*Daily News*, extract from, ii. 313  
 Dalhousie, Lord, i. 66, 81, 96, 173, 484  
 Damaraland, ii. 190, 426  
 Deccan Revenue Survey, i. 25 ; Durban of chiefs of, 476  
 Delagoa Bay, ii. 371  
 Delhi, siege of, i. 202, 205, 224  
 Denison, Sir William, i. 408  
 Desert, transit of, i. 48  
 Dharwar, i. 406  
 Dhuleep Singh, i. 431  
 Dil Moorad, i. 216  
 Dillwyn, Mr., ii. 391  
 Dingaun, ii. 226, 232  
 Disarmament Act, ii. 381  
 Disintegration, ii. 389  
 Doombkees, i. 145  
 Dost Mahomed, Sir Herbert  
   Edwardes' treaty with, i. 202 ;  
   Lord Dalhousie's attitude towards, 483 ; death of, 487  
 Duckworth, Canon, i. 149  
 Durand, Sir Mortimer, ii. 158  
 Durnford, Lieut.-Col. A. W., R.E., ii. 182, 236, 272  
 Durrayah Khan, i. 216  
 Dutch Church, ii. 375 ; loyalty of the, 373  
 Dwarka, i. 293  
*Dwarka*, the, i. 104

## E

Eastwick, Capt., letter to, i. 511  
 Edwardes, Sir Herbert, i. 202, 256, 369  
 Elcho, Lord, i. 316, 388, 391  
 Elgin, Lord, i. 386 ; death of, 424  
 —, letters to, i. 405, 412, 419  
 Ellenborough, Lord, i. 38, 80  
 Ellis, Sir Barrow, i. 123, 170

Ellis, Sir Barrow, letters to, i. 311, 328; ii. 37, 433  
 Elphinstone, Lord, letters to, i. 104, 193, 194, 196, 204, 226, 236, 238, 241, 252, 283, 284, 287, 307, 308  
 Elphinstone, Mountstuart, i. 20, 67  
 Emancipation Act, ii. 168  
 Empress of India, title of, i. 230; ii. 150  
*Enchantress*, the, ii. 74, 89  
 Erasmus, Abel, ii. 177  
 Erasmus Farm, ii. 298  
 Euan Smith, Sir Charles, ii. 71  
 Eustace, Col., ii. 193, 200  
 Evans, Col., i. 282

## F

Fair at Kurrachee, i. 115  
 Fairfax, Capt., R.N., ii. 71  
 Falkland, Lord, i. 83, 96  
 —, letters to, i. 91, 108, 113, 117  
 Famines, ii. 56, *et seq.*  
 Fannin, Mr. J. Eustace, ii. 398  
 Ferguson's Hotel, ii. 293  
 Fergusson, Sir James, letter to, ii. 49  
*Feroze*, the, i. 293  
 Fife, General, i. 120, 413; remiscences, 120  
 Fife Lake, i. 416  
 Fingoes, ii. 193, 199  
 Fitzgerald, Sir Seymour, i. 442  
 Foodthelee tribe, i. 514  
 Forbes, Mr. Kinloch, i. 447  
 Forjett, Mr. C., ii. 443  
 Franciscan Nuns, school of, ii. 78  
 Frere, B. C. A., i. 127; ii. 71  
 Frere, Edward, i. 3, 49  
 Frere, John, i. 1  
 Frere, John Hookham, i. 3, 35; ii. 51  
 Frere, Lady, i. 47, *et seq.*, 178, 200, 387

Frere, Lady, letters to, ii. 74, 86, 90, 93, 104, 263, 311  
 Frere, Richard, i. 8, 35, *et seq.*; ii. 141  
 Frere, Sheppard, i. 2  
 Frere, Sir Bartle, birth, i. 1; childhood at Clydach, 5; school-days at Bath, 6; Haileybury, 8; goes overland to India, 12; arrival at Bombay, 16; appointed assistant to Mr. Goldsmid, 22; Assistant Revenue Commissioner, 26; Private Secretary to Sir George Arthur, 44; marriage, 47; goes to England on sick leave, 48; returns to Bombay and is made Assistant Commissioner in the Customs, 50; Resident at Satara, 50; Commissioner at Satara, 70; Commissioner in Sind, 83; arrives at Kurrachee, 84; promotes the improvement of Kurrachee harbour, 94; the making of roads, 107; travellers' bungalows, 113; fairs, 114; canals, 116; the study of the Sindi language, 122; letters to his children, 125; his person and character, 129; his "cold-weather" tours, 131; warmly defends Jacob, 163; goes to England on sick-leave, 170; returns to Kurrachee, 171; prompt action on outbreak of the Mutiny, 177; despatches European troops to the Punjab, 180, and to the Deccan, 192; deprecates cession of Peshawur to the Affghans, 201; deals with the mutineers at Kurrachee, 210; desires the proclamation of the Queen as sovereign of India, 230; his policy in Beloochistan, 143, *et seq.*; views on the true attitude of Government to Christianity in

India, 257, *et seq.*; on centralization, 265; on the organization of the Indian army, 270; leaves Sind, 291; goes to Calcutta as Member of Council, 295; supports proposed income-tax, 303; on Wilson's death, takes charge of financial department, 312; his friendship with Sir Robert Napier, 317; reconciles difference between Balfour and Napier, 320; pilots Government measures through Legislative Council, 327; correspondence with Sir Charles Wood as to changes in constitution of Council, 334, and as to governing India in India, 349; protests against policy of Punjab border retaliatory raids, 362; his satisfaction at Lord Canning's Adoption-Despatch, 372; intimate relations with Lord Canning, 386; goes to Bombay as Governor, 393; promotes cultivation of cotton, 397; summons a conference of engineers and officials, 412; his difficulties with the Calcutta Government, 417, *et seq.*; writes minute on frontier policy and sends it to Lawrence, 427; his relations with Lawrence, 443; organizes the rebuilding of Bombay, 459; promotes education, 470; his antagonism to the doctrine of "masterly inactivity," 483, *et seq.*; letter to Sir John Kaye on Frontier Policy, 491; favours Pelly's action in the Persian Gulf, 509; urges raising of civil servants' pay on account of high prices, ii. 11; endeavours to restrain speculation, 13; his relations with the Bombay Bank, 17, *et seq.*; his manner of

dealing with applicants, 27; leaves Bombay, 33; on the Indian Council in London, 36; correspondence with Miss Nightingale as to a sanitary department for India, 38; organizes an Army Control Department, 44; correspondence with Lord Mayo, 46, *et seq.*; his work on the Geographical Society, 52; lecture on Famines, 57; goes on a mission to Zanzibar, 71; his interviews with the Khedive, 74; arrives at Zanzibar, 82; leaves for the South, 88; returns to Zanzibar, 99, and takes stringent measures, 101; made a Privy Councillor, 115; views on Indian Missions, 119; goes with the Prince of Wales to India, 125; describes Peshawur, 141; his views as to how to deal with the Ameer, 147; is made a baronet and G.C.B., 152; meeting and correspondence with Lord Lytton, 154; goes to the Cape as Governor and High Commissioner, 164; receives news of annexation of Transvaal, 179; vainly urges the declaration of a protectorate of Damaraland and Namaqualand, 191; goes to King William's Town, 193; dismisses the Molteno Ministry and sends for Mr. Gordon Sprigg, 210; returns to Capetown, 214; goes to Natal, 237; his difficulties as to the Disputed Territory Award, 241; despatches ultimatum to Cetywayo, 249; his calmness during the panic after Isandhlwana, 275; has an interview with Joubert, 284; travels to the Transvaal, 286; visits the Boer Camp, 294; sends

home the Boers' memorial, 300 ; virulent attacks on him by British Press, 313 ; the Government censures him, but begs him not to resign, 316 ; his return journey to Capetown, 334 ; he is partially superseded by Sir Garnet Wolseley, 337 ; his difficulties in Pondoland and Basutoland, 348 ; his views as to African missionaries outside British territory, 358 ; correspondence as to Staff Correspondents, 365 ; Mr. Gladstone's Government coming into office give him no instructions to change his policy, 376 ; the Radicals continue to attack him, and the Government yields and he is recalled, 395 ; general indignation in South Africa, 396 ; his return to England, 433 ; visits the Queen and the Prince of Wales in Scotland, 434 ; his correspondence with Mr. Gladstone, 436 ; writes letters as to the occupation of Candahar, the Ilbert Bill, and the suppression of agrarian crime in Ireland, 440, *et seq.* ; his last illness, 449, and death, 451

Frere, William, i. 16, 17

Froude, Mr. James Anthony, ii. 172, *et seq.*, 367, 369

Fynn, Mr., ii. 255

Fynney, Mr., ii. 232

## G

Gaikas, ii. 204

Galekas, ii. 193, 199, 202

Galle, i. 294

Gallwey, Mr., ii. 235

Gell, Rev., i. 257

Geographical Society, ii. 52

Gibbs, Mr., i. 196

Gladstone, Mr. W. E., ii. 376, 390, 408, 418 ; correspondence with, 436

Glyn, General, ii. 199, 201, 213, 272

Goldsmid, Mr., i. 22

Goldsmid, Sir Frederic, reminiscences, i. 135

Gordon, General, ii. 443, 450

Gore-Browne, Sir Thomas, reminiscences, i. 32

Goshen, ii. 425

Grahamstown, ii. 193

Grant-Duff, Sir M. E., ii. 385

Granville, Lord, ii. 69, 70, 101, 113  
—, letters to, ii. 81-84, 96, 102, 103, 107

Green, Colonel Malcolm, i. 488

Green, Sir Henry, i. 134, 147, 243, 246 *et seq.* ; ii. 33, 61, 153, 450  
—, letters to, i. 240, 244, 248, 368

Greenwood, Mr. F., letters to, ii. 410, 441

Grey, Mr. Albert, ii. 138, 434  
—, letters to, ii. 328, 419

Grey, Sir Charles, ii. 71

Grey, Sir George, ii. 170, 171

Grey, Lord, ii. 169

Griquas, ii. 171

Gungaram, i. 235, *et seq.*

Gurdon, Mr. Brampton, letter to, ii. 420

## H

Haden, Mr. Seymour, ii. 430

Haggard, Mr. Rider, letter from, ii. 415

Haileybury, i. 8

Hart, Mrs., i. 200

Hay, Lord John, letter to, i. 511

Henderson, Sir Edward, ii. 412

Herat, siege of, by Dost Mahomed, i. 485

Herbert, Sir Robert, ii. 180

Herbert, Sir Robert, letters to, ii.  
187, 211, 223, 238, 265, 279, 285,  
306, 309, 311, 325  
Hill, Sir Clement, ii. 71  
Hicks-Beach, Sir M., ii. 217, 260,  
315, 393  
—, letters to, ii. 217, 245, 259,  
260, 263, 267, 268, 277, 302, 305,  
323, 327, 344, 346, 351, 358,  
363  
Honorary Magistrates, i. 376  
Hooghly, description of, i. 322  
Horsford, Sir A., letter to, ii. 268  
Hovas, the, ii. 90, 93  
Howard, Monsignore, ii. 72  
Hübner, Baron, ii. 422, 449  
Huguenots, ii. 167  
Hussan, Mahomed, i. 155  
Hutt, Sir William, i. 188, 191, 209  
Hyderabad, battle of, i. 81; mutiny  
at, 208

## I

Ilbert Bill, ii. 440  
*Imam*, H.M.S., i. 501  
Income-tax in India, i. 302, *et seq.*;  
discontinuance of, 452  
Indapore, i. 23  
Indian missions, ii. 119  
Indigo-planters, i. 360  
Indus flotilla, i. 180  
Ireland, criminal societies in, ii.  
442  
Irrigation, i. 420  
Isandhlwana, ii. 273

## J

Jackson, Sir C., ii. 26  
Jacob, General John, i. 108, 109,  
121, 138, *et seq.*, 170, 175, 181,  
206, 220, 241, *et seq.*, 251, *et  
seq.*

VOL. II.

Jacob, General John, letters to, i.  
177, 246  
Jacobabad, i. 147, 251  
Jamieson, Col., i. 319; ii. 45  
Janadeyra, i. 145  
Jekranees, i. 150  
Jellalabad, siege of, i. 38  
Jenkins, Mrs., ii. 185, 198  
Jeremie, Dr., i. 9  
Johnstone, Capt. Bob, i. 209  
Jorissen, Mr., ii. 181, 406  
Joubert, Mr. Piet, ii. 258, 284, 296,  
299, 377, 385

## K

Kahun, i. 251  
Kama, ii. 225, 423  
Kambula, battle of, ii. 289  
Kattywar, i. 447  
Kaye, Sir John, letters to, i. 173,  
483, 491, *et seq.*  
Keatinge, General, i. 448; ii. 31  
Kelat, Khan of, i. 127, 226, 234,  
242; ii. 61  
Khedive, interviews with, ii. 74,  
*et seq.*  
Khojas, ii. 105  
Kilwa, ii. 95  
Kimberley, ii. 171; meeting at,  
332  
Kimberley, Lord, ii. 376, 383, 390,  
420. Letter to, 394  
Knollys, Sir F., letter to, ii. 131  
Koopmans de Wet, Madame, letter  
from, ii. 401  
Kossier, i. 14  
Kotree, railway to, i. 99  
Kreli, ii. 193, 200, 204, 213, *et seq.*,  
225  
Krüger, Mr., ii. 181, 258, 270, 299,  
308, 377, 385, 406  
Kurrachee, i. 84, 93, *et seq.*, 285

2 H

## L

- Lahej, chief of, ii. 81  
 Laing, Mr., i. 326  
 Lanyon, Sir O., ii. 187, 236, 400, 407  
 Lawrence, General George, i. 231  
 Lawrence, Lord (Sir John), i. 167, 203, 283, 369; ii. 40, 45  
 —, letters to, i. 428, 432, 434, 488, 507, 509; ii. 15, 16  
 Lawson, Sir Wilfrid, ii. 391  
 Laxuman, Mr. Narso, i. 34  
 Le Caron, Major, ii. 413  
 Legislative Council at Calcutta, i. 334  
 Leicester Smyth, General, ii. 384  
 Leith, Capt., i. 211  
 Leith, Dr., i. 460  
 Lester, General, i. 87  
 Letsea, ii. 383  
 Linsingen, Capt. Von, ii. 401  
 Littleton, Hon. W., ii. 194, 237, 255, 286  
 Livingstone, Dr., i. 505; ii. 67, 115; death of, 117  
 Local taxation, minute on, i. 454  
 Long, Mr., i. 360  
 Lumsden, Major, i. 238  
 Lüneberg, ii. 244  
 Lushington, Mr., ii. 19  
 Lytton, Lord, ii. 150, 154, *et seq.*  
 Lytton, Sir E. Bulwer, ii. 171

## M

- Macauley, General, i. 233  
 Macgregor, Major, i. 211  
 Mackinnon, Sir William, i. 297; ii. 99, 450  
 Macnaghten, Sir William, i. 288  
 Maculla, ii. 102  
 Madagascar, ii. 90  
 Mahabuleswar, Frere's visit to, to

- see the Governor, i. 58; the climate, 410  
 Mahomed, Dost, i. 201, 234, 483; death of, 487  
 Mahratta Confederacy, i. 18  
 Majuba Hill, ii. 415  
 Majunga, ii. 90  
 Malays at Capetown, ii. 164; address by, 397, 403  
 Malta, i. 12, 49; ii. 35  
 Manchester Cotton Company, i. 408  
 Mansfield, Sir William, i. 420; ii. 14  
 Markham, Mr. Clements, ii. 52  
 Marriott, Gen., i. 439; ii. 34, 154.  
 Letter to, i. 312  
 Massacre of Zulu girls, ii. 228  
 Massey, Mr., i. 454  
 Matchett, Mr., i. 257  
 Mayo, Lord, ii. 45, 49, *et seq.*  
 —, letters to, ii. 46, 48  
 Mayotte, ii. 95  
 Meeanee, battle of, i. 79  
 Mehemet Ali, i. 49  
 Mehrab, Khan, i. 155  
 Melvill, Sir Melvill, i. 83  
 Merewether, Sir William, i. 147; defeats Boogtees, 152; guards frontier during Mutiny, 206, *et seq.*; urges occupation of Quetta, 238; commands at Aden, 512, *et seq.*; commands cavalry in Abyssinian expedition, ii. 38; as to frontier, 62; letter as to censure, 321  
 —, letters to, i. 286, 514; ii. 38  
 Merivale, Rev. Charles, letter to, on Sinceritism, i. 472  
 Merriman, Hon. J. X., ii. 194, *et seq.*; correspondence with, 202, *et seq.*; dismissed, 210  
 Midlothian speeches, ii. 375, 432, 437  
 Military expenditure in India, i. 101  
 Military Finance Commission, i. 318

Missionaries in South Africa,  
Frere's opinion of, ii. 358, *et seq.*  
Mitchell, Sir Charles, ii. 238  
Mocha, i. 15  
Mohurrum, festival of, during  
Mutiny, i. 195, 216  
Molteno, Mr., Colonial Secretary,  
ii. 189, 191; is dismissed, 210  
Moore, Major, ii. 212  
Morad, Ali, i. 85, *et seq.*  
Morier, Sir Robert, his indignation  
at Frere's treatment, ii. 321;  
efforts to secure treaty as to  
Delagoa Bay, 371  
Morley, Mr. John, ii. 388  
Morosi, ii. 348, 382  
Mozambique, ii. 90  
Municipalities, introduction of, by  
Frere at Sattara, i. 74; at Kur-  
rachee, 137; at Bombay, 463  
Mure, Col., i. 319  
Murray, Dr., i. 59  
Murray, Mr. R. W., ii. 179; dis-  
tress at surrender of Transvaal,  
416  
Murrees, i. 145; Major Green's  
expedition against, 242, *et seq.*  
Muscat, ii. 103  
Myers, Mr., ii. 11  
Mysore, i. 406; grant to princes of,  
332

## N

Namaqualand, ii. 190, 426  
Naomul, Shet, i. 136, *et seq.*, 489;  
receives Star of India, ii. 31  
Napier of Magdala, Lord (Sir  
Robert Napier), i. 317; regret at  
Frere's departure from Bombay,  
ii. 33; commands Abyssinian  
Expedition, 38; as to relations  
with Persia, 62; refuses to super-  
sede Frere, 337

Napier, Sir Charles, i. 78, *et seq.*;  
stays with Frere at Kurrachee,  
' 84  
Napier, Sir George, ii. 169  
Naples, ii. 73  
Napoleon Buonaparte, i. 19  
Narra, River, i. 19, *et seq.*  
Natal, ii. 237  
Newcastle (Natal), ii. 288  
*New York Herald*, correspondent  
of, ii. 84  
Nightingale, Miss, ii. 38, *et seq.*  
Nixon, Mr. H., ii. 379  
Norman, Mr., ii. 24  
North, Miss, extract from journal,  
ii. 330  
Northbrook, Lord, ii. 107, 129  
Northcote, Sir Stafford, ii. 39  
Nott, General, i. 39  
Nubar Pasha, ii. 135  
Nuffosk Pass, i. 251  
Nuggur Parkur, i. 277; outbreak  
in, 279

## O

Orange Free State, ii. 170  
Osborn, Mr. (resident in Zululand),  
ii. 428  
Osman Effendi, i. 13  
Outram, Sir James, i. 78, *et seq.*;  
commands in Persia, 177; at  
Alexandria with Lord Canning,  
389

## P

Paarl, ii. 334  
Palgrave, Mr. Coates, ii. 190  
Palgrave, Mr. Gifford, i. 510; ii.  
67  
Pakington, Sir John, ii. 43  
Palmerston, Lord, ii. 66



Panda, ii. 226, 232  
 Panic, commercial, at Bombay, ii. 23  
 Parr, Col. Hallam, ii. 237, 286  
 Parry, Sir Edward, i. 6  
 Parsees, i. 393  
 Pasley, Capt., i. 506  
 Peacock, Sir Barnes, moves amendment on Arms Bill, i. 328; on certain titles to land, 331  
 Pears, Rev. James, i. 6  
 Pearson, Sir Charles, ii. 272  
 Pelly, Sir Lewis, perilous journey from Persia, i. 484; in the Persian Gulf, i. 503, *et seq.*; with Zanzibar mission, ii. 69, 71, 89; Frere's letters to, i. 504; ii. 69  
 Persia, expedition against, i. 170, *et seq.*; seeks friendly relations, ii. 62; bad government in, 108  
 Peshawur, to be held to the last, i. 203, *et seq.*; description of, ii. 141  
 Peshwa, the, i. 19, *et seq.*  
 Pietermaritzburg, ii. 239; letter from mayor of, 335  
 Politics, Sir Bartle Frere's, ii. 54  
 Pollock, General, i. 38  
 Pollock, Sir Richard, ii. 145  
 Pondoland, ii. 348, *et seq.*  
 Ponsonby, Sir Henry, letters to, ii. 138, 197, 231, 374  
 Poole, Capt., ii. 344  
 Poona Collectorate, road to, from Sattara, i. 55  
 Poona, Conference at, i. 412  
 Pope, interview with the, ii. 53  
 Postage-stamps in Sind, i. 111  
 Press, native, i. 196, *et seq.*  
 Press, virulent attacks of, on Sir Bartle Frere, ii. 313, 446  
 Pretoria, public meeting at, ii. 333; convention of, 420  
*Pretoria*, the, ii. 402, 433  
 Pretorius, ii. 293, 364, 407

Prices, great rise of, at Bombay ii. 9  
 Pringle, Mr., i. 83  
 Probyn, Sir Dighton, his estimate of Sir Bartle Frere, ii. 444  
 Pulleine, Col., ii. 273  
 Punjab frontier system, i. 166, 425; Frere's minute on, 427  
 Punjab Report, i. 164

## Q

*Quarterly Review*, Sir Bartle Frere's articles in, ii. 55  
 Quetta, reconnoitred by Malcolm Green, i. 158; its occupation urged by Frere and Merewether, 238, *et seq.*; peremptory refusal by Government of India, 490; occupied and fortified, ii. 157; connected by railway, 450  
 Quintana mountain, fight near, ii. 212

## R

Raikes, Capt., i. 177  
 Rawlinson, Sir Henry, ii. 437  
 Recall of Sir Bartle Frere from Cape, ii. 395  
 Rémusat, M. de, ii. 71  
 Residents, British, in Zululand, ii. 355  
 Retief, Piet, ii. 287  
 Rhodes, Mr., ii. 432  
 Ribb, ii. 102  
 Rind, Sunjur, i. 157  
 Ripon, Lord (Goderich, Lord; De Grey, Lord), letters to, i. 260, 261, 265, 295, 358  
 Roberts, Lord, ii. 412, 418  
 Robinson, Sir Hercules, ii. 401, 416

Robinson, Sir John, ii. 429, 430  
 Rome, ii. 71  
 Rorke's Drift, ii. 277  
 Rose, Sir Hugh, i. 252, 453  
 Roychund, Premchund, ii. 20, *et seq.*  
 Roydon Hall, i. 2  
 Rudolph, Mr., ii. 244  
 Runjeet Singh, i. 77  
 Russia, true danger from, i. 496

## S

Salary of Governor of Cape, settled, ii. 162, 163; docked, 392  
 Salim, the parricide, i. 507; ii. 103  
 Salisbury, Lord, ii. 64  
 —, letters to, ii. 141, 145, 146  
 Sand River Convention, ii. 170, 174  
 Sandford, Sir Herbert, reminiscences by, i. 62-64, 71-76  
 Sandilli, ii. 204, 213, 214, 225  
 Sanitary department for India, ii. 39  
 Sattara, Frere made Resident at, i. 50; annexation of, 68; Frere made commissioner of, 71; conspiracy at, 75  
 —, Rajah of, i. 50, *et seq.*  
 Sausse, Sir M., ii. 14  
 Scapegoat, demand for a, ii. 312, *et seq.*  
 Schlickmann, von, ii. 176  
 School Kaffirs, ii. 215  
 School of Art, i. 472  
 Schreuder, Bishop, description of Chaka, Dingaan, Panda, and Cetywayo, ii. 232  
 Schultz, Mr., ii. 84  
 Scott, Mr. Michael, ii. 14  
 Secocoeni, ii. 176, 235, 363  
 Sedashegur, i. 407

*Serapis*, the, ii. 133  
 Service, Indian Civil, candidates for, i. 269  
 Seton-Karr, Mr. W. S., i. 360  
 Seymour, Mr. Danby, letters to, i. 285, 299  
 Seyyid Said, i. 501  
 Shahabudin, Kazi, ii. 71  
 Share-jobbing, minute on, ii. 13  
 Shaw Stewart, Mr., i. 401  
 Shenandoah, i. 464  
 Shepstone, Mr. J. W., ii. 236, 255  
 Shepstone, Sir Theophilus, ii. 178, 180, 188, 227, 240, 241, 304, *et seq.*  
 Shere Ali, i. 487; ii. 145  
 Shikapur, meeting at, i. 218  
 Simons Bay, ii. 166  
 Sinceritism, i. 472  
 Sind, annexation of, i. 77; Ameers, 79; Frere Commissioner in, 83; geographical features of, 90; backward condition, 91; roads, 107; postage-stamps, 111; fairs, 113; canals, 116; language, 122; Sind Irregular Horse, 138, *et seq.*; frontier system, 164; mutiny in, 208; Frere's departure from, 291  
 Sindia, i. 378  
 Singh Doorgah, i. 153  
 Slave-market, ii. 86  
 Slave-trade, ii. 65-69  
 Smith, Sir Harry, ii. 169  
 Smith, Sir Sidney, i. 6  
 Smythies, Bishop of Zanzibar, ii. 449  
 Soldiers, comparison between British and Asiatic, i. 271  
 Solomon, Saul, ii. 331, 382  
 Somali Coast, ii. 103  
 Special Correspondents, ii. 129  
*Spectator*, extracts from, ii. 46, 446  
 Speculation at Bombay, ii. 7

Speed-money, i. 110  
 Spider, ii. 286, 334;  
 Sprigg, Sir Gordon, ii. 211, 220,  
 221, 276, 322, 382, 398, 419  
 Staff, special correspondents, ii.  
 365  
 Standard plans, i. 429  
 Stanley, Lord, letters to, i. 97,  
 258  
 Stanton, Col., i. 74  
 Star of India, institution of, i.  
 377  
 Stegmann, Rev. George, ii. 237,  
 251, 255, 270, 286, 294, *et seq.*  
 Stellaland, ii. 425  
 Stockenstrom, Mr., ii. 206  
 Storks, Sir Henry, ii. 44  
 Strachey, Gen. Richard, i. 418, *et*  
*seq.*  
 Strahan, Sir George, ii. 401  
 Suez Canal Shares, British purchase  
 of, ii. 151  
 Sullivan, Admiral, ii. 275  
 Sydenham Cottage, i. 6

## T

Tambookies, ii. 208  
 Telegraphs, mismanagement of, in  
 India, i. 438  
 Temple, Sir Richard, i. 285; letter  
 to, on sanitary matters, ii. 41  
 Termini, of railways in India, ii. 3  
 Tewfik, ii. 135  
 Thouaini, i. 505  
*Thule*, the, i. 465  
 Time Bargains Bill, ii. 14  
 Todleben, Gen., ii. 36  
 Toorkee, ii. 105  
 Transkei, the, ii. 194  
 Transvaal, the, made an indepen-  
 dent State, ii. 170; hopeless  
 condition of, 175; annexation of,  
 179, *et seq.*; opinion in, 250;

discontent, 258; Frere's journey  
 to, 286, *et seq.*; the Boers' Camp,  
 294, *et seq.*; Frere's proposals  
 for administration, 309; popu-  
 larity of Frere at Pretoria, 333;  
 Sir Garnet Wolseley supersedes  
 Frere, 337; Sir Garnet declares  
 annexation irrevocable, 361;  
 signs of wavering, 361; Bok and  
 Pretorius arrested and charged,  
 364; Pretorius promoted to  
 Legislative Council, 365; Mr.  
 Gladstone's speeches fan the  
 discontent, 376; Sir George Col-  
 leys succeeds Sir Garnet Wolseley,  
 386; preparations for rebellion,  
 406; the republic proclaimed,  
 409; Aylward, 410; Majuba  
 Hill, 414; the penalties of loyalty,  
 417; convention of Pretoria, 421;  
 Boer filibusters in Bechuanaland,  
 424; Sir Charles Warren, 427  
 Trevelyan, Sir Charles, i. 295;  
 publishes *Minute* against Income-  
 tax, 305; recalled, 307; financial  
 secretary at Calcutta, 402; his  
 budget censured by Sir Charles  
 Wood, 453  
 Tugela-drift, meeting with Zulu  
 envoys at, ii. 255  
 Turner, Major Blois, R. E., i. 95  
*Turon*, loss of the, i. 395  
 Tyrwhitt, Lieut. George Booth, i.  
 189, 277, *et seq.*

## U

Ultimatum to Cetywayo, ii. 248;  
 delivery of, 255  
 Ulundi, battle of, ii. 344  
 Umbelagi, ii. 226  
 Umbelini, raids by, ii. 244; destroys  
 mission-station, 281  
 Umhala, ii. 215

- Umquikela, his insubordination, ii. 349  
 Unity of Liberal party, South Africa sacrificed to the, ii. 391-405  
 Upcher, Capt., ii. 212  
 Uys, Piet, serves under Col. E. Wood, ii. 283; his death, 289

V

- Verney, Sir Harry, invitation from, and reply, ii. 448  
 Vibart, Mr., i. 32  
 Victor Emmanuel, Frere's interview with, ii. 71  
 Vienne, M. de, ii. 87  
 Villiers, Sir Henry de, ii. 416  
 Volksraad, ii. 184

W

- Wahabees, i. 500  
 Wales, H.R.H. the Prince of, visits India, ii. 125, *et seq.*; received Frere on return from Cape, 433  
 Walfisch Bay, ii. 191  
 Walker, Col. Forestier, ii. 237, 255  
 Waller, Rev. Horace, letter as to Zululand, ii. 430  
 Warren, Sir Charles, at Kimberley, ii. 280; clears Bechuanaland, 427  
 Webb, Mr., ii. 84  
 Wellesley, Lord, i. 19  
 Wellington, Duke of (Sir Arthur Wellesley), i. 20; ii. 59  
 Widcombe Cottage, i. 6  
 Williamson, Mr., i. 22, 26, 31  
 Willock, Sir H., i. 115  
 Wilson, Rt. Honble. James, i. 302; death of, 312  
 Wingate, Sir George, i. 25

- Wodehouse, Sir Philip, ii. 171  
 Wolff, Dr. Joseph, i. 12  
 Wolseley, Lord (Sir Garnet), Administrator of Natal, ii. 237, *et seq.*; supersedes Frere in Natal, etc., 337; arrives at Capetown, 344; refuses assistance in Pondoland, 349; his settlement of Zululand, 352, *et seq.*; in Transvaal, 361, *et seq.*; his staff correspondents, 366; leaves Capetown, 373  
 Women, education of, i. 474, 479.  
 Wood, Sir Charles, letters to, i. 287, 313, 331, 336, 350, 352, 378, 383, 403, 408, 413, 414, 425, 427, 428, 440, 441, 445, 449, 452, 466, 470, 471, 485, 486; ii. 4, 5, 8, 11  
 Wood, Sir Evelyn, addresses Boers, ii. 258, 264; in command of fourth column, 273; at Kam-bula, 289; at Convention of Pretoria, 416; Frere's letters to, 244, 282  
 Wressil Lodge, i. 170; ii. 433  
 Wuzzeerees, expedition against, i. 363

Y

- Yule, Col. Henry, R.E., Frere visits him at Palermo, ii. 35; his indignation at Frere's treatment, 321; meets Frere at Southampton, 433

Z


- Zambesi, British Protectorate to, advocated by Frere, ii. 431  
 Zanzibar, arrival of *Enchantress* at, ii. 82; consuls at, 84, *et seq.*; *Enchantress* departs for the south, 88; returns and leaves again, 99

Zanzibar, Sultan of. *See* Burg-hash.

Zulus, origin of, ii. 225 ; hostility to Boers transferred to British, 230 ; ultimatum to, 248 ; the celibate army, 253 ; meeting at Tugela Drift, 255 ; Lord Chelmsford enters Zululand, 272 ; Isand-

hlwana, 273 ; Natal Zulus remain loyal, 281 ; battle of Ulundi, 344 ; Sir Garnet's thirteen kinglets, 353 ; British Government refuses to govern them, 427 ; Cetywayo restored, 429 ; anarchy and bloodshed, 430 ; Zululand annexed, 431

THE END.



*London ; John Murray, Albemarle Street.*

*F.S.Weller.*

